Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 97: Aristotle's Arguments for the Unmoved Mover

Transcript
================================================================================

So he calls upon the student, the student can't answer the question, right? He always say, Neil, Dr. Nohavut. So he's really kind of implicating this principle into their noggins, right? But nothing gives or doesn't have, right? The student can't answer the question, he doesn't have it. He doesn't know the answer. He doesn't have the answer. That's kind of a way of making use of the occasion of the ignorance that you often have in class, right? To illustrate, right? And to repeat, right? Well, it's really a very basic principle, right? So there's got to be two parts then in the thing that is said to move itself, right? It remains, therefore, that one of its parts is moving only, and the other is what? Move, right? And thus, we have the same thing as we had before, meaning that there is some immobile mover, right? For it's not able to be said that both parts are moved, thus one by the other, nor that one part moves itself and then moves the other part, nor that the whole moves the part, nor that the part moves the whole, because they would follow the four-go contradictions, and that something would be at the same time, would move and be moved by the same, or according to the same species of motion, and they would be at the same time in ability and in act, huh? And further, the whole would not be first moving itself, but reason the part. It remains, therefore, that of the thing moving itself, it is necessary that one part be immobile, and moving the, what, other part, huh? But then our style goes on another step, right? But because in those things moving themselves, which are among us, to wit, in animals, the moving part, to wit, the soul, although it is immobile as such, it is moved, nevertheless, by happening or by accident, because if the soul is in the body, and the body is moved, in some sense the soul is moved, right? Not as such, right? But to another. He further goes on to show that of the first mover, of the first moving itself, the part moving is neither moved per se nor per accident. As they are still going to show this. For the things moving themselves, which are among us, namely animals, since they are corruptible, the moving part in them is moved, per accident, huh? But it is necessary ever that things corruptible, moving themselves, be reduced to some first mover, something first moving, that is eternal. Therefore it is necessary that there be some mover, of some moving itself, which neither per se nor per accident is moved, huh? How does Aristotle argue this way, huh? This is the famous argument in the De Generazione Corruptione. There are going to be necessary, according to his position, that something moving itself be eternal, is clear. For if motion is eternal, as he supposes now, right? He's going to come back to that, right? It is necessary that the generation of things moving themselves, which are generable and corruptible, be perpetual. But of this perpetuity is not able for there to be the cause one of those things moving itself, because it is not always, nor together always, nor together all of it, first because they're infinite, and second because they're not together. It remains, therefore, it is necessary that there be something moving itself, perpetual, that causes the perpetuity of generation and these inferior things moving themselves. And thus, the mover, its mover is not moved, neither per se, nor per accident. Let's come back and just look at that a little bit there, huh? Suppose, I move myself, you know, in a way. You can see that. Okay? But, I have a beginning and an end in time, right? In the same way for every animal, right? So, if motion is going to continue, these things moving themselves that are corruptible, like me and the dog and the cat and so on, we've got to generate another like ourselves, right? Now, if this is going to continue, this generation has got to go on forever, right? Otherwise, you'd have no more living things around, right? And they'd only think to move themselves so all motion would stop, right? So, what's the cause of this generation going on forever? Is it me or my dad or my grandfather or my son? I can't be the cause of it because I'm not, what? Not forever. Yeah, I'm around forever, right? Okay. So, I can't be the cause of why the human generation goes on forever. And orange or whatever it is can't be the cause why the generation of cats goes on forever because orange wasn't here when it was going on before, right? And it'll go on after orange, I assume, unless the world comes to an end, right? Okay. Now, if we say, well, then if I know the cause of it is me plus my father plus my grandfather plus my son plus my grandson plus my great-grandson all of us together are the cause of this going on forever? We don't all exist together, do we, right? It's not going to be a cause of anything. So, he's saying that outside the perpetual generation, let's say, of the cat or the dog or the man, there must be something, right? Responsible for this, right? And in his thinking it was the, what? Heavenly bodies, right, huh? That were always, what? Moving always incorruptible, right? Incorruptible, but they were causing motion down here, right? Okay. That has some