Wisdom (Metaphysics 2005)
Lecture 51: Natural and Rational Abilities: Distinguishing Nature from Reason

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Oh, my mother would sing sometimes. I thought she'd say, yes, I do sing. But I don't think you'd want me for your wedding or whenever they wanted the hardness of the purpose to sing for. So, sometimes you might deny that someone is able to sing if he can't sing, what? Well. Well, huh? My father-in-law used to say, you know, I'd sing something. People who can't sing usually don't, he says. So, or my friend Warren-Marie said, Dwayne, we're going to learn how to speak French. Well, am I able to speak French? Well, he would say no, right? Okay, okay. But I would say a few things in French and so on. And so, there are two different means of your ability, right? Sometimes you say to be able to do something only if, what, you are able to do it well, right, Tom? Okay. And Tom just gives an example there, you know, of how you might say wood is burnable, right? But if the wood is not dry, it's not, what, burnable well, right? You know, it's moist or something, you know, it's not going to burn very well. So, but obviously in the ability to do something well is included in the ability to do it, right? So, y'all go back, right, to the earlier senses and back ultimately to that first sense, huh? So, he distinguishes, you might say, there are five senses of ability, right? Okay? The ability to act upon something, right? The ability to undergo, the ability to resist being acted upon, the ability to act upon something well, right? And the ability to be acted upon well, right? Okay? Now, I didn't have much ability really to type, you know, I mean, I didn't, I'm self-taught, which, the old saying is, you have a full full of a teacher if you teach yourself. Well, so I never really learned how to use my fingers on the typewriter, so I never really became a very good typist, huh? And, uh, but in the old typewriters, huh? There always seemed to be a key that didn't work right. I don't know if you remember the old typewriters. And so you'd type out a word, and six letters, and five letters would be nice, clear, distinct, and one of them would be kind of, what, faint. So you have to back up and hit that key again, and then back up again, and hit again, maybe three or four times, and the fight, you'd get dark enough, you know? So, um, what would you say about the ability to take later? It was flawed. Yeah, yeah, see? So, it was, um, it did react, I think it didn't just get stuck, but it didn't do it well, yeah. So, that's another sentence, right? So, you see those five senses, then, of ability? But again, the most important distinction is between the ability, uh, to move another, and the ability to be moved another, right? If I like to say in English, the ability to act upon another, the ability to undergo, right? Okay? Okay. First out, it says that understanding is an undergoing, right? And, of course, in English, you've got the same, what? Uh, etymology there, you've got the word under there, right? Okay? And notice, how we sometimes speak as if the matter is, what, the underlying matter? And as if the form is above the, what? Matter? Okay? But the form in the matter is a result of the agent acting upon the matter, right? So, if the form is a result of the agent acting upon the matter, it's kind of natural to imagine the form as being above the, what? The matter, right? Okay? Because act upon means you're above, right? And the matter's undergoing it. Okay? Now, in the next paragraph, the third paragraph, he's talking about how, in a way, the ability to move another and the ability to be moved by another are one ability, huh? Okay? Uh, in that they are, what? Connected, right? Huh? Okay? So, in a sense, you could say the piano's ability is an ability to be played by the pianist. So, it kind of unites the two abilities together, right? But, nevertheless, the ability to play the piano is in the pianist and the ability to be played is in the piano. They're not the same thing, right? Now, sometimes it's a little more difficult because sometimes um, a thing has parts, right? And one part is able to act upon a, what? Another part, yeah. But still, there's a distinction there of, what? Parts, huh? Okay? Remember the problem there in the great fragment of, um, in Xavier's, right? Where he says that the greater mind must be separated from things in order to act upon them. It was mixed up to things and couldn't order them. And, uh, we usually develop that point, you know, we say if a judge is going to rule in a case, say, where you two businessmen are in dispute, the first thing we demand is that the judge be impartial, right? Which means literally not a part of. Again, there is a negative prefix. So, if the judge is a, you know, is a financial interest in your company or the other guy's company, um, he should really excuse himself from being a judge in this case, huh? Mm-hmm. So, in order to rule others, you can't be, what? Mixed up with them, right? And, uh, I've heard, you know, people describe, you know, when a priest is made a bishop, right? Um, he can't be quite buddy-buddy with the priest that he was buddy-buddy with before he was made a bishop, right? He's got to kind of separate himself a bit, right? Otherwise, he can't rule, right? And he's going to have his judgment corrupted, right? Well, then the problem was how can any savings turn around and say the mind is self-ruled? Because, um, that seems on the one hand to be true, as is shown by the example of logic, huh? Where the mind rules itself. But the ruler has to be separated from the ruled. How can the mind rule itself, huh? You may recall how we solved that problem, right? Uh, but we started