Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 88: Motion, Time, and the Now: Resolving Zeno's Paradoxes

Transcript
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Well, not necessarily, because you can do it for ceasing to B, too, like my dying, right? And, as he says, when you're changing from A to B, right? When you have changed from A to B, right? You're in B, not in A. And when you first have changed from A to B, right? When that change is first completed, he argues that there's got to be something indivisible, okay? Yeah, yeah. And he says, but at the same time, when you have changed from A to B, or when you're changing, in that matter, from A to B, you're leaving behind A, right? Yeah. So they read the same reality, that leaving behind A and changing from A to B. So when you have changed from A to B, you have left behind A. And so that indivisible, when you have completed the change, you're not A anymore, right? So there's, and since you have completed it, you're indivisible. In that indivisible, you're not what you were before, what you've become, okay? But it's the same way if you go in the reverse order, you're going from, you know, if I'm dying or ceasing to B, right? When I first cease to B, I am not. In case I am when I first cease to B. See, and when I first cease to B, that's something, what? Indivisible, right? Okay. Now, as it's the same scripture there, you know, talking about the damned, and in puto, in a point, they descend, right? You know? See? Because it's something indivisible, right? That judgment maybe is not in time there, right? It's not in time anymore, yeah. I guess, you know, I keep thinking of different ways of how these errors are, but with this, it's like the sharing of the now in an even though. Sharing the now, it's the concept that now occupies time. So there is, there cannot be the same sharing of the now between not being and being. Yeah, but you have a problem there, we'll see. If you admit that there's a last now in which you were in the term from which you're proceeding, right? So then you've got a problem, right? Because you can either make them the same now as the one, first of all, which you are, in the term to which you're going, in which case you have a contradiction at that point, in that now, or else you make them not the same now, and you have a time in between, and you've got to be one or the other in that time in between. So you can't really have a time in between. So in that sense, there's no time between my being alive and my being dead. Interesting thing, right? Is that the reasoning the modern Jews to say that a straight line will eventually... Yeah, yeah, they speak of the polygon, right? If you've gone through an infinity of what? Divisions here, right? So you're always getting closer to the circle, but you never read equal, right? Then you have really a contradiction, because a straight line would be a curved line, right? You had something like that with the instantaneous velocity, right? Because they're talking about velocity at a point, but there's no motion at a point, so there's no philosophy, right? And after quantum theory, they kind of came back and said, gee, wasn't that a fiction, right? But a useful fiction, you see? And it's kind of strange that there is such a thing as a useful fiction. I'll mention, you know, how Will McNeil there, he says, you know, the first period of world history is the period of Middle Eastern dominance until 500 B.C., right? And he speaks of the fictitious sharpness of these dates, right? Oh, yeah. But if you say, you know, well, things are, you know, it's kind of, history is a continuum, you know, when it becomes unintelligible, right? Things are always changing, you know, we can't say anything about it, right? Right, right. You couldn't characterize anything, right? Yes. So, you make things more sharp than they are, isn't it? So, he calls that sharpness a fictitious sharpness, and Einstein and Heisenberg and Guy de Broglie, a lot of these scientists who developed the 50th century say that science is based upon, what, idealizations, huh? And these idealizations involve a departure from reality, you know? In Einstein, in his book, The Evolution of Physics, he takes the law of inertia, right? That a body in the absence of external forces, right? Will either remain at rest or in uniform motion in a straight line. And he says, not one example of such a body, in our experience, right? You know, there's things with a body in the absence of exterior forces. But, you know, we notice that as we oil the wheels of the wagon and we smooth out the road and so on, it goes further, right? Because there's less friction. So, if we eliminated all exterior forces, then we imagine it would go on forever, right? But that's in our imagination now. And you can see the imagination does that. I mean, the tragedy and comedy are like, what, idealizations of some aspect of life, huh? You kind of simplify life, huh? Without this idealization, you couldn't have the precision of the mathematical science of nature, right? It's kind of amazing, and there's one text there where Heisenberg says, you know, he kind of criticized Aristotle's critique of the Pythagoreans who are trying to force experience into their mathematical theory. He says, we've got to force the facts. The right thing they accuse me of the philosophers of doing, you know, forcing