probability to it, huh? We want to, we might want to rethink that a bit, right? But it has some probability because, um, everything is blossoming here, but why? Because of the position of the sun and so on, right, in the sky, right? Okay. And without the sun there wouldn't be the plants going on and on, right? So there's some truth to what he's saying even in our way of thinking today, right? Without the sun there would not be this, what, continuous generation of plants on this earth or animals that matter. Okay? Okay. Further he says, in things moving themselves, huh, we see that some begin to move newly on account of some motion by which the animal does not move by itself, huh, as the food digested, right? or the air being altered, huh? By which motion the mover moving himself is moved, what, carotidense, huh? Okay? So I'm sleeping at night and all of a sudden, bang, you know, and I wake up, you know, suddenly, right, huh? Okay? Well, I'm not responsible for that sound that woke me up, right? So I'm not going to always be in motion if I have this sort of thing, right? From which one can take that nothing moving itself is moved always, whose mover is moved either per se or paracidense. But the first thing moving itself is moved always. Otherwise, there could not be, what, motion always, right? He's assuming that, right? Okay? Going back to that. Because every other motion is caused by the motion of the first thing moving itself, huh? It remains, therefore, that the first thing moving itself is moved by a mover who is not moved either per se or paracidense. So the animals that we know, right, they sleep and then they wake up, right, and then they start to move again, right, huh? And they stop, right, huh? Okay? So how can they be the cause of motion being eternal when they are not themselves, right? Right? always in motion, right? So we need a kind of incorruptible, eternal thing, right? Okay? If you're still, if you want to see there's another body, right? You haven't come right to this altogether immobile thing, right? Okay? But you're coming just according to this probable proposition, right? You're coming to the idea that there's something moving itself, right? Well, if it's moving itself, it's got to be a body, right? But if it's moving itself and is responsible for motion always being, it's got to be what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Nor is this against the reason that the movers of the inferior orbs move a eternal motion, or by eternal motion, and nevertheless they are said to be moved to rachidans. Because they are said to be moved to rachidans, not by reason of themselves, but by reason of their mobiles, which follow the motion of the superior orbs. We don't worry about that too much here. But because God is not a part of something moving itself, Aristotle further in his metaphysics investigates from this mover, which is a part of the thing moving itself, another mover entirely separate, which is God. For since everything moving itself is moved by what? Appetite. Appetite, or by desire, right? It's necessary that the mover, who is a part of the moving itself, that it moves on account of the desire as something desirable. And that would be superior to it in moving, right? The end is the cause of all the other causes. For the thing desiring is in a way a, what? A moved mover, right? A moved mover, right? Okay. This is brought out more fully in the, what? The thing he's going there now is that he can understand better when she had the dhyanima, right? Okay. With the dhyanima, you see how desire in a way is a, what? Moved mover, right? Okay. So, the food, I see the food and that moves me to, what? Want the food, right? And then, because of my wanting the food, then my body is moved as a consequence of that, right? Okay. So, my desire for the food is a moved, what? Mover, right? It's because I've been moved to hunger, that my hunger is moving me to go to the restaurant or going to the dining room or whatever the food is, right? Okay. But the desirable is a mover wholly not moved, right? It's the unmoved mover. It's necessary, therefore, that the first separate mover be entirely immobile when this is God, right? Okay. Now, the four said processes seem to be, what? Two things seem to make infirm or weak, right? Infermare, huh? Okay. Of which the first is that they proceed from the supposition of the eternity of motion, right? Which, among Catholics, is supposed to be false, right? The universe didn't have, the universe had a beginning, right? The information had a beginning. It wasn't always, right? Now, why does Thomas go on to say, and to this it should be said, huh? That the via efficacissima, the most efficacious way to proving God to be is from the supposition of the eternity of the world. Okay? Why does he say that? You're not going to suppose the beginning of the world, obviously, there is going to have to be a creator or a God of some sort to start it all off. Yeah. If you said that the world didn't even exist, right? Yeah. You know? You see? If you said the world didn't always exist, then you're going to have to, I have to have something to bring it into existence, right? You know? What doesn't exist at all can't bring itself into existence, right? See? In that case, it's very clear, right? Okay? So, So he says, now why does he say efficacissima, right? Most efficacious. Yeah. But, I