Wisdom (Metaphysics 2005)
Lecture 28: Wisdom's Subject Matter: Substances and Immaterial Causes

Transcript
================================================================================

and therefore its existence is not tied to the body. Now the third place, of course, where you find this in natural philosophy is when you define motion in the third book of natural hearing. And you go through all these things about motion in the subsequent books. And then starting in book 7 and 8, you start to see the dependence of motion upon a mover. And then eventually the dependence of moved movers upon an unmoved mover. And of course the body doesn't move without being moved itself. So you end up, therefore, with an unmoved mover at the end of the eight books of natural hearing that is not a, what, a body, right? So these are three places in natural philosophy where you come to the existence of something immaterial, an immaterial substance. And maybe that's a good reason for calling wisdom sometimes metatahuzika, after the books of natural philosophy. And without those books, you would kind of be stuck, you know, back with your imagination. And whatever it is must be somewhere, right? If it isn't somewhere, it doesn't exist, right? It's very hard to get beyond that point, though, for the average man or even the average thinker. Now, he asks a second question. Assuming that there is something apart from what? The material substances, right? Is there one or many kinds of such substances? And we mentioned this last time, right? Because Anaxiavius spoke when he had this greater mind of one. And Plato spoke of the forms and the mathematical things and explained why he got into that position. Aristotle, when he talks about the number of separated substances, right? He doesn't want to go too far away from the distinct motions he can see in the heavens, right? But Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentilis gives good reasons to say that there must be many more than what Aristotle thought, right? And of course, Aristotle, you know, he's only speaking of probability there is not many there are. But so you have even a disagreement, maybe, between Aristotle and Plato, right? He's kind of in between Anaxiavius and Plato, right? But Thomas, along with Anaxiavius and so on, these things are very numerous. But he gives very good reasons for it in the Summa Contra Gentilis. Now, he sticks in those two questions which are really about the things and not about what wisdom is about, right? Because if there are immaterial substances, right, then the question is, is wisdom about material substances and immaterial substances? Or is there one knowledge about material substances, about animals and plants, and another knowledge about the separated substances? Okay, there raises problems about this, right? But in the dialectic, when he goes into it later on in Book 3, he'll pull out those ones and make them a separate part, the questions here on substance, right? Okay? He sticks them in here because, obviously, they involve, and the kind of certain answers to them are presupposed for the importance of these other questions. And if it is about substance, the second paragraph, now going back, and if it is about substance, whether there is one, about all, or many, right? Well, that becomes especially a question if you say that there are, what, not only material substances, but immaterial substances. Are these known in the same what? Yeah, yeah. In the same science. Yeah, yeah. Now, if you go to Plato, Plato, you know, speaks of the soul as if the soul is looking out there at material things, right? And drawn towards material things in the senses, huh? But if you want to know these immaterial things, you've got to what? Turn the soul around again, okay? And, you know, when you turn around, you don't turn around to 180 degrees at one thing. You turn first to 90 degrees, right? Then you go to 180 degrees, right? So, I'm looking at these sensible things that are always changing and hardly knowable, right? But if I go to mathematics, right, I come to a science which is not as immaterial as the forms, right? The things it's about are not as immaterial. It's closer to the material world, but it's still kind of separated. And that's kind of turning 90 degrees, to use that kind of metaphor, right? And then I'll try to do what? And Proclus, you know, following in the school of Plato, you know, says that mathematics purificat, augmentis, purify the eye of the mind, the eye of the soul, right? And then turn around and look now at the U.S., immaterial things, right? Okay? Now, of course, you Christians, right? He tries to philosopher here, you know. You Christians sometimes speak something like that, right? Because when St. Paul is carried up into the third heaven, right? Whether in his body or not, he didn't know when he talks about this. And if you're talking about that kind of knowledge, you kind of turn away from the sensible world, right? The black net of the soul, maybe, and so on. And you turn around and face in the other direction, right? And what's interesting about this, it's kind of metaphorical, what Plato's saying there in the public. I mean, you know, comparing the