Wisdom (Metaphysics 2005)
Lecture 6: Wisdom as Universal and Causal Knowledge

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These are all the cases that need to be distinguished. So there are really more things to be considered here in geometry than arithmetic. And that's why I'm less sure here that I am there. You see? And you will see people raising questions more about geometry, you know, the moderns, than about arithmetic. Because of those points, huh? Okay. Now, as you go from arithmetic to geometry, to natural philosophy, to political philosophy, you keep on requiring you to consider more things, right? So when you go from the geometrical sphere, or the geometrical circle, to the sphere in matter, or the circle in matter, right, you have to consider other things, because there's matter involved there, as well as the spherical shape, right? And so, when people talk about the shape of the Earth, well, is it a cube, or is it a, you know, plate, or? Well, no, we say it's a sphere, right? Okay, but then you come back and say, yeah, but, you know, we think it's kind of flattened at the poles, and I don't know if there's a reason for that. Maybe there is, right? Does geometry have to worry about whether it's spheres that get flattened at the poles, see? Or we say, a side cut there of the tire there in my car out there, it's circular, right? Now, it's supposed to be a great invention, the circular wheel, right? But when I get out, I look at my car there in the parking lot there, it's flattened out at the bottom, right, because of the weight of the car and so on, so it's not really a perfect circle. So there's more things to be considered here, right, in the earthly sphere, or the tire, whatever it is, than in the geometrical one, right? Okay? So natural philosophy or natural science is going to be more difficult, less sure, than geometry, right? Just like geometry was less sure than arithmetic, right? But now when I go from man, as considered in natural philosophy, to political philosophy, when I go, say, from what man is by nature to what man is, what American man is, let's say, right? Well, American man is what he is partly because of what he is by nature. So I'm a two-footed animal, just like Aristotle, I think, and Plato were two-footed animals, right? But now I have to consider in addition what American man is by custom, and by the choices he's made and so on, in addition to what he is by nature, right? So it's going to be more difficult to talk about American man. I've got to consider what he is by custom and by choice and by chance and so on, in addition to what he is by nature, right? So political philosophy will be less certain or sure than natural philosophy, and that will be less certain or sure than geometry, and geometry less sure or certain than what? Because the more things you have to consider, the less sure you're going to be, right? And sometimes you take a simple example, you know, it's fairly easy for me and sure to count the number of students I have in this class here, right? But now an inauguration coming up there in Washington, D.C., or the pro-life march, something like that, or the number of people in the Super Bowl or something, right? It would be hard to get the exact number of that, wouldn't it? To be sure of the number of people that went to the Super Bowl. In fact, nobody will be sure about the number, right? Because so many people are to be taken into account, right? You see? So I can maybe be sure of the number of students in this class today here, right? And be quite uncertain about the number of people at the Super Bowl, you see? Because there's so many people that could be taken into account there, right? Or the number of people in Piedersham, you know? Maybe that's easier than the number of people in Worcester or New York City or something, right? You see what I mean? So the more things you have to take into account, the less sure you are, right? Or vice versa, the less things you have to take into account, the more sure you can be. You see that? Okay? Well now, this is a reason for saying that the most universal knowledge is the most certain. Because as you descend from the more universal to the less universal, you have to take into account more things. So as I descend, let's say, from body to living body to animal to dog or cat, I'm adding things, aren't I? Or when I go from, what, dog to animal to living body to body, I'm dropping things, aren't I? So the one who considers the most universal has the fewest things to consider. Actually, even though this is being said of all things, there's actually fewer things to take into account. And if the one who has to take into account fewer things is more certain, then the man who has the most universal knowledge is going to be the most certain. And of course, this is going to be reflected when the wise man defends, say, the axioms, or talks about the axioms, as we'll see. So I'm more sure that the whole is larger than one of its parts than I am that water is H2O. And I have to know all kinds of other things, many different things to know that water is H2O if I ever succeed in knowing that. Which I have not succeeded in knowing it, by the way. In fact, I take on human faith that water is H2O. I don't know if I should believe them or not. But I don't take on human faith that the whole is larger than one of its parts. Do you see that? Yeah. Do you see the principle, right? The principle is that the man who has fewer things to consider right is more certain than the man who has additional things to consider right. Well, as you descend from the more universal or less