Wisdom (Metaphysics 2005)
Lecture 55: Act, Ability, and the Problem of Beauty

Transcript
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You wouldn't think of form as an act. And then these words derived from act, like activity, action, you wouldn't probably apply them at all to form, right? It's the contrary. So you begin to see that the word is equivocal, and it names first motion or something like that. And we place the name act upon motion first, because things in motion sort of catch the eye, but not stir us. And then, because our knowledge starts with our senses, right? So that's the act that's most known. I was telling you about one of my philosophical friends there who said that as long as his eyes are over the page, his wife knows enough not to interfere with his serious activity, but when he looks up in the page and there's no outward motion, now is the time for him to come in with his small talk. Because he's obviously not doing anything, right? So he's maybe doing the most important part, huh? That's the time when you kind of sit back after reading something, you kind of think about it, and you kind of penetrate it and absorb it, you know? That's probably the key movement of your study, right? And, but it appears his wife is not doing anything at that point, so. But he's actually, what, maybe getting some perfect act at that point, huh? But when you're reading the page, have you read the page yet? No. When you have read something, are you reading it? So reading is kind of, you know, that first type of activity, huh? But that's the one that seems to be doing something, right? You know, Professor Surik there, his last one was worse than mine, huh? He used to always quote Thomas, The man sitting makes wisdom. By the way, I read the process of Thomas, Homo satiens, fit sapiens, huh? The man sitting becomes, I guess it would be, huh? Why? It wasn't makes wisdom, but that's an adjective. But he hasn't said the idea of what Thomas is saying, right? So the man seems to be doing, what? Nothing, huh? You get these descriptions of Socrates, where he's going off to maybe a dinner at somebody's house with a friend and something comes up in that conversation and Socrates stops on the porch or something and stands there, you know, still. Sometimes they think something through, right? And the other guy goes on into the dinner, whatever it is, you know, and these Socrates standing out there. But then Socrates is really doing his deep thinking, right? So, let it be clear then from these things and such as them and what and how it is to be an act, huh? I know Sir Astero here doesn't go to existence as an act here. He doesn't speak of that, does he? Okay. But if you look at Thomas, say, when he's distinguishing in the, say, the Summa Carna Gentiles, he will distinguish the composition of matter and form, right, from the composition of the substance of a thing and its existence, right? He'll contrast those two, show their differences, right? So, if you're going to... Well, he's talking about the separated substances, but he wants to show that it's not the same kind of composition we've been talking about in natural philosophy of matter and form. He contrasts existence and substance with form and matter. So, if that sense of act would have to come after the ones that Aristotle distinguishes it, right? In other words, you first see motion as act and more generally some thing like doing or operation or activity, right? And then you see form as act, right? And then perhaps last you would see what? Existence or to be as an act, huh? And this, as you would contrast, form as an act from motion and existence from... Now, the other distinction Aristotle sometimes makes among acts is between the, what, transitive act, right? Where you act upon something outside you and then, what, an operation or activity that remains within the, what, doer, okay? So, seeing and understanding and loving are intrinsic acts, huh? And this is important when they talk about somebody's name instead of God, right? Did God love us before he made us? Yeah. But did God, was God our Lord, our ruler, and so on, before he made us? No. So, those operations, it implies something specific to God, right? Was God our creator before he created us? No. No. The creation kind of signifies as an operation that has something, what, outside of the creator, right? But understanding and loving remain within the one understanding and loving, right? So, God, I mean, said to have loved us in eternity, right? To have chosen us in eternity, right? But we couldn't say that, strictly speaking, that he created us, that he was ruling us, or he was our shepherd before he had his flocked shepherd, right? So, that is an important distinction, right? Between those two kinds of acts, the one that remains in the doer, and the intrinsic one. So, does that always correspond, then, all, in other words, all intransitive acts are perfect, and vice versa? Well, no. If you take, in us, you know, something like learning, right? Learning is more like, what, motion, right? Oh, yeah. And that's why sometimes, you know, when I'm explaining how we define motion, let's come back a little bit here, manifest it in here. And take a simple example, like, say, coming into the room, right? Okay. Remember how I explained this before? You say, coming into the room is the act of the ability to come into the room. Now, is that statement true or false? True. Obviously true, right? Now, you say, is that a definition of coming into the room? You'd