with the idea of self-rule for a country, you see? And when a country enjoys self-rule, does that mean the whole country is ruling the whole country? No, it really means that one part, the government, is ruling the other part, son. And when we say that a man is self-controlled and the way he's self-ruled, we mean maybe that his reason is ruling his, what, emotions. There's still a distinction between the rule of the rule, but it's hard to see because the distinction between the government and the governed is between different people, right? But now, when a man is self-controlled, self-rule, his reason, his emotions are inside of him, huh? But the reason has to rule over the, what? The emotions, yeah, and I'm afraid can't be mixed up with the emotions, huh? So if I'm speaking out of emotion and not, you know, I can't that rule my emotions, someone else has a rule for me. And then we had to find, wow, what's the distinction and reason between the rule and the rule? And then we got the clue from the great Socrates, huh? Socrates found in his conversations with men that they had mixed up what they know and what they don't know. And so you have to separate what you know from what you don't know. And then you can use what you do know to come to know what you don't know, right? So the mind is ruled in what it doesn't know by what it does know. So if I know the length of this table and the width of this rectangle, right? I'm going to be ruled by my knowledge of the length and the width and what I say eventually about the area of this. And so reason is ruled in the conclusion by the premises, huh? And of course you can say it's ruled in the less known by the more known, So there's always some kind of distinction there between the rule and the rule, huh? Well, something like Aristotle's saying here, right? That the ability to act upon something, the ability to undergo are never the same ability, but suddenly Sometimes the ability to act upon is in one thing, like, say, in the fire, and the ability to undergo, to be burnable, is in something else, like the paper. But sometimes the ability to act upon and the ability to undergo are found inside the same thing, right? But then there's always some kind of distinction, like, of parts, right? So even when you speak, you know, in the study of living things, we say a living thing is a thing that, what, moves itself, right? So self-motion is kind of a common notion of life, right? But like that self-ruling in the fragment that we had one time ago, you've got to realize that's like when you speak of self-rule of a country, right? Where you don't mean there's no distinction between the rule and the rule, but that phrase self-rule might kind of be taken to mean that, right? And the same way self-motion might imply that the mover and the moved are, what? Yeah, yeah. There's always some kind of distinction, huh? Of parts or something like that, sorry. But notice in this third paragraph on page one, he's saying that in some way, the ability to act upon something and undergo are so connected that they seem to be one ability, right? Okay, the piano seems to be what? And the piano seems to be together, right, huh? Okay. And the piano is able to be played by the pianist, so you're bringing the two abilities together, but yet they're in different, what? Things, huh? And therefore they seem to be, in that sense, clearly not the same ability, right? So the one might kind of order one to the other, but not that they're one and the same subject. Now, in the last paragraph, having talked about ability, it's time to talk about inability, right? Please throw you a brief there, huh? So he says, inability and unable is the lack which is contrary to such an ability. So he speaks of the males being impotent, right? Okay. Well, that's, say, what? A lack of this inability, right? Okay. So that every ability is opposed to an inability of the same and according to the same. And he's kind of a footnote there about the word lack, huh? Okay. But what does lack mean in the strict sense, huh? As long as you see the Latin word, too, privation. What was a lack in the strict sense? Wouldn't it be a privation? Well, privation is the Latin word for lack, right? Okay. It's something that should be there, but isn't. Yeah, yeah. So in the fullest sense of lack, is a stone lacking life? No. Okay. You could, in a very broad and loose sense of lack, say that the stone lacks life. It doesn't have this, right? Right, huh? Okay. But since a stone is not apt to have life, and it's not something that should have life, huh? It's not lacking in the strictest sense, huh? But in the strictest sense of lack is the non-being, the non-existence of something you're able to have and should have, right? Mm-hmm. And when you should have it, right? Okay. That's the lack, which is really something bad, right? Mm-hmm. So I started touching upon the different senses of lack, huh? From the loosest sense to the strictest sense, huh? It comes up a lot, huh? It came up with the word, beginning of logic there, the word property, huh? What's, when Euclid, not Euclid, porphyry defines property there. The property belongs to only one species, to every member of it and always. Mm-hmm. So half of four is a property of two. Mm-hmm. Only two is half of four. Every two is half of four. Two is always half of four, right? See? But then you could use property in a lesser sense, right? Is it a property of two to be, let's say, less than ten? Yeah. Yeah. But it belongs to other things besides two, right? Mm-hmm. So it belongs always to two to be less than ten. It belongs to every two. But not only to two, right? Mm-hmm. See? You're, you know, less to sense, huh? Is it a property of man to be a logician? Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha Okay, so should we take our break before we start the second meeting? So we can So let's look now at the second reading here, where Aristotle is going to begin to distinguish the abilities found in the soul from the abilities that are generally found in the natural world, but especially the abilities that are found in the understanding soul, the soul that has reason. Since some such beginnings, notice he's called beginnings in the definition of these abilities or powers. Beginning meaning the origin or the source or something. So one ability is a beginning or origin or source of change in another, and another is a beginning or source of being changed by another. But now he's going to bring out a distinction, mainly of the active abilities, between what we might call a natural ability or power, and a rational ability or power. And there's some anticipation of the rational abilities or powers, even in the lesser souls. And the main difference he'd be pointing out is that the natural ability or power seems to be limited or determined to one of two opposites. So the fire, for example, so the fire, for example, as such, will make things hot or cold, but will just, what, be limited to making things, what, hot, right? Okay? But the rational ability or power is capable of what? Of contraries or opposites, huh? So the doctor can heal you or make you sick by his art, huh? Not that both are the purpose of the art, but the art enables him to do both, right? And as a magician, I can reason well and reason badly. I can teach and I can deceive. Not that I should do both, but I have the ability to do both, you know? Okay? Now the kind of anticipation of this, and in the simpler natural science of the Greeks there, Aristotle saw that heavy things go down and light things go upright, which is somewhat true. But a tree seems to grow, but a tree seems to grow in what? One direction? Primarily. Well, no, it grows up into the sky, but down in the ground, right? And there's a kind of a ratio between the two. So it seems to grow in opposite directions, huh? So it's kind of the anticipation, even in the lowest soul, the living soul there, of being open to opposites, huh? But most of all, the understanding is so, because there's the same knowledge of contraries or opposites, huh? And this is an old truth that is found in Plato as well as in Aristotle. And one famous text is in the Symposium, right? I don't know if you've ever read the Symposium, but by the end of the Symposium, which means picking together in the Greek word, everybody's more or less under the table. But those people talking towards the end there are Socrates and the two poets that are there, Aristophanes, the common poet, and Agathon, the tragic poet, whose tragedy has won the prize this year, and the Symposium is in honor of him. And, um, Socrates was saying at the end there to Aristophanes, the common poet, and Agathon, the tragic poet, if you guys knew what you were doing, you could both write tragedy and comedy. Now, perhaps Agathon wrote just tragedies and not comedies, couldn't write them. And Aristophanes wrote just comedies and couldn't write tragedies. But Socrates is saying, if you knew what you were doing, you could do both, huh? As if there's the same knowledge of what? Opposites, right? Okay? So if you're writing these things by knowledge, you should be able to write both. And, um, we know that the supreme poet there, who's Homer, uh, wrote not only the, the Iliad, but the Marjites, huh? The Marjites is lost, huh? Although there's some fragments we have of it. But Aristotle, in the book on the poetic art there, says that the Marjites is to comedy, but the Iliad is to life's tragic. Yeah. So if the Marjites was as good a comic work as the Iliad is, a tragic epic, you might say, um, then Homer could do both, huh? Mm-hmm. And the same way Shakespeare can do both, right? We're more familiar with Shakespeare's tragedies, you know, Homer and Juliet and Hamlet and Macbeth and so on. Um, but he writes very good comedy, right? I remember my brother Richard, you know, uh, seeing somewhere in one of Shakespeare's comedies, you know, and saying to me, I didn't realize Shakespeare could be so funny, you know, and so on. So he can do both, right? You see? Um, but this is the idea that there's the same, what? Now it's the opposite, huh? Mm-hmm. Aristotle, in the fifth book of the politics, huh? He shows both how to overthrow a government and how to, what? We serve it, huh? And he does both of those in the same book, as if it's one and the same, what? Knowledge of both, huh? And as we've mentioned before, in the logical works, you learn about correct reasoning and incorrect reasoning, huh? The eight books about places, the so-called topics, and the two books on the physical reputations, form one entire work, right, huh? Which you learn both about correct reasoning, you might say, and the incorrect reasoning, huh? The second tool of the delegation is to distinguish the senses of a word. And the most common mistake in thinking is mixing up the senses of a word. So it's kind of the same knowledge of both, huh? I know myself that the fundamental mistakes the mind makes, commonly, kind of in the beginning of the trouble for the mind, is not seeing some distinction, right? Overlooking some distinction, or misunderstanding some distinction, huh? So I tell my students, you know, if you understand these kinds of distinctions, you can understand these kinds of mistakes. But likewise, if you see people making these kinds of mistakes, you realize the importance of understanding these kinds of distinction, huh? So, I mean, some might say, well, it's important to distinguish the senses of words equivocal by