Ethics
Lecture 1: Definition, Examples, and the Question of Good as Cause or Effect

Transcript
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What is good? How would you define good? What is good? Well, we've heard before, the good is what all desire, the starting point. Now, let's go back a little bit before that, right? Let's imitate Plato, right? Who's one of the chief philosophers in history. Wrote these famous conversations of Socrates, dialogues of Socrates. If you read the dialogues of Plato, which are representations of Socrates conversing with people, dialogue is a Greek word for conversation. Very many of the dialogues are asking, what is something, right? So he asks, you know, for example, what is virtue, right? Or he asks, Euthyphro, what is piety? Or he asks, Theotetus, what is episteme, right? He's now acknowledged, what is that? He asks, Bacchus, what is courage, right? Now, Plato represents the man to whom Socrates addresses this question, usually is giving examples of the thing when he's asked what it is. And here you understand Plato's understanding of the way human beings begin, right? They're more apt to begin when asked what something is by giving examples of it than by giving a definition of it. They're more apt to begin by giving examples of the thing than even trying to give a universal definition of it. And perhaps the younger and the more inexperienced they are, the less they heard, they will begin with examples, right? So if we brought a little boy, for example, into this room here, set him down at the table here, we said to him, Now, Johnny, what is a nose? What do you think he'd say? Say, that's a nose. Yeah, that's a nose, that's a nose. He starts pointing, it's your nose or my nose, right? He wouldn't even attempt to give a, what, definition of what a nose is, huh? Okay? If you asked him, What is a chair? What is a chair? What is a chair? What is a chair? You tend to give examples, huh? And is there a reason why we tend to give examples before a definition, or before even trying to give a definition to something universal? What is the reason? Okay. But perhaps even more basic is that the first rodent knowledge is from the senses into reason, huh? And the senses don't know anything universal, let alone any definitions, right? So the senses know only singulars, and they are only examples of the, what, universal. Okay? If you ask someone, What is an animal? They say, Well, something like a dog, a cat, you know, a horse, that's what an animal is. And give you some kind of a, as you say, a confused notion of what it is, right? But in a way, I'm giving examples of that animal, right? What is water? Well, when you turn the faucet on, the lake out there, the rain, that's water. You know? I've been giving examples of water, right? Okay? So, if Socrates was to ask, let's say, a boy, American boy, what is good, right? What would the boy probably answer at first? Yeah, candy's good. Pizza's good. And Socrates would say, well, is anything good besides the things you can eat, like candy and pizza? He'd say, well, baseball's good, or football's good, or bicycles are good, or vacation is good, right? Okay, but he would be giving, what, examples of things he considers good, and Socrates would... You should stop somewhere along here, right? And you'll say, now, I asked you for one thing and you gave me many. And sometimes he makes a joke. I think I told you there's some, I think it's a proverb or something in Greek, you know. If you break a dish and you're handing it to somebody, no? No? So I asked you for one dish, not... But that's what Socrates is saying. And so he's trying to explain the difference between giving examples of a thing and defining it, right? And the most obvious difference between those two is that there are many examples, maybe even endless amount, number of examples of a thing, right? But there seems to be only one definition or at least one complete definition of it. Now, those are two different things. There's a connection between the two, right? Because that one definition is going to bring together what's common to those examples. Okay? And so even Aristotle, in the second book of the posterior analytics and logic, will say, one road to a definition, right, could start from examples, huh? And what you would do is compare those examples and separate out what they have in common and leave aside their differences, right? So if we say that the girl in the ocean there in California that swam out into the shark-infested water where a young man got his leg chopped by a shark, right, and she pulled him into shore, right, we'd say she was a brave woman, right? And if we say that the soldier who gets up and charges the enemy, right, he was a brave man, right, and we say that the fireman who ran into the building that was collapsing and rescued the baby and so on was a brave man, right, we'd say, well, what do these have in common? The shark and the bullets that are flying out there on the battlefield and the burning, collapsing building. Two different hazards. Yeah. There are things that could end your life, right, huh? And so here you have three people who are going into something or towards something in their life, right? But you could maybe add for a good reason, right? To save the young man or to save the baby or to defend the country or something of this sort, right, huh? So