say no, because you would be defining it by itself, right? Okay. True. And then you take the next thing. You say, coming into the room is the act of the ability to... Well, now, I'm not defining it by itself, right? By coming into the room. I'm defining it by being in the room, right? Okay. But this seems to have another defect. It avoids the singularity of the first statement, but, unfortunately, it seems to be false. Because the act of the ability to be in the room is to be in the room, right? Okay. So you seem to have kind of an insoluble problem here, right? Either you say what is true of coming into the room, but then it's not a definition, right? Because it's circular, right? Or you avoid the circularity, and then you end up saying something false, right? Okay. But then, on second thought, we can say, hey, yeah, but when I'm coming into the room, I'm already partly in the room, right? So then coming into the room is a partial act of the ability to be, what? In the room, right? So if I say coming into the room is the imperfect act of the ability to be in the room, I seem to not confuse it. with being in the room, right? And I seem to be now saying more of what it is, right? But then someone might say, yeah, but what about the guy standing in the doorway? You know, one foot in, one foot out. Is he coming into the room? No, he's standing, he's not moving at all, right? He's probably in the room. Well, then you've got to say that coming into the room is an act of the ability to be in the room, an imperfect act of that, insofar as you're still able to be in the room, right? It's ordered to a further what? Activity, right? And then you can separate it from standing in the doorway, right? So, when you get the definition of motion as the act of what is able to be, insofar as it's able to be, right? I understand the last part, I understand it now. Well, insofar as it's able to be, as saying two things, right? One, that the act has only partially completed that ability. And secondly, that's a, what? A partial actualization on the way to a further actualization, right? Okay? And that separates it from both being in the room fully, and standing in the doorway. Now, sometimes I manifest this by learning, right? And I say, is learning the same thing, learning something the same thing as knowing it? And we say, no, right? Okay? And learning is the act of the ability to learn, and knowing is the act of the ability to know, right? Well, obviously it's not a definition of learning, to say it's an act of the ability to learn, because you define learning by itself. But then I say, is the ability to know, and the ability to learn, two different abilities? Like the ability to walk, and the ability to talk. Or is it by learning that your ability to know is in fact actualized? Yeah. And when you're learning something, are you entirely eager to know? No. Okay? Well, then you could say learning is, to some extent, imperfectly, an act of the ability to know. Well, okay? Depends on whether or not the philosophy professor is trying to fool you. But, again, like with motion, you could say, you know, sometimes a student enrolls in a course, and somewhere in the middle of the course, he decides that this is not the way to go. And he doesn't like the subject, and maybe he doesn't like the grades he's going to possibly get. And so he withdraws in the course, right? Now, when he withdraws in the course, is he learning anymore? No. No. But he might retain a little bit of what was communicated in the course, but he might have no intention of ever, what? Getting to know it better, right? So learning is an act of the ability to know insofar as you're able to know still, right? But insofar as, what? You're on the road to knowing more, right? So you've got to understand both of those things to really know what it is, huh? And so it kind of manifests the definition of motion by the definition of learning, huh? It's kind of easy for the student to see that learning is, in fact, to some extent, an act of the ability to know. But it's an imperfect act of that ability to know on the way to a further act, right? That's what motion is, right? Coming into the room is an imperfect act of the ability to be in the room on the way to a further act of that ability, huh? That's what it is, huh? So someone asked me, is everything intrinsic a perfect act? Well, learning is more like what? Motion, right? Okay? So long as I'm learning, I haven't learned yet fully, right? Okay? And when I have learned fully the Pythagorean Theorem, then I'm no longer learning the Pythagorean Theorem, right? Okay? So I wouldn't say every imminent act is a perfect act, right? Okay? But these, but most of these perfect acts that we would see would be intrinsic acts like seeing, my seeing you or my understanding what a triangle is or my loving you or something of this sort. Okay? But is, is every transitive act imperfect? Well, the question is, are there some transitive acts that are, what, all at once, huh? Mm-hmm. See? So I mean, did creation take any time? God is creating my soul. He has created my soul, right? So, maybe there are really two different divisions of these things, huh? Divide motion or doing or activity, whatever you want to call it, you know, into imperfect and perfect one, right? And then imminent and then, what, transitive, right? But most, the ones that Aristotle takes them from us, I mean, like building a house or making a statue or making dinner, whatever it is, making wine, these take