the facts into some kind of system they are, right? You know, we have to force the facts, right? And, of course, you know, the simplest example of that is in the lab. The numbers you get in the lab never fit the equations, huh? And, of course, what the scientists say, well, there's, you know, an acceptable margin of error, right? But does that margin of error, due to the, you know, the accuracy of our instruments and so on, or is it due to the falseness of our what? Theories. Yeah, yeah. And, of course, sometimes you make more precise things, and you have to modify the theories, right? See? So what is an acceptable error? So, you know, as Boris says, coming back, you know, from some of these meetings with the logical analyst philosophers, you know, they make science impossible, right? Because if you demand that the things perfectly fit the theories, then they don't. So, you know, things out, right? I mean, even when you regard a planet as a, what, point moving around a line. Well, it's not really a point, right? But because you just have the precision that you want to have. You've got this, you know, regular thing, you know, going around. You can't work with those things. You can't work with that thing, right? You can't work with a point going around a line, you know, like they do, but, you see? You have to, but Heisenberg says, huh, that in these idealizations that we have to do in modern science, you have to depart from reality into your imagination. So, you're losing the immediate contact with reality. That's what he says in the GIF for lectures, right? You know, he says the concepts of natural language, meaning by natural language, you know, ordinary language as opposed to mathematical language. He says the concepts of natural language, vaguely defined as they are, have a greater stability in the growth of knowledge than the precise terms of science. But the reason he gives there in the GIF for lectures is that the precise terms of science are based on a, what, idealization. And only is this way can you have a mathematical science. When you idealize, you're already departing from, what, reality, you know? Yeah, that's a strange thing, huh? And so, Louis de Broglie, when he discussed that in his book on the quanta, he says, you know, nothing is more misleading than a clear and distinct idea, you know, contrary to the cart he's saying, right? Right. Yeah. But, what's his name, Bore, you know, spoke of complementarity, complementarity with an E there, right? But you could say something like that with tragedy and comedy, right? You know, if you bring one aspect of life into sharp focus, the other aspect of life, what, disappears, right? When my cousin Donald came back from four years in the Navy, right? And he was over telling my old professor, Kisarek, right, who had been four years in the Navy, too. He was telling me all these funny things that happened while he was in the Navy. And he said, every time I told Kisarek one of these funny things that happened to me in the Navy where I ran across, he says, Kisarek would talk with an even funnier story than what happened to him in the Navy. And I tell you some of those are not. Well, one thing that happened was that this guy was trying to get his radio station with his radio in the ship there. There was so much metal in the ship, right, that he couldn't get proper reception. So he went out and saw where the level of the ocean was and so on. So he drilled a hole in the side of the ship and stuck his aerial in there and got nice reception, right? But he didn't realize the ship was not fully loaded, right? All of a sudden the water's coming up to the level of the ocean. You can't imagine these crazy things would go on, see? But on the other hand, you can say war is what? Hell, yeah. And so you couldn't be at the same time talking about this laughable aspect of the military with this terribly serious and sort of tragic experience, huh? That we have. But Aristotle, you know, in the rhetoric, right? In rhetoric, he quotes the advice of who is it? I forget who it is right now. But the advice, you know, to kill your opponent's seriousness was jesting. And they're jesting with what? Seriousness. Seriousness, huh? And I always get two examples, you know, of how when Lincoln was in a debate there with Douglas, you know, and Douglas called him two-faced, you know. And Lincoln turned to the audience, and you have to realize that Lincoln was an ugly man, right? He turned to the audience, he says, Now I ask who he says. If I had another face, would I wear this one, he says? Well, now you can't go back and call him two-faced, you know. And the time when Mondale was running for president against Reagan, you know, and he was trying to make a little bit out of Reagan's age, you know, maybe he's too old for the job and that sort of thing, right? So in one of the debates there, Reagan says, you know, I'm not going to make, you know, political capital out of the age issue, he says. He says, I'm not going to make capital out of Mondale's youth inexperience, he says. Everybody laughed. Mondale had a laugh. And that finished Mondale. He could never come back and, you know, you know, attack him for age, you know. This thing, you know. But sometimes people, you know, when you're in a kind of merry mood, you know, they kind of put you down with their seriousness, you know, like you're, you're, frivolous