universal, you have additional things to consider. Why, there are fewer things to consider as you ascend, right? So if the wise man knows the most universal, then he would, what, be most certain, right? Do you see that? Kind of subtle, right? Okay. So three is enough, we say, right? I was reading the Gospel of St. Matthew, and you're kind of struck by, you know, Peter denies him three times, right? Then, of course, later on in the resurrection, he's asked three times, and the commentators remark on how, you know, this is appropriate punishment for Peter, right? They have to confess, you know I love you. But three seems to be, what? Or, you know, Christ, he, what? He goes and he prays three times during the Christ. It's kind of striking that he does that, huh? Or he's three days in the, what? Two, yeah. Three days is enough, right? Two would not have been enough, right? But three is enough. And you keep on seeing these examples where three is, what? Enough, huh? You know what Mark Anthony says in the famous speech there, you know? You all didn't see you all in the Feast of Luper call? I thrice presented him a kingly crown? That third refusal seems to be, what? Complete, right? I tell the girls in my class, you know, if you, you can say no when he asks you once, twice, but that third no, he'll take his final. No, no, no! It's funny, huh? But three does seem to be, what? Very often enough, right? So, Aristotle, from the first three things, he argues that the wise man must be knowing the most universal. Why? Because he knows all things, right? In some way, but in the way that's possible for man, right? Which is only by knowing, what? Universal. And so if you're knowing all things in the way that's possible for man, you must be knowing the most universal, right? You must be knowing what is said of all, right? Or the wise man knows things they're difficult to know. Most difficult to know, right? Well, in some way, the most universal perhaps seems to be most difficult because it's furthest from the singular, right? It's the most abstract, right? Okay? But perhaps, right? And in some way, the man who considers the more universal has less things to take into account, right? And therefore, he's more what? Sure, right? See? And you see that principle simply, you know, even in science. Like I say, 28. Well, is that a number? Is it a perfect number? It is, yeah. Is it a perfect number? Yeah. But in order to know it's a perfect number I have to take into account much more than I have to to know it's a number, right? A perfect number is a number which is equal to what? The sum of everything that measures it. Measures it in a strict sense, evenly, right? What's 28 measured by, huh? 1 plus 2 plus what? 4 plus 14, right? But you have to stop and think, is that all it's measured by? Because that's going to add up to 28, isn't it? So I can't be assured that 28 is a perfect number as that it's a number, right? So as you descend from the more universal, the less universal, right? The what? Less sure you are, right? Okay, so if he knows the more universal, he must be the most certain, right? I can see it, right? So 3 is enough to see in some way that wisdom is about what is said of all, right? Now he's going to reason from the next 3 things that it's about the, what? Cause of all, right? Maybe we should stop now, maybe it's 4.30, huh? But next week now we'll meet on Thursday as usual, yeah. My other students now, they want to do it from Monday to Wednesday, which is okay, but we're only fair with us, anyway. Wednesday, when the one's got a conference that comes up on Monday, and the other guy can't go on Tuesday because his kids take violin lessons or something. They tell me that Matt, Maria's wife is on the phone, that Matt bought a violin, playing the violin now. Are you kidding? Yeah. Well, he says to Maria, how's he play? Not bad. I know his sister care of it, I saw her, you know, I sit down and play the violin, and they keep playing Bach and so on and so on and so on. Not bad. Not bad. Not bad. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, the guardian angel, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand how much you have written. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. So Rastad worked out a six-part outline of what the wise man is, what wisdom is. That the wise man knows all things in some way. In so far as it's possible for man to know all things. He knows things that are, what, difficult for man to know. He's more sure about what he's saying. He's more able to teach. He has the knowledge that's most desirable for its own sake. And he orders everybody else around, huh? And is not ordered by anyone else, huh? Okay? He's the most architectonic, huh? Okay? Now, from the first three of those things, as we saw last time, he reasons to wisdom being about what is said of all, what is most universal, in the sense of said of all, right? Okay? And now, from the second three, the fourth, the fifth, and the sixth, he's going to reason to its being about the first causes. Now, we saw before that the man who knows the cause is more able to teach, right? So, if the wise man is most able to know, he must most of all know the cause, right? Now, as you know, sometimes a cause has a cause, right? So, if I hit you, why did I hit you? Maybe the cause of my hitting you was I'm angry with you. So, anger is, in some sense, the cause of my hitting you. But anger is the kind of cause that has a cause, right? So, you might ask, not only why did I hit you, because I'm angry, would be the answer, but why am I angry, right? And then I'd be looking for the