time, right? So, yeah, every, every, there isn't, there isn't one with us, every transitive would be imperfect. Well, you've got to be a little careful of that, right? You know? Yeah. You know, substantial generation. Oh, that's right. Yeah. But anyway, the examples here would be, you know, mainly ones that would be imperfect, huh? So those are probably the, the, um, two main ways, right? Of dividing motion or activity, right? Now, Thomas in the commentary will mention how Plato sometimes uses the word motion more loosely than Aristotle to cover either one of these, huh? And, uh, when he talks about, um, Plato, the Platonists saying that, uh, God moves himself. And he's the first mover. And he's never really contradicting Thomas says, Aristotle says, God is the unmoved mover. Because when Aristotle says that God is the unmoved mover, it's his emotion in the strict sense for the imperfect act. But when Plato maybe says that God moves himself, he means that God understands himself and what? Loves himself. Loves himself, right? Okay. He better, I think, huh? It's probable. You know, I was, I was thinking about, um, the beauty of, um, Juliet, huh? And, uh, Romeo's seeing her beauty, right? Mm-hmm. In terms of the five senses of before and after? And I said, well, the beauty of Juliet is before Romeo's seeing it in the first sense of before in time, right? It's also before it in the sense of being, the second sense of before, because her beauty could be without his seeing it, right? Mm-hmm. But his seeing could not be without her beauty, right? And in the crowning sense that we attach to the second sense, right? Her beauty is a cause of his, what? Seeing her beauty, right? Because her beauty acts upon his eyes, right? With the result that he sees her beauty, right? Okay? Her beauty is before his seeing her beauty in the third sense, because he wanted to define his seeing her beauty as opposed to his seeing his friend Venvolio, right? He'd have to bring in Venvolio and Juliet's beauty, right? He'd have to define it, right? What's his activity is? It's seeing the beauty of Juliet, right? So the beauty of Juliet is in the definition of what his seeing is, right? Okay? But now, what about the fourth sense of before, which is, you know, is before goodness or better? Is the beauty of Juliet before his seeing it in the fourth sense? In all the other senses, right? First three senses are in the crowning sense, her beauty is before his seeing it. But is her beauty better than his seeing it? No, it's not. It's seeing her beauty, for the sake of her beauty. So that the end is the better than the The knowledge would be higher. Well, this is the point, see? If you have a beautiful page in the wall, right? Isn't that a beautiful painting there for the sake of being seen? Okay? A beautiful window in the chapel, right? It's for the sake of being seen, right? So it's seen, then, that the end of the beautiful is to be seen, right? Okay? And the same way if you say the music of Mozart is very beautiful, but the music of Mozart is for the sake of being heard. But the music of Mozart would lose its purpose if no one heard it. The paintings of... Whatever great painting I take, huh? Would cease to have any purpose, right? Beautiful paintings and statues and windows and so on. Stained glass, huh? If no one saw them, right? Okay? So, if you say, then, that the beauty of Juliet is for the sake of Romeo seeing it, right? Then Romeo seeing her beauty is better than what? Her beauty. And it's the end or purpose of her beauty, right? Just like my seeing the beautiful painting is the purpose of the painting being there. Right? Huh? It's in your head, right? Yeah, I think... I was thinking of what I'm saying, right, maybe, is that Romeo would object to saying that she exists for the sake of his seeing her. He would say, like, my whole existence is so that I can see her. Well, I wasn't saying it around. I wasn't saying that Juliet exists for the sake of his seeing her, right? But I was saying the beauty of Juliet, right, would seem to be for the sake of our seeing it, right? Like Shakespeare says about Sylvia, heaven unto such grace that she might admire her be. And certainly with a painting or a piece of music, right, it seems that we make beautiful paintings and beautiful music to be seen and heard, right? So that the seeing or the hearing of these beautiful things seems to be the end or purpose of that. Doesn't it seem to be so? Yeah. Well, okay, and the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end, huh? Okay. Now, having said that, right, then I got thinking about the beauty of God, right? And what Augustine says, right, too late will I come and know thee the ancient beauty and so on. I said, well, now, if you say the beautiful is for the sake of being seen, right, you have to say the beauty of God is for the sake of our seeing it, and therefore you have to say that our seeing is the end of God's beauty, and therefore our seeing the beauty of God is better, because the end is always better, but it's for the sake of the end, is better than the beauty of God, but the beauty of God is God, because God has no distinction. Therefore God is, what? We're better than God. We're better than God in here. I said, well, that's obviously something wrong. And yet, it seems to make sense to say that the beautiful painting you have in the wall is something. There in the chair, I know it makes sense, and with Julia, I'm still a healthful, but nevertheless. Yeah, yeah. I wasn't saying Julia's a hole, but