mean, in a sense, I don't think he means that it would be easier to show that there's a God if the world always was. Stronger. You know? It would be, harder to show it, right? But, if you could show that even if the world was eternal, there had to be a God, right? Then, in Fort Seorite, if the world had to be dang, there had to be a God, right? You see? You see? For every reason you have for the eternity, the world that would hold for the, even if it were finite, but nevertheless, you have more reasons because you have the creator something to start it. Yeah, yeah. It would be more manifest that there is a God if we knew by reason, right? Rather than by faith. We're talking about reasoning, you know, by reason alone. If we knew by reason that the world had a beginning, right? Okay? So that the world existed after not existing, right? Okay? Then it would be clear that there had to be someone to bring the world into existence, right? Okay? But, if you take the alternative and say the world always was, right? Then it's less clear that there's going to be a what? A God, yeah? So if you can show it with that supposition, then most assuredly, you'll show them that there's a God, huh? Okay? Now, I don't want you to misunderstand this comparison, but make a little comparison here. Now, sometimes in Aristotle, when Thomas, especially in the early Thomas, like in the sentences, when he refers to Aristotle's position here, that he seems to reason from in the 8th book, say, of the physics and so on, that the universe always was, right? And emotion is eternal. But sometimes I speak of this as a mistake of Aristotle, right? Okay? Okay? Other times, Thomas will say, well, maybe it's not a mistake of Aristotle. He's, what? Taking the more difficult case and showing that even given that, right, you can show that there's a God, right? Okay? Now, well, he doesn't bother to show it for the easier case, right? See? In other words, you could argue this way. Either the universe, the material universe, always was, right? Or it had a beginning, huh? Okay? Now, if it had a beginning, it should be very easy to see that there had to be a maker, a creator, right? See? Okay? So he leaves that to you to see, right? He says, but, if it always was, for these reasons, there would still have to be a unmover, right? Okay? Do you know which, which were, what was written first, the physics or the topics? Do we know? I don't know if we know exactly, but, see, in the topics, he gives the question of whether the universe is eternal or not as an example of a dialectical question that we would want to know the answer to, but as if it's something we can only reason about the probability, right? And when Thomas, you know, has a work by itself, he discusses it in some of his major works, too, like in the Sumas, he discusses it. He has a separate work, too, on the eternity of the world, right? But, in that work on the eternity of the world, Thomas considers the reasons that have been given by Aristotle or by other philosophers or thinkers for saying the universe is eternal or the universe is not eternal, right? And, he argues that none of the arguments either for or against are demonstrations, huh? He only has some probability, right? Okay? And therefore, he concludes that we know only by, what? Faith, right? That the universe was not, what? Eternal. Eternal. Always existing, right? Now Aristotle may or may not, you know, he may have been the opinion that the universe always was, but he has an opinion, right, you see? But what he says there in the topics, it seems he's aware of the fact that he doesn't really have a demonstration, right, that the universe was eternal, right? He doesn't really know that, right? But in a way, he's doing something a little bit like Euclid does, right? Where, if you read, you know, the Heath notes sometimes, in some of the theorems, it's necessary, really, to distinguish a number of cases, and as Heath points out, the later, the commentators like Proclus and later ones, they distinguish these cases and show it for each case, right? But Euclid takes the most difficult case and shows it, right, and leads to his reader or his commentator, right, to present the other cases, right? And Heath often makes that point, if you look at the notes there, right, that Euclid is taking the most difficult case, right? Well, you might say something like that, perhaps, is here, right, that Aristotle is taking the more difficult case to show there's a God, right? See, the universe is eternal, and, of course, eternal doesn't mean eternal in the way, God's eternal, I mean, the universe always was, right, or the universe had a beginning, right? If it had a beginning, it's easier to see that there must be a God, right? If it always was, you know, then it's harder to see that there's a God, right? But here is the reasons for, even in that case, for thinking that there must be a God, right? There must be an unmoved mover, and so on, okay? Let me see what he's doing there, huh? Okay? Something being moved, moving something, is it per accident? Well, not in the way that the soul is moved per accident, huh? Because the soul is a form in a body, right? Okay? But the angel is not in that way. But there is a kind of, you've got to be very careful there, there is a kind of time in the angels, right? Which Augustine, you know, calls it more