reason. And you see people making all these mistakes when they mix up these senses, then you realize the importance of that. So it's kind of the same knowledge of both, right? And the more you realize the, or understand the distinction of the senses of a word, the more you can see how people can fall into these mistakes so easily. So we're still going to develop as we go along here, right? But there's, it's something found mainly in the soul, the understanding soul, but there's kind of an anticipation of that, right? In the way the tree grows, huh? And you've heard my comparison to the way the tree grows and the way wisdom grows. There's kind of a paradox at first about wisdom, because wisdom is going to go all the way to knowing God, right? The highest points, you might say. But it also considers the axioms which underlie all of our knowledge, huh? And when the wise man defends the axioms like he does in Book 4 of wisdom, especially the axioms of being and unbeing, and when he distinguishes the senses of the words used in the axioms like he does in Book 5, he's going down and down into the beginning of our knowledge, huh? So it's like he's growing in two directions, huh? He's, um, below everybody else, because he's going down into the cellar, into the foundation of our knowledge. It's more deeply than anybody else ever does. At the same time, it's rising, but above all, that's more, right? You say, well, that's kind of paradox, right? But I say, it compares the way the tree grows and, in general, the way plants grow, because the higher they grow up into the sky, the more they grow and settle down into the ground. I guess the botanists say, you know, it's kind of a portion there, the higher ratio between what's above, or how high you're up in the air, and how far you go down in the ground. Just like I exposed with our buildings, right? The higher you want to go up into the sky, the more you have to have a foundation down in the ground. But it's kind of strange that you're going in opposite directions, right? That's kind of a paradox. So there's really anticipation of what you're going to find more fully in the understanding soul. So that's what he speaks here. Since some such beginnings, these abilities we talked about in the first reading, are present in soulless things, right? Things that have no soul, none of the things. And you might call those, not just negatively soulless things, but natural things, right? They're called natural abilities. And others in those having soul, right? In the soul itself, and especially in the part of the soul having reason, right? It is clear that some abilities will be without reason, and some with reason, right? Wherefore, all the arts and making sciences are abilities. For they are beginnings able to reduce change, and others as other. And now he starts to talk about the difference of them in the second paragraph. And all those with reason are the same of what? Controllers. So by grammar, I can say, I am your professor, and I can say, I is your professor. And you am my students, right? And I know I'm speaking incorrectly there, right? But how do I know that? How do I know it's incorrect to say you is my students, and I are your professor? How do I know it's incorrect to say you are your professor? How do I know it's grammar? Yeah, yeah. So you might say grammar, in any way to speak correctly, and what? Incorrectly, right? And a good lawyer, a good man who has something to give to persuade you, he can persuade for, or against, right? Which area is being paid to do. But those without reason are one of one. And we could call those abilities natural abilities, huh? Nature is determined to one. For example, heat is only a heating, or fire, I might say, is only a heating. But the medical art is both a disease and what? Health. Health, yeah. So if I put the steak on the grill, you want to cook it so it's still pink, let's say the steak, huh? But I also know how to overcook it, too. And the knowledge of how much you cook it is also knowledge of how to overcook it. Not that you want to aim at both, but you have the ability for both, huh? Mm-hmm. Now, Shakespeare touches upon that in Coriolanus, huh? And Ophidius is speculating as to why Coriolanus is so tragic, right? And he says, nature not being able to be more than one thing. And he's thinking of how Coriolanus is really a soldier and he can't, what, adapt to civilian life. And he continues to act like he was commanding his army and so on, right? When he's got to kind of fight with the people and so on to get honest in civilian life. So, sometimes people, customs is like a second nature, right? It's like nature you're determined to one. Now, why is it that the rational ability is of contraries when the actual one is not, then? It's because there's the same knowledge of what contraries are opposites. So, in the definition, let's say, of blindness, would be, what, sight, huh? But in matter, one contrary excludes the other, right? So, if you have sight, you can't be blind. And if you're blind, you don't have sight, huh? But in our knowledge, one contrary is involved and helps you know the other one. So, because of the same knowledge of contraries, and you're acting through knowledge with the rational ability, rational ability is the ability for contraries. But the nature determined to one. Now, in the third paragraph, you're starting to get that reason, then, right? The cause is that knowledge of reason is thought, and the same thought, in a way, shows the thing in its lack. Except not in the same way, huh? Right, okay? So, you might know directly what sight is, and then to know what sight is, you know, what blindness is, huh? Okay? Or you might know what health is, and you might say, what my blood