it's gone. Really, Julia, right? In other words, you say, you know, if Julia is somebody, is moon and island with no possibility of communication, it would make much difference, you know, she didn't even have a mirror. I mean, she's good for art, right? Doesn't make much difference, doesn't it? I said, you know, what are you going to say about this thing? Now, in my study of Plato, at least from the dialogues, you know, in the public, he talks about the beginning as being the good itself, right? And in the symposium, he talks about the beautiful itself, right? And at the end of our ascent in knowing the beautiful, you just see the beautiful itself, right? Okay? It's like, that's no saying, right? But now, it's not clear to me from the way Socrates speaks in the public or in the symposium, right? That the beautiful itself or the good itself, right? Knows and loves itself, right? He didn't seem to make the beautiful itself or the good itself a person, right? Or persons. Who knows and loves itself, right? Okay? So when he says the good itself, he doesn't necessarily mean God. Well, you've got to be careful, I see. Because when we go to the Summa Theologiae, which we'll do after maybe the ninth book here, in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas will first show that God exists in the second question. and then he'll take up what we call the substance of God, right? And you'll find out that God is simple, first of all, right? And then that God is perfect and therefore good, right? And that God is unchanging and God is infinite or infinite and then unchanging and then one, right? But then comes the treatise on the operations of God, right? God's understanding and his, what? Loving and so on, right? Okay? And then comes the treatise of the Trinity, right? Now, you can say, therefore, there's a distinction in the Summa Theologiae between the consideration of the divine substance and the consideration of the divine operation, right? There's two parts there, right? But now you say, is that because the substance of God and the operation of God are two different things in God? No. Because God is altogether simple. So the substance of God and the operation of God are the same thing. Why do we have in these two treatises, right? Well, it's because we're knowing God from creatures. We're not knowing God as he is, right? Thomas always quotes this passage here and I've looked it up in my English Bible and it doesn't seem to be in there, but anyway. One of the prophets say, you know, and that day, right? I suppose that day we see him as he is. There'll be, what, one name? And Thomas sees that as what? You see God as he is, you'll see him as he is. Even if you have only one name for what you're saying, right? But when we know God from creatures and we name him from creatures, right? Then the multiplicity comes from the, what, creature, right? And I often use this kind of a likeness here to indicate this, huh? I take a circle, right? And the center of the circle is one point, right? Mm-hmm. And you can see if it was one point, these mini radii go out to the circle, right? And at the end of each of these lines in the other direction, we have a really different point. So what is, one is God, right? When it proceeds, right, to the creature, it's multiplied, right? Mm-hmm. But now knowing God from creatures, we're going in the reverse direction. Mm-hmm. Like the great herald had said, the way up and the way down is the same. He said we're going in the direction, right? So if I'm starting from this point on the circumference and this other point on the circumference, right, and I say, well, now this point here, which we call the center, it's the end of line X there, right? And it's also the end of line Y. So now I have two notions about that, right? Mm-hmm. So I can talk about the end of X or the end of Y, but really it's one point, about two points. So, to go back to the example here, in creatures, the substance of the creature and the operation or the motion of the doing, right, are really two different things. Blaine Berquist and my understanding of what I'm trying was not the same thing. And my walking and Blaine Berquist are not the same thing, right? Okay? So, I have a separate thought on the substance of the creature and the operation of the creature, and then I come back to God and I talk about the substance of God, the operation of God, but I negate of God himself in a real what? Yeah. So, the distinction between the substance of God and the operation of God is really in my what? My mind. Well, this is in my mind, right? Okay? So, in a way, we know just the reverse of the way God knows. We know the one and simple by the composed and the many, and he, but the one and simple knows the composed and the many. Just the reverse, right? We do like a much better way. What did we do? We're in a couple I can't think, right? Not our fault. They're not even going to preach it, right? But notice, huh? The treatise of the substance of God comes from the treatise of the apparition of God, right? So, among the things you learn about the substance of God is that he's good, that he's goodness itself. He's the good itself, as the thing would say, right? And you could know that to some extent, right? Before he would come to understand the apparitions, right? So it's Plato's work, stop there, right? And Aristotle has gone, what, to both, right? Because if you look at the 12th book of wisdom, he'll take up the substance of God, and then he'll start to talk about