Wisdom (Metaphysics 2005)
Lecture 54: Act and Ability: From Motion to Universal Understanding

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In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our Almighty, guardian angels, stir from the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and rouse us, and see it more quickly, as St. Thomas Aquinas, an angelic doctor, pray for us, and help us to understand all that you are written. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, amen. So up to reading five, huh? You never know how to translate lexio, huh? Sometimes they translate lecture, right? But since we're reading this, we also translate reading, right? How about reading five? It's a little more relaxing lecture, anyway. So reading five and six are the second part of the ninth book, huh? Where he's going to, emphasis will be upon act, but in a much more universal way than just, what, motion. And so Aristotle, continuing himself with what has gone before, referring back to the first four readings, says, Since the ability set according to motion, the ability to move another, right? Or the ability to move another, and so on, has been considered. Let us now determine about act, what it is, and how it is. And the able, at the same time, will become clear to those dividing, that we call able, not only what is apt to move another, or to be moved by another, either simply, or in some way, like, to do so well, but also otherwise, right? In a more universal way, there'll be a kind of acts that can be found even in the, what, immaterial things that are not really subject to motion in the strict sense. And then we'll see, at the same time, that there are senses of ability, right? Other than the ones that we saw in the first part, huh? But also otherwise, huh? There are other senses of act, for which we have gone through the others in our, what, investigation. I think what this shows is, again, like I said before, a little bit of the order, right, in wisdom, huh? That you tend to ascend, right? From a less universal consideration of something, to a, what, more universal consideration of something. So really, in the first part, the first four readings, he was considering ability, mainly, but also act, but only the act called motion, and ability for motion in some way. Now he's going to see act in a completely universal way, and then he'll see other senses of ability. But you could say that, not as clearly maybe as here, but when he takes up a substance, he's doing something like that, huh? That he starts with material substance, and then he tries to rise to a universal understanding of substance, somewhat applicable even to the material substances then. And the same way when he considers the one, which is convertible with being, you start from the one that is the beginning of number, and then you ascend to the one that is convertible and is universal with being. The one that's the beginning of number is really limited to the genus of quantity, but the one that is convertible with being is much more universal. And sometimes, you know, when Thomas says that, following Avicenna, that being is what is first understood by our mind, he's not as precise as he is at other times, when he says that the being that we first understand is being considered immaterial things. And when we come to talk about immaterial being, we talk about it kind of by thoughts that fit more material being than immaterial being. And you see that when you talk about God especially. So when you talk about God, you have what? Words that are what? Concrete and words that are abstract. And there's no distinction, God, between what is, right? And that by which he is what he is. But in material things, there is a distinction. And so we have these two kinds of thoughts, and we have to negate the distinction that there is in material things when you talk about God. But we don't have one thought to talk about God, right? We have two thoughts corresponding to the two things in material things we start from. So we do ascend from the less universal, not respect to the more universal. In the second paragraph, he begins to talk about act. And, of course, you'll see that he doesn't define act like he defined ability. And he'll stop and explain why he doesn't do that. Act, then, he says, is the existence of a thing, not in the way in which we say an ability. And now he starts to exemplify. We say an ability, as Hermes, now Hermes is what, the Greek god corresponding to Mercury, I suppose, in Latin now, the message of the gods. In fact, they make statues out of, to represent Hermes or Mercury. As we say an ability, as Hermes is in the wood, right? Okay, okay, so before the wood has been formed, right? Okay, but then when it's been formed, then you have act, right? Okay, so the wood is an ability, a statue, but then it's an act. The statue of Hermes, when it gets its form, so form is a kind of act. And you say, Michelangelo saw this big slab of marble, he says, someday I'll make something out of it. And he made the pietas on his one day, huh? And the half is in the whole, because it might be taken from. So you've got a parallelogram there, and you draw a diagonal, and now you've got actually two, what, triangles, right? But those two triangles are there in ability, what, first, huh? And then another quite different kind of built-in act here, when the man is, what, able to consider some theorem, let's say, of geometry, but he's not actually considering it, right? Okay, and then sometimes he's actually considering, I'll go