pressure should be, or what the thyroid should be, right, huh? But then, you know, an overactive or an underactive thyroid has got to be compensated in some way, by medicine or something of this sort, or call it a tonic cocktail, you know? I don't think people who talk to a tonic cocktail sound pretty bad, but, but, or an idea of high blood pressure, right? You know, does include the idea of what normal blood pressure should be, right? So, the same knowledge of both, huh? Therefore, such knowledge of reason must be of contraries, but of one as such, and of the other not as such, but maybe through the first. Okay? So, he's developing that idea. Okay? Now, since contraries, in the fourth paragraph now, now, since contraries do not come to be in the same thing, but the knowledge of reason is an ability to having thought, and the soul has a beginning of motion, therefore, while the wholesome makes only health, and the eater only heat, and the children only wholeness, the one with the knowledge of reason can make both, but the thought is in both, but not in the same way. And it is in a soul which has a beginning of motion. And that's the basic difference, huh? Now, Aristotle doesn't elaborate here too much, but is there anything that the reason actually knows? In the same way, you get to the will, right? When I go into the restaurant, they give me the menu, I can choose to have steak, or not to have steak, right? I'm not determined to one or the other, right? But does the will naturally will something? Well, if you say that the reason and the will naturally, or the reason naturally knows something, and the will naturally will something, that there's something that the will is not free to will the opposite, right? Like in the case of the will, is my will free to choose between, say, happiness and misery? Can I really want to be miserable? I can choose between having steak and not having steak, or having steak or having chicken, right? But can I choose between happiness and misery, or do I naturally want to be happy? Or what's the beginning of the first book of wisdom there in the premium? All men by nature desire to know, or all men by nature desire to understand, right? Did I choose, you know, to like the beautiful? and not like the ugly? Or did I naturally like the beautiful and dislike the ugly? What do you think? It'd be natural. Yeah, yeah. So it seems there's something of the natural even in the will, right? Okay? And there's something of the natural in reason, huh? So is reason really free to think, say that the whole is not more than the part? Okay? Or is reason really able to think that something can both be and not be at the same time in the same way, huh? Okay? Well, if you look at Thomas and he talks about reason knowing some things naturally, where it's determined, right? To one side of a, what, contradiction, right? Or the will is naturally turned into something. What happens to this distinction that he's making here, right? You see? Because the distinction here between a natural ability and a rational ability that he gives here in the second reading is that the rational ability is an ability for contraries, right? And the natural ability is an ability as determined to one of the two contraries. What would it simply be that, say, my reason has a nature, my reason has a nature, and consequently it will know something by nature, not just by reason alone? So nature is what's first in the thing, right? Okay? But now, like I was saying earlier, we were talking about mistakes there, I don't know if you were in the room when we were talking about mistakes, but the beginning of trouble in our thinking, I was mentioning before, seems to be not seeing some distinction, right? Or misunderstanding some distinction, huh? So the man who is deceived, let's say, by the fallacy of equivocation, he doesn't see the distinction in the meanings of the word, right? Okay? I was mentioning before about the Malises too, right? They mix up two different senses of infinite, right? Okay. And you heard my little sophism there about whole and part, haven't you? You know, they say that man is an animal, but he's not just an animal. An animal that has reason. So animal is only a part of man, right? And then I say, but animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elk, then. So sometimes the part includes more than the whole. Well, when I first presented in class, the students, yeah, yeah, gee, sometimes the part is more than the whole. You see? But you're picking up two different senses of whole and part. The fundamental distinction between the composed whole, right? And the composed whole, in this sense, is the definition of man, right? Mm-hmm. And a part of the definition is less than the whole definition, right? So if the definition of man is an animal that has reason, animal is only a part of the definition, and the definition is more than just animal. Mm-hmm. But then when you compare animal and say animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, you don't mean that animal is composed of man, dog, cat, and horse. But that animal is said of what? These, right? It's the universal whole. And the universal whole is always said of more than one of its parts. And the composed whole is always composed of more than one of its parts. See? So you're mixing up those two different senses of whole and part. So someone who overlooks the distinction of meanings there of whole and part is easily what? Deceived, huh? I know when I teach the beginning of natural philosophy and Aristotle shows that the general is before the particular, right? And he has a very good reason for saying that because we know things in a confused way before distinctly. And so when you get more particular, you're