Wisdom (Metaphysics 2005)
Lecture 5: The Six Attributes of Wisdom and Two Senses of Universality

Transcript
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In knowledge, right? You see? Okay. But, if someone says, you know, someone knows the first cause of all things, somebody might be skeptical as whether you could know the first cause of all things, right? But that such a man would be wise, who would, what? Deny that, right? So, it seems in some way more known to us that the end of our knowledge would be to know the first cause than at the end of our knowledge would be a knowledge of the most universal. That might seem to be contradicted by the fact that in knowing this in front of me, and this in front of me, my knowledge is advancing when I know that it's paper and that's water than when I just know that there's something. Do you see that? And so you'll see, when you look at the beginning of the fourth book of wisdom, for example, that Aristotle reasons from wisdom being about the first causes to its being also about what is said of all, right? As if it's more known that it's about the first cause than it's about what's said of all, okay? Now, you have something like that on a lesser scale, wisdom in a kind of qualified sense, this wisdom about human things, right? When Aristotle begins or began the Nicomachean Ethics, which is kind of the beginning of practical philosophy, right? What is the Ethics about? Well, it's chiefly about happiness, right? Okay? When Shakespeare has someone studying philosophy there in the Taming of the Shul, right, he applies that part of philosophy that treats of happiness by virtue especially to be achieved, okay? But then later on we find that practical philosophy is about all of the goods of man in general, right? And the distinction of all the goods of man into the goods of the soul, the goods of the body, and exterior goods. And it's about the order of those three, right? The goods of the soul are better than the goods of the body, and the goods of the body are better than the outside goods, right? And there's a reason why the practical philosopher considers in general all of the goods of man, right? Why? Because he considers the end or purpose of human life. And all of these goods in some way, what? Some more, some less, contribute to that end or goal, right? So because ethics and practical philosophy is about the end of man, the end and purpose of human life, because it's about happiness, you can see it's got to look at human life to some extent as a whole, right? In the same way that because political philosophy is about the common good of the city, it's got to talk to some extent about the whole city, right? And all the arts and sciences that must be therein, right? Okay? But ethics gets its excellence because it's about happiness and what it really is, what the purpose of man is. Do you see? And so you might reason from its being about the purpose of man, the end of the whole human life, to its being also about these general things, the distinction of all the goods of man, right? In Aristotle we reason something like that in the fourth book. The reason because wisdom is about the first cause that it's going to also talk about all things in some general way. Do you see that? Just like we might say in theology, that in theology you talk about the creator, mainly God, you're going to talk about all creatures, but not in a particular way that the botanists talks about the tree, right? But you're going to talk about all creatures in some general way, aren't you? Do you see that? But the excellence of theology is because it's about the Creator. Not because it's about the creature in general, right? But what's going to be about the creature in general is a consequence of its being about the Creator. Do you see that? So there's a good reason why Aristotle proceeds the way he does, huh? And why he emphasizes that, right? But you see, I kind of anticipated in the discussion that we're talking about today of the comparison of experience and art or science. He's going to argue that art or science is closer to wisdom than experience, right? But not from its being about the universalism. In fact, from its being about the universal, he merely points out that it could be inferior, and often is, to experience as far as doing, right? And it's only from the, it's being about the cause, that he tries to reason that it's, what, superior and more wise. Do you see that? As if it's not so clear from that other difference, right? If at all, that it's superior, right? Did you see that a little bit? Yes. We'll come back to that when we get to the great turnaround, the great turnaround, I call it. In my little course description, let's go about the great turnaround. Let them guess what it's going to be. Okay. Now, let's recall the division here of the premium, huh? The premium has two parts, huh? And the first part, which occupies the first and the second reading here in the editorial division, is what is the end or goal of wisdom, right? Okay. And chiefly what he wants to show there is that it's about the first causes, right? And he shows other things, too, but that's the chief thing. And up to this point, he's especially shown that it's about causes, right? Okay. Now, in the second reading, he's going to go further and show that it's about the very first cause, huh? But he's also going to develop some of it as being about the most universal, what is said of all. Okay. So the second reading is the second part of the first part of the premium. Do you all see that? The second part of the premium will be in the third reading, and that's the kind of knowledge this wisdom