to the board and do the theorem like they do on the TAC, where you go to the board and you diagram, you've got a figure out there, and you diagram, one of these things, huh? Well, you're going from ability to act, did you know that? Hopefully you're going from ability to act, if you've done your homework and done this item. And during final exams, you often go to the board and do the Pythagorean theorem, just so I don't forget the proof of it. I'm going into act, right? If I had to build the, before I go into act. Now in the third paragraph, Aristotle's going to explain why he's not tried to define act, huh? And he's going to say that you can't make known act by definition. What we wish to say, he says, is clear in the particulars by induction, and one should not seek a definition of everything. Now that's a principle in what? What? Logic, yeah. And it's proportional to one should not seek, what? Prove every, what? Statement. Okay? Now you know that logical thing there. If every statement was, what? In need of being proven, would you prove any statement? Begin. You can even begin to prove, right? Because the statements you use to prove a statement, some would say, before you use them to prove that statement, prove them first. And then the same thing about the one to prove them, and so on. So you couldn't even begin to prove anything. You wouldn't, what, know anything, huh? Is that true you don't know any statements? My favorite example recently is, statements exist. And the man who says, statements do not exist, is making a statement, right? So it's kind of, you know, you're caught, right? But you don't try to prove, right? Mistakeings exist. It's obvious, huh? And come. So, it's like that with definitions, right? If every part of every definition was an easy definition, then there'd always be a definition before you could define anything, and therefore you couldn't even begin to define. And so you wouldn't know what anything is, right? But I think it's part of our experience, to just approach it in one way, it's part of our experience that what some things are have been made known to us by definition. And this is possible only if we knew the meanings of the parts of that definition. And there could not have been an infinity of definitions before that, or we would not ever have made known, huh? What a rhombus is, or rhomboid, or trepensium, or something, right? Okay? So if you have the experience of coming to know these things by definition, you know that not everything had to be defined, huh? Something had to be known without definition, huh? And the question is, what is that? See? And I think we've mentioned here before that Descartes, right, the so-called father of modern philosophy, and John Locke, one of the prominent empiricists, they both deny that motion can be, what? Defined, huh? And they criticize Aristotle's sense for trying to define motion there in the third book of the actual hearing. And Aristotle is aware of the fact that not everything can be defined. But he sees that motion can be defined by act and ability. And it's not motion then that's undefinable, it's actually, what, act. Now it's funny, we don't seem to be aware of the text here, as if Aristotle thought everything could be defined. Everything should be defined, huh? No. Aristotle's quite aware of the fact, he's the father of logic, after all. He's quite aware of the fact that some things must be known without definition. Just as some statements must be known, but not known by reasoning to them from other statements. And those are the first statements of all. And likewise, these things that are known without needing to be defined are the first things we know, and through them we, what, define everything else, huh? And Aristotle's saying, well, it's act that cannot be defined. An ability can, to some extent, be defined through the act that's been built before. So we talked about ability as being the beginning of a source of motion and another is other, right, and so on. We define it by the act called motion there. It's act that cannot be defined. But how is it known? Well, it's known practically, as he says, by induction. And as he goes on to say here, but also by seeing a, what? Proportion, right? And notice a proportion here is being used in Euclid's sense, huh? Not for ratio, but for a likeness of ratios. And he gives something in the proportions here in the rest of the same third paragraph. As the one who's actually building a house, right, is to the house builder, right? And the one who's awake to the one who is, what, asleep, right? And the one that is seeing to that which has its eyes shut but has sight, that is to say is not blind but has the ability to see. And that which has been formed out of the matter to the matter, right? And that which has been worked up to the unworked on. And notice in the first examples there are house building to the house builder and awake to the sleeping and seeing to that which has its eyes shut. They seem to be more something like an activity or emotion, right? Although the house building is more transitive action than this seeing is one that remains within the one seeing, huh? But then that which has been formed out of the matter to the matter and that which has been worked up to the unworked, there he's seeing, what, form as proportional to, what, motion. Okay? So just as I'm able to see people, but since my eyes are closed now, I can't actually see, right? And how am I now to, when I open my eyes and actually see, right, that something like the wood before it's been