getting more distinct, right? Mm-hmm. What are you drinking? Are you drinking a dry red wine? Well, what kind of red wine? Well, it's a carboné sauvignon. I'm not as sure that I'm drinking carboné sauvignon as I'm drinking a dry red wine. Yeah. And so you get them to agree that we should, that we know the general before the particular. And then I turn around and say, yeah, but the senses come before reason. And the senses know only particulars. You can't see man in general, you always see a particular man or a particular dog. So if sensing comes before reason, then particulars come before the general. So Aristotle is obviously contradicting himself, right? Well, they think he is, right? But the word general and particular have two senses. So when Aristotle says that general comes before the particular, he means general in the sense of more universal before particular in the sense of less universal. But when he says other places that particulars come before the general, particulars means what? Singulars and general means universal. So since our knowledge begins with our senses, and senses know only singulars, right? Singulars come before any, what? Universals. But among universals, the more universal comes before the, what? Less universal. The confusion comes because we use the word particular, sometimes for singulars, and sometimes less universal. So when I say Socrates is a particular man, particular means an individual man, right? When I say dog is a particular kind of animal, particular doesn't mean a singular there. It means something less universal than animal. So I say the beginning of trouble for our mind is not seeing any, what? Distinction or misunderstanding it, huh? So, what is the distinction here between the rational ability and the reasonable ability, huh? What's the difference? Well, you can just understand that distinction, right? Okay? And it goes back to a kind of equivocation, huh? By reason that we saw before. We talked about it, I think, sometimes. Sometimes. Sometimes when a name is said of two things, huh? Sometimes one of those two things keeps that name as its own. And the other gets a new name, right? Okay? An example of that is the word animal, right? Now, we might say, you know, that animal is said of animals with reason. You can call those men, right? And animals without reason, you might call them a beast, let's say, right, huh? Okay? But sometimes, instead of using the word beast for an animal without reason, we'll just keep the word animal for the animals without reason, huh? And so sometimes, we distinguish man and animal, right? Because it's not the same thing, right? But just a minute now, before, we're saying that man is an animal. Well, as I go back and say, my mother didn't like it when I would say, man is an animal. And I'd say, well, mama, I don't mean he's just an animal. Okay? An animal has reason. Okay, well, that's better, I should say. You see? So sometimes, we use the word animal, right? Right? With this precision, right? Cutting off. But it's just an animal. See? But since man has something very significant, huh? In addition to being a living body with senses, huh? Maybe that he has reason, right? He gets in the name, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? But you have to be careful, you see, not to change this distinction. Because if you distinguish man against animal, do you mean by animal is distinguished from man, living body with sensation? Or man is a living body with senses too. So you mean what is just an animal, right? Okay? Okay? So, when you distinguish between nature and reason, or between a natural ability and a rational ability, huh? Okay. Okay. Okay. It's like this distinction between animal and man. Because the natural ability is something that is just the natural ability, right? Okay? Our reason is not just the ability to know something naturally, right? But to know things by reasoning and so on. But the mind is kind of opening up to opposites, huh? Okay? In the same way for the will, right? What is, you contrast nature and will. What doesn't mean there's nothing of will, nothing of nature and will. But why does will then get the name will and nature keep it? But what is just a nature keeps the name nature. And what is not just a nature but has something in addition to that, the ability to choose and so on, gets it a name and calls it the will, right? Okay? Do you see the way? Now, it goes back a little bit, you can explain a little bit, going back to the Eighth Book of Wisdom, right? Where Aristotle compared the definitions to, what, numbers, right? Okay? Now, so suppose you're contrasting two and three, right? Okay? Well, is there a two in three? Yes. Yeah, see? So you've got to understand that when you distinguish two against three, you're not denying that there might be in some way two in three, right? But three is really, as we saw before, two plus one. That's what it is, right? So three is not just two, okay? So it's almost like we're dividing two into what? Two and three. Okay? Two into what is just two and what is two plus one. And two plus one, because it's not just two, it gets a new name, three. And what is just two, it keeps the name, yeah. You see what I mean? Mm-hmm. Okay? So, you don't want to misunderstand the distinction between two and three. There is a distinction between two and three, right? Mm-hmm. But you don't want to misunderstand it and deny that in some way there's a two in three. Okay? But you want to understand that three is not just two. There's two and something more, right? Mm-hmm. You see? That's kind of a subtle thing, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? Now, Aristotle, when he distinguishes the rational ability from the natural ability, right, he's