or something, right? And we were seeing one of the movies there where the guy was talking about one-upping ship, right? See? And he says, now, you've got to dominate everything, like even the party, you have to dominate, right? And suppose someone is telling jokes and got to dominate the party. Well, he says, okay, tell a joke, he says to the guy, right? And so the guy tells a joke, you know, the guy's drunk and he's coming home, kind of, he's got one foot on the curtain and one on the street, right? Yeah, like this. And the guy says, gee, I left home there the same length. The professor, you know, and he's like, he has a bad leg or something like this, you know? I'm an professor, you know, people are telling, you know, oh my gosh, you know, they've done something. You know, you don't have to make a joke about some of these physical ailments like that, you know. It's very funny, yeah. He's a sweetheart, right? You know? They defeat the, what? You know, scouts the guys. They attempt to make humor, you see. So there are ways, apparently, you know, to, to, to, to, to squelch somebody's, you know, laughter with seriousness and, you know, the other is probably easier to do, right? But you see kind of how tragedy and comedy are kind of, what? Complimentary, right? And you have to get out of one mood, in a sense, you know, for the other, right? Shakespeare says, at the beginning of Henry VIII, they come no more to make you laugh, you know. And he's trying to prepare you, get you in the mood for a tragedy, you know. So, next time we'll look at this eleventh reading here, okay? Okay. Let me come back to something that you raised before, you know. You were saying that there's a difference in the now, whether you're in motion or at rest. You're trying to say that? I was trying to say that. Yeah. You know, it seems that there's a difference there, right? You know, someone is saying, okay, let's say this body is at rest, right? And this body is, what? Going through, right? Okay. And in the now, when this body is here, right? And this body is there, is there any difference between the body in motion in that now and the body at rest in that now? Is there any difference? The body is at rest in this place and the body is going through that place. Is there any difference between the now there, right? You're irritated there is. But is there, huh? What would be the difference? If we use the definition of motion, imperfect act, which is in order to a further act. So, in your example, the man who's only standing in the door and the other one's walking through the door, when he passes, the one that's standing in the door, he's only in an imperfect act, a state of imperfect act, which is also going to be further. Yeah. But if one is neither in motion nor at rest in the now, right, how can there be any difference between the thing in motion and the thing in rest in the now if something is neither in motion nor at rest in the now? Right. Is he trying to say the difference is what? In the body? Or? Or position. You just talked about position. They're in the same position. There's no difference. So, you're thinking the fact this is going to stay there, right? And this is not going to stay there, right, huh? Okay. But they are there. But, in the now, what do you mean by staying there, right? Is there at rest in the now? It can only be at rest in time. And this can only be in motion in time. So, if there's neither in motion or rest in the now, how can there be a difference between what is in motion, what is at rest in the now when there's neither in motion or rest in the now? Because, in some part, there's a difference between perfect act and imperfect act. Well, you can say this now here is in the time, right, that this body's at rest. And this now here is in the time that this body is in motion, right? But then you're really thinking of something outside the now, aren't you? Yes. when those who think, those who think of time as being composed of nows, right, of invisibles, right, then for them there's really no difference between being at rest and being in motion. And we don't think that, right? But if we think of the now, can there be any difference between the two? It doesn't seem there can be any difference between the two. You're such a thing. Saying the body of rest is here in the now in a different way than the body of motion is here. What is that difference? Maybe it's like the difference between online when I've made it actual and when I haven't. Okay, there's something to that, yeah. But these bodies are both actually there in the now. The only difference would be it's in time, since now is not time. But at first time, Thomas said there in one paper where he had the two bodies moving, right? He wanted to prove that a body has moved, right, before it's moving, right? And he has two bodies going at the same speed, and one body stops here, right? And then the body continues, right? He's kind of manifesting this by that, right? And in Tom's case, in the music way, our style does that, that this is more actual, right? Because it's stopping there, right? And this is going on, right? Maybe, but maybe there's some difference there. Could we say that if that one's in motion, and that this particular now really seems to be side by side, time seems to be... See, I'm going to argue that in that now, there's neither motion nor rest. So how can