like a discrete time, right? Not a continuous time, right? But let's leave that until the time when we study the angels, huh? Okay? Because this might be confusing, you know, to speak of time or even motion in the angels, huh? Well, you're first seeing that probably in the physics, you know? But in the metaphysics, you're probably going beyond that, right? So some people make a distinction between, in a sense of the physics, once you arrive at the idea of an unmoved mover in the sense of an immaterial mover, right? A mover that is not a body, right, huh? Okay? Well, if you're taking motion in the strict sense, you know, it involves a body, right? That was shown in the sixth book. And so once you arrive at a mover that is not a body, that is not material, right, that's the end of natural philosophy at the border, right, huh? Okay? But when you get to the twelfth book of wisdom there, the twelfth book of the metaphysics, and you're aware that there's more than one immaterial substance, right? Then you have to see reasons why they go back to one, huh? And this is touching a bit upon that reason, right, in terms of the desirable for which, you know, what is moving the heavenly bodies, right? Take the ancient science there. Why is it moving the bodies always, right, huh? Okay? Well, in a sense, it's to, what, have something of the eternity of God, right, huh? Reflected in the material world, right? Okay? But Plato and Aristotle, Plato and the Symposium in Aristotle, in the second book on the soul there, they talk about how reproduction in the animals and in the plants is trying to be, what, like God so far as possible, right? That the animals and plants as individuals can't go on forever like God does, right? But by reproducing themselves, their kind can go on forever, right? So when, you know, Shakespeare starts the sonnets there, and he's writing, you know, the first 20 sonnets almost, you know, trying to urge somebody to marry, right, huh? But the very first sonnet, you know, it says, the very first line to the sonnets, from fairest creatures, we desire increase, huh? That thereby beauty's rose might never die, right? So he's talking about the desire to reproduce, in a sense, is the desire for, what, immortality so far as possible in these mortal things, huh? So the mortal is striving to be like the immortal so far as possible, right? And something like that in teaching, right, because you're trying to, what, keep alive this knowledge of the science, right? You know, when the German physicists, especially those of Jewish blood, were leaving Germany because of this madman Hitler there, and Heisenberg said to Max Planck, should I leave too, you know, and Max Planck, if we all leave, you know, what's going to happen to science here, you know, you know? And so that it's kind of a desire there that this be immortalized, right, huh? The same with the art of music, right? I mean, you know, if you play the violin, and it's been your life to play the violin in the Boston Symphony Orchestra or some other orchestra, right? You certainly want someone to play the violin when you're gone, right? And continue this, right? You see? So you teach somebody else, it's this kind of a desire for what? To immortalize something, right? And it'll go on after you, huh? So in that sense, you can see they're being moved, right, by something that is eternal, huh? They're trying to be like it, huh? So far as possible, right? And so, you know, if you're thinking of the motions of the sun, the moon, the stars, and so on, is being ordered to the generation of things down here, right, huh? Well, they're aiming at that. They're being moved, right? The movers of these things are being moved in the way in which desire is moved by the desirable. But they're trying to be like God, who is the cause of all things, right? In so far as they themselves are in some sense a, what? A cause, right? Okay? That's what Dionysius says, right, you know? And the ultimate thing there in being like God is to be like God even so far as he's a, what? Cause, right? You know? That's true even, you know, in the animals and the plants that, you know, that when they're perfect, then they're able to reproduce themselves, right? Be perfect even if you have any fathers perfect, right? As God says there in the ancient scriptures there in the Old Testament there, you know? Am I who give generation to others? Am I going to be without the ability to generate, right? But, you know, the Church Fathers understand that it's referring to the, you know, to the generation of the sun, right? Okay? Do you think the first argument here in Chapter 13, does that just really conclude to a material being that's not moving strictly? Well, it depends, you see, upon how universally you understand an act and ability, right? And, you know, when you look at the Summa Kana Gentiles, it goes on from here, right? He will pull out, you know, act and ability there and make the separate argument, huh? In a couple of forms there, huh? And, uh, uh, so if you're looking at act and ability just as they're found in motion, right, then you're not being as, what, complete as when you pull out act and ability and understanding and where you... universal way, right? But you're getting up into the ninth book of wisdom, right? In the ninth book of wisdom, when Aristotle begins, he talks about ability in the first