you're starting to pull out what's common to those who are brave, right? They are those who risk their life, right, but for a good reason, huh? As opposed to the foolhardy man who risks his life, right, for no good reason, huh? Or the coward who, even for a good reason, won't risk his life, huh? Do you see that? Okay. So, if you got into the little boy, this recognition that there is a difference, huh, between giving examples of good things and then bringing out what's common to all those examples, right? Now, what does candy and pizza, one is sweet and one has a different taste, right? And then the bicycle, you can't eat that at all. And the vacation, you know, it's not even like a thing, I don't know what you call it, right? What do all these things have in common that he himself would recognize, right? That's what he has in mind when he calls them all good, huh? What do you say? Pleasing for the senses. What? Pleasing for the senses. Yeah. Or in general, these are all things that he wants, right? He wants candy, he wants pizza, he wants a bicycle, he wants vacation, right? So all the things that he wants, he calls good, right? Okay. I think I mentioned how in the dialogue called the Mino. Mino's trying to define virtue, right? And he comes up with a definition of virtue, it sounds pretty good. The desire for good things and the ability to achieve them. Sounds pretty high class, right? And Socrates says, well now, does a desire for good things separate the virtuous man from the vicious man? Doesn't the vicious man want good things for himself, too? Doesn't the man that goes to the bank? And robs a bank, doesn't he want something good for himself? Yeah. So, eventually, Mino's forced to admit that the vicious man, as well as the virtuous man, wants good things for himself. So it seems that everybody wants good things for himself, so that doesn't separate the good man from the bad man, it seems. And Mino can't see any way out of this. I remember one time when the kids were quite little, and they have three little kids around the table there, and dinner's being served, sometimes, this is a good dinner, Mama. Sometimes, oh, Mama, this is awful. And my oldest there, Paul, one day, kind of out of blue, figured out, you know, if we'd like the dinner, if you want it, then we call it good. If we don't want it, then it's bad. You see, that's kind of the first notion, right? You know, our Lord said, unless you become again like a little child, you can't enter the kingdom of heaven, right? Because there's something like that for philosophy, right? Unless you become again like a little child, you can't enter the kingdom of philosophy. And likeness there consists, though, in the fact that the little boy tends to begin with what is really more known to us. And that's where the philosopher should start, with what is more known to all of us, right? And the little child will not so much repeat something that his teacher in college said, or something he saw in a book or something. He'll start with where we all originally started, calling good the things we want, right? So, this is sometimes called, then, the first definition of good. And Aristotle begins Nicomachean Ethics, right? That kind of induction, huh? Every art and every science and every choice and action needs it's some good, right? Therefore, they define the good. Well, you see, the good is what all want. It is what all desire. That's the way he begins the Nicomachean Ethics, okay? Now, maybe next time I'll give you a little bit of Nicomachean Ethics, right? From the very beginning, you know? Where he really does that. But we want to develop this on our own here for a while. Now, this goes back to Plato, and before Plato, too. But you'd find it when you're a child, in a sense, right? And it's touched upon, as they say, in the Mino. Now, in the dialogue that comes after the Mino, in the dialogue called the Euthyphro, Socrates teaches us there how to ask a very basic kind of question, a question which is a question of before and after, in a sense of cause and effect. Euthyphro has been defining, after giving examples, tries to give us a definition of piety, that the pious is what the gods approve of, okay? Or the pious is what the gods are pleased with, right? Okay? And Socrates asks the question of Euthyphro, well, is it pious because the gods approve of it? Or is it reverse that the gods approve of it because it is pious, okay? Is it pious because it pleases the gods, right? Or does it please the gods because it is pious? Another way of stating the question is, is the approval of the gods, of the gods? A cause making it to be pious, right? Or is it an effect of its being pious and the gods recognize it as being pious? See? That's the fundamental question, right? Okay? Now, Heisenberg, the great physicist in the 20th century, some put him next to Einstein, but Heisenberg said that the Greeks were able to ask these questions of principle. This is the most powerful tool, he said, that the Greeks gave us, huh? The most powerful tool. But you see an example of that in this question of Euthyphro. You can ask that kind of question, not just about Euthyphro's definition of the pious, but about many other things, huh? Now, I'll give you an example from another Platonist named St. Augustine, right? Okay? St. Augustine quotes the first definition of the beautiful. The