is. Okay. Mm-hmm. Since we seek such knowledge, knowledge is the knowledge of the cause, right? This ought to be considered about what sort of causes, about what sort of beginnings is wisdom, the, what, knowledge of. Perhaps, he says, philosophical modesty, as Thomas calls it, perhaps it would become clearer if one took the thoughts we have about the wise men. Again, the we here is not the editorial we, we Aristotle have, or even we, the Greek philosophers, right? But thoughts, for the most part, anyway, that we, meaning us men in general, have about what? The wise men, or do we have about what? Wisdom, right? Now, sometimes he'll talk about the wise men, sometimes he'll talk about wisdom in this next part here, but one can easily be transposed to the other, right? So, if we think the wise men knows all things in some way, then we think that wisdom is a knowledge of all things, right? Or vice versa, right? So, he's going to work out here now kind of a, an outline of what wisdom is, or what the wise man is, put together from the things that are more or less commonly, what, said about the wise men or about wisdom. And it's going to be a six-part description. And then he's going to reason from the first three of those six, to wisdom being a knowledge of what is most universal, what is said of all, and from the last three of those to its being a knowledge of the first cause or causes. Okay? See that? Now the first thing he says, We think first that the wise man knows all things so far as possible, not having a knowledge of these in what? Particular, right? Because no man can know all things in particular, right? Okay? But in some general way we think the wise man knows all things. Now is that a problem? Thought about the wise man? Mm-hmm. He knows everything. Yeah, yeah. I just want to take the example, you know, of a wise guy in the majority sense. What are you, a wise guy, know it all? Mm-hmm. But in a sense, you know, the wise guy is pretending to what? To know it all, huh? Okay? Oh, we have another expression, you see, in daily life. He's got it all together, right? Oh, okay. What does that mean? Somehow he sees the whole of life, right? He hasn't left chunks of life out of his consideration, right? Or his, you know, his wisdom about human life, huh? Okay? You see that very much in Einstein, right, huh? He wanted to know the universe as a whole. The details don't bother me, don't interest me, he says, you know? But he wanted to somehow see the big picture, right? Okay? I suppose that's what they thought about Homer or what we think about Shakespeare, right? That he understands human life as a whole, right? Mm-hmm. The poet does, huh? Mm-hmm. That the carpenter might understand wood and how to work with wood, or the tailor might understand cloth and how to work with cloth. But you don't necessarily see the whole of life, right? The rest of their life might be a mess, right? Mm-hmm. So I'd like that book, Einstein, the book, Lincoln. The universe and Dr. Einstein, right? Mm-hmm. He knows all things in some way, right? He understands the whole universe. Wow. Then we think wise, the man who is able to know things difficult and not easy for a man to know. Well, now, isn't that a common thought about the wise man? A wise man is the man we admire or reverence or honor for his knowledge, right? And we honor and reverence and look up to a man because he knows things that are easy to know. There's eight people at this table, you know? Do you admire me for knowing that? Easy to do, right? Okay. Not a count. Two more guys. There, better. Let's take this table here. Two cents is common to all, right? Hence, it is easy and nothing, what? Wise, huh? Now, in the third, or next paragraph, the fourth paragraph in this reading, as Thomas in the commentary will explain there, there's two more items, right? So you might want to draw a little line between the man more certain or more sure and then the man more able to teach, right? Okay? Because the third thing we think about the wise man is that he's more certain or he's more sure, to use the English word, right, of what he has to say, right? Now, is that true, huh? Do we think of the wiser man as being more sure of what he says? Well, it seems to me that when you're kind of unsearching yourself and somewhat in doubt or you're not too sure what you're saying, right, that you go to some... when you consider wiser in this matter to confirm or reject what you have to say right okay so if a doctor for example the general practitioner let's say is not too sure about your ailment huh but he kind of suspects what it is he might send you to a what yeah yeah okay my wife had carotid conitis there and years ago you know and of course when it first happened you know when one discovered went down to the local idoc doctor i think he knew what it was but he sent her to boston to the specialist right okay okay i used to drive up to quebec you know every thanksgiving vacation every easter vacation to see once indiana yet right and usually you know questions that i've worked on miles away and usually you know i've worked out an answer to the question you know basically i'd check them with him you know and most of the time he'd agree with what i thought out but occasionally he'd have a disagreement or a qualification there and usually i'd say you know that he knew it's also something i didn't see right but why did i go to this man right or the only man that i really knew that i could really what trust trust yeah yeah but so if i consider him wiser it's because he what um he's more certain about these things right i'm not sure so those are the first three things about the wise men in some