Wisdom (Metaphysics 2005)
Lecture 16: Mind, Self-Rule, and the Separation of Known from Unknown

Transcript
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If the mother tries to join your teenage daughter's party or something, one of them, right, then they kind of lose that, what, respect or that distance. And, of course, when I grew up, you know, where your mother was at home and your father was away during the day, you are not so, you're more scared of your father than your mother, right? And you get a little bit out of hand sometimes. And my mother said, when your father comes home, you know, when my father would come home, you know, he'd tell me, you sit in that chair, and don't get out of that chair until I tell you to. And I'd sit there. I wouldn't get out of there until I tell you to. My mother was amazed at this command he had over me, you know. It wasn't just because he was a man, but partly because my mother was mixed up with us all day, right? You see? But it was kind of a separation. And you see this, you know, how a stranger sometimes, you know, will say something to a child and they'll be more frozen by this than by their own, what, parents, huh? And I was a little boy there. I was in my aunt's story heritage. My grandfather there was an ice cream place and, you know, soda fountain and so on. And I was spinning those stools, you know, and driving my aunt Helen crazy. And finally the cop comes in to get a Coke and he sits down and my aunt is just, you know, so she sits down, you know, what are you little boy who's been spinning these things all day long, you know? And he said, well, we can put him in jail for a day. And he said, oh, did I behave myself, you know? And I guess my mother used to joke about this. My aunt Helen didn't realize how she'd scare the stickers out of me asking that thing. But there's a lot of distance, you know, between me and the placement, you know? I mean, probably my aunt Helen, you know? So, you see the idea, the ruler must not be mixed up with the ruler, right? So, if the greater mind rules over animals and plants, ranging their parts and so on, it must not be mixed up with these things. It must be separated from matter. Now, at this point, there is a apparent contradiction in something that Heraclitus had said, right? And we've seen a bit in Heraclitus, huh? How contradiction might be the start of discovery, right? Aristotle will talk about this explicitly at the beginning of Book 3 when we look at that. But you see two things that seem to contradict each other here. He said three things about the mind and he's given a reason for one of the three, right? As he compared those four things, the two of them seem to kind of contradict each other in a way. So, you get four, two and three, between two and three. Yeah, and between two and not three by itself, but the reason for three, right? Yeah. Because two has said that the mind is self-ruling and that seems reasonable and the existence of logic is a sign that that's true, right? But it also seems reasonable that the ruler must be separated from the rule, but the mind is not separated from itself. So, there's a apparent contradiction between the second thing he says about the mind and the reason he gives for the third thing, right? And I think, you know, in teaching this fragments at, you know, in college for years, I maybe had maybe one student who saw the contradiction, you know, on his own, and even I asked him about the contradiction because a lot of times they can't find it, you know? But it's a very striking one, right? What's important about it is that there's truth in the reason for number two as well as in the reason for number three. So, but they seem to contradict each other. So, two things that are both highly probable, that the mind can in some way rule itself, and that the ruler must be separated from the ruled, both seem reasonable, but they seem to contradict each other, you know? And so, something here is hidden from us, right? The hidden harmony, as Heraclitus said, is better than the apparent harmony, right? We've been in a state of apparent harmony. Because when I say to my students, I say, what two things seem to contradict each other, and a lot of them can't find them, you know? So, all these things seem to be acceptable, right? And yet, when you stop and compare the second thing with the reason for the third, there seems to be a contradiction here. And now you're out of the state of apparent harmony, and you're in this state of perplexity, huh? Where even reasonable things seem to point in opposite directions, huh? And how do you do this, huh? Maybe there's a difference between self-ruling or self-direction and ruling objects outside. But when the mind is self-ruling, is there a distinction there in the mind between the ruler and the ruled? In the sense of its operation and not itself. Yeah, yeah. Well, let's go back and take another key from Socrates, because he gives us the key solution to this. But let's go back to another thing he says in the Republic, right? In the first book of the Republic, Socrates shows some things, and they can't really deny what he's saying, but they're still not convinced. And so someone says that Socrates is beginning the second book of the Republic. Do you want to have seemed to have