beautiful is that which pleases when seen. Okay? This is the first definition of the beautiful. So when I see a painting and it pleases my eyes, how beautiful, right? Or if I see the fall foliage, you know, it's how beautiful, right? Now, Augustine asked the same kind of question that Socrates teaches us to ask here, and asked to be very careful of the definition. Augustine asked, is it beautiful because it pleases my eyes? Or does it please my eyes because it is beautiful? Or to put the question a little different? Is it pleasing my eyes an effect of its being beautiful? Or is that the cause that makes the thing beautiful? Well, Augustine, being intelligent, says he has no doubt that this is an effect of its being beautiful, right? That it's not beautiful because it pleases my eyes because it pleases my eyes. That might be how I recognize it's beautiful, right? But that's not what makes it to be beautiful. But rather, it pleases my eyes because it is what? Beautiful. Okay? You can see how important that question is when you get into the Beaux-Arts, as they call them, the beautiful arts, right? Arts to be beautiful. Because if you say beautiful, it's beautiful because it pleases us, right? Then beauty would be nothing, beauty, and a thing, right? We call it beauty because of this effect it has upon us, right? But if this is an effect of its being beautiful, right? Then you have to look more deeply to see what the beautiful really consists in, right? Okay? Order and symmetry and things of this sort, right? You could apply this to the question of law, right? Okay? I sometimes ask about the Ten Commandments, right? I say, there's a commandment that you shouldn't have murdered people, right? Now, is it bad to murder people because there's a commandment against it? Or did God make a commandment against it because it is bad? Yeah. And even my crazy students are not, you should say, it's what? It's a commandment against it because it is bad, right? And the commandment was not there to cause murder to be something bad. But because it is bad and very bad, right? And God has given a commandment against it, so we will especially avoid that doing, right? Okay? Or there's a commandment to honor your father and mother, right? Now, is it good to honor your father and mother because it's a commandment to do so? Or do you God see it as being good to honor your father and mother, and very good to do so, right? And therefore he gave us a commandment so we would do what is in fact very good to do. It makes all the difference in your understanding of the Ten Commandments, right? To see which of those is true, right? Now there might be some kind of law where it's the reverse, right? Like the law to drive on the right side of the street, or the law to drive on the left side of the street, right? So you might say, when you're in England, it's good to drive on the left side of the street. That's the law in England, right? But is it good because there's a law to do that, or is there a law to do so because it is good? It's just by convenience. Yeah, yeah. You see, what's important is that you decide either to go on the right or the left and be consistent, right? So, you know, it's going to be good. But it's not because driving on the right or on the left is either one is good and the other one is bad, right? Otherwise, you have to see that the English are bad people or we're bad people, one of the two, right? You see? Okay. So, you can distinguish between what they might call, you know, a positive law, a law that's laid down, like, you know, we're laying down a law that in this city you're going to drive on the right side, and a law which is a natural law, right? If there's something naturally good or bad, like honoring a mother and father or committing murder, right? Or one is naturally good and the other is naturally bad, and the law is there just to encourage the one and discourage the other, right? But the law doesn't make the one to be good and the other to be bad, right? Do you see that? Okay. You see, you're asking the same kind of question that Socrates asks here. Someone says, you know, if I say, you know, Mozart's music is the best, and I say, well, you just say that because you like his music the best. And I say, no, you got it backwards, see? I like his music the most because it is the best. It's not the best because I like it the most. But they assume that when I say it's the best, it's because I like it the most, right? Okay. No, I like it the most because it is the best, huh? They're like saying, you know, if you love God the most, right? That's what you say, God's the best, right? No, no, no, you're all wrong. It's because you know he's the best, that you love him the most, right? Do you see the point? See? So that kind of question that Socrates teaches us to ask here, that he uses with Euthyphro there in the dialogue called Euthyphro, could be applied to this, what? Definition of good, right? Okay. And that's what Paedo taught me to do, right? Paedo, in Euthyphro, taught me to ask the kind of question that is the basic question now to ask about the first definition of good. So, is this a definition by cause, or is this a definition by effect? Okay? Or to use, you know, the other way of speaking, say, is it good, is something good because we want it? Or do we want it because it is good? Okay? So, is something good