sense he seems to know all things at least in some general way right he seems to know things are difficult for us to know right not easy to know he's more sure of what he says right i notice there's a little paradox there between the second and the third thing right because if a man is knowing things more difficult or maybe the most difficult for us to know you'd think well then wouldn't he be less sure about what he's saying than the man who's knowing the number of people at the table here or knowing something easier to know right but we have both of these thoughts about the wise men don't we but maybe where the wise man knows what's most difficult to know and where he's more sure it's not exactly the same place but the mystery there right comes up later right and aristotle has something i see mystery in the three books about the soul right because in one way we're very sure that we have a soul but about what the soul is we're not too sure about that something descartes didn't see right i think therefore i am right he's very sure he's thinking right but are you sure what thought is that's difficult to know exactly what thought is and what thinking is right so i can be very sure that i'm thinking and not very sure or less sure anyway of what thinking really is okay i was asking the students there the night i ask people this sometimes you know can you think without words do you know what you're thinking without words but before i can say in words what i think do you know exactly what i am thinking do you know you realize that's so clear thinking yeah okay now the fourth thing they might be a little easier if one left out the word the causes because he's got a kind of reason to speak about the first causes right but i suppose you could leave that in there the wise man is more able to teach now what do you think about that is that a thought we have about the wise man he's more able to teach so when i didn't once in a while i could start my first teacher right the question he wasn't too sure about. Well, the first thing he'd do was get on the phone and call Father Baumgartner to seminary and ask him, right? Or send me over to see Father Baumgartner. Okay. Or then, later on, when Charles DeConnick used to come down in this lecture tour to give, you know, seven or eight different talks in the Twin Cities area and so on. And he'd stay at Kassarik's house. So Kassarik says, well, when DeConnick comes down, he says, you ask him those questions. So I was about to go to the house and DeConnick came down and I put to him the same questions that Kassarik couldn't quite handle and DeConnick was very clear about it and explained it all to me. And I could see very clearly DeConnick's superiority there to what? Kassarik, right? So the teacher is more able to what? To teach, right? And of course, people who had never studied under DeConnick, you know, but it run into people who had studied under DeConnick, right? They had a hard time understanding the respect that we had for DeConnick as a teacher. It was kind of very manifest now. See? But that's part of his wisdom that he could, what? Really teach. My teacher, Kassarik, had given up philosophy for a while before he met DeConnick. And then he heard about DeConnick and, well, I'll try this guy out, see. But he was older when he first went to the wall, see. And so he got up there and he says, DeConnick, if you teach the way I was taught philosophy in the States, I'll get up and leave your class. And DeConnick was not annoyed by this. He says, oh, we're fine, you know. And, but you could see the respect that Kassarik had for DeConnick. And I always remember one little incident there where DeConnick was speaking there up on the stage there and there was some problem with the microphone, you know, getting adjusted for it. And Kassarik, he jumps out of the audience, runs up on the stage, adjusts the microphone, runs bad. Like a kid almost, you know. But you could see that kind of respect, you know. And just, you know, right away, you know. And towards him. Of course, he used to, Father Baumgart, I mentioned, and Father Dulac and Kassarik and so on would study on DeConnick. And DeConnick, they would pay DeConnick's way down here, you know, so they could come down and see what he's thinking about these days. So the man more able to teach, we think, is what? Wiser, huh? He knows Boer was, what, visiting the United States there when he got something from one of his colleagues in Europe, right? And then he realized, what? The possibility of the atom bomb. The first thing he said was, get rid of the reporters. Don't report us out of here. And then he explained to the American scientists the possibilities, right? Well, he seems wiser, right? He's teaching them, right? And Heisenberg, you know, who some people think is the greatest scientist, next to Einstein anyway, Heisenberg, you can buy his lectures when he first came to the United States to explain, what? The quantum theory to the American physicists. Heisenberg describes Boer. When Boer first came to Germany, he was still a young student at the time. And Boer had the reputation of knowing the atom better than anybody in the whole world. And so the German scientists called it the Boer Festival, the series of lectures. Boer gave, right? So we think of this guy who's able to teach as being, what, wiser. Now, the fifth one here, in our democratic practical age, a little harder for us to see. But we saw it anticipated here in some of the things we read in the first reading. And the science is the one for itself. And it's interesting that we do give the Nobel Prize more for the work of the theoretical physicist, than for the