doing so by what the rational ability has that the natural ability doesn't have, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? And that is that in some ways it's open to opposites, right? Okay? So, Shakespeare can write a tragedy or a comedy, right? Okay? Uh, one can use the fifth book of politics to overcoat it, or to preserve it, right, then? So, do that, see? Um, in many things reason has a difficulty knowing the truth, right? And it has reason to think it is so, and reason to think it is not so, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? So, Socrates and Amino reasons that virtue can be taught with probability, and it can reason that reason that virtue cannot be taught with probability, right? Okay? So, you can, um, you're open to opposites, huh? Um, and I can choose to do something or not to do it, or to do it this way, or to do it that way, right, then? Okay? So, you want to distinguish, uh, the rational ability from the natural ability. You do so by what the rational ability has that the natural ability doesn't have. It's almost like saying that the natural ability, um, is not just a natural ability, it's a natural ability plus something, what, more, right? Okay? So, in my desire, I have a natural desire to know, right, then? And, uh, I don't naturally desire to be ignorant. I have a natural desire to do it, right? So, it's not, I choose, you know? Should I choose to, to know things or, or to be ignorant? No, I naturally want to know, okay? So, in that sense, I'm not open to those two opposites, right? Okay? Um, I suppose in some way, I naturally want to be wise. I don't want to be a fool. Ha, ha, ha. Um, you know, in there, King Lear, I mean, of, uh, Thelarite, where a fellow realizes that his wife is innocent, he's been deceived by Yahu, you know? Fool, fool. He's done his clothes on white, right? Now he realizes. So, he wants to be a fool, right? Okay? But now, does my natural desire to know mean that I will study now natural philosophy tonight, rather than, say, studying geometry tonight, or studying theology, right? You see? So, I'm not just determined to one or two opposites in my life, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? I can choose to study natural philosophy tonight, or not study natural philosophy, or study natural philosophy, or study geometry tonight, right? Or study theology or something, right? You see? Okay? I can read the Gospel of St. John tonight, or not read it, right? I can read the Gospel of St. John, or read the Gospel of St. Matthew, right? Okay? So, I don't, I'm not just determined to one, right? So, I'm not, my reason, or my will, is not just a natural ability. It's a natural ability. It's something, right? You see? But when you distinguish them, you distinguish them by what one has in addition to the other. That's what stands out, okay? So, when you distinguish the will of nature, you might begin to distinguish them by saying the will is the ability to choose, okay? And reason is an ability for opposites, and so on, right? You mean the idea for that. But it's not just that, right? Everybody likes saying that in no way there are two and three. You can't get two and three, because three is not the same as two. Now, the modern philosophers, huh? When you read them, they, some of them, very explicitly, deny that reason actually, what? Knows anything, okay? So, like, John Stuart Mill, take an example here, right? I don't know if they're called on liberty, right? Okay? And the moderns are very interested in liberty, huh? And John Stuart Mill's work called on liberty, right? But one of the chapters is on liberty of thought, right? Where he's defending liberty of thought, free thinking, you know, I want to put it that way. But part of this, right, defense of this, is something that Aristotle would admit, right? That there are things where we don't know whether it is so or it isn't so, right? And we can give maybe reasons for saying it is so, maybe reasons for saying it isn't so, right? Maybe the reasons we can give for it is so are stronger or numerous than the ones we can give for it's not so, right? But maybe somebody else will go up with some better reasons for it's not being so, you know? So we've got to kind of keep an open mind, you might say, right? But where Mill disagrees with Aristotle is that there's nothing we really, what, are determined to say it is so and cannot not be so, right? Or it's not so and cannot be so, right? There's nothing, in other words, that reason is naturally determined to, right? So that for Mill, we'll go on talking forever but never really, what, anything, never definitely say, you know, it is so and cannot not be so, right? Okay? So he's denying that there's something of nature. Sure. Sure. in the reason, right? So he's misunderstanding the distinction between the natural ability and the rational ability. Just like if you distinguish between the animals and man, right? As we sometimes do, right? But if you misunderstand the distinction to not realize that man is in some way an animal, right? And that we distinguish man as an animal because man is not just an animal, right? In the same way we distinguish three from two, not because there isn't a two in three, but because three is not just two, it's a distinction from two, you see? In the same way with the will, you see? You take something that's crazy about freedom, like Sartre, the distinction of something. Well, for Sartre, there's nothing that the will necessarily wills, okay? And that, you know, you're copping out if you think that your will is necessarily willing to something, right? That's this kind of absolute, what, indetermination of the will, right? It's completely free, huh? And is that really true? See? So, in a