cause of the cause. And so on, right? Until you come to the, what, first cause. Now, incidentally, Aristotle, in the second book, will show that within each kind of cause, there are, in fact, first causes, right? So, he's kind of assuming, right, here, that there are first causes, right? What he's trying to show is that the wise man would be the man who goes as far as you can go in knowing causes. And therefore, he's most able to, what, teach, right? Okay. So, if I was trying to teach about the terrorists, you say, well, why are they blowing us up? Well, maybe the answer is because they hate us. And that's the cause, I suppose, that they're blowing us up, right? But then the question might ask, right, well, why are they angry with us? Why do they hate us, right? And then you'd be asking for the cause of the cause, and you'd be more able to, what, teach about these things, huh? So, the man who knows the first cause, right, or first causes if there's more than one, he, it would seem, would be, in a sense, most able to, what, teach, right? Because he, most of all, knows the causes. Now, in the third paragraph on page four, he's going to reason that he has the knowledge most desirable for its own sake. Now, how does he reason out from this that he's knowing most of all the causes, and therefore knowing the first causes? Well, if you're seeking knowledge for its own sake, if you're pursuing knowing things, huh, you're obviously looking for what most of all makes you to know, right? Now, what most of all makes us know? Now, what most of all makes us know, right? Now, what most of all makes us know, right? Now, what most of all makes us know, right? Now, what most of all makes us know, right? Well, we most of all know something when we know why it is the way it is, right? When we know its causes. So he says, understanding and knowledge for the sake of themselves, especially belong to the knowledge of the most knowable. For the man who desires to know for itself will most desire what is most knowledge, and such is that of the most knowable. And most knowable, it doesn't mean now to us, right? But in themselves, are the first things of the causes. For other things are known through these and from them, but not these through what comes unto them. So it's the cause that really, what? Clarifies the effect, right? It's the cause that really explains the, what? Effect, huh? You could say the effect is fully knowable only in the light of its cause. So nothing is more enlightening than the cause. And the cause of the cause is more enlightening than the cause. And so the man who knows the first cause knows what enlightens everything else. Fits in with the first cause being called light, as we say in Scripture, right? Okay? Look severa, as Thomas says in the after-communion prayer, right? Seeing God is to see the true light, huh? It's the light of the world. So it's the cause that enlightens the effect. And therefore, it's the cause that most enlightens our mind. So if I'm seeking knowledge just for the sake of knowing, right, I most of all want to be, what? Enlightened, right? Yeah. And therefore, I most of all am seeking, what? Cause. And therefore, most of all, seeking the very first cause. Now, the sixth thing he says will become more clear when we understand, when we take up the causes, that end or purpose is one of the four kinds of cause. And in fact, the end is sometimes said to be the cause of all the other causes. See, why did wood get to be in some way responsible for this table here? This is a wooden table, I guess, huh? Well, the wood got to be the wood of a table. It got to be the matter of a table because the carpenter, what, shaped the wood and so on. How did the form get into the wood? Well, because the carpenter, right? But why did the carpenter put this form into the table? So we could ask something to write on or to eat on or something, right? So the end is the cause of what the carpenter did, right? Sitting is why the carpenter made the chair the way he did. So in that sense, the end is the cause of all the other causes being causes. Okay? Now, who, or what does it mean to direct others, right? You always direct people towards some end or goal, right? So, he says that is the chief science. We saw this already in our study there in the Nicomachean Ethics, right? That because health is the end of medicine, right? That's why the medical doctor commands the pharmacist. Okay? So if the wise man in the fullest sense is the most architectonic, right? He must be aiming at the end to which every other end is subordinated. And that could be the end of the whole, what, universe, right? And that, he says, is the chief science, and more ruling than the subordinated science, which knows that for the sake of which each thing ought to be done. This over is the good of each. And as a whole, it's going to be the best in all, nature in all, reality, right? The end of the whole universe. What does God say in the scripture? I am the alpha and the, what, omega, right? He's not only the first maker, the first mover, right? But he's also the end and the goal of everything, huh? I am the alpha and omega. We're getting the end. I am the alpha and omega. I am the alpha and omega. I am the alpha and omega. From all the foresaid, then, he says, the name sat, namely wisdom, falls in the same science or knowledge. For it's necessary that this looks at the first beginnings and what? Causes, huh? For one of the causes is the good, right? And that for the sake of which, which is the definition of the cause called good or end. That for the sake of which. So you see what he's