man who might construct the bomb or do something else on the basis of the theory. And so we said Einstein has admired more than those who did the practical things with this. So the one for itself and for the sake of knowing, that's the same thing, is more wisdom than that for the sake of its results or for the sake of doing or making something. That's the fifth attribute, the wise man of wisdom. And then the sixth one, and this in a way comes out of our thinking that the chief artist is wiser than the man who, what, obeys, right? Well, then the one ruling is more wisdom than the one, what, obeying. That's a common thought we'd have, right? For the wise man ought not to receive orders from another man, because another man will be wiser, but to give orders, right? And he ought not to be persuaded by another, but the less wise by him. So such and so many are the thoughts we, meaning people in general, right, have about the wise men and wisdom, right? So as Thomas says, you can construct a kind of six-part, right, description or encircling of the wise man, right? He's a man who knows all things in some way. He knows things that are difficult for man to know, right? He's more sure of what he says in some way, right? He's more able to teach, right? He has knowledge more desirable for its own sake, knowledge more desirable simply as knowledge, and he's able to order, correct, others, right? So you find Thomas often quoting that in Latin, sapientis est ordinari, right? Okay. You saw that, you know, from the Book of Wisdom, huh? Wisdom ordered all things, you know, sweet thing, huh? Okay. Pretty interesting description of the wise man or wisdom, huh? And sometimes he speaks of the wise man, sometimes of wisdom, but as I say, you can transpose one to the other, right? If wisdom is a knowledge of all things in some way, then the wise man in some way knows all things or vice versa. Okay. You see that? Now, sometimes I would give students a kind of little exercise thing, which seems more like wisdom, logic, or ethics and political philosophy, or natural philosophy, right? In some way, the logician seems to, what, direct all the other parts of philosophy, right? I mean, Socrates is in the phaedo there, and again, a very important question, especially in the last day of your life. The question is whether the human soul survives death, right? Goes on after the destruction of the body. And Socrates developed some arguments that seemed pretty good, and then Simeon and Sibas come in with some objections, and the arguments don't seem so good. And Socrates will say, we need an art about arguments. That would help us to tell the difference between a good argument and a bad one, right? And the difference among good arguments between one that's really necessary and one that's only probable. And this is, to my knowledge, the first time someone has said, we need an art about arguments, which is what logic is, ultimately, an art about arguments. So, maybe you're arguing about the triangle, and you're arguing about the soul, and you're arguing about courage or temperance, right? I'm going to tell you all whether you're arguing correctly or not, right? I'm going to be directing all you guys. So, it's not the geometer or the natural philosopher or the political philosopher who's what? Like the wise men, it seems like the magician is directing them, right? But you, being a political philosopher, you might say, hey, but just a minute now. We're going to decide, Berkwist, whether you practice the art of logic or practice the military art, huh? You know, where you can best, you know, contribute to the defense of the country or something, right? And we're going to see, Mr. Berkwist, where you can most contribute to the common good of this country, right? So, we're going to be directing you, right? And Aristotle spoke of, you know, how in some way the political art seems to direct all the other arts, huh? And so, I can't practice the medical art without being in some way certified by the state, right? And I can't practice that art of driving out with... I've got a little license in here that licenses me to practice that art, right? And they talk about, you know, get old like me, you know, they check us again to see if we're capable of driving safely on the roads out there, right, no? See? It's very deciding whether I can practice loose art or that art, right? And when the president of Assumption College confers formally the degrees, he says, in virtue of the authority invested in the state of Massachusetts, he says. Yes, you know? So we're giving degrees. Assumption College is licensed, you might say, by the state, right, to grant degrees in certain areas anyway, right? So the political philosopher in some way seems to be what? The wise man in the political statesman, right? But then in terms of knowing causes, the natural philosopher might seem to be, right? But you can see the different parts of philosophy all have a likeness to wisdom. And even somewhat in some of these items more than others, right? So, I mean, if ethics in political philosophy is basically about the end of man, well, then what? You direct somebody to the end, don't you? So if this is the ultimate end of human life, and the practical philosopher knows that end, and he's directing everybody towards it, isn't he the great director? Isn't he the wise man? Of course, in wisdom, we consider the end of the whole universe. But certainly in terms of human affairs, the political philosopher seems to be the wise man, right? In terms of knowing the end. But in terms of thinking, you know, logician seems to be the great director. Well, Buckley used to have, was it