because, meaning the cause being, or is it wanted because it is good? Okay. Okay. What do you think, see? Another way of pretty true questions would be to say, is wanting the cause or the effect of the good? Then going back to the first definition of good, right? Is this a definition by cause or by effect? Is the first definition of good a definition by cause or by effect? When Aristotle first defines virtue, right? Let's speak of this being a praiseworthy quality, right? Now, is that a definition by cause or by effect? When you define virtue as a praiseworthy quality. Right. Yeah. Does the praise make it to be a virtue? So the praise is more an effect, right? Of us being a virtuous, being a virtue, right? Now again, very often we define by effect before we define by cause. And what's the reason for that? Why is it more obvious to us? The effect, the effect, the effect. Yeah? What's the first road in our knowledge? The sense. Yeah, the road from the senses into abuse. And what do the senses know more, the cause or the effect? The effect. Yeah. So, you know, Socrates asked me, you know, what is a dog, right? And probably, if I was not giving examples, trying to say universal what it is, I'd probably begin by saying a dog is an animal. That's usually the way students begin to ask in class, what is a dog? You know, you say, well, so is a man. Well, it's a four-footed animal, not a two-footed animal. Well, so is a cat, right? Okay. Now, maybe about this time, the average person gets stumped, right? It's a four-footed animal that barks. Mm-hmm. Okay? Now, let's, for the sake of argument, say that the dog is the only animal that barks. There's some kind of other creature that does. But even if the dog was the only four-footed animal that barks, right? Would this be a definition by cause or by effect, you see? Well, Socrates might say, well, is it a dog, Mr. Berkwisp, because it barks? Or does it bark because it is a dog, Mr. Berkwisp, which is it? Right. You see? It stops barking, does it cease to be a dog? Oh, no. No. So barking doesn't make it to be a dog, does it, Mr. Berkwisp? No. So it must be that it barks because it is a dog, right? And Socrates' point would be, well, Berkwisp, you haven't told me fully what a dog is, because you haven't said what makes it to be a dog rather than a cat, right? You're talking about some effect or result of being a dog rather than a cat. And it's better than nothing, right? And it's easier for me to do that if I hear the bark, and I hear it barking by the dog all the time across the street. Okay? And the cat's meowing all the time, right? Okay. So a cat is a four-footed animal that meow, see? Okay? Well, Mr. Berkwisp, is it a cat because it meows? Or is it meow because it is a cat? See, you're still asking the same question, right? See, all these things that question be asked about, right? Is meowing the cause that makes a cat to be a cat? Or is it an effect of what the cat is? Is it? And if it's an effect of what the cat is, then it doesn't make known fully what the cat is, does it? Is that the insufferable accident? Is that the thing? Well, it could be something like that, yeah, or a property, yeah. I could think maybe it's a property, you know. If it's something that follows upon the nature, it's a property that follows upon the nature, right? It's a property that follows upon the nature of the cat, and it's a property that follows upon the nature of the cat, and the nature of the cat, and the nature of the cat, and the nature of the cat, and the nature of the cat, and the nature of the cat, and the nature of the cat, and the nature of the cat, and the nature of the cat, and the nature of the cat, and the nature of the cat, and the nature of the cat, and the nature of the cat, and the nature of the cat, and the nature of the cat. Or by being, say, white to be a more simple accident, right? Because to be white doesn't follow upon being a man, what a man is, the nature of a man, right? But it's a simple accident of this individual, right? Or black would be a simple accident of the black man, right? So you see the kind of question that Socrates is asking us and how important a question that is, huh? Now, you may have in mind, you know, the correct answer to this question. But let's be slow about it, right? Let's follow the advice of Fire Lawrence, the Franciscan there, right? You can see the Franciscan advice, you know, St. Francis, he might as well take Fire Lawrence there in the Romeo and Juliet. And he says to Romeo, wisely and slow, right? They stumble, they run fast, huh? Okay? So let's look at this, huh? Okay? Is something good because it is wanted? Well, there's an obvious objection to this, right? What's the obvious objection to saying that something is good because it is wanted? To be good when you don't want it anymore. Yeah? Because different people have different desires. So some... One might desire something and another not. Yeah, I would think you might say, well, it's good for this guy and not for that guy. That's what they'd say today, you know? Yeah. Is there something, just in my individual experience, or a biologist would say that something is not good for me just because I want it? What would that be in my experience? Too much can do. Huh? I mean, it can't be if I'm diabetic or... Yeah, yeah. It may look good, but after I've had it, it could be totally different