shaped, huh, is the wood now that it has been, what, shaped, right? So he's seeing, then, that act can be said of both motion or operation and of what form, and perhaps that's the first distinction you can see among acts, huh? An act that is like a motion or a doing of some sort, huh? And act that is, say, what, form, huh? Okay? And Aristotle is showing here that the word act has more than one meaning, and as the order in his example show, it's the motion or the doing that first is called act. But then the word is kind of carried over to form, and one way of carrying it over to form is by a likeness of what? Ratio, son. Now, there's a number of words that Aristotle points out that are equivocal by reason of a likeness of ratios. And so we saw that, I think, before in these courses here with the word, what, before, right? And you see it with the word in, and out there in the, meaning of in and out there, being in and being out in the fourth book of Nehachal Gehry. And you see it in the beginning of the fifth book with the word beginning, huh? Okay? Now, there are other ways that words are equivocal by reason, huh? But one way that words are sometimes equivocal by reason is by reason of a likeness of what? Ratio, son. Okay? So the form, in a way, is to the wood before it's been shaped. Something like my seeing you people, right, is to my eyes when I had them clothed, right, but was not a blind man, right? Do you see? And so that's one way, sonny, of seeing that act is not being said equivocally by chance of these two. And likewise, then, ability, right? But you distinguish at the same time your two abilities, the ability to be in motion or to do something, and the ability to be, what, formed, huh? Corresponding to these two different kinds of, what, act, huh? I've seen Thomas in another text there, in the, I don't know if it's in the potency, but in another text where he points out that form is at the end of motion, right? And form is also a beginning of motion because a thing acts through its form. So that's another way you can see that act is not said, what, equivocally by chance, huh? But by the ratio of form to motion as its beginning or as its, what, end, huh? So when I transform something, I'm changing it, right? But the end result is change as it has a form it didn't have before. And when your mind is in form, then you can go out and teach. So form is a beginning of motion or doing and also a end of some kind of motion or doing. And so I could say, you know, that by teaching you results in this information of your mind, but then the form is like the end of the activity of teaching. But then you say, once the mind has been formed, then it can teach others, so form can be the beginning of a doing. So that's another way that a name can be equivocal by reason. Instead of the second, by reason of its, what, ratio to the first, huh? That's the beginning or the end of the first in this example. Just like we call logic philosophy equivocally. But by reason of the ratio of logic to philosophy, huh? It's a tool of philosophy, right? So it's not purely equivocally that we call logic philosophy. But it's not philosophy in the original sense, huh? But in the third paragraph here, Aristotle sees the likeness, sees the equivocation by reason of the likeness of ratio, huh? But as I mentioned there with Thomas there in other texts, he sees another way that you can see that the word act is, huh? 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By reason of the ratio of form to motion or doing, huh? You follow me? So there's more than one way you could present something as what? Malogous? Yeah, yeah. Yeah, equivocal by reason, huh? Now, going back to the mistake of Descartes and Locke, in terms of natural philosophy and in terms, I suppose, of actual theology, huh? Giving up and denying, which you can define, motion is most serious, huh? When Aristotle begins the investigation of what motion is in the third book of Natural Era, he said that if motion were unknown, then nature would be unknown, huh? Because in the second book, nature is defined as a beginning and cause of motion and of rest, and that which it is, first as such, and not by happening. So nature is defined by motion. So if motion were unknown, then nature would not be fully known. And so in the third book, then, he goes about defining motion, huh? You may recall that definition was by means of act and ability. But then later on, the definition in the seventh or the eighth book, I guess, of the natural era, the definition of motion is a beginning for seeing that nothing moves itself. And that's the beginning for eventually reasoning out the existence of the unmoved mover, which is the first argument, huh, for existence of God. Yeah, so throwing out the definition of motion has most serious consequences for understanding nature and later on for the argument for the unmoved mover, but the first and most manifest argument for the existence of God, huh? Things in motion, soon to catch the eye, but not stir us. So the argument for motion is the first argument for the existence of God. So it's no little damage, you might say, that Descartes and Locke are doing to natural philosophy and to wisdom by denying that motion can be defined. Descartes kind of quotes a somewhat garbled version and says, Who understands that by just playing with words? That's it. Descartes and Locke talks about, well, motion is a simple idea, you can't define the simple, huh? As I pointed out, I think, a long time ago, you might be able to define even a point