sense, what they're saying is that there's nothing that we naturally will, and there's nothing that we naturally understand, right? So, in the case of the will, everything you will is a choice, okay? And everything you think is a result of some kind of reasoning, or something less than reasoning, right? And there's nothing that you naturally think. So, the moderns are misunderstanding the distinction between the two, huh? I mean, just like Aristotle's text here by itself, you might think that because he distinguishes the rational ability, right, and the natural ability, because the rational ability is capable of opposites, and the natural ability is determined to one if two opposites are eight, that he's making, what? An aim? Yeah. But Aristotle will talk, you know, in, when he talks about the, in the fourth book, when he talked about the axioms, like the whole is more than the part and so on, he speaks there of the mind naturally knowing these things, right? So the mind can't really think that something both is and is not. It can say this, but it can't really think that, huh? And, some can say that, well, the part can be equal to the whole, but if you give him part of his cell radio, he'll rave and rant, you know, because he knows that the part is not equal to the whole. And, so, so to say that the rational ability is capable contraries is not to say that it has, what, no determination at all. It doesn't naturally understand, in the case of reason, or naturally will some things, huh? So I, take it as an example, they're not unique, I mean, I know the text pretty well, the text of Mill and the one of Sartre, right? For Sartre, there's nothing that we will naturally. Everything is a choice, huh? Again, for Mill, there's nothing that we naturally, what, understand, right? Which, you'll find that running through the modern scientists a lot, too, huh? You see the force you're accustomed, right? But they think that every thought is a, what, hypothesis, right? Um, to be tested by its consequences, huh? Well, if you know a little bit of logic, you know that the confirmation of an hypothesis is not a, what, sojourn. As a scientist says, you know, if my hypothesis is correct, then he says, what will be so? He makes some kind of prediction, right? Some kind of consequence. And if what he predicts by his hypothesis is found to be so, then that's a confirmation of his hypothesis, right? If what he predicts doesn't take place, then that's reputation of his hypothesis. But notice, if you look at what he's doing logically, the, there's more strength in the rejection of an hypothesis than the confirmation of, right? And so, if you want to put it here in, uh, logical form, you might say that when this hypothesis is confirmed, you're in a sense arguing, if A is so, then B is so, B is so, but even how much logic we learned it doesn't follow necessarily that A is so, right? Oh, you're hearing my example, I use the logic class all the time. If Berkus dropped in last night, then Berkus will be absent today. That's my prediction. My hypothesis is he dropped in last night. My prediction is he dropped in the class. He is absent in the class. Does it follow necessarily that he got dead last night? No. No, I tell the students that's wishful thinking. It's not logical thinking, see? Okay? But now, if I argue this way, A is so, then B is so, and B is not so, then it follows necessarily that what? He is not so. So there's more strength in the, what? Rejection of a hypothesis than the confirmation of it, right? Now, Einstein said this there, he's talking about the Newtonian physics and relativity physics. He said, Newtonian physics predicted so many things that came true, or found to be true, right? That the physicists began to think the Newtonian physics must be true. And then along comes Einstein with the relativity theory, and by a different theory, different hypothesis, he can predict the same things that Newton predicted, plus something Newton didn't predict, right? So, then it became crystal clear, he says, the physicists that they never know. But, just from simple logic, you can see that the fact that if A is so, then B is so, even if it turns out that B is so, it doesn't follow necessarily that what? A is so, right? It's not a syllogism, huh? That could be considered a fallacy in logic to include that A is so. Now, you can say, the more things you predict that aren't shown to be so, the more probability there is that A is so, and the more precise those things are, right? Numerically, the more probability there is, right? But the form of the argument is there as such that it is necessarily so. So, the physicists being accustomed to this, right? As I was quoting Claude Bernard, I think, if you're in one of our lectures, Claude Bernard sees this, right? And he says, doubt is intrinsic to the experimental method, right? That no matter how many times an hypothesis has been confirmed, right, you can still doubt it to the extent of testing it again, right? And maybe now something that you predict will not be so, and then now you've got to reject or modify your hypothesis, So, they're used to working then with ideas that are, what, hypotheses, right? And so, they accustom, they think that every idea is an hypothesis to be tested by its consequences, huh? Like Shakespeare says one place, thoughts are but dreams until their effects be tried. It's the imagination, right? Well, if that's what you think every idea is, then there's no idea and no thought that our mind is what? Certain. Yeah. No one towards determined, right? Okay? There's only more or less probability for some idea and, well, that would confirm this way of thinking or this thinking that bit. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.