we speak of the difference between what is in motion, what is at rest, in the now, when neither of those things you're comparing are in the now? But I think it seems like the difference between stopping there, right, and continuing, as you say, right? It seems you've got to almost think of what's coming later, right? To say it's continuing, huh? It's not continuing in the now, right? It almost always seems like, when we're saying now, at that point, it's moving, our mind wants to make some bit of a little time maker. Yeah, you can't really imagine. There is no time at that point, so... It's like the question, you know, can you imagine the point by itself, or is everything you imagine continuous? Can you imagine the point? I don't think so. If you try to imagine the point by itself, you kind of imagine a little circle or something like that, right? So, it may be that the... I remember talking to the kindness one time, you know, it seemed to be good, but I was thinking, you know, I said, you can't really imagine the point by itself, but you can co-imagine it. Let's say you can imagine a finite line, right? Okay? The same way, you know, when you imagine a line, right? Can you imagine a line without any width? See? So you can't draw, obviously, but... Can you imagine, right? But you can imagine a square or something that has an end, right? So you can imagine, co-imagine it with that, which it is a little bit, right? But maybe not by itself, right? There's a couple different types of imagining. This is like, here, when you think, oh, imagine a square, right? I'll try to imagine the point. Well, you get that problem with, you know, a dot or something. But you can say, imagine a five million-sided polygon. We can imagine it intellectually, but not visually. You can accept it. When you say imagine intellectually, are you imagining and thinking of the same thing? Well, you're not having this image, per se, as though you're looking at it, but I guess the word imagine isn't the same, but you can think of it. Yeah, that imagine and thinking are not the same thing. So maybe the thing with this is that you don't want to be imagining it at that point. You just have to think it or whatever that word is. It cuts to learning and all that stuff. Imagination is going to take you back as if you're resting here, stopping here, and you're making something continuous, right? And here you're going through, right? You know, so you tend to imagine something that's continuous, right? So you can imagine maybe the rest of your time, the rest of your emotion, when you're imagining time, right? You know, Aristotle will say later on there in the books on sensations, that we don't think without images, and therefore we don't think without the continuous and time, right? But he points out that when we think about the indivisible, even in the sense of the point, we just think about it negatively, right? Oh, yeah. So as you go from the body to the surface, we start to negate, right? It has length and width, but no depth. And then we go to the line and it has length, but no width. And then we get to the point and it has not even length, right? It has no parts at all, right? So we seem to know the point negatively, maybe because you can't imagine it. Or can't imagine it by itself anyway, huh? You can maybe imagine the finite line, huh? So what do you think about that, using that? Well, I think there's some little difference. That's what suggests to me. There's some truth in what you're saying, you know, but I'd be very careful about that, Bill, see? Because there's neither rest nor emotion in there, right? Okay? So if there's neither rest nor emotion in the now, how can there be a difference between things that aren't there? There's no rest or emotion in the now. Yeah, it also seems that if you're going to say, well, they don't exist in the same way there. I mean, something either is or isn't. But then if you were to say, well, the thing that's moving, its existence is really less than something that seems to be sitting still because of all these strings of now. I mean, if you're going along that same line of thinking, you know, as soon as something's moving, it doesn't, I mean, motion, you can say, is, what was that thing we were saying about motion before, is barely, motion itself, or something that barely bears, but the object itself is this perfectly. Let's say, you know, like when I divide the line, right, bisect the line, making those two halves of the line more actual than they were before, or is that point there? Well, it seems to me you're making them to some extent more actual than they were before. As far as you're calling it two halves, but the line itself, nothing's changed about that other than, you know, but the two halves of the line are more actual now than they were before. Or it is a vertical. Every time I divide the line, I'm making actual point that was there before, only on one ability. Well, you're making actual halves, but now the thing that we call what is a half is existing. Yeah. But I say, if I'm making actual point that was there in ability before, right, and that point is a division of those parts, right, that I'm actually dividing those parts, right, so I'm making actual in some way the parts in the way that they weren't before. It doesn't make some point to what you're saying, right? In a sense, you're saying that, and that's