part of the book, right? And act, but only in reference to motion. And he talks about ability only for motion, active or passability. And he says, this is not what our main interest in here, right? But this is where we have to start. But when you get to the second part, we'll see act more universally than just motion, right? And then we'll see other senses of ability, right? And that's at the stage for the third part of the book, where he talks about the before and after of act and ability, right? And it's there that you see the basis for why the first being, the first cause has to be pure act, right? The basis of our reasoning to that. So, in that broader sense, even in the angels, there's some kind of ability and act, huh? Their substance is not their, what? Existence, right? And if your substance is not your existence, then your substance is to your existence, its ability is to act. See? That's quite different. Thomas, in the second book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, there, when he's showing that, you know, even in the angels, there must be this composition of a built-in act because their substance or what they are is not their existence, right? But then he has a whole, you know, chapter or so there where he's showing that this distinction between the substance of a thing and its, what, existence is not the same as matter and form, right? You know? And a lot of people confuse those two, you know? And that's not the same thing as the mobile and its motion, right? You see? But there's a certain, what, proportion there, right? You see? So you have to, you have to understand, you know, that form is not the same thing as motion. That when you say, you know, that or it's not the same thing as operation, right? In existence, it's not the same thing as form, right? Okay? So eventually you understand act and ability in a much more universal way than it is found in motion, right? And that enables you to come to a better knowledge of the first cause, you know, so that's really more proper to the wise man to do that. See, that's the ninth book of wisdom. You're getting ahead of the game, I say. Okay? Okay? That's one of the questions in the third book, right, of the wisdom, huh? You know, if there are immaterial causes, right, there's something immaterial, is there one of these, as Anne Xavier spoke of one, or is there many, like Taylor spoke of many, right? Well, that's the question that has to be investigated, right? We natural philosophers, we wouldn't know anything about that. Everyone gets that question, right? Because once you realize that there's something immaterial, then you're at the end of natural philosophy. At the end of one is the beginning of another, right? So there's two or three places in natural philosophy where you come to the border, right? And one is when you get to the unmoved mover, right? And you realize the unmoved mover is not a body, right? Well, that's one place where you're looking over the border there into wisdom, right? And the second place is in the third book on the soul. We have the argument for the, what, immortality of the human soul, right? That it can exist in separation from the body. And that kind of opens the door, right? That's kind of the opening in the knowledge of the soul there to the knowledge of the immaterial substances. That's the second place, really, you know? And the third place is maybe where, you know, an exegesis led, right? The idea of a greater mind through the border in the natural world. And he has reasons to think that the greater mind couldn't order things if it was mixed up with them, right? So there's at least three places then, right? Where you see that natural philosophy come to the border, right? But just as the border, you know, the end of the United States is the beginning of Canada, right? So the end of natural philosophy is the beginning of another science, right? So then we'll be thinking more along the way Plato thinks of motion in the broader sense? Well, yeah, it might be better to say that we've come to understand act and ability more broadly than just motion, right? But motion is the act which is most known to us. As Shakespeare says, things in motion, the sooner you catch the eye, the what that stirs, huh? You see? And that's why even, you know, metaphorically, you know, we speak sometimes, you know, God is, you know, guiding through the world, right? You know? It's with thoughts, as Heraclitus says, right? But that's kind of, speaking more metaphorically, right? Kind of a metaphorical extension of the word motion, right? So, to this it ought to be said that the most efficacious way to proving God to be is from the supposition of the eternal to the world, which being posited, minus fideta, right? It seems less, it less seems to be manifest that God is, right? Okay? For if the world in motion begin de novo, de novo, right? It is clear, it is necessary to lay down some cause which de novo, newly, produces the world in motion, right? Because whatever de novo, newly, comes to be from some innovator, right, necessarily takes its origin. Since nothing brings itself from potency to act, and if it's very from non-being to what? Being, right? Okay? So something that is not could not be the cause of its being, right? So if before it was, the world was not, right? It could not be responsible for its own being, could