Eleanor Roosevelt's faulty reasoning? But he'd submit, you know, submit it to James Brenner, who was something of a philosopher, right? You know, to correct the reasoning, or point out the fallacies in the reasoning. So if you turn to the logician, right, to see if this reasoning is correct or not, sometimes Charles de Connick would get Monsignor Dion, right? You know, have Monsignor Dion give a logical analysis or something, right? Well, there, de Connick seems to be being directed by Dion, right? But then in his premium to logic, Thomas recalls things that Aristotle taught in the third book about the soul. So now the natural philosopher seems to be coming into prominence, huh? And maybe this end or purpose of man you're talking about is the natural end of man, right? Does nature act for an end? We're going to go to this guy for natural philosophy or for direction in that matter, right? Take a little break here. Sure. I'm going to break here now, I can't help it. Aristotle is going to reason from these six things to two things about wisdom, right? One that is about the most universal, what is said of all, right? And the other that is about the cause of all, right? Now, if you read the modern philosophy, it's always confusing these two things, right? Okay, and let me, in Latin, when Thomas talks about it, he'll sometimes use the phrase universale in preditando, universale in calisando, right? But it's a distinction here between what is said of many, and if it's most universal, said of all, and what is a, what, cause of all, right? Now, I think it's a simple example of the army, right? Because Aristotle, in the 12th book of Wisdom, will compare the order of the universe to the order of an army. And God is like the general, right? He doesn't take the city, because the city is too distorted. It's the army. But notice the difference between a soldier, let's say, which is said of all in the army, right? And then the commander-in-chief, let's say the general of the army, who is an individual, right? And he commands everybody in the whole army, right? Okay? So if it's General Douglas MacArthur, I'd say, my favorite general, if MacArthur is a universale in calisando, right? He commands the whole army, right? They all obey him in some way. But he's not saving anybody in the army, is he? No one else is MacArthur, right? You heard the thing when, what was it, replaced him in Korea there. I asked him, you know, does he feel like to step into his shoes? He says, nobody feels his shoes. But soldier is said of all, right? There's a big difference between what is said of all and what is a, what, cause of all, right? So soldier can be said of everybody in the United States Army, right? Okay? But the commander-in-chief, let's say, is the president of our system, right? Well, Bush is not said of everybody in the army, is he? No. But Bush, in some sense, is the cause of the whole army moving, right? Okay? You see the difference between those two, huh? Okay? Now, my favorite whipping boy is Hegel, or, you know, who knows, anticipates it, huh? They confuse the two things, right? Because Hegel takes the being, which is said of all things, right? And he tries to generate everything out of the being, which is said of all things. And Karl Marx, you know, who studied under Hegel school, in a sense, has a little playfully making fun of it, right? He says, this is what Hegel does, huh? He says, you've got an apple here, and an orange, and a banana, and a pineapple, and so on, right? And Hegel, you know, separates out what they all have in common, which is fruit, right? And then, from the idea of fruit itself, he tries to give rise to all these fruits. Well, it's taking what is said of all, and trying to make that the, what, cause of all, huh? Now, what we do, there's an equivocation here in the word universality, right? But you have that same confusion, or multiplicity of meanings, in, say, the English word general, right? Because in one sense, soldier is something general, right? Said of every particular soldier in the army, right? In another sense, Douglas MacArthur is called a, what? The general, right? But he's not general in the way of its soldiers, is he? Okay? So you have to separate those two, huh? Okay? When the great Heraclitus says that those who speak... With understanding, must be strong in what is common to all. Well, it can be common to all in the sense of being said of all, and what? Being a cause of all, right? Remember how we were talking about the goods of the soul, and the goods of the body, and exterior goods, right? What's common to all of them? Well, they're a good of man. In which sense is that common to all of them, good of man? Instead of all. Instead of all of them, right? Okay? But happiness is in some sense common to all of them too. But in this other sense here, okay? It's for the sake of happiness, right? That all these other things are assumed, huh? So, Hegel, if you look at his logic, for example, where this thing comes up, the being which is said of all things, he identifies with the one who said, I am who will. So, he's confusing these two. That's quite an interesting mistake. But a terrible mistake, huh? Of course, you know, it's going to be a pantheistic notion of God, right? Where God, in a sense, is a part of everything, because what is said of all is the sense in everything, right? Now, Aristotle wants you to avoid that. Now, he could reason from some of these things here to both conclusions, right? But instead, he does something kind of interesting, huh? From the first, second, and third, that the wise man knows all things in some way, that he knows things difficult to know, and that