soul to the body turning around. But it kind of fits that word that Aristotle used at the end of the second book, where the Greek word was tropos, right? Aristotle would talk about the tropos, the way of proceeding, and so on. And I mentioned how that word's a little different from the Latin word they used to translate it. and modus pocedenda, yeah, modus. And in English we use the word war, more way, huh? But the Greek word tropos has got the idea of what? Of turning, right, huh? And one of my favorite authors there, Washington Irving, huh? And that beautiful little thing called Mountshoy, right? It's a guy who's got a very poetic turn of mind, he says, right? And he's attached to this teacher, you know, who makes everything poetic, you know? Yeah, it's a very interesting little story, but I'm struck by his choice of word, right? And sometimes I think other people use that phrase too, right? Somebody has a different turn of mind, huh? And so, if you think that you have to turn 180 degrees, and it's just the opposite direction, in order to consider these immaterial substances, how could there be one knowledge, right, of material substances, and what? Immaterial substances. If you have to turn away from the material world, and go to this, and look in another direction, huh? Now, if you answer that, which is kind of plausible at first, right? Okay? And we might say, you know, to use a word that we Christians use for the immaterial substances, we call them angels sometimes, right? Would you think there's the same knowledge of animals, that zoology and the knowledge of angels would belong to the same knowledge? Hmm? Yeah, yeah, okay. Well, now, that goes on to the next question then, right? If you have one knowledge of material substances, and another knowledge of immaterial substances, which is wisdom. And what happens to what we learned about wisdom in the beginning, that wisdom is a knowledge of all things, right? So, get two wisdoms? That seems strange, right? Or, if you say one of these is wisdom, then wisdom is not about all things. You've got real problems here, right? Okay? Do you see a problem? Yeah, that's what you want to see at this point. Not the answer, but a problem. A question, right? Okay? So, here's two questions then, about wisdom being about substances, right? Is there one wisdom, one reason of knowledge, about all substances, or not? And then, assuming that we're reasonable to get... If you guess that there isn't one knowledge, then get two wisdoms, or one of these wisdoms, one's not. But that involves problems, doesn't it, right? Because then wisdom would not be a knowledge of all things. The wise man would not be a know-it-all. Okay? And if you're knowing the first causes of all things, which is what wisdom's goal is, well, one of these would be about all things. is whether the man contradicts himself or not, right? Because eventually Protagra starts to contradict himself and then there's another criterion which is more hidden but somewhat the man's appetite, right? And as Protagra says if I had always fought the weapons my opponent wanted, I never would have become famous and my name would not have spread throughout Greece so you can see the man is getting even glory, right? So but anyway, the topic of the conversation between Protagra and Socrates is about what we might call the cardinal virtues but the list that Socrates has is not the four we have but the four we have plus piety so you have practical wisdom or foresight and you have justice and courage and moderation and piety, right? Socrates asks him are these five names the same thing? Or are they five names they're different things like the ear and the nose and the eyes well he says it's like the ear the eye and the nose and so on and Socrates starts to reason, right? That they're all the same thing and I won't go into all of it but one part is relevant to this he argues that wisdom and moderation are the what? Same thing now there's a certain connection between those two, right? Like that fragment of Heraclitus moderation is the greatest virtue and wisdom is to speak the truth and to act in accord with nature but the way Socrates tries to reason that they are the same is that the contrary of both is what? The same and so he says well what's the contrary of wise in this practical sense? Be foolish foolish, yeah? Okay? And what's the opposite of being temperate? Like being a drunkard? Well drunkard acts foolishly, right? As I mentioned the word fond you know the word fond you see you're fond of a girl but the original meaning of fond is foolish, right? So you see so he's fond of a girl he's acting like a fool, right? So Socrates gets some evidence that the opposite of moderation is foolish, right? And everybody thinks the drunkard you know I mean he makes a fool of himself, right? And then Socrates reasons that a thing has only one contrary so foolishness is the contrary of moderation and foolishness is the contrary of wisdom and wisdom and moderation must be the same thing So then you see what might suggest these questions to Aristotle, right? And the examples he uses, right? We mentioned contrariety there in the next to the last paragraph in this reading Of course Aristotle