why Thomas says there are still reasons in that way, right? That act is more known to us than potency, right? See? So the thing that stops here, it's more clear that it has moved, right, instead of distance, the one who continues to, and you see, it's manifesting potency by act, right, because act is more known to us. That's why he's in that way, right? Somebody says, there's some truth to what you say, right? But I wouldn't want to make too much of a difference. Partly because they say there's no motion or rest in the now, right? But secondly, and also my thinking that those people who think of motion as being made up of of indivisibles, right? Or timing made up of indivisibles. They don't really have an distinction between motion and rest, right? As if they wouldn't differ unless they have something continuous, right? And when Aristotle argues that there's no motion in the now, it doesn't seem he uses his definition of motion. Well, no, he argues from these things that, well, he could argue, some of his ways to argue from fact that there's faster and slower bodies, right? And so if the slower body, if the faster body, no, excuse me, if the slower body goes a certain distance in the now, during the now, we'd say during the now, then that same distance, the faster body would go in less than the now, and therefore you have to divide the indivisible, right? So it's that way. Is it possible to argue from the definition of motion? Well, in a way, the way I understand it, there's something to be argued from there, yeah. But even if you go back to the idea of change, the thing is different now than it was before, right? It can imply some kind of visibility, right? We see a thing that's changed when it's different now than before, right? So that's going to imply some kind of before and after there. Yeah, it seems that's what Aristotle's thinking of, is change here, but he doesn't. Well, it's interesting when Aristotle takes up time, the definition of time, and he says time is something of motion, right? Okay? And then he wants to figure out, I mean, he begins by saying that time is significant with motion, right? Okay? And then he argues that time is not in motion, right? Okay? But you don't perceive time without perceiving motion, therefore time is something of motion, right? And then he seems to say that time is something of the before and after of motion, right? Rather than something of the definition of motion, right? Yeah. Okay? But there's a connection between those two, right? Yeah? Well, I see how there's a difference between these in the now, is that, well, if you do have bodies, and in actuality, in reality, the one's moving, the other isn't. And here, you're taking a look at it, at it particularly now, well, they have to occupy the same position, but the reality of it is that the other body is moving. Yeah. Yeah. So there is a difference there, even in the now, because if you were to say that the one isn't moving, I mean, that if it stops moving in the now, well, then you string a bunch of nows together, then it won't be moving at all. Yeah. So I guess that would be that, you know, there is a difference in reality. Yeah. But was the original question, is there a difference between the two nows? Wasn't that the original? No, no, no, no, there's a difference between these two in the nows. The two in the nows, okay. So I don't want to exaggerate the difference, but maybe there is some difference. Okay, okay. Like you were saying, in the line now, like you were saying, between the line before an act has been divided, right? Okay. And the point is more actual, right? Act is divided than before. Just like in that paradox of the great democratist there, you know. If you cut a cone, right? If you cut a cone parallel to the base, right, and you look at the two circles, are they equal or unequal? I don't get to say they're equal, right? Okay. But then you have to, in a sense, say that you would have, what, made actual circles that were there only potentially. If you make all those circles actual and they're all equal, then you've got a cylinder and not a cone, right? The same way here. If you make, if you cut a triangle, or let's say it's not a triangle parallel to the base, and you look at the line at the end of this tunnel, no one's end of this tunnel, they have to be, what, equal, right? But aren't you making those lines equal? Otherwise you say, you know, well, let's cut it every way it can be cut, as the thought experiment of a democratist, cut it every way it can be cut. But then you have to say the same thing, right? That all you get is equal straight lines, right? And then you end up, you have to get a rectangle rather than a triangle, right? So, this is what I was going to do later on, you know, with Zeno, you know, in their books, that Zeno was saying, you know, I have to go half of the way to the door if I can go the whole way. I have to go half of the half of the way to that, right? And there's an infinity of points I've got to go, what, through, right? How can I go through an infinity of points, huh? I've got to get through them all. It's another point I have to go through. But he's making more actual the points than they really are, right? In the motion. That's what would be the problem with the cone when you cut that and say, oh, well, both lines have to be equal. Cut it now in a different place. Well, now