it? Again, a positive disorder. So Aristotle is taking the more difficult case, like our friend, right? Yuka, right? Secondly, that he supposes in the force of demonstrations that the first motion, or the first move, rather, namely the celestial body, can be moved from itself, from which it follows that it is, what? Animated, right? Okay? Which has not been seen by many, right? Okay? And to this it ought to be said that if the first mover is not laid down to be moved from itself, it is necessary that it be moved immediately by something entirely immobile. Whence also, he says, Aristotle, under a disjunction, right, brings in this conclusion that to it is necessary either to, what? Arrive at a first immobile mover that's separated, or to one moving itself. And again, he takes the less. That's it? That's the evident case, right? From which, again, one comes to, by the argument we saw, to a first immobile mover that is, what? Separated, huh? Okay? Then he goes on to talk about the, what? Argument from the maker, right? Okay? Now, I was not trying to fully understand either these first two motions, arguments from motion, but merely to go through them a bit to see that they do, in fact, what? Depend upon a knowledge of what we learned in the, what? Physics, right? Like the definition of motion, which is, we learned in book three, but also what we learned in book six, right? Okay? And you might suspect also what some of these things they went into, especially in the second argument, necessity of knowing the, what? The anima, right? Which is the next thing we're going to study. Right? Okay. I think I still have some of those ones that you used on TAC, you know, maybe we can use that. You don't have any. translation of it, so I'll sit there and find some of those and bring them up next time, okay? How many copies do we need, though? I mean, is this a full contingent, or six? I won't be here. I'm going to be bowing out until the end of this. It's now. We'll get to it quickly. What do you mean? We're just telling you you need it. I know. You can't convince us, period. Okay. No, I'm from a small community, so I'm feeling guilty, and I've never done the metaphysics, but I certainly could get a lot more out of the day on here, but... Okay, well, anyway, so we need five copies of Easter, or what, or six, or what, I think? Oh, yes. Yeah, we need more. Six, six. Okay, six. Oh, God, I think we've probably got six left, yeah. Yeah. Okay, we'll start. We'll go slowly, say, don't we? I don't have to get a lot of words, eh? We'll bring it next time, okay? Could I ask you this? I'm going to say this at Pentecost. Do you know, on the top of your head, the various meanings of spirit, and the order of meanings? Well, the first meaning of spirit is wind, or breath, then. And then it's carried over to the material substances. Because air, notice, is a substance that is, what, almost... Sort of spiritual. Yeah, and kind of, what, not sensible, right? Can't be sensed, right? So they carried that word over and applied it to something entirely outside the sensible world, right? Can't be sensed at all. But perhaps also because of the, what, thinness of it, right? What does Shakespeare say in The Tempest there, huh? And the vision there that he conjures up, you know? And these are actors, as I foretold you, who were all spirits. And they're melted into air, into thin air. Oh, yeah. Remember that? Mm-hmm. See? So the idea of thinness there, right, huh? It's almost metaphorical and applied to an angel, right? But there is some continuity there, I think, at least metaphorical, right? So, Anaxedrus, although he's thinking of the greater mind as immaterial, he speaks of it as the thinnest of all things, huh? And scripture often speaks of, you know, the word of God is, you know, being sharper than the sword and penetrating things. So sharpness comes from thinness, right? Uh-huh. You see? So, but it's used more, you know, to name a, name an immaterial thing, to name more like the angels and even God himself than to name, say, the soul, right, huh? But the soul is sometimes said to the human soul, only, really. In scripture, it's sometimes said to be a spirit because it is immortal, right? And it has understanding and will, like the angels have, right? And so the soul, insofar as it is above matter, right, and has these powers that are above matter, is sometimes called a spirit, right? So, in the Magnificat, when she says, my soul magnifies the Lord and my spirit rejoices in God, my Savior, she's apparently using the words there in their strict sense, right? Now, what makes she say, my soul magnifies the Lord, right? Uh-huh. See? Maybe it's partly, not only because she's vocally praising our Lord, right, which involves the body and therefore the soul is the form of the body, right? Uh-huh. But also because she, what, gave birth to our Lord, right? See? And she had to do that in her womb, right? Fruit of thy womb, we see in the prayer, right? This is the fruit of thy womb, huh? It's kind of interesting, huh? We say, hail Mary, okay? We say, full of grace, the Lord is with thee. And then we say, what? Blessed art thou amongst women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb, right? I don't say the distinction between those two parts is exactly the same as the distinction between spirit and soul, right? But it's something like that, huh? The