something about the apparition of God. What is it that God understands, right? And Aristotle sees that God must understand basically himself, right? And Thomas will see this, and so on. And it's better understanding himself than understanding else he understands. So in Plato talks about the, what, the good itself, the beautiful itself. He seems to be speaking the substance of God, but he doesn't seem to know about the apparition of God. I don't say he doesn't, because Thomas, you know, says that he does this other place. But in terms of what I see in the dialogue, I don't see that, right? Okay? Now, if you think the way he speaks in the public or in the symposium, you know, I think, if God was a beautiful itself, but he didn't know or love his beauty, then you've got no problem there, right? See? Because we could know and love his beauty, and that would seem to be, you know, why should he be beautiful, right? If no one knew his beauty, right? You see? And in this hypothesis, you know, this is the way Plato understands it, it would be only us that know and love his beauty, right? And that would give us a certain, what? One up? Yeah, yeah, yeah. On God, right? You see? And this is absurd, right? Mm-hmm. But why isn't God's beauty for the sake of being seen by us? You see? Well, I think you've got to realize that the whole truth is that God knows his own goodness and beauty and loves his own goodness and beauty as much as they are knowable and, what, lovable, right? And they're infinitely knowable, infinitely lovable, and he's the only one who knows and loves himself as much as he is knowable and lovable, right? Mm-hmm. So our knowing and loving him adds nothing to his being known and loved because God knows and loves himself infinitely. And so, we're not really necessary there to... But, of course, God's knowing and loving his beauty is not the end or purpose of his beauty because the end is always really distinct from that of which it is the end. And God's knowing and loving are not distinct from his substance and therefore loving his goodness and beauty, right? So we're kind of superfluous, right? Mm-hmm. But it's good that he gets us into seeing and loving his beauty and his goodness, huh? Mm-hmm. And so it gets to me, well, to claim the first book of the Confession there, too later I come to know thee, right? Because it is somewhat dissipated in life. That's a point. But there's a little problem with Plato, right? If the good itself and the good of itself didn't know itself and love itself, right? We kind of, you know, hook it up in it. Right? That's it. So do you say that God's beauty is not for the sake of himself? We can't say that? Well, no, I'm saying God's knowing and loving himself exhausts his nobility and his lovableness, right? Mm-hmm. And God is the only one that can know and love himself as much as he is knowable and lovable. Mm-hmm. And that's because he's infinitely knowable, right? Right. And infinitely lovable. And no creature can love him as much as he is lovable and knowable, right? Sure. Right. You know, what was it in St. Francis of DeSalle? I think there when he's, Trace and Divine Love, maybe it was there, I think I saw it. But, you know, and then you're talking about praising God, right? And then you keep on, you know, calling upon the angels to praise him, but you can't praise him enough, right? Mm-hmm. And finally, you're talking about like Christ does, you know, or, you know, where Christ is going to manifest the glory of the Father and the Father glorify him, you know, and show them the glory I have of you before the creation of the world and so on. And you find calling upon God to glorify himself because he's the only one who can, you know? Mm-hmm. You know, the famous definition of glory there in St. Androsa, Clara Notitia Cum Laude, right? Clear knowledge with praise, right? Well, we don't know him as much as he's knowable, so we can't praise him as much as he is praising, right? And in the Psalms, you know, praise him as much as you can, but you can't praise him too much, right? Mm-hmm. So, if God didn't know and love himself, then you have a problem, it seems to me, right? Mm-hmm. Because then only we would know and love God, right, huh? And then he'd be to some extent, right? So we're late to us, right? Mm-hmm. But that's absurd. When you realize that God knows and loves himself as much as he's knowable and lovable, then you realize, in a sense, for anybody else to know or love him is kind of superfluous from the point of view of the way things are. You see? And just, you know, due to his superabundance, his generosity, right? And what is it, Thomas quotes Avicenna there, you know, Avicenna says, God alone is generous or liberal, right? He's the one who gives, you know, gaining nothing by giving, right? It's completely, you know, pure generosity, right? He doesn't even get a good deed out of it, right? Like me, he's got a good deed out, you know? A good thing if he attempts to somebody. So it's kind of interesting, you know, just thinking about that thing about Romeo and Juliet and always looking before and after, you know, and this is used as an example in class a lot because when I'm talking about the good is what all want and why it is that the good is not always wanted, and I'll just take the example of Juliet, right? And they see that you have to know the good before you want it, right? And so on. So in that context. But then when you think about the before and after, then you see, seeing with. It is Romeo seeing