will talk about contrariety in the tenth book of wisdom especially Did you say he won't? He will He will Yeah But the dietician always talks about these things When Plato was making this argument he certainly must have seen that he was using the word equivocally or analogously did he? Yes Well the point is dialectical reasoning is reasoning from probable opinions even to contradictory conclusions Now probable opinion always has some part of the truth in it, right? But not the whole truth right? And as we find out when we study ethics the moral virtues like moderation and courage and so on they all have to partake of reason and therefore of practical wisdom Yeah and the vices opposed to them don't partake of the sin so they might say they partake of folly, right? Yeah So folly is the pure contrary you might say of wisdom, right? Mm-hmm But the vice opposed to moderation, right? Drunkenness and so on partakes of folly, right? Yeah without being it Okay So it's like if you listen to the music of Mozart, right? It's very convincing when Mozart represents the emotions the truth that underlies ethics that the emotions can partake of what? Reason Yeah Yeah And that famous article that Asti wrote years ago called Towards an Evaluation of Music appeared in the Thomist but when he compared the music say of Mozart's period or the Baroque to to the Romantic period, right? The thing the Romantics wouldn't admit is that reason should rule the emotions and you gotta be careful about that because Aristotle when he says that reason should rule the emotions he asks a very good question he said should reason rule the emotions as a master rules his slave or should reason rule the emotions like a father rules his son and Aristotle will eventually conclude that like a father rules his son right? But notice the master rules the slave not for the good of the slave but for the good of the master right? But the father rules the son for the good of the son right? And so you see that in family life you know where the parents are good parents reasonable parents wise parents the children are more happy with the great discipline they're not being crushed there's not a father crushing the children you know but giving them the right discipline and so on like a father disciplining a son right? Then they're actually emotionally more happy than the ones that allow it to run wild so there is an element of what he's saying what's interesting too about he wants to try to show later on he doesn't get to because protagonist wants to get out of this thing he's getting into but the one that he leaves kind of to the end is courage and wisdom right? Well it's beautiful the way you know for understanding these things because when we study the moral virtues and learn that they are in the mean between two extremes what we call the golden mean not the mean that is demining you know Shakespeare likes to put in that huh? You know they are sick that suffer too much as they that starve with nothing therefore it's no mean happiness to be constituted in the mean it's no little happiness right? to be constituted in the very beautiful understanding but it doesn't mean that the moral virtue is equidistant from the two extremes and so courage is in between cowardliness and foolhardiness right? and moderation is in between let's say turdianism and interprets right? but moderation is closer to to which extreme yeah but courage is closer to what? foolhardy right? so courage doesn't seem to be opposed to foolishness as much as moderation does because moderation is more opposed to eating and drinking too much or chasing the woman too much and so on right? and the man who drinks too much or makes a fool over himself or the woman right? it seems more opposed to folly see like courage the courageous man almost seems foolish to us right? because it's not as far from that so he doesn't reason the same way right? so even that tells us something doesn't it? it tells us I mean it shows an understanding of of moderation is more opposed to folly than courage is okay? and so in Shakespeare's great play Coriolanus he's a very brave man but the other men think he's foolhardy but he's not foolhardy they're a little bit cowardly compared to him right? but he he doesn't appear to be posed to folly but to be folly or to be foolish but notice the last question Aristotle asks there further whatever happens as such to these and not only which of these is not only what the contrariety is but also this further question kind of like the property of a property whether one is contrary to what? to one right? so if you know the Protegrees you can see how Aristotle is being influenced right? but if you remember the other the other you can see I know we do the first book of natural hearing, you know, but it's there that starting with Heraclitus and then Plato and the Phaedo and finally Aristotle in the first book of natural hearing bring out that all change is between contraries, it seems. And to some extent, all the Greek philosophers see this, right? So contrariety takes a great importance, huh? But nevertheless, these last two questions seem to be a little more particular than some of the ones we saw earlier here in this reading. And