you're moving as far as in dimension there. And it's almost as though you're looking at the line as something thick at that point. So, at any given point where you cut it, yes, both lines on each side would have to be equal, but still those lines aren't occupying any width at all. No, but those lines actually get there before you cut it, see? If they were, then you've got an infinity of lines, right? On top of each other here, right? All being equal. Right. But those lines don't occupy any width or... That's true. That's true. Yeah. Yeah. And it's always, you see, in reality, there's potentially always a line between any two lines, right? Mm-hmm. So, if the lines are next to each other, we have a problem, right? Because the lines above and below... Yeah, you can't keep slicing away from the butcher, you know, from the machine there. But when you cut it, it's like the line above and below are two different lines now, right? But they were, what? They had nothing in between them, right? You see? And so you're making the lines, in a sense, what? Next to each other, as they can be. Back to Father Anthony's original question, I guess I'm trying to understand. And were you thinking that the difference in the two objects is that one of the objects isn't existing as perfectly as the other? No. But how it's existing in the place, not the object itself. How it is. What's the connection between the definition of emotion and the before and after emotion? Well, the thing that struck me about Aristotle going back there, he's saying that he reaches the point where he knows that time is not motion, but it's something of emotion, right? Okay? And the next step is to see it's something of the before and after emotion, right? Okay? And that's not ever something of the definition of emotion, is it? But there's a connection between the definition of emotion and the fact that there's a before and after emotion, right? Okay? They're there in harmony, those two truths, right? Okay? But the definition of emotion is not in terms of before and after, it's in terms of act and ability, right? Now, I was just kind of thinking of that in terms of what Aristotle does in the metaphysics there, where he says, he shows in the beginning of the fourth book that wisdom is about being as being, right? And then right after that, he shows that it's about the one and the many, and that these are in a sense the same thing, although they're a little different in meaning, right? Okay? Being and one, huh? And then when he gets to book five, and he's talking about the multiplicity of meanings of the word being and one and so on, right? Act and ability are one distinction of meanings of being, right? But it takes up opposition, which is the basis of distinction, and before and after, under the names pertaining to the, what, one. That's interesting, right? And it strikes me here, you know, something like that, you go from the definition of motion, which is given in terms of act and ability, or act and fluency, and then you go to, what, the before and after, right? And you tie time up with the before and after emotion, right? It's really the same reality you're talking about, right? But it's, you're thinking more of the, what, the order, right? Okay? I just thought I was defining distinction earlier there in this thing, you know, things are distinct when one is not the other, right? I was thinking about that the other day, you know, what distinction was. But it seems to be tied up with the one and the many, doesn't it? So when Aristotle, you know, critiques Parmenides and Melisus, right? Parmenides and Melisus are trying to say, they don't do it too well, but they try to say that everything is one. There's no multiplicity all in the world. Everything is one. And Aristotle says, well, now, if you say that, you're doing away with any beginning. And he seems to be using an axiom, right? That nothing is the beginning of itself, right? So you've got to have some multiplicity. You have to have a many, meaning more than one, to have, what, a beginning. And I argue the same way when I try to show what Thomas says, that distinction is presupposed to what? Order. To before and after, right? It seems to me you have an axiom there, that nothing is before or after itself. So you can't have a before and after without having many, right? And that kind of makes me see, by Aristotle and Thomas, would put opposition, which is the basis of distinction, and fundamentally that this is not that, right? And order, or before and after, among the names pertaining to what? The one and the many in some way. It's very striking there, you know, when Aristotle, you know, it says it's a property of one to be a beginning. Of course, you can see that in the first meaning of one for us, which is not the one convertible with being, but the one that's the beginning of number, right? It's very much a, what, beginning of all number, huh? And so he ties up the beginning, not with being, but with one, huh? Even though it's connected with being in some way, right? But he speaks of being a property of the one to be a beginning, huh? See? And then he takes up distinction, I mean, opposition, which is the basis of distinction among the names, secondary names of one, and he takes up before, it's tied up with that. See? So, I mean, it's kind of interesting, huh? That the definition of motion is in terms of act and