effect. My stock example is that of if at the party and the host or hostess says you want another drink, right? You say, yes, you want another drink. And then they get sick after that last drink. So you wanted it, but even you would admit that it was not good for you, right? I shouldn't have had that last drink, right? Okay? So, or the kid who wanted to drive his car 100 miles an hour down the Swindy Road, right? And he's trapped it around a tree and his car is wrecked and he's in traction, you know? It was good to drive your car, you know, 100 miles an hour down the Swindy Road. Well, even he realizes it's not good for his car and not even good for himself, right? You see? But he wanted to do it. No question he wanted to do it, right? No one was pressing his foot down on the gas pedal, right? He was doing it himself, right? So, without getting into things, you know, that people might disagree about, everybody has in their experience examples of things that they in fact didn't want, but which now they realize or realize later were not good for them, right? So if wanting something made it good for you, the fact that I wanted that last drink would have made that last drink good for me, right? The fact that I wanted to drive my car 100 miles an hour down the Swindy Road, right, made it good for me to drive my car at that speed down that road, huh? Okay? So that's kind of the obvious objection to saying that something is good because it is wanted, huh? Okay? But now look at the other side, right? Is there any obvious objection to saying something is wanted because it is good? Maybe not as obvious as an objection, but some kind of objection. Yeah? Yeah? So it might argue, you know, well, the good is not always wanted, right? If the good were the cause of wanting, then the fact that something is good should mean that everybody wants it, right? But perhaps someone might use the same example and say, well, contrary causes have contrary effects, and vice versa. Contrary effects have contrary causes. That kind of makes some sense, doesn't it, huh? I mean, if the butter gets hard sometimes and the butter gets soft, right? Would you expect the same thing to make the butter? They're hard to make the butter soft. No, but as hard and soft or contrary, you'd expect contrary causes, right? So if coldness makes the butter hard, then the contrary of hard, which is soft, should be caused by the contrary of cold, which is hot. And that's exactly the way it is, right? Okay, you see that? So if good is the cause of wanting, right, then the contrary of good, which is the bad, should be the cause of aversion or turning away, right? Okay? But don't people sometimes want things that are bad for them? So if good were the cause of wanting, bad should be the cause of turning away. People seem to be attracted to bad things quite often, right? Right? How can you say that it's wanted because it's good, right? Sometimes people don't want what is good for them. A kid doesn't want to go to school. A kid doesn't want to go to bed. Right? He needs to sleep, right? He needs education. He doesn't want what's good for him, right? And then they seem to want bad things sometimes, right? And if he adds to the idea that contrary effects are contrary causes and vice versa, he says, right? Okay? It's kind of confusing the issue a bit, as my old teacher Kassari would say, right? This is the teacher who confused the issue a bit, right? So let's take a little break now, right? Which is it? You see? It's a little bit of difficulty on either side, right? Okay? So, we not only have to answer the question as best we can to begin with, but we also have to, what? Answer the objection to the other side, right? If I come down the side that it's good because, what? You want it? Well, then it contradicts that last drink not being good for me, right? But even if I take the more reasonable side that I want it because it is good, right? But why isn't the good then always wanted, right? Why do you have the cause not the effect, right? And if contrary causes and contrary effects, then if the good is the cause of wanting, then the bad should be the cause of what? The opposite of wanting, aversion, turning away from. People seem to turn towards, you know, bad things like central care or something, right? Okay? And I'd explain this thing. Okay? But before we answer the objection to side, we've got to try to see, you know, which side seems to be more, what? True, right? Okay, and how should we do that? Take a little break now. 15, I'm sure. Let's begin again now. Now, we're going to try to answer this question. And of course, later on, we'll learn even more reasons for the answer we give, but we want to start with the most known way, right? To make known the answer to this question. Now, basically, there are two kinds of arguments, huh? And one is called induction, right? Epigogi in Greek. And the other is called syllogism, right? Okay? And syllogism is an argument in which some statements lay it down. Another statement falls necessarily because of the ones laid down. But induction is an argument from many particulars to the general. It's an argument going forward from many particulars to the general statement. Now, those two kinds of arguments, which one is easier for us? Induction. Induction, yeah. And for the same reason that we give examples before we have a universal