convinced us, Socrates? Or do you really want to convince us? And Socrates says, well, I really want to convince you. And so they're asking for, to make things more clear, right? And so Socrates says, well, I'm going to blow up! He's been showing something about the soul and the way the parts of the soul should be in the first book. And it's hard to see the parts of the soul and so on. So he makes this famous comparison between the parts of the soul, or three parts of the soul, and three parts of the city, right? And then he goes and talks about the city, right? And are you able to see from that later on, huh? It's a little bit like, you know, if I say, you know, it's terrible in your soul to have your emotions not moderated and controlled by your reason. No, I don't see that. But I was thinking about that one time I was in McDonald's, right? And it was a busy time, you know, and the people behind the counter are resting to get the orders filled and so on. I said, what an awful job, I said, you know, to me. But what if I kill as well as demanding all these things, right? All these people at the counter, you know, demanding their food and wanting to get out fast, you know, and so on. And that's in a way what your reason is to your emotions, right? You're kind of enslaved to it, huh? So, I go back to this idea of self-rule, right? And I say, now, let's take the city, right? When a country is a colony, it's ruled by the mother country. But when that country gets independence and starts to enjoy self-rule, what does that mean? Does it mean that the whole country is ruling the whole country? No. It means that one part of the country, called the government, is ruling the other parts of the city, or country. But we'd still speak of this as self-rule, right? But still there's a distinction between the ruler and the, what? Ruled, right? That's easy to see, right? Okay. And then, I go from that to a man, right? And sometimes we speak of self-rule, maybe more often as self-control, right? But even using that phrase, self-control, what does that mean? Does that mean that the whole man is controlling the whole man? No. Self-control means that one part of you, like your reason, maybe, or your will, is controlling another part of you, like your emotions, huh? That's a little harder to see than the government and the other parts of the city because they're different individuals, right? Here you've got different parts of the same man. So, one part of me, my reason, is controlling the other part of me, my emotions. Now, when you speak of reason-having self-rule, well, you don't have two parts of reason, one part of which is ruling the other part, right? In fact, as I go on to say, your reason is the thinnest of all things, so you don't have one, it wouldn't be the thinnest of all things if you have parts. So that's not what it means there, right? What does it mean, say? Well, Socrates, I think, gives us the clue to that, as well. We're proceeding up to this point. Because what was Socrates doing in the dialogues? What was he doing, as he recounts it in his defense there of his life in the Apology, right? What did Socrates find out when he went around and talked to men? That people didn't know that they did not know. Yeah. That they had mixed up what they didn't know with what they did know, right? And they thought they knew things they didn't know, right? And Socrates was trying to get them to separate what they really do know and what they don't know, right? Now that's really a premium, you might say, or the preparation for logic, right? Because logic is the art of using what you do know to investigate and to prove, if you can, what you don't know, right? So logic presupposes the separation or distinction of what you really do know from what you don't know. And of course, later on, Aristotle would say in the separation of what is more known to you from what is less known to you, right? And even the separation of what is most known from the other things that are more known. But so long as the known and the unknown are mixed up in your mind, you can't use one to know the other, right? So, what is the separation in the mind, then, that makes self-rule possible, right? Well, the mind should be ruled in what it doesn't know by what it does know. And it should be ruled in what is less known to it by what is more known to it. And it should be ruled ultimately by what is most known to it, right? And that's possible only if you separated the known from the unknown and the more known from the less known and the most known from the rest of what is more known, right? So the ruler must be separated from the ruler, see? And that's the discovery, you see? Socrates, in a sense, is preparing us for understanding how it is possible for the mind to rule itself. What does that mean, right? It doesn't mean that the ruler and the ruled are identical. You know, that goes against the other truth down here, right? And it doesn't mean that there are two parts of the mind, one which is ruling the other part, right? But what it means is that the mind is ruled in what it doesn't know, but what it does know, huh? So if I know the length and the width of this rectangle, right, but not the area, I'm going to be ruled by my knowledge of the length and the width and how to