they're not really developed that much in the dialectical. They're not as basic as whether there are material substances only or also immaterial substances. That's a real major question, you know. So with the exception of those two questions about whether there are immaterial substances as well as material substances and if there are, whether there are one kind or many kinds, right? These questions in this first group of questions have been about what wisdom is about, right? Okay? And Thomas says he brings up those questions first because you have to know what wisdom is about before you can know the way of proceeding in wisdom. And you have to know the way of proceeding in wisdom before you can proceed well, right? To answer the questions about the things themselves. So the end of the second book kind of shows us the difference and also the order of the questions in the second reading and the questions in the third reading, which would be about the causes themselves, right? Okay? So let's turn now to the third reading here. Now, Aristotle does something interesting here in the way he arranges the questions in the third reading. There's going to be about 14 questions, right? And all the questions are divided according to the opinion of Plato. See? They say, well, why are that? What's not is if the other people's opinions aren't going to come up. Well, everybody else's opinion is going to come up in its opposition to the opinion of Plato. Okay? But why give this kind of prominence to Plato, right? Well, you could say Plato is the only philosopher, for the most part. Hank Seger says there's an exception somewhat, right? But Plato is the only philosopher before Aristotle who talks much about immaterial things, right? Plato is the only guy who seems to have a thought that there are more things than these material things, than these natural things, right? And they're supposed to have asked Hank Segerich, you know, why is it better that a man be born than never born, right? Well, so he could contemplate the universe, right? But he's kind of talking about the material universe, right? Cosmos, huh? So, in a way, Plato is, quote, the first metaphysician, right? The first man who sees wisdom as something after, that is to say, natural philosophy, huh? Okay? Up to that point, natural philosophy would have been considered wisdom. And that's because all things, as far as we know in the beginning, are these things around us. These sensible things, right? And sensible things are mainly natural things and artificial things, right? So, when I look around this room, most of what I see is artificial, right? It's only your face and hands that are natural, right? But your clothing and the walls and the room, everything's artificial. Now, if we went for a walk in the woods, most of what we'd see would be unnatural, right? But if you stop and think about it, you realize that the natural things are before the artificial things. That the artificial things were made originally out of material that came from the natural world. And they're made by the hands of man, right? Which are something he has by nature, right? So that the maker and the matter of artificial things is really something natural. So if you're looking for the beginning of all things, the first causes, right? You don't look for the first causes of artificial things, but the first causes of what? Natural things. And if all there is is these sensible things, meaning artificial and natural things, a natural philosophy, it must be wisdom, right? Okay? And of course, you know, sometimes, you know, in this relativistic age, you know, people will say, you know, you call that wisdom of the best knowledge just because you want it, right? Right? Well, the point is, for 200 years, the Greeks thought that natural philosophy was the best knowledge, right? And they weren't attached to it. They didn't say it was the best knowledge because they liked it the most, but they wanted it the most because it seemed to be the one that was about what was the beginning of all things, right? If you knew the beginning, right? The first causes of natural things, since they're the causes of artificial things, then you know the first causes of all things, right? But then when they realized that there were immaterial things, right? As Anaxagoras began to realize, and Plato much more so, and Aristotle, then they realized that wisdom is going to come after. And then they wanted that knowledge even more than natural philosophy. And although natural philosophy has to be learned first, it's on the way to something else which is more philosophy, first philosophy, as Aristotle would call, or wisdom. So, now, notice what Plato said. Plato had two main opinions about these immaterial things, right? He had the, what, separated forms, which are capitalized, corresponding to the definitions that Socrates is looking for, right? The universal forms. And then he had these mathematical things, right? Okay? This is what kind of nip to play. Mathematical. Things corresponding to the mathematical sciences, huh? And we gave one visa, which Thomas often gives for these two, right? That the way we know must be the way things are. If we truly know, right? And so, if