definition, right? Yeah? Could you also say, then, that that might be Sherlock Holmes' reasoning in reverse, would be induction, going from effect to cause? No, he's trying to syllogize more. Oh, really? Yeah, yeah. He's trying to deduce, you know? He was talking about deducing. ...induction all the time, right? Even though we spoke of going from effect to... Yeah, there's two kinds of syllogism that we study in the Boston Analytics, right? Demonstration, appropriate, they call it, going from cause to effect, and then the other one going from effect to cause. So induction is more known to us as an architect, eh? And of course, notice the similarity between the word induction and introduction. Etymologically, induction and introduction are the same, aren't they? Leading in, right? When I give you an introduction to a course, I'm leading you into the whole from just some of the parts, right? In induction, I'm leading you into the universal whole from the particular instances of it. So, we're going to try to answer this question here. Is something good because it is wanted, or is it wanted because it is good, right? Is it wanting the cause or the effect of the good? We're going to try to answer that question by induction, okay? Now, we have to come back to the injection on the other side, right? Okay? Now, the induction, as we said, is an argument from many particulars to the general. So, we have to take our examples of many particular goods and the desires corresponding to them, right? And see what seems to be the case in each one of these particulars, and then induce a general conclusion, okay? And, of course, we're going to go back to the most fundamental desires, and what desires that are the most, what? Natural. And many of them are common to us, and even the other, what? Animal, right? So, did you ever hear of a good called food? So, we're going to make a table here. And in one column, we'll numerate the goods, and the other one will numerate the desire for that good, right? Okay? Desire corresponding to it. And you'll find, of course, that some goods, the desires for some goods have a name, right? Other desires, we don't have a name, so we'll have to use a phrase for that, right? So, let's take a good that you pursue every day. Food. Okay? What's the name of the desire for food? Hunger. Hunger, yeah. Let's take water, to be kind of simple here. What's the desire for this water? Thirst. Thirst. Thirst. Now, notice, these two goods and these two desires we share with the other animals, right? Okay? How about sleep? Now, does the desire for sleep have a name? Sleepiness. What would you say, the desire to sleep, right? And this, again, is a good that we share for, what, with the other animals, right? How about health? Is that good? Okay. That's a good that animals share in two, right? Have a name? The desire? Huh? No. No. Now, desire for health. What about reproduction? I don't really have a name either. It's kind of strange that it isn't, but, you know. So-called desire to reproduce. Let's take pleasure, now, of these things. Let's take a look at this. Let's take a look at this. And notice, all of these desires, to some extent, are common to us and to get animals, right? As are these goods, right, to us and animals. What about this desire called wonder, curiosity? Good to know, isn't it? A little more human desire here, right? Yeah, that's good. Everybody will read that. Money, huh? Desire for money, too. That's very prevalent in our society here. It's desire for money, right? Yeah, there's a very common desire here. What about something like desire for companionship? A friend, I just say a friend. Everybody wants a friend, don't they? So a friend is a good, and it's quite common. What about wisdom? It's a knowledge in a sense, but it's a bit down here. Desire for wisdom. Maybe that's long enough, let's see, to begin with, right? Now, let's look at the first one here. Food and hunger, right? Is it hunger that makes food good for man and for the other animals? Now, can you see a reason why food is good for man and other animals, apart from their hunger for it? We can die, right? Without food, right? We'd starve, death. Without food, right? So at least in the example of food and hunger, it doesn't seem that hunger makes food good and even necessary for man and other animals, right? It seems that nature has given hunger to man and the other animals, so that they'll pursue food, which is in fact good and even necessary for them, right? Now, again, how about water and thirst, right? Can you see that water is good for man and for the other animals, apart from their thirst for it? And even for the plants, right? Yeah. So does thirst make water good for you and me and the dog and the tree out there? No. So is nature given the animals thirst to make water good and necessary for them? Kind of stupid to say, wouldn't it? Yeah. But because water is good and in fact necessary for them, right? Then nature has given them thirst so they'll pursue what is good and necessary for them. Okay? How about sleep? Can you see any good in sleeping for not only man but the other animals? So is the desire for sleep make sleep good for them? Did nature give the animals the desire to sleep so that sleep would become good and necessary for them? No. But so they would do that, right? Okay. 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