distinction between? Between, you said she's full of grace, right? Okay. Because grace is, you have to be very careful about that, huh? But grace is more in the soul than in the body, right? But, you know, you've got to be careful, I think, because, you know, obviously the body of her is macular, you can see, you can see, you can see, you can see, you can see, right? But, but, um, um, sanctifying grace, I think you'd say, is more in the soul than the body, that's the subjugate of it, right? And, uh, when Thomas, um, distinguishes there between, say, grace and sanctifying grace and, and the, uh, theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, the theological virtues are really in the reason and in the will, right? So faith is in the reason, but depends upon the will, and hope and charity are in the will, right? But sanctifying grace is in the, what? The soul, yeah, yeah. And just as from the nature of the soul, there follows upon it reason and will, right? So from grace in the soul, there follows into the reason and the will, faith, hope, and, what, charity, right? Yeah. So, so, I mean, our, our soul, insofar as it's the form of the body, right, is most properly called the soul, right? But insofar as our soul is not entirely immersed in matter and has some powers, like the understanding in the will, that are not in the body, which we'll learn when we get to the third book about the soul, um, that is called a, what? Spirit, right? Okay. But we wouldn't, properly speaking, call the, the soul of a, uh, dog or, or a, um, the soul of a plant, a, uh, a spirit, yeah. You can call it a soul, right? Yeah. And the word animal comes from the word soul, right? Sure. My wife and I were looking at, uh, sort of at plants there, and there were places there, and I said, Rosalie, I said, uh, each one of these plants has its own soul. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And it sounds really, you know, you know, it's really, yeah, feeding an affinity for all those plants there, right? Yeah. It's each having its own soul, you know? Um, there's one, one plant there, you know, um, called, uh, Tisdemona, that's its name? Do you know of that character? Yeah. It's called Tisdemona, and of course, uh, I said, I'm going to buy this mostly, I said, you know? And, uh, but yeah, I was kind of reading, you know, the description there of it, you know, and it's, it's like, uh, the other plant called Othello. Oh. So there's, there's some plants that are called, you know, I forget what the other part of the name was, Planta Gulliara, so I forget what it was, you know, but, but apparently there's, there's two connected plants, one is called Tisdemona now, the other is called Tullos, I don't know. I guess when you go over to, to, to Stratford and Avon there, um, they have a garden there, you know, where they have, um, the plants, not that they have those names, I mean, the plants that are named in Shakespeare's play, so you can, you know, and all the, all the plants that they, that he named, that they have them there, you see, and then you can, and I guess, you know, you go, you got the quote from the, the play and, and the plant there, you know, so, so I kind of, you know, you got to go there, you know, you see all these little plant souls there, but, in honor of Shakespeare, you see, which wouldn't call him a spirit, right, so, so she says, you know, why'd she say, my soul magnifies the Lord, right, well, she magnifies the Lord, not only in her, what, spirit, right, but also in her body, right, in fact, in her body, she gives birth to, to, uh, our Lord, right, okay, this is the fruit of thy womb, right, that's not a, let's see, it's a body, um, and, uh, and so you can praise the person, you know, also with your body, with your tongue, right, um, so, insofar as then her, her, her soul through her body gives birth to the Christ, and insofar as her soul through her body is praising God, right, and say, my soul magnifies the Lord, right, huh, but then in my spirit, right, rejoices in God and His Savior, that's, that's the higher part of the soul, right, huh, you know, yeah, we can more properly, the body can't really rejoice in God the way the soul can, because the body, the senses don't know God, right, and the emotions can't really have God as their object, but there can be a kind of what, you know, overflow, right, from the, uh, soul into the body, right, but, but basically, you know, the love that is charity is in the will, it's not, it's not a love that is an emotion, huh, it can move the emotion in some ways, and I will, but, but it's primarily the love which is in the will, huh, and the rejoicing there, right, is primarily in the will, right, so I think there's a little difference in what she's saying there, my soul magnifies the Lord, right, and my spirit rejoices in God, my Savior, yeah, yeah, my Savior, yeah, me, me, me, me, I have to look at the text again, and I'm just thinking now about, which is, it says the Lord for the first part, right, my soul magnifies the Lord, what'd you say, yeah, use the word Lord, rejoices in God, my Savior, yeah, and then, and the second part, she uses the word God, right, you see, you see, but even that's kind of appropriate to that distinction, though, because he's called Lord of his creation, right, you see, and that's in part of his material, his creation, right, you see.