we truly know in mathematics, there must be a mathematical world out there. If we truly know numbers and geometrical figures and so on in separation from the sensible world, they must truly be out there in separation from the sensible world. In the same way, if we truly know the definitions, as Socrates was showing in the catalogs, and the definition is knowing the universal in separation from the singular, then those universal forms must be released out there in the world by themselves, huh? The world of forms, huh? The Spanish, kind of a Greek word, idea, you know? Ethnologically, that's a more transliteration, a translation. So, these 14 questions are divided according to these two, okay? But there's going to be 12 questions about the first, and two about the second, although some of these can be subdivided, but that's basically the way it is, huh? Okay? Now, those 12 questions, you'll see more clearly the first six, how they're related to this, okay? The first six. Because the second six are more particular, huh? Okay? So, in a sense, what Plato's saying is that there are universals separated, right, from all the things, huh? So, in the first six questions you'll meet, some will be about separated, and some will be about universals. But after these questions, he will bring in everybody else's opinion. Very subtle, Aristotle does here, now the second six questions will be more particular, and not as closely tied to this position, but we'll see those second six when we come to that, okay? Now, the first two questions, huh, will be tied up with the universals. Thank you. And then the next four was separated. Okay? Now, there's going to be a certain similarity between the first two questions and the third question. Okay? The first question about separable, or the separated. Look at the third question just a moment, and I'll come back to the first two, because I want to make this comparison a bit here. Most of all, right, it's extremely important, he says, should be sought and considered whether there is some cause as such besides matter. Okay? Now, we went through the early weeks, if you remember, right? And the poet said, Mother Earth. In Shakespeare, I think a good poet, right? Addresses Mother Earth saying, Common mother thou, whose womb immeasurable, an infinite breast, teems, which means gives rise to right, birth to, and feeds all. So Shakespeare addresses, what? Mother Earth as a common mother of us all, right? Whose womb immeasurable, right? An infinite breast teems and feeds all, right? And then you have Thales saying, The water is the beginning of all things, right? And then Naximena is saying air, and so on. So the first philosophers are thinking of matter, some kind of matter, as a beginning of all things, right? And although some of the later thinkers, right, like especially in Pedocles and Anxagoras and so on, and even some of the things in Pythagoras, were introduced to some other kind of, what, cause, right? They also keep matter as a cause, huh? Okay? So you could say that everyone agrees that matter is a cause of some things, right? But the early ones think only that matter is a cause, right? So that's the first question there, you might say, right? Is there some cause besides matter, or is matter the only cause? Okay? Now, of course, in modern times, you know, I mean, you have, the Marxist philosophy is officially called, what? Dialectical materialism, right? Okay? But materialism means that matter is a source of everything, huh? And as comrade Lenin said, you know, Mind, the highest product of matter! So, this is something about which the philosophers disagree, right? They don't disagree as to whether matter is a cause, but they disagree as to whether matter is the only cause, okay? So Aristotle doesn't raise the question, is matter a cause? And he takes it, right, as being something there's no disagreement about, really. The disagreement is, is it the only cause? Okay? It's very interesting. He's taking what is more known, right? And even the poets, who imagine more than think, maybe, right? Even they say that same thing, right? Common mother thou, whose womb immeasurable and infinite breast teems and feeds all. Do you see that? Okay? Now, the second question, in that, we'll continue, there's a second group here from here. Now, if there is reason to think there's some other kind of cause besides matter, right? The next question is, but is it only in matter? Okay? So someone might admit, well, yeah, there's another kind of cause, because, say, your parents are a cause of you, right? Your parents made you, right? Okay? Maybe not entirely, but they might think entirely, okay? So they might admit that the parents made the offspring, but the parents really aren't the matter, right? Okay? So here you get another kind of cause, but your parents are material things too, right? Okay? Or someone might say, well, the teeth in front have a different shape than the teeth in back, right? So here you've got something besides matter, namely shape, right? But the shape exists only in the matter, right? Okay? So now, if you look at, say, a person who says those things, you might say, okay, there's another kind of cause besides matter, like the