he's more sure or certain of what he says. He's going to reason from those first three things in the description of the wise man are wisdom to its being a knowledge of what is said of all. Okay? Do you see that? Let me just kind of darken it a little bit to show you what I'm saying here. One, two, and three. He's going to reason to that, to wisdom being about what is most universal in predication being said of something, huh? Okay? He's going to reason from four, five, and six that the wise man is more able to teach, that his knowledge is most desirable for its own sake. He's able to direct and order all others, right? He's going to reason from those three to its being a knowledge of the cause of all, or he could say the first cause, okay? Now, he could reason from some of these to both of these, right? It seems to me he wants you to keep the instinct in your mind, right? Now, you know, of course, there's three. Three is enough, right? He's going to have, in a sense, three arguments to show that wisdom is about the most universal, what is said of all, okay? And we'll see more, better in book four, what is said of all, okay? And you're going to argue from three arguments, three things, right? That it's about the first cause, the cause of all, okay? Three different things, right? And in books, say, six through ten, he's mainly talking about what is said of all. In books 11 to 14, what is the cause of all? See, this will be both of them. We did something like that, but on a lesser scale, in ethics, right? We talked about human goods in general, right? And human good is said of the goods of the soul, goods of the body, okay? Not equally, but it's said of them, right? And then we talked about happiness, right? Two different things, right? What is said of all, and what is the cause of all? Is that clear or not fair? Okay. What it is to be a soldier, and what it is to be Napoleon, huh? Not the same thing, isn't it? but the same science it talks about both in the politics which is a culmination of practical philosophy Aristotle will talk about the common good and he'll talk about the government and he'll talk about what a citizen is who is and is not a citizen and you talk about what is a citizen you're talking about something that is very general but in what sense when you talk about the government or you talk about the common good you're talking about what is yeah MacArthur said what in war there's no substitute for victory well victory is the end right but that's a cause in the sense of the end of all the army does right the general Napoleon and MacArthur who is commanding is a cause, universal cause in another sense the mover, the maker right but soldier is general another way right General Schwarzkopf said the first Gulf War the reporter asked him a question he said well generally speaking and he interrupts and says generals always speak generally I told you about Shakespeare's punting on that didn't I so I always try to show you he's wiser than Hegel because in Taurus and Cressida when Taurus and Cressida comes over to the Greek camp and Agamemnon gives her a kiss oh yeah and of course she'd be a pretty good girl so everyone else could do the act and so Ulysses says she's been kissed by the general but she hasn't been kissed in general but he gives her a kiss right this is the start of the downfall because you know a ruined woman but it's one thing to be kissed by the general another thing to be kissed in general right but Shakespeare often you know kind of intellectual in a sense because the Elizabethans are always punting on the meanings of words and Shakespeare does that now next to the last paragraph on page 3 he's going to start to reason out the first thing that we saw that the wise man knows all things in the way possible to man right but that's not possible to know all things in particular now some might say you know well how can anybody know all things because there's an infinity of things to be known right now you say well stop and think because something it's very easy to see do you know what an odd number is and what an even number is and do you know that no odd number is even yeah but odd number is said of how many things yeah and even numbers have infinity of things and even if it's your number is right so when I say no odd number is even I'm talking about infinity of things right but what way is it possible for man to know an infinity of things see well you can't go through all the odd numbers one by one no one can ever do that right but you can know something that is said of even an infinity of things right you see so if the wise man knows all things in the way that's possible for a man to know all things right it's not by knowing all things in particular but by knowing all things by knowing what is said of all things right do you see so he can reason from that first thing to its being a knowledge of what is said of all of these to know all things necessarily belongs to the man most of all having a knowledge of the universal the man knowing the most universal therefore for he knows in some way all things placed under the what universal right so when I say no odd number is even I'm making a statement in a way about all odd numbers aren't I about infinity of things now notice you can see there why the philosopher will say that God alone is wise because to know all things simply without qualification it would be to know them in detail and in particular right and that's what man does know all things but it is possible for man in some imperfect way to know all things because to know the universal he knows in some way everything that's underneath it right you see that now the second thing