the beauty of Juliet for the sake of the beauty, you see? Well, the beauty in no way depends upon the seeing, does it? So it's hard to say that his seeing her beauty is for the sake of the beauty, right? The beauty is nothing added to it, but it's being seen, right? So it seems almost to her, son, that the beauty is there to be seen, right? Which is not exactly the same thing for the beauty of the sake of him, but her beauty, right, is there to be seen. And it seems to make sense if you talk about paintings and statues and churches and so on, right? And the music of Mozart and so on. They seem to be for the sake of being seen, right, right? You wouldn't say that I'm for the smithers for the sake of what? Or my seeing in the beautiful paintings for the sake of the beautiful paintings. It seems to be just the reverse, right? But once you see that, it seems in some sense to make more sense to say that the beauty of Juliet is for the sake of the seeing, right? And therefore his seeing is before her beauty and before it's since better, right? It's more the end, right? But then you turn like that and you say, well, this creates a little problem, right? But it seems to me that the problem is compounded, or it really is a problem, if you don't see that God knows and loves his own beauty and that he knows and loves it as much as they know from the other way. Finally, something that you can say, I'm still not happy with Juliet, but obviously with works of art, you have the intention of the artist and in a way he's trying to make something beautiful. Yeah. Obviously Mozart wants something beautiful and he wanted it to be heard. et cetera, and likewise with all of them, I think. And so if you look at the natural beauty of nature or of Juliet, you have the cause of nature, and in a way nature is for the sake, say let's just take nature right now, you have nature is for the sake of man, like the beauties of nature in some way are, or are they created by God for the sake of man, and so you can say that with the beauties of nature. So couldn't you say it also with the beauties of women? Yeah. So it would still hold good with Juliet. Obviously you can't bring it to the level of God, but you can with Juliet. You know, there's a passage in times that is discussed in the opinion of Averroes, right? Averroes has this kind of strange position about how we can know the separated substances even in this life, and one thing that Averroes apparently said was that if we didn't see them, they'd be like, without purpose, right? And Thomas says, this is kind of ridiculous, because they know themselves, right? Yeah. I was kind of thinking of it in this context, right? You know? They'd be like saying, you know, well, what good would God's beauty be if we didn't see it? Well, he sees it, right? And he sees it, you know, fully, as much as it's seeable, right? So there's no seeing left for us, really. You see? Our seeing is, in a way, adds nothing to the seeing of God, right? I mean, it's like the thing we were saying before about the, does the goodness of the creature add something to the goodness of God, huh? No. And Thomas always says, well, no, no. And I think I've explained it two ways. He sometimes leads us by the hand to understand a bit. He says that God is infinitely better than we are, right? So that the, our goodness compared to God's goodness is not like that shorter line to a longer line, but like a point to a line, right? Now you add a point to the line, and it's no longer, right? Okay? So we add nothing to the goodness of God, right? And of course, you know, if you said we add something to the goodness of God, well, then God plus us would be better than God alone. And then God would not be goodness itself and so on. No, it's a difficulty, right? And the other example Thomas gives is that whatever goodness there is in us is partaking of the divine goodness in some way. Now a whole and its part is no more than the whole alone. Therefore, huh? I'd say that way he kind of showed it, huh? But to me, that's kind of a very interesting thing to think about, right? And you realize how retuitous God's created in us was, huh? And how thankful he has to be, right? That he chose us, right? Whatever goodness we have comes from him, right? Well, he could apply something like that to this, right? That our seeing, right, adds nothing to God's being seen, huh? Because it's being seen by himself, right? As a kind of infinite character to it, huh? So our seeing adds nothing to it just like the point adds nothing to the, what? Line, right, huh? Okay? But if you, you know, speak of the beautiful itself the way Plato does in the, what? In the symposium, I don't think he speaks of the beautiful itself as knowing itself, right? He doesn't deny that it knows itself, but he doesn't seem to bring that out, right? So if you think of the good itself and the beautiful itself as not knowing or loving itself, right? In fact, the substance doesn't know the operation of the first thing, right? You know, Plato knows, so he thinks, I think he knows in some way, that the first thing is the good itself, the beautiful itself, huh? I think the good itself and the beautiful itself are the same thing in Plato. But he doesn't seem to say, at least in the dialogue, I see, that the good itself and the beautiful itself knows and knows itself. And that would be just a problem, right? If only we knew it, right? Yes, sir. And I said, I went up and shipped a little bit of pride in our party. So, take a little break now.