multiply them and what I eventually say about the, what, area, right? And in the syllogism, right, one is ruled about the conclusion through the, what, premises that one already knows, huh? So this apparent contradiction is solved with the help of Socrates, right? But Socrates, in a sense, is also, in his experience, showing that most men's minds are not yet ready to rule themselves, huh? So, I'm always annoyed at graduation time. The student gives a valid dictator or something, he's always complimenting the professors, everybody in the place, for that matter, but complimenting the professors, you know, for having taught us to think for ourselves, right? And I say, well, fine, you need to think for yourself if you can do it. But he'd be a little more clear if he'd say, you know, that your mind is ruling itself, right? But your mind can rule itself only if it's, what, separated what it knows and what it doesn't know. Not that that's all it's required, it's got to know how to use what it knows to what it doesn't know. But if it hasn't even got to the point of separating what it knows and what it doesn't know, it's not yet capable of ruling itself. And Socrates showed when he talked to men that most men are in that position of having mixed up the two. So most men cannot, in fact, rule themselves. They can't think for themselves, you see? And of course, you have to know logic, too, because that teaches you how to use what you do know to investigate what you don't know. Do you see that? It's really beautiful. But it's a good example, and a very, you know, fundamental example, of the role of contradiction in the development of our knowledge, right? Well, it seems to be a contradiction between two things that are both reasonable, to say that the mind is self-ruling and that the ruler must be separated from the rule. The apparent contradiction between those two forces us to look more deeply, right, into what it means to say the mind is self-ruling, right? And what, in fact, is the distinction in the mind between the ruler and the ruled that makes ruling of this sort possible, right? What that means means. And of course, what does Socrates use to separate the known from the unknown? What does he use to show men, at least, that they don't know what they think they know, right? Dial them questions. Well, he asks them questions, yeah, but then he shows that some things they think contradict other things they think, right? So he's using, usually, you know, syllogism, but ultimately contradiction, right? But nothing's more known to us than something cannot both be and not be, right? So I'd say the simplest example of that is the slave boy, right, who thinks the way to double a square is to double the side, right? But if you take a square, it's two by two, and you double the side, eventually he's going to see that two by two is four, and four by four is sixteen, and he knows that sixteen is not double four, but he said if the side was twice as long, it'd be twice as big. But twice as big is not four, so the things he says don't fit together, right? They don't harmonize, huh? So there's noise in his mind, huh? And Socrates is going to restore him to music, huh? The harmony. Should we take a little break now? Yeah. Okay. It's interesting to compare him a bit with Anaxagoras, because Anaxagoras comes to this idea of a greater mind, by reason, not as a believer, right? I mean, he was not a believer at the religion, at least at the time, the Greek religion. No, Anaxagoras got in trouble, you know, for saying that the sun is a stone on fire, that the sun is the god of power, right? Yeah, but he comes to the idea of a greater mind through the intelligibility, that is to say, the order he finds in the universe. Well, Einstein, you know, when they ask him about what he thinks of God, he has the same idea that there's a greater mind that reveals itself, right, in nature. And he says all scientific work of a higher order is based on, you know, a feeling like that of religion, right? Because you're convinced that the universe is, what, understandable, right? And therefore that it's a product of some kind of greater mind. In that respect, they're similar, right? Because Einstein was not a believing Jew, and he didn't become a Christian or anything like that, or whatever. But they differ that this greater mind for Einstein is mixed up with things, huh? In other words, it's pantheistic, and Einstein admits that his notion of God is pantheistic, right? Why, and Exeggius says that it's separated, huh? And he gives a very good reason why it's separated, that the ruler must be separated from the ruled, huh? And Einstein doesn't give, at least in the text I've seen, where he talks about this, any reason for saying that the greater mind is mixed up with things. But de Tocqueville, in the Democracy in America, in the chapter on religion in there, that's the main thing he says, that democratic customs give men pantheistic notions, huh? So I think Einstein is more influenced there by custom, huh? To make the greater mind mixed up with things, huh? And democratic customs would be part of it, maybe scientific customs would be something to do with that, too, you know? Because, as we said before in the previous reading, it's based upon equality, right? So, but equality kind