he says he's going to reason out from the wise man knowing things difficult to know right They've got to be careful about this, right? Because Aristotle could have reasoned from its being about things difficult to know to say it's about the first cause. Because everybody would admit that it's very difficult, if not, if it's possible, the first cause, most people, right? Aristotle knows how he qualifies this, and perhaps, right? The most universal are the most difficult for men to know, and he gives a reason for it, for they are furthest from the senses. If our knowledge starts with the senses, and the senses know what? The singular, well then the most universal would be furthest away from the starting point, and therefore would seem to be, what? Most difficult to know, right? But he says perhaps. Because it's going to be much more difficult to know the first causes, right? You see what he's doing? He could reason from that second thing even more so to its being a knowledge of the first causes. He doesn't want to be like Hegel and accept the two. Right? He doesn't want to confuse. So he's going to reason from the first three just to one thing and from the last three to the other, right? Now, there is, you know, science a question about this, right? Because some might say, isn't it easier to know that this is a liquid, let's say, than that it's water, right? Okay. And there's a little problem there. But as a teacher of philosophy over many years, and hearing students, you know, talk about the difficulty of philosophy, right? And why they might find philosophy more difficult than other subjects, or some other subjects anyway. Kind of the common thing they come up with is that it's so abstract, philosophy, right? Good. Now, of course, that's a very abstract word. Abstract in English. But what do they mean by saying it's so abstract, huh? Don't they mean it's very, very general? You see? And not particular and concrete like history or botany or something, right? You see? And so they're saying in some way it's very difficult to know something that is very, what? Universal. And it's easier to talk about something much more, what? Particular. Yeah. You know, when you go to the supermarket, and you get to the checkout counter and they've got all these trashy magazines telling you about movie actresses and actresses and anybody who's, you know, it's Charles or Princess Diana or whoever it is, you know? And all these things. It's kind of funny to see the title of some of these articles that they're selling it for, you know? But that's what the common man is reading, apparently, the common woman or somebody's reading because they're all there, you know? But they're all about the singular, right? You know? They have a hard time, you know, considering man or a woman, it's got to be Princess Diana or whoever the actor is or actresses, right? Now, there's a special problem we'll find out about the most universal. Because in some sense, the universal seems to be easier to know in some way, right? Although, there's that strateness, you know? People see some difficulty there. But, just give a little hint here, huh? In the fourth book of Natural Hearing, Aristotle quotes the common opinion of the Greek philosophers. Whatever is must be somewhere. If isn't somewhere, it doesn't exist. So people take it as a property of what is to be in place. And this is really a property not of what is, but of bodies, right? So when men think of what is, in the beginning, they think of what is as bodies and what is in bodies. And that's why they say whatever is must be somewhere, but in some way it doesn't exist. And so, you know, it's to be a little question of where is God, right? And, you know, when the Russians, when the communists were in power in Russia and they sent the astronauts or the cosmonauts they called them. And, you know, speaking back, you know, in the intercom system, you know, to hear that. there's no god up here they're saying it's so funny you're gonna see god in some place up there if he exists right but uh most people even you know people who are christians right they kind of think that way right you see and uh i know myself you know i mean i'm convinced that the soul is immortal you know from philosophy as well as from the faith but i tried to you know you know picture you know my soul separated from my body and i'm trying to imagine my soul to be kind of a body-like thing you know and people imagine the soul to be a kind of a a um air-like substance but different something kind of bodily right more or less in the shape of yourself right like don represents the souls there you know that he meets there you know purgatory and so on he tries to embrace them in their air like that but people can't rise above body right now well as you're still point out later on if everything that is is a body or in a body right the natural philosophy would be wisdom and it's only because you have some reason to think there exists something that is not a body that you begin to realize that being is something more universal than what body and what is in bodies right so the most universal things like being are hard to what separate from less universal things like body and what is in bodies so he says perhaps there's a lot to think there right he's not elaborating right okay he really points out one difficulty that there might seem to be in knowing the most universal and that is because it seems to be furthest from the starting point and that's the difficulty the students are trying to get at when they say philosophy is so abstract okay um but they say there's another difficulty and that is that the uh most universal there is