done, then? Then from the first, second, and third thing in the drawing a line around wisdom of the wise man, right? The description, so to speak, of the wise man or wisdom. From the first three elements of that, he reasons to wisdom being about what is said of all. What is most universal in the sense of being said of all things. What is common to all things in being said of them, right? And then from the last three, he reasons to wisdom being about the first causes, right? Which in another sense are common to all things, right? Okay? Now we saw something like that on a lesser scale in our study of ethics a bit, because we talked about the division of human goods into goods of the body, goods of the soul, exterior goods. We talked about the order among those goods and so on. So in a general way, we're talking about all the goods in human life, right? But when he talked about happiness or the end or purpose of man, we're talking about what was common in another sense, right? To all the what? The goods in human life, right? Because they're all for the sake of the end of man, the purpose of man. Do you see that? Yeah. Okay? Just like we said in an army, right? Sorger is common to everyone in the army. In the sense that it's said of everyone in the army, right? But the general who commands the army, in some sense he's common to everybody too, right? In a different sense. By power? Yeah. By his power, by his command, right? Okay? So I put on the board there those words I quoted before from the central thinker in human thought, who's Heraclitus, teacher of the teacher of Plato, right? He says, those who speak with understanding must be strong in what is common to all. So Aristotle in the 14 books of wisdom is going to try to become strong in what is common to all. But in two senses of common to all, right? Two senses here. What is said of all and what is a cause of all. So he's going to try to become strong in these very universal things that are said of all. He's going to try to become strong so far as we can in the knowledge of the very first causes, the causes of all things, right? But part of becoming strong is not to confuse these two. Okay? And I mentioned how Hegel there in his so-called logic, whatever he means by his logic, he identifies the being which is said of all things, if everything that is in any way whatsoever can be said to be a being, right? Okay? He identifies the being which is said of all with the one who in sacred scripture says, I am who am, right? The one who is the what? Cause of all, right? And therefore you have in Hegel and very much in modern thought, this pantheism, right? Of confusing what is said of all with what is a cause of all. Now, I happen to be reading the Summa Contra Gentiles, they're my favorite book, right? And the chapter 26, I think it is, where Thomas says the whole chapter in order to show that God is not the promale esseonio, the to be that is said of all things, right? That's not the being that is God. See, the whole chapter in the Summa, that's not the being that God is not the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the one who is the Contra Gentile, that is the first book, they're devoted to showing that they're not the same, right? You heard me make kind of fun a little bit of Hegel there that Shakespeare himself, you know, with his love of Elizabethan, love of playing in words, right? He plays on those two senses of what? The general, right? When he says that towards Impressida, you know, or as Ulysses says, that she's been kissed by the general. She's Agamemnon, right? But she hasn't been kissed in general. Okay? So he's playing the two senses of general, right? But you have it in English, right? The general of the army is called general, right? But you could say soldier is general. Everybody in the army is a soldier, right? That's something general, right? Not everybody's a colonel, not everybody's a captain, not everybody's a sergeant, but everybody is a what? Soldier, right? That's general. But two different senses of the word what? General, right? So you don't want to confuse what is said of all with what is a what? Cause of all. But notice in a way in ancient times, I don't know if you know much about Plato, but Plato thought that universals, like man and dog and cat and so on, right? Exist in the world outside of individual men and dogs and cats, right? And he called those the forms, which they kind of, it's translated in English as the ideas, right? It means the forms. But in a sense, he's taking what is said of many things and making it a what? Cause of all, right? Okay? As if apart from individual men, there's man himself, right? And we all in some way partake of man himself, right? You see? So he's seeing, you know, what is said of all as in some way a cause of all, right? That's already the kind of confusion that you have later on in Hegel and people like that, huh? So that's a big mistake, huh? But to become strong in what is common to all means, first of all, to not be confused about these things, right? To have a distinct knowledge of these things. And the first distinction you better understand is that these two are at stake, right? They're not the same thing, right? You see? That soldier is not Douglas MacArthur, right? Or human good is not the same thing as what? The end of man, right? You see, our person might confuse those a bit, though, right? Because that is the good of man, right? You see? But human good can be said, the goods of the soul, the goods of the body, exterior goods, right? Grandchildren and so on. You see, all goods of man, right, huh? The water, that's the