of dominates modern thinking, partly because of democracy and partly because of equations, right? So if you think of everything in terms of equality, you can't make God much more than the whole or something mixed up with things, huh? So in that sense, Hank Segris is much wiser than Einstein, huh? About the greater mind, huh? But they both come to the idea of the greater mind, huh? The superior mind reveals itself in experience through the order that they find out there. So it seems to be a democratic custom that the ruler doesn't have to rule himself in order to be on the roll. If you look, you know, at the Inchiridion, the Symbolorum, or something like that, the official texts of the church and so on, you'll find that all the way through the, you know, 19th century there that they're always correcting some Catholic theologian in Germany, usually, for his pantheistic notions, huh? And who was the Italian cardinal who wrote the book there where he talks about Rahner and... Siri. Yeah, Siri, yeah. You know, and he'll quote passages from the books that are very pantheistic, huh? And the kind of subtle writers, you know, in the sense that they'll have a semi-Orthodox part in that one that seems pantheistic and so on, but that's been, that's the, something we have to really worry about in our time, according to Dutonville. And there's a lot of truth to that. And of course, you know, you always say to the students, you know, the force be with you, because that's a pantheistic notion, right? You become part of the force, and the good side or the bad side of the force, whatever it is, but that's not a result of any thinking, really, on the part of the people who wrote the story and so on, but it just shows democratic custom at work again, that they make their God mixed up with things. You become a part of this force, for good or for bad, but it is for him. That's what Chesterton says in his book on America. He says, the devil can quote scripture, and the most common part he quotes nowadays is, the kingdom is within, the kingdom of God is within you. Okay. Okay, now we go to the next thing here, the apparent condition. For it is the thinnest of all things, right? Okay, that's the fourth thing he says now. The mind is the thinnest of all things. Interesting how the word unlimited and thin came up before, right? You're not thinking about matter, but they have a different meaning here, right? But now, again, going back to what is more known to us, our own mind, right? Is there some reason to think that the mind is the thinnest of things? The sense that it penetrates, it can get into. And the better the mind is, the sharper it is, the more penetrating it is. And it's the thinnest that can, what, penetrate things, huh? Or, again, it's the thinnest that divides things. It's not like when you sharpen your knife, you make it thinner. And the mind is always separating, dividing things. And, in fact, the mind separates things that can't even be separated in reality, like it separates the universal from the singular, or it separates the sphere from rubber ball and from glass ball and so on. So, if it's the thinnest that separates things, and the mind most of all separates and distinguishes things, then it must be the, what, thinnest of things, huh? Does it also take on the shape of? Well, it doesn't take on the shape, but then it would be... I don't see that in the idea of being thin as such. Yeah. But the idea of dividing things, separating them things, penetrating things, huh? I mentioned before how even in Empedocles, who thinks the mind as being, what, something material, right? But instead of taking bone or flesh, he takes thought as being, what, blood, right, huh? And the moderns take it as being electric, magnetic waves or something, right? But that takes something very thin, right, to be thought rather than something, what, gross, right? Because it does seem to penetrate things, huh? It's incited to things, huh? Okay? So that's the fourth thing he said about the mind. And that shows, then, that it's not to be understood to be unlimited in the sense of what? An infant body or something like that, right? Or an infant body. Yeah. But that also shows that it has no parts, right? Otherwise, there'd be something thinner than it, these parts. But notice that another way we think of the first matter as being the thinnest, right? So the atom is thinner than the molecule, and the elementary particle is thinner than the atom. And if there's quarks or something like that, or these other things they talk about, they're even thinner, right? But the first matter would be the thinnest of things, huh? They would think, huh, the mind is even thinner. Now, the next thing he says, purist, at first, I thought that this was nothing new, that he'd already said this. It's just another way of saying this, mixed with nothing, right? But perhaps, you could make a little distinction here between the third and what is being said here. And here, you could say that the mind is mixed with nothing else, right? Because they're mixed with these things that couldn't rule them, right? And here, that the mind is not itself a mixture of things. Okay? It's not in composition with other things. It's not composed. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So the mind is the purest of things. And this, of course, would be in order because if it's the thinnest of all things, it can't be a mixture of things, because they would be thinner than it, right? So if it's the thinnest of things, it must not be a mixture of things. Okay? But here you're saying, nothing about the mind in itself, but looking at it towards other things, right? It's not mixed with these other things, because then it would not be able to rule up in them. It'd have a share of everything in it. Do you see that? I was thinking, you know, a little bit about Thomas there in the Summa, you know? And I mentioned how when he talks about the substance of God, he has it divided into five parts. And the order is a little different in the two Sumas, but he'll talk about the simplicity of God, his not being composed. And he'll talk about the unity of God and so on, right? And you could bring these under the heading that God has no parts and is not a part of anything, right? Okay. But if you look at even the treatise on God not being composed or God being simple, the first maybe six articles or so, seven articles, will say that God is not what composed, you know, eliminate each kind of composition you have in creatures, no composition of quantitative parts, no composition of matter and form, no composition of what you are and something else, no composition of existence and substance and so on, substance and accident. But then you'll say, but God is also not what? Composed of something else, right? Okay. So he neither has any parts of any sort, nor is he a part of anything. And those are kind of different points to be made, right? It's one thing to say God has no parts, another thing to say God is not a part of anything. And so you might say, it's one thing to say that the greater mind is not mixed with anything else, it's another thing to say it's not a mixture of things itself, right? So it seems to me this number of five here is a different thing, right? Would it be though... And as they say, it's placed here in the order here, it does seem to follow from this too, right? That's not a mixture of things, because then those things that are mixed together to make it would be finer and thinner than it. And therefore it would not be the thinnest of all things, right, isn't there? I'm sorry, actually you just answered it, because I was wondering if it really is the same as four, but as you said, it follows from four. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. It'd be like you couldn't say, say a point and a line, you couldn't say number three of a point, because a point terminates a line, or is it not, would that not be the case? Well, you'd say something like number five here, the point, the point is not put together. It's not put together, but you couldn't say the other way around, you couldn't say number three. It's not mixed with other things, because it is mixed with a line. It is, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. You know, someone's wanting to say God's like the limit of things, and it's a thing, you know, like he's a part of them, right? It's interesting, when Aristotle takes up the word limit or end, it's kind of the same word there in Greek. So I could speak of the point as the end of the line, right? Then later on you get a meaning of end, meaning purpose, after the sake of which, right? And God is the end in that sense. I am the Alpha and the Omega. I am the beginning and the end. That's the third sense he gives of end, right? But the first sense of end would be the sense in which the point is the end of the line. And some people are saying God is... That's the Tehran Deshares, right? Yeah. The Omega point. Yeah. That's true. And it has all knowledge about everything. Well, that in a way follows from us being the thinnest of all things, because then it can penetrate all things, and therefore what? Know all things, right? And of course, this is found fully in the, what? Greater mind. It has all knowledge, if they would say. Now, the next thing, if it has the greatest power, well, as I say to my students, as a modern, you should say it right away, right? Because knowledge is power. That's what the modern world began with. With Bacon, right? That's the effort, isn't it, right? You can't simply acknowledge your power. So, if it has all knowledge, it has all power. So, man, you know, overpowers the other animals, not because his muscles or arms are stronger, but because of his, what? Knowledge, right? That's the seventh thing he says about the greater mind, huh? But notice, this is, to some extent, true about our mind, too, right? Because it's powered by knowledge, right? So, they powered the atomic bomb, right? That sort of thing. Now, the next thing he says about the mind is the mind rules all things which have life, both the greater and the lesser. Now, as far as this eighth thing is concerned, he's going to speak of the mind as ruling over all things, right? Greater mind, huh? But the eighth thing here is singling out the mind's rule over things that have life, huh? That's to say animals and, what, plants, right? Now, why should he single out that? Why is it more obvious, let us say, that mind is responsible for animals and plants and is responsible for the rocks and the sandy beach and so on? What is