as the end of a line, even though the point has no parts, right? Okay, it's simple. Of course, motion isn't that simple, really, as a point, huh? But motion is always something of another, right? So there is a basis for the multiplicity of definition. You can say what it is of what. And this is more than just a name, right? It's the act of what it's able to be, right? In so far as it's able to be. It takes a long time to understand that, right? I remember as a young philosopher, thinking I understood the definition of motion, where Brother Richard is kind of laughing at me, you know? Well, I know the words, but... But you talked about the definition of motion, didn't I, earlier? I get it. Yeah, we'll go back to right now. But it's kind of amazing, huh, that something as important as that, huh? Descartes and Locke, you know, speak almost as if those who try to define motion and aren't aware of the fact that some things have got to be known without definition. That idea was really foreseen by Aristotle, clearly. But also he sees what it is that we know without definition, huh? So, you see a little bit of the proportion here, then, and the distinction between an act that is like motion or doing and an act that is form. So, he says, let one part of the difference here be distinguished as the act and the other as the able. So, he can say we know it by induction and by seeing a, what? Proportion, right, huh? Okay. But not by definition. Now, in the fourth paragraph, he comes back to this distinction between motion or doing and form, huh? But all things are not said to be an act in the same way, huh? It's not inimical. But in proportion. As this and that, or towards that. Well, this and that is said more with regard to form in matter, right? Or towards that, as the ability to see, to see, right? Or the ability to hear, to hear, right? And that way of speaking is used more in talking about motion or doing. So, as this and that, so another and another, or towards another, right? For some are as motion to ability, and others as substance, which is Aristotle's annoying way of referring to form now, right? Because we've seen, you know, from the age book, you know, that form is especially substance, right? And Aristotle wants to emphasize that, right? Now, in the next paragraph, he talks about another kind of ability and act, which is a kind where the ability is never fully actualized. Unlike my ability to see, right? My ability to see is fully realized actually by my seeing, right? And likewise, when the statue is finding in form, right? It can be fully and act now, the statue. But what about the continuous, huh? The continuous is defined in natural philosophy as that which is divisible forever, that which is able to be divided forever. Well, we've talked about this before. But in geometry, a straight line can be what? Bisected, right, huh? And you bisect a straight line, what do you get? Two straight lines. Yeah, two short of lines, huh? Well, then they can be bisected, right? What do you get with your bisect now? Too short. Yeah. Not necessarily coming to an end. The only way to come to an end would be if you cut a line into two nothings and then that would be the end of it. But that's laughable because then the line would be out of nothing. It would have been nothing, right? Or if you say you can cut a line into two what? Points. Points. But that's a mistake to think you can put points together and make a line. We talked about that argument before, which is to briefly touch upon it again. If you're going to try to put points together to make a line, the points would have to come together and touch. And since the points have no parts and no edge in the interior, the only way two points can touch is to coincide. And so if two points touch, they coincide, and if they coincide they have no more length than one point, which is no length at all. And if ten or a hundred or a million or infinity of points touch, right, the only way they can touch is to coincide, and if they coincide they have no more length than one point there's no length at all. So you can't put together a point from line even from infinity of points. So I tell the students if your high school math teacher said or your college teacher said that a finite straight line is composed of infinity of points, he was mistaken. But his being mistaken is a sign of the difficulty of understanding that kind of ability. if there's any time you cut a straight line would you get a point. And so it seemed like the point was there already. But after you cut the line you're making actual a point that was there only in ability. And so you keep on cutting it and making actual points as long as you want to. But you never, you always cut a straight line into two shorter lines and never into what? points or two nothings, then is that ability ever, what? Satisfied or actualized. Actualized, yeah. And of course, time and motion and so on are, what, also continuous, huh? So he's talking about an ability that is never fully actualized, huh? It's kind of a strange animal, right? But there is that kind of a thing, huh? Or the ability, let's say, of numbers to increase, right? If you can divide and continuous forever, then the number of lines can get larger forever, right? But is that ability of numbers to get larger, just add one to whatever it is to the number you have, is that ability ever fully realized? It's like the, you know, ability to reflect upon yourself, right? I know what a square is, and I know that I know what a square is, and I know that