ability, right? And then, later on, you look at the before and after in motion, and go into all this talk, and time is tied up with that before and after, right? But time is a measure, right? And involves the one to many, right? So, could we say then, with Father Anthony was saying about these two bodies here in the now, could we say there is a difference? Now, if we were to say that motion, a body that's in motion, it's an act. It's in the act of motion. So, if you were to say, at a particular now, what's the two differences? Well, you know, you can't stop this body from going. No, but you could say that, you know, in Aristotle's comparison, right? What argument we saw there, where he's trying to show that it has moved this far, right? Even though it doesn't stop there, right? It hasn't moved that far. He compares it to another body going at the same speed that stops there, right? You can see. And it's very clear that this body has moved that distance, right? And Thomas says, he manifests that this body has moved that distance, because the equally fast body that stops there has moved that distance, right? And this being equally fast, as that, will have gone that same distance, right? So the way it has moved that same distance, this one thing has. But why is it manifested through this? Yes, he says, well, because act is more known to us than ability, right? See? So that to have moved is to motion a bit like the point is to the line, right? Or the now is the time. It's a division of this thing, right? But just as this is not composed of points and the time is not composed of the now, so motion is not composed of has moved, right? It's more the division of it, right? But then, just as the point, in a sense, is made more actual, when you divide the line, right? Well, then you can say maybe the has moved is more actual, right? In the body that stops there, right? Rather than the body that is continuing, right? Yeah. Well, let's say the body is moving. It's moving. We're saying it's moving. It's moving in time. Yeah. Anywhere along that line, it's moving. Yeah. And if we were to say now, the reality, although we kind of, it's almost as though we're stopping it by saying now, but at that point, which has no time, there is a difference in that body because the reality of it is we're taking it at a point in time and calling it the now there, there's a difference between those two bodies because it's moving. Otherwise, if it, I mean, you can't say it's moving now because this now has no time. But I mean, I see that there's a difference to the reality of it. Even if, you know, the body has stopped moving in this now here, right? This is the end of the motion, right? See? Mm-hmm. And this is, in a sense, the beginning of its rest, right? See? Why this here is not the beginning of rest, right? There's this now, right? Mm-hmm. I'll take a little less extreme example. The body's not at rest for some time, it's beginning to rest, right? To say this is the beginning of its rest, right? Yeah. That's true to say, like, that now is the beginning of its rest, right? Mm-hmm. But the now here is not the beginning of this body's rest in that place. Mm-hmm. So there's that difference, right? That the now, in the one case, is the beginning of the time in which this is going to rest. The other is not the beginning of the time it's going to rest. But it's probably more fundamental to say that it's more actual here than, right? Than this case here. So, hard thing to understand, motion, right? But Aristotle would say that in Boethius, you know, following him, Thomas following Boethius, that the cause of difficulty is not in us but in the thing itself, right? We try to imagine this to be more actual than we really are, I think. A Heisenberg student there, by Sacha, says that when we imagine something, we make it actual in our imagination. So we try to make these things more actual than they really are. That means reality. Yeah. It's not impossible to be, but it's a piece. Heraclitus said, now, men do not understand the things they meet every day. Although they think they do, right? That's one of the fragments they have. That's what you're kind of anticipating, the great Socrates, right? They think of Socrates as being characterized by that discovery, you know? But it's already in the fragments of Heraclitus, you know? You can't know for sure, you know, what the whole man's thought was. But that's certainly true about motion and time, huh? Men would think they understand motion and time because they experience them every day, right? But they don't, huh? So it's like, you know, So it's like, you know, So it's like, you know, So it's like, you know, So it's like, you know, So it's like, you know, they were there. Sex, you know, you know what sex is all about? You don't even know what it's all about. It's all about children, don't you know that? You don't know that. You don't know what it's all about. I think you do. You don't know the first thing about it. So we'll see a little bit of seeing those arguments next time. Now, do you have, for the Summa Conscientilis, do you have an English copy of that or not? Here at the school, at the monastery? I mean, particular kinds of change, you know. Okay. I mean, the scientists, I mean, you know, the light behaves in some experiments like a particle, another pinpointed particle, and other experiments like a