it? Not such a complexity, but something that's involved with the complexity. Because you see the order in animals and plants. Yeah. Count for it. Yeah, you see order in animals and plants because you have a diversity of parts that are well arranged, huh? By a rock, you don't see that, do you? That's one thing, right? A second thing is that you see end or purpose more in animals than in plants than in a rock or in water, right? You see? So, I mean, most people recognize, you know, the eyes having a purpose or the ear or the heart and so on. But does water have a purpose? Well, you almost have to compare it to living things to see it as having a purpose, huh? You see? So, when Socrates in the Phaedo, when he talks about first reading Anaxagoras, he thought that Anaxagoras would go on now and explain the purpose of things in the actual world because there was a greater mind and mind does what it does with some inner purpose in mind. And Anaxagoras didn't get around to doing that. So, Socrates felt kind of let down by this, huh? But the point is there's a connection then between the mind and what? End or purpose. But you see end or purpose more, much more clearly in animals and plants than you do in the atom or something like that, huh? Right? So there's a reason why he singles out the things that have life, though he's not going to limit the mind's control or order to that, huh? And now the whole separation of things that is tied up with this revolution of things, he attributes that to the mind, right? And mind ruled over the whole revolution. So it began to evolve in the beginning and first it began to evolve from something small but now it revolves over a greater distance. And it will evolve over more, right? Okay? Now, as I say, our own mind uses what? Circular motion as a way of separating things, huh? Centrifuge and things of this sort, huh? Okay? So if you want, you can make it a separate thing there from number seven, right? But it's a more universal thing, huh? Okay? So, the eighth thing, though, you want to make it more general. You can say that the mind, what? Separates things, huh? By a circular motion. Mind, right? Because eight would have been mind rules over all things? Or is that part of seven? No, I was thinking of this eight here. Okay. But mind ruled over the whole revolution but this is where things are being separated by this in the whole universe, right? You know, from the earth that's, like you said earlier in that earlier fragment there, that the earth settled down at the bottom and so on and the light things went off like my hat. Now, the next thing is that mind's set in order, right? Things, huh? Okay. So nine, mind orders things, right? Okay. Now notice, going back to our own mind, how did Shakespeare define our own mind, our reason? We define reason as reason as the ability for a larger discourse, looking before and after, which is the definition of order, right? But if reason is able to look before and after to see order, it must be able to see, what, distinction. And I sometimes say, what does reason always see before it sees a before and after? You can deduce what it always sees before it sees a before and after by the axiom of before and after. And the axiom of before and after is that nothing is before or after itself, right? So there must be some distinction between what is before and what is after, right? Today is before tomorrow and after yesterday, but today can't be before or after today again. So reason always sees some distinction before it sees a before and after. If I can in no way distinguish between today and tomorrow, I couldn't see that today is before tomorrow, could I? But you can sometimes see a distinction and not see which is before and which is after. So you could distinguish between me and some other man and not know who's older, right? Who's before in time or who's better or something like that, right? But you couldn't know that one of us is older or one of us is better than the other unless you could distinguish between us, huh? Okay? That's very important when you come into wine tasting, right? Because if someone says, you know, that these judgments are all, you know, subjective, relative and all that sort of stuff, but among those who know what they're drinking, there's more agreement as to which ones are, what? Better, right, huh? Yeah, see? But if someone doesn't know where he's drinking Carbonet Sauvignon or Pinot Noir or Zinfandel, he's not able to judge which is better, right? Okay? And so when they test somebody, you know, to be a judge if they want to do it up, you know, really well, they give him a test where he's blindfolded and their wines are right into and outlabeled, right? He's got to say, well, this is Pinot Noir, this is Carbonet, that's Zinfandel, you know. And most people can't do that, right? But among those who can do that, right, some can go beyond that and say which are better, some can't, right? So if you see the distinction between Carbonet Sauvignon, that's Zinfandel, Zinfandel, you might be able to see that Carbonet Sauvignon is better than Zinfandel, but if you don't see the distinction, you just can't see which is better. So these guys just say, you know, this beer is better than that beer, right? And they give them the beers without, what, labels, and