parents or the shape, but only in matter, there's another kind of cause, right? Okay? Then you have this strange guy named Dan Xagres, right? who says that not only is there another kind of cause besides matter, but one of those causes other than matter, right? Named in the greater mind exists without matter, right? So that's another disagreement, right? Okay? You see? Someone might admit that there are moved movers, right? And Aristotle's talking about the opinions about the soul in the first book about the soul. And they all had the idea that the, what? The soul moves the body, huh? But they thought you couldn't move something unless you were in motion yourself. So they tried to make the soul, like the Democritus did, these atoms that are very mobile, huh? And, well, no, if you only had moved movers, right? Then you'd have another kind of cause besides matter, the mover. But the moved mover would be itself a body of some sort, huh? So that's the difference between in the third paragraph at the bottom of the page, in the third reading there, and the fourth one, right? The third one is saying, is there any kind of cause besides matter? Okay? And some people say, no, that's all there is. Mother Earth or water or something, right? I would say, yes, there is. But those who say yes, then there comes another question, right? Does another kind of cause exist only in matter? Or is it just a part of matter? And you see, not only would Anaxagoras see that there is a cause, at least one of the causes other than matter, right? The greater mind is existing in part of matter. But Plato would talk of the separated forms, huh? So you guys, you're all partaking of the form of man himself, right? But the form of man himself doesn't involve any matter. So here's a cause other than matter existing not in matter, right? So Plato and Anaxagoras would be on one side and the other guys maybe might be on the other side, huh? Okay? Do you see that? And those are perfectly asked how to order the questions there, right? Those, okay? You have to agree or come to the conclusion that there is some kind of cause besides matter, right? Before you even raise the question is, are some of those causes or some cause other than matter existing only in matter or is there some cause other than matter that doesn't even exist in matter? It exists without matter, right? You see that? Perfectly order. Can't be otherwise. And then the third question is like what we met before, right? Like you read about substance. Whether one like the greater mind of Anaxagoras, right? Or many a number like the many forms that Plato spoke about, right? And that's perfect order, right? Because now you're asking whether that cause other than matter that doesn't exist in matter doesn't exist without matter, right? Whether it's one like Anaxagoras said or many like Plato said. So these are questions because the great thinkers have what? Given different answers to them, right? Okay. Now the fourth one is a little more particular, right? It was dealing with the idea of the forms themselves, right? And whether there is something besides the whole together. Now, what does he call the whole together in Greek, huh? When something is said of matter, right, huh? Okay? Or nothing, or of these, but not of those, and what sort of things they are, right? So you're a whole together, right? You involve what a man is, because you are a man, right? But you involve something private to you, right? You're a matter, huh? Is there something besides that, man himself, or not, huh? Okay, that's a little more particular question, so he puts it forth, right? Okay? Now, let's go back to the first two questions here in the third reading, huh? The reason why I mentioned those ones there, because obviously, you can see the starting point in that group of four questions, they're talking about separated from matter, right? Okay? Separate in kind, and then if in kind, also separated in existence, right? For matter, right? Okay? But it's starting from matter, which is the natural place for our mind to start, huh? Okay? That's why I think the English word for cause is very revealing, right? The English word for cause is what? Ground. Ground, yeah. Okay? And I was reading The Comedy of Errors, right? I sometimes, you know, clever element of Shakespeare a bit, and I'm always asking these questions, like, what title of what Shakespeare played best describes modern philosophy? And I think the two best comparators are, much you do a lot of them, or The Comedy of Errors. But The Comedy of Errors is very interesting, very interesting in errors, right? How errors are made, huh? And, um, yeah. But in there, Shakespeare puns, like he does in, in, uh, The Two General Verona, he puns on the word, what? Understand. Oh. Okay? Now, regardless of what you think of humor, of punting upon the words like that, In, in the, uh, General Verona, the two, uh, servants are talking to each other, and one doesn't understand what the other guy's saying, and the other guy's kidding him, you know? Well, my, my kid understands me, right? You see? And so they, they, they, they kind of, you know, claim that. Well, in this one, the, the master is whacking the ear on the head of