good of mine, right? My clothing is good, right? Okay? But whatever the end of man is, if the end of man, let's say, is knowing and loving God, well, that's not something said of everything in life, is it? This is not knowing God and loving him, is it? But maybe I should eat and drink my water, or drink my water in a way that will lead me to God eventually. Do you see that? So it's very important to see that distinction, right? So in the great Heraclitus says, those who speak with understanding must be strong at what is common to all. And sometimes Thomas will say, well, this is common to things by predication and being set of, right? This is common in what? Cause healthy, right? Okay. You can say both of those things come under the rule of Heraclitus, huh? Now, you can say also that wisdom is the highest or the greatest perfection of reason. And what is the highest or greatest perfection of reason? Is it thinking, or reasoning, or understanding? What is it? Understanding. Yeah, yeah. So, cause we think about things. You know, you might try to think them out, right? You try to reason out things, huh? So we're aiming at understanding that's a result of thinking out things, reasoning out things. That's the ultimate end. So if wisdom is the highest or greatest perfection of reason, then the wise man must most of all understand, right? And if those who speak with understanding are strong of what is common to all, the wise man is most of all strong in those things that are common to all, either it being sort of all or it being a, what? Cause of all, right? Okay. So everything fits together there, right? But this is the end of the first of the two parts of the premium, right? As Aristotle will recount in the epilogue, as Thomas explains in his commentary, Aristotle does basically two things here. One is to show what wisdom is aiming at, mainly. It's aiming at knowing causes and more precisely at knowing ultimately the first causes. And now in the second part, which is contained in the third reading here, he's going to talk about the kind of knowledge wisdom is, right? Okay. Now, he's going to say in this second part, he's going to say four things about this kind of knowledge, huh? And you'll see that one kind of leads into the next, huh? He's going to show, first of all, that wisdom is looking knowledge, huh? That's not practical knowledge, huh? Practical knowledge is for the sake of doing or for the sake of making, huh? But looking is for the sake of seeing, the sake of understanding, huh? Okay? That's the first thing he wants to show about wisdom. It's not practical knowledge. It's looking knowledge, huh? And what's going to follow from that is that wisdom is liberal or free. Liberal is a Latin word, right? It's liberal or free knowledge, huh? Now, we'll see when he goes to that second thing how that follows from the first. Now, you've got to be careful, huh? We speak sometimes of liberal education, liberal arts, and so on. But we don't use those words very clearly, right? The liberal arts go back to, what? The Greeks, huh? And it goes back to Pythagoras and Plato, huh? And they distinguish the two groups of liberal arts, huh? Pythagoras had introduced the four mathematical liberal arts, geometry, astronomy, arithmetic, and music. And later on in the Middle Ages, those four became or were named the quadrivium, huh? Which comes a lot of the way for four. Four ways, quadrivium, okay? And then with the sophists and with Plato, you have grammar and rhetoric and what? Logic, huh? And those three were called the trivium later on in the Middle Ages. So those seven liberal arts are pursued for the good of the mind as a kind of foundation. And they were called arts because they made something, but more a mental thing that they made. Like in geometry, you construct things, right? But, in logic, you construct syllogisms and definitions and so on. But that was only the beginning of liberal education. Wisdom was the, what, end or the goal of liberal education. So Aristotle will say that wisdom is the most liberal now as there is, right? It's not for the sake of anything further. Now, the third thing he'll say about wisdom, and you'll see again Aristotle's nothing naive about this, is that it's not a human possession. It's not a human possession. It's not a human possession. It's not a human possession. It's not a human possession. Now, you've got to be careful when he says that. It doesn't mean that you can't acquire wisdom to some extent in some imperfect way, right? But he's using his Thomas to expand the commentary, the word possession there, in a very strict sense. If I possess, if I own, you might say, a book, right? Or if I own a ballpoint pen, I can pick up that book or that ballpoint pen anytime and use it, can't I? It's mine, huh? I can't do it with a library book because it says in there, I've got to return it by a certain date and they're going to penalize me if I don't return it, right? It's not my possession, right? Well, man, as Aristotle explained here, has got all kinds of needs for his body, right? And for his external possessions, right? And he can't just pursue wisdom whenever he wants to. He's got to be free from these other needs, at least temporarily, right? And even if a man was wealthy, he'd have to, what, sleep a little bit once in a while, right? He'd have to go eat, right, huh? Maybe go to the doctor or maybe get some exercise or something, right? So he can't pursue this knowledge that's only for its own sake very often, can he? Okay, so it's not a human possession, right? It's a more divine thing, right? Okay, and then the culminating