they sometimes prefer, you know, the one. So they don't know whether they're drinking Budweiser or Miller or whatever it is, you know. They can't really say one is better than the other, huh? And it's interesting, though, when Aristotle talks, both in the categories and the metaphysics, the fifth book, when he talks about opposition, which is the basis for distinction, huh? And he talks about before and after. In both cases, he talks about opposites before, before and after, and together, right? Distinction and what? Order, right? But notice, huh? Shakespeare defines reason by order rather than by distinction, because if you can see the order, you must have seen the distinction. But if you see the distinction, you don't necessarily see the, what, order, right? Like John Dryden, huh? The poet Laurie to England, right? Seven Years a Young Man, you know, there were more plays of Fletcher and Beaumont performed in Shakespeare. And of course, you'd see the plays and so on. And he gradually realized how better Shakespeare was. And so he said, finally, that Beaumont or Fletcher was just a loom of Shakespeare and an armor of Shakespeare. But no, no, he might have been seeing the plays for some time before he was able to see that one was before the other in the sense of what? Better the fourth sense of before in the categories. But if you haven't seen both, you can't really see that one is better, can you? But if you can see that one is better than the other, you must see the distinction. So it's included. Another expression, Chesterton, is if you don't know the reason why something's there, you can't pretend to have a better reason to do away with it. Because you have nothing to compare it to. You have no comparison of the reasons. Yeah. Okay, so 8 and 9, you know, Thomas in the Summa, when he's talking in the second, say, book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, he's talking about the distinction over the universe and that God is a cause of both of these, right? And by his mind, right? You go back and refer all the way back to Anaxagoras. So you have to admire this Anaxagoras, huh? I mentioned that Aristotle said, you know, that when he introduced the greater mind and so on, he seemed like a sober man among drunk men. So he's very thinking of the moderns as being quite drunk, you know? Because they're back with the early guys, huh? So the mind set in order all things that were to be and all things that were but now are not. Whatever is now and everything will be. And this revolution which the stars and the sun, the moon, the air, and the ether go around and separate it off. The revolution has caused them to be separated, right? The thick is separated from the thin and the warm. This is nothing new but just elaborating. And then, of course, going back, he said, nothing is separated off nor divided entirely the one from the other except the mind, right? Okay. Now the tenth thing he says here is that every mind is similar both the greater and the lesser, right? And that underlies our whole thinking here, right? Of the reason why we think there's a greater mind but also that we understand to some extent the greater world through our own mind because in some way alike, right? And that's why, of course, when we study the Trinity we have to study it to some extent through our own mind and will. And so Thomas talks about the reason why the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, right? Through the Son. It's because we can see a little bit of that because in our own will, right? The love of something proceeds from our, what? The knowledge of it, right? So if I'm a lover of wisdom that presupposes that I kind of know what wisdom is, right? So if you add that as a tenth thing every mind is similar about the great molester. That's a tenth thing to be noted, right? In this great treatise on the mind. Now the last sentence there is really more appropriate to the discussion of matter. Somebody would say if everything is inside of everything why call this a man and that a dog and that a cat and that a tree and that a stone. Well, we call it what it has most of. In a way, in a way that's true though, right? Because there's something in me, right? That's able to be a dog or a cat or anything else that might eat me for example, right? Why call me a man rather than a dog or a cat or a horse? Well, because what's in me is actually a man now. So it's more a man than it is, what, a dog or a cat or a horse because only those things are the ability, see? Just like the wood in this chair is more a chair than a table or a bed or a cabinet, right? Because those things only in what? Ability, right? This is toothpicks in ability. But it's more a chair than it's toothpicks because it's toothpicks only in ability and it's actually a chair. But he would understand it more in a quantitative sense. But I call that the Anaxagorean way of naming things. We call things what it has most of. But when you stop and think about it most things are in some sense a mixture, aren't they? In our world. And we do very often name them for what they have most of. And so I always take the example of when I grew up we call this the market economy, right? We call that the planned economy or misplanned economy. But now they call it the command economy.