something very hard to separate from the body to what is in bodies and until you can do that you don't realize there's something higher right one reason why this science is sometimes called metta tafusica after the books of natural philosophy there's two or three places in natural philosophy where reason can reason to the existence of something apart from bodies and one place is in the seventh and eighth books of the natural hearing where our style of reasons to the dependence of motion upon a mover and the dependence of moved movers upon a what unmoved mover and then that a body doesn't move without being moved so the unmoved mover is not a body right that's one place where in natural philosophy studying motion and the causes of motion one comes at the limit you might say of natural philosophy to the unmoved mover there's not a body and then in the third book about the soul aristotle perfects plato who had some awareness of this he reasons to the what um immortality the human soul and then you have another evidence right that there's something that is not a body or it plot they can be okay perhaps the third place is when you start to realize that um there's some greater mind behind material world and we'll see that again in anic sagres first begin to see this that this greater mind is not mixed with matter he had a reason for saying this we'll see very good reason so it's only very gradually very difficult to follow reasoning right that our reason begins to realize that there's something that is not a body and then you realize that what is being which is said of everything that is right is not to be identified as everybody does in the beginning with bodies and what is in bodies right there's not a property of being as such to be somewhere see that's very hard you can see how hard it is to to derive it that huh now let's take that example there my cousin you know went to laval to teach his philosophy he's having a conversation with his pious mother right he just can't understand that god doesn't have this divine nature of body right you can't transcend the imagination right um i'm going to be posting on the net there, in the sixth book there, Wisdom, there's some of the things I've put on. But Thomas' questions there in the tutus on the exposition of Boethius' De Trinitate, right? But one of the questions, or one of the articles he has, Thomas, there following Boethius, is that you can't judge these things by the imagination, right? You can't end up with the imagination. Of course, we never think without images, and the images are tied to bodies and what is in bodies, so we're very much inclined at first to think that whatever he is must be a body, or in body. And we can't judge the way God is, the way the angels are, for that matter, by what we can imagine, or what we can sense. And if you do, you're going to end up, you know, the soul being, you know, air-like substance, huh? So it is, in that sense, the most universal, is very, what, difficult for man to know, not just because it's removed from the senses, which are now it's a singular, but because you have to transcend judging by your imagination. Okay? Now, the third thing was that the wise man is more sure, or more certain, right? Now, at this point, he recalls a principle that is given in the, what, Posture Analytics, right? Which is about demonstration, and the effect of demonstration, which is a reasoned out understanding of things. And Aristotle is saying that one science is more sure or certain than another, and he takes, you know, these fundamental sciences of arithmetic and geometry, and the principle is that those from fewer things, he says, are more certain or more sure than those from addition, as arithmetic than geometry. Now, sometimes when we compare arithmetic and geometry, we take the simplest thing in geometry, which is the point. Jupiter says it has no parts. And in arithmetic, the simplest thing is the one. Now, the point is something one, indivisible, but the point has, in addition to the one, it has position. It's here or there, right? So if you compare, let's say, three, which has three ones in it, and then, let's say, three points, well, you can see those three points, you have to consider where they are, right? And you can always draw a line between two points, but where's the third point? Well, it could be on the same line, right? Or it could be outside the line, right? Okay. How about the three ones? Do you have to consider where they are? No. So the point involves more than the one. Now, if you study Euclid, which is the way to learn arithmetic and geometry, when you study the geometrical theorems, and especially if you have Heath's notes and so on, right, or Proclus' commentary in the first book, the geometries down through the ages have distinguished in geometry, in the proof of the theorem, a number of cases you have to consider, because the lines can fall in somewhat different positions, right? And, of course, we read Heath's notes or Proclus, sometimes they'll say so-and-so in calming on this thing, has distinguished more cases than necessary, you know, you know. And they'll point out that Euclid sometimes, or usually, will give the most difficult case and leave the simple cases to us dumb schools, right? I know myself in trying to be sure about these things, right? See, now, we have all the cases that need to be distinguished here, right? But when I do arithmetic, I don't have to worry about that, you see? So I know kind of concretely through my study of geometry and arithmetic that there's a difficulty, right, in geometry that there isn't in arithmetic, huh? And that I sometimes say, now, you know, am I sure