wave, you know. Those kinds of contradictions. So I like general arguments, others, between ones you know. Those ones just kind of stand out in my mind, you know. When you develop the definition of motion, you run into these difficulties of defining it, right, without defining it by itself or defining it. I mean, I suppose somebody could argue, like, you know, Aristotle does a bit there with time, you know, that time doesn't exist, right, because the past doesn't exist anymore. The future doesn't exist yet, and there's no time in the now, right? So one might argue, you know, that if motion takes time, well, then part of the motion is in the past and doesn't exist, and part is in the future and doesn't exist, right? All that there is of motion is in the now, but there's no motion in the now. I don't know what you're talking about. And it's so interesting that Aristotle, in a sense, doesn't really answer those objections against time, right? But later on, he'll say, this is showing, as if he doesn't take them as, you know, as objections against the real existence of time, right, but as objections that force you to realize how time is, right, and how barely it is, huh, you see? And Aristotle goes so far as to say, you know, there wouldn't be time without the numbering soul fully, right? That the number which is time, which is a numbered number, right? That number doesn't exist as much as the number of chairs, say, in this room. So all these chairs exist together, right? So you can more say there's a number of chairs in this room, even if we never counted them, than there's a number that is time, if we never counted it, because the things that are being numbered don't exist. In time, right? So. So he says there wouldn't be time without the number in soul. Not fully, no, no. No, I think Tom says, but it's a barely, huh, it barely is, huh? So it's the least real of all acts is motion. It's the least actual of all acts. But it's, as he says in the ninth book of Wisdom there, it's the act that is what? Seen is most real to us, most known to us. So we go from the act which is least actual but most known to us to the act which is most knowable but least known to us, God, who's pure act, right? And then we're argument, we're going from, it's a beautiful example of what is more known to us to what is more known by nature, but kind of the extreme examples, right? Because this is the least known motion, because it's the least actual but most known to us. And God is the most knowable but least knowable to us. It shows the imperfection of our mind, right? The chief difficulty knowing is our mind. Because Aristotle says if the chief difficulty was in things and not in our mind, we'd know what is more knowable. What is more knowable would be more knowable to us, right? And just like if I, you know, love the private good more than the common good, right? The common good is more lovable than the private good, but not to us. At least in the beginning, right? And so the fact that what is less lovable is more loved by us is a sign of the weakness of our heart, right? Christ even speaks to, you know, one place, God alone is good, right? Why do you call me good, you know? God alone is good, huh? Only God, in a sense, is fully lovable, right? When we love the sense good, you know, we love candy before we love wisdom, right? Don't love wisdom at all, I'm kidding. When I was a little boy, he said, you know, what candy, you want wisdom. I probably say candy. On the start, right? So what is more loved by us is less lovable. What is more lovable is less lovable to us. But that's an example of that distinction, too, of simply in some respect, huh? It's got to run through these things. The kid would rather drink soda pop than wine, right? But the soda pop is less tasteable, less tasty than the wine. More tasty to him. That's true of all these kinds of education, right? A hundred push-ups is more productive of strength than ten push-ups, right? But for a weak person, it's not. Doing ten push-ups is more productive of strength for him than doing a hundred. You see? That's because his body is imperfect and he needed development, right? So you have to go from what is more known to us to what is more known. Do you have a definition for, like, the lovable? Like, you know, you've got some concepts. It's good in itself. Well, something is lovable because it's good, right? Yeah. So the more good something is, the more lovable it is, right? Mm-hmm. Now, we can reason out that the common good is, is a greater good, is better than the private good. Just as the whole is better than the part, right? Mm-hmm. So the good of the whole is better than the good of the part. Now, I read another portion of that is, of the lovable, is that it's more lovable, it's able to impart that good to you, which kind of made sense. Is that? Well, that's kind of more, that's a more, almost fundamental aspect of it, right? You're saying something is good in itself, right? That's part of being good in itself. Yeah. It's part of that. Yeah, yeah. I see. I see. You're saying something is good because it causes the good, then you're, you're, there's a second sense of good, right? Yeah, I see. There's a second, there's a second, there's a second, there's a second, there's a second thing about it, you know. Well, once you see God face to face, you know, as he is, you know, it would be so pretty.