thing he'll say is that wisdom is the, what, best knowledge and the most honorable knowledge because it's the most divine knowledge, huh? Okay? It's the best or most honorable knowledge because it's the most divine knowledge, huh? The most God-like knowledge, right? Now, you'll see how each one of these, I mean, how the first one leads into the second, and the second into the third, and the third into the fourth, kind of naturally, we'll see, right? Well, let's look at the fundamental one here, first of all. Wisdom is looking knowledge, huh? Now, how does Aristotle go about trying to show that wisdom is not practical knowledge? It's not concerned with making or doing. Well, he goes back to something which Plato himself had pointed out before him in the dialogue called the Theotetus, huh? The dialogue called Theotetus, named from this young geometer, Theotetus, who's a famous geometer, actually, in history. There's a young man who's talking to Socrates, right? And he's introduced to Socrates by his teacher, Theodorus, who says that my student is a little bit of a philosopher, he says to Socrates, right? And during the course of their conversation, Theotetus breaks out in wonder. And Socrates stops at that point and said, Theodorus guessed rightly about your nature, huh? For this wonder, he says, is very much the beginning of philosophy. And Socrates actually says it much stronger than I'm stating it. He says, There is no other beginning of philosophy than wonder. So Aristotle's going to point out that men begin to philosophize out of wonder. And so he's going to reason from the desire that gave rise to philosophy, that it's knowledge pursued just for the sake of understanding. If it had begun in hunger, right? If it had begun in thirst, huh? If it had begun in the desire to keep or restore or recover your health, right? If it had begun the desire to be wealthy. it would have led to a practical what? Knowledge, right? But the fact that it began in wonder is a sign that's being pursued just for the sake of what? Knowing, of understanding. So Plato had pointed this out, or Socrates had pointed it out in the Theotetus, right? And Aristotle states that same thing. But if you go back to the first Greek philosophers, before Plato and Aristotle, you see that wonder, right? They have a beautiful fragment from Democritus, one of the early Greek philosophers who said, I would rather discover one cause than be master of the kingdom of the Persians. Now the kingdom of the Persians was the greatest kingdom in the world at that time that the Greeks would know about. So if I was master of the kingdom of the Persians, I'd be the wealthiest man in the world, right? I'd be worshipped as a god. The Persian kings had a thousand chefs to prepare dinner every night. They'd better be good or they'd lose their heads, right? And you'd have a harrow, right? So all these things that men want, the pleasures of the table, the bed, wealth, power, honor, and so on, right? All of these things, the kingdom, or the master of the kingdom of the Persians would have an abundance, right? And yet Democritus says, I would rather discover one cause than be master of the kingdom of the Persians. And of course, how much more to discover the first cause of all things, huh? So you see, in the Greek philosophers, the first one, this wonder is what gave rise to that. The man who wonders thinks himself ignorant, huh? And he's trying to escape his ignorance, huh? So he's pursuing knowledge not to get wealthy, not to get a good meal, not to get a good drink, not to get his health back or something, right? But just to know, to understand, huh? Okay? So this is the first way he reasons here in the first paragraph here in the third reading. That it is not a making science, or you could say in general practical science. It is clear also from those first philosophizing. For men both now, like himself or Plato, huh? And at first, like Democritus and Thaddeus and so on, they began to philosophize through wonder. Okay? In the beginning, they wondered about the strange things close at hand, right? Then little by little, thus going forward, raising questions about the greater things, as about the changes of the moon, you know, the sun and the stars. And finally, they wondered even about the origin of the universe, huh? But the man in doubt and wondering thinks himself to be, what? Ignorant, right? So the philomuthos, and we'll come back to who the philomuthos is, so the philomuthos is in some way a philosopher, for the myth is put together from wonders. Hence, if men philosophize to escape ignorance, right? It is clear that they sought knowledge for the sake of understanding and not for any use, for any making or doing, huh? You see this argument? He's drawing a sign, right, from the desire that gave rise to philosophy, right? That it's knowledge for the sake of understanding and not doing or making, huh? See that? If it had begun in thirst, it would have given rise to the art of digging wells or something, right? Or the art of making beer or something, you know? See? If it had begun in hunger, it would have given rise to the art of hunting or fishing or farming or something, right? If it had begun in the desire to get healthy, right? It would have given rise to the medical art or something, right? So there are other desires that give rise to these practical kinds of knowledge, right? But philosophy begins simply in what? Wonder, right? Twinkle, twinkle, little star. How I wonder what you are, right? So wondering what things are and why they are the way they are, right? That's what gave rise to philosophy, huh?