I know that I know what a square is. And you can go on, it's kind of a sterile infinity, right, forever, right? But you have an ability here that is never, what, fully actualized, huh? Okay. Now, in the next paragraph here, there is a problem, not so much about the distinction of two acts here, he's going to be distinguishing motion or doing, right, huh? But what we should name these two acts, huh? In Latin, Thomas will sometimes say, for want of a name, he'll speak of motion and operatio, huh? Okay. But operation is not altogether a satisfactory way of naming this, huh? You could say motion and doing, huh? But kind of abstract a little bit from the problem of naming this, you give these, and see the difference that Aristotle wants to point out between these two things, huh? And it's a difference between, let's say, my walking home and my seeing you, right? Okay. Now, they're both on the side of motion or doing, as opposed to form, right? So it's a subdivision, you might say here, of the first kind of act, huh? Now, when I'm walking home, can you say that I have walked home? So it's essentially an imperfect act, walking home, right? And when I have walked home, which grammatically you would say perfect, right? When I have walked home, am I walking home? No. Okay. So that's why we call motion here, and imperfect, so long as I'm walking home, I haven't walked home yet. And when I have walked home, I'm not walking home. Okay. Or when you're building a house, right? Have you built a house? And when you can say that you've built a house, are you building the house? So that kind of a motion or doing, may everyone call it, is essentially what? Imperfect, right? Essentially an incomplete act, if you want to use the word, incomplete. It's a perfect act, right? Okay. My walking home is not yet completed when I'm walking home. And when it is completed, my walking home, I'm not walking home. Okay. But now, what about my seeing you, right? When I'm seeing you, have I seen you yet? Mm-hmm. Yeah. So that's essentially a what? Perfect act, huh? A complete act. Okay. Now notice, grammar reflects more the imperfect act, huh? When we use grammar. And that reflects the fact, as Aristotle said, that motion is what we first call act, huh? And seeing is what's active to us, right? But it's actually an imperfect act. And this is important, you know, for the whole philosophy. That when you talk about the activity that is going to be our happiness, right? Is it going to be essentially one of these imperfect acts? Or is it going to be a perfect act, a complete act, huh? So, seeing is one example, the sensing of that sort, or the act of reason, like, say, understanding, right? When I'm understanding what a triangle is, have I understood what a triangle is? It seems almost dramatically strange to say it that way, right? But that's a big difference, huh? And when I was sticking for the girls, when I'm loving you, have I loved you yet? Oh, yes, yes, I agree to that. So, sensing and understanding and loving are a different type of doing, right? Then walking home, or even building a house, huh? Making dinner, right? Making dinner, have you made dinner yet? No. When you have made dinner, making dinner? Well, now it's time to sit down. So, Aristotle is distinguishing those two, huh? In this paragraph here. Since of the acts, or acts of which have a limit, none is at the end, or about the end. For example, the parts themselves, and one is making them thin, are in movement in this way, not existing that for the sake of which is a movement. This is not an act, or not a perfect act, for it is not an end. But act, we don't want to call it, huh? As they come, you know, for want of a better name, call it operation. Is end, which the end is. For at the same time, he says, we are judging and have judged. Our understanding have understood, huh? But learning is more like emotion, isn't it? When one is learning something, one hasn't learned it yet, right? When one is becoming healthy, one is not that healthy. And then he touches upon the importance of this forever, huh? At the same time, we are living well, and have lived well, right? And are happy, and have been happy. Of these, then, some should be called motion, but the other is, what? Acts, huh? That's kind of a quick word is there. Energea, maybe Energea. Ganesi's Energea, huh? But there's a little problem about how he named these two, right? But the first one is more clearly named motion, and the second one, Energea, or act, or operation, or doing, right? It's a little problem there about how to name it best. Using the phrase, the imperfect act, and the perfect or complete act, huh? And happiness is going to have to be the second find, huh? So he goes on, exemplifying these things. Of these, then, some should be called motion, but the other acts. For every movement is incomplete, huh? Thinning, learning, walking, housebuilding. These are movements that are imperfect. For it is not true that at the same time a thing is walking and has walked, right? Is building and has built. Or is coming to be and has come to be. Or is being moved and has been moved, but I'm there. But then the other kind that he calls acts here, or Energea, but the same has seen and is seen and understands and has understood, huh? And loves and has loved, right? The latter I call an act in the former a, what? A movement, huh? That's the way it turns out an idea there. Notice that these words like act, action, activity, right? You'd think of something like the emotion you were doing first, wouldn't you?