the servant, because he's not really supposed to be doing, and, um, what did he say, and so on. And I could hardly understand him, right? Meaning, you know, I could hardly stand up under the blows with, okay? But where do we think of the humor, or, or, or, you know, of that punting? Shakespeare's making us, what? Think of the etymology of the word, right? And I maintain that the word understanding is better than the Greek word, knowing, right? And even better than the lack of the word intelligently, unless, it's a way better than the Greek word. Some people, Thomas, they interpret as intelligere, as intuslegere, to breathe within. Or some people say it means to breathe between, but anyway. But the English word understanding has a meaning, basic meaning, that corresponds to the etymology. Now, the etymology and the meaning don't always correspond, but here they're very close. So, to understand something means to know what stands under it, or to know it by what is said to stand under it, right? And so, when you understand a word, what does that mean? You know what stands under the word, the meaning of the things that stand under the word. And of course, even in Latin, they'll speak of the word as being upon the thing. Thomas used the term, impositio, or nominism, the placing of a name upon something, right? And we'll say that too, right? To put a label means a name upon something, right? So, we speak as if the meaning of the word or the thing that is being named is under the name, right? So, to understand the word means to know what is said to stand under the name. Yeah, okay. Or we use the expression in English, the underlying cause. Yeah. So, we speak as if the cause is supporting the effect, right? So, what does it mean to understand an effect? To know the common. To know the cause that stands under that effect, right? Okay? Or we have the same etymology with the lack of the word substance, right? And the word understanding, right? Okay? And sometimes use the word substance as opposed to accident. Sometimes substance means what a thing is, right? So, our reason or understanding knows the substance, huh? The accidents are known by the senses, but the senses don't know substance. That's why the moderns think they don't know substance, right? That's why I say things that his wife is an hypothesis, right? You know? Um, he doesn't think he knows that she's a substance, right? Um, he doesn't think he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows that he knows He takes first the material clause, right? And he defines it as we've known before. That from which something comes to be, existing within it. And he exemplifies this with artificial things, right? Okay? Like glass is a matter of that, right? Or silver, or it will take, you know, great example, there are wood is of the chair, right? But then, after he's gone through the four kinds of causes, and gone through the three corollaries that follow upon the four kinds of causes, then he comes back to the four kinds of causes a second time. Okay? And there's a difference in what he does the second time around. Because he shows you how broadly you can understand each kind of cause. And so he says that all parts out of which something is put together, right, are like the kind of cause called matter. Okay? Because the whole comes to be from its parts, right? And they're in it. Okay? So even in an immaterial thing, sometimes Aristotle gives, as an example, material cause, the premises of a syllogism. Okay? And he's not thinking of the fact of it being like a deficient cause, if they are in another way, but he's thinking, just take the formal syllogism there, every B is A, every C is B, therefore every C is A, right? Well, the parts of the conclusion, the subject and the predicate, the parts that the conclusion is put together from, are in the premises, right? Okay? But now you're thinking of something immaterial, the syllogism there, right? But still there's something like the material clause there, when you have these parts, right? Okay? Or I could say, you know, that a statement is speech signifying the true or the false. And they aren't defining statement by its end or purpose, huh? But I could say a statement is speech put together from a noun in a verb. And then I'm defining it by its parts. And I call it a definition from material clause, even though you're dealing with something maybe in the mind, the statement, huh? Or I could define a definition as speech signifying what a thing is, or speech making known what a thing is. That's its end or purpose. But I could also define it by its matter, its parts, that is to say. And say it's a what? Speech composed of the genus and differences, right? You see that? Okay? So there's a certain similarity, right? You can say that the mother and the father, the children, are the parts of the family, right? You can say the soldiers are the parts of the army, right? And which cause are the soldiers of the army? Right here. Yeah, yeah. Okay? So all parts, in a sense, are like matter, right? Okay? Now, we need a little comparison right now. Because in the first two questions of the third reading, Aristotle's going to talk about dividing something, taking it apart, to get to the beginning of it, right? And that's what we do, don't we? You know, these were analysis all the time, right? Aristotle's famous books on the scientific analogy called the prior and the posterior analytics. But the prior and posterior analysis, the prior and posterior taking apart, you might say, in English, right? Okay? So the similarity in what he's doing in the first two questions, in this first group of six, right? These ones here, as you say, they're all ordered from starting with matter, right? Okay? Now, these first two ones are talking about, if you want to get to the beginnings of things, don't you have to go apart? At least the intrinsic beginnings of things, right? Okay? Don't you have to divide, right? Okay? And now Aristotle takes, in those first two questions, three kinds of division. Okay? Now, I don't know if you've heard me talk before, but imitating what Aristotle and Thomas do all the time, you know, Aristotle would say at the beginning of the physics there, the natural hearing, he'll say beginnings, causes, and elements, and those are the first three words of the fifth book of wisdom, beginnings, causes, and elements. And strictly speaking, beginning is more general than what? Cause. And cause is more general than what? Element, yeah. So every cause, as Aristotle explains in the chapter on beginning, every cause is the beginning in some way. But not every beginning is a cause. And the stock example is the point is the beginning of a line, but not the cause of a line. So beginning is more general than cause, and then cause is more general than element, because element is basically the material cause, and not even every material cause, but the most basic one as a form. So every element is a cause, but not every cause is an element, huh? Okay? Well, I even take that. When I talk about these three words, in fact, I mentioned this before, distinction, division, and definition. Okay? Now, I was always bothered, I don't want people to break now. I was always bothered by Aristotle in the beginning of the natural hearing there, when he speaks of the definition as dividing. But in a way, in a definition, you do divide. So when I go from square, which in a kind of confused and indistinct way, says what this thing is, right? When I go from square to definition, and say, well, it's an equilateral, and a right angle, a quadrilateral, I'm kind of dividing and breaking it apart, aren't I? Okay? So in a way, a definition is a division. Okay? But not every division is a what? Definition, right? Now, how about division distinctions? You say, well, a lot of times we use the words interchangeable, and you'll see Thomas is one kind of a interchangeable. But strictly speaking, division is a distinction of the parts of some whole. So now your distinction is a division. But every division is a what? Distinction. Okay? That becomes very important, say, when you get, you see, in theology, you talk about the Trinity, right? There is a real distinction between the Father and the Son. And between the Holy Spirit and the Father and the Son. And to deny it because there is a distinction is heresy. You get your back in, those who are saying that there is just one person there, right? But we never use the word division talking about it. God is not divided into the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. That would be to falsely imagine and God would be a kind of whole. And these are what? Three parts, right? So, the first thought I was doing here is touching upon three kinds of division to get to the parts that are the beginning of reality. Right? Okay? And each of the three kinds of division will give you a different beginning for reality. Now, if you study the key chapter of part and whole in the fifth book of wisdom, you will find out that there are four, there are four central beings of whole and part. And therefore, there are four kinds of division. But here, he uses only three of his predecessors that he used, right? And the correct one is not used by that. Okay? Now, I see him do that a little bit elsewhere, too. Let's take a little break and then I'll come back to that one. But it's pretty good when he does that. But you see a certain affinity between asking how we should divide reality to get to its beginning Let's take a little break. Let's take a little break. Let's take a little break. Let's take a little break. Let's take a little break. Let's take a little break. Let's take a little break. Let's take a little break. It goes immediately afterwards, talking about matter, right? Because in a way to divide, to get parts, and parts may not be material in the gross sense, you know, but there's a certain likeness, and you divide it into parts. There's an affinity there, those questions. And the questions that start to matter. But you'll find people, you know, not exactly knowing why, but they think in hell it's just important to know something, right? And analysis means basically what? The chemical analysis, whatever it is, you're taking something apart. And therefore you're divided in some way, right? But if there's three, or most people always, of dividing, which is the one to get to the beginnings, right? The things, right?