Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 87: Order, Symmetry, and the Problem of First in Motion

Transcript
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I think this is a difference of one kind of order, right? One kind of order. You see? Yeah. Okay. Now, I might have, you know, a certain order to you people, right? But it's not based upon how I generated you, right? Okay. I have a different order in particular towards my children that I generated, right? Oh, yeah. Okay. You see? So the act of generation pertains to the order between me and my children in particular, right? Okay, the act of teaching or something like that might pertain to my order with respect to you people, see? Okay? Okay? So when Aristotle, or rather Thomas, when he shows that there's no before and after in the Trinity, he goes back to the senses of before and after that we saw in the categories, and he shows in the fact that they're distinguished, distinction tells the four, they're distinguished by relatives, that one can't be before the other, right? Okay? Just like double and half, you know, take, you know, relations that are more known to us, double and half, one can't be before the other in time, can they? Something can't be double in time for something else to have, can't it? No. And they're the same in what? You have to know relations together, huh? They're no reference to each other, right? Okay? So in various ways he'll show, right? That one member of the Trinity is not before, right? I mean, God the Father is God and God the Son is God, so one is not better than the other, right? God the Father is not more God than God the Son is God, and so on, right? So you're going to eliminate every sense of before, right? Inductively, right? Going to each one of them, right? And the fact that they're distinguished by relatives. So as I say, you can misunderstand that text, and I was misunderstanding it, and I was like, it was me, but maybe I misunderstood, you know, I mean, maybe my thinking is, maybe I'm mistaken, right? You know? The fact that order always meant before and after, but then, you know, then later I found this text here, so I always go back to this text, and I quote that when I talk about it, you know? Okay? So is there an order between double and half? Well, it's not an order of time. It couldn't be an order of time, could there? And is one before the other in knowledge? Well, again, one can't be without the other, right? The second sense of before is what? When this can be without that, then that's vice versa, right? Well, the double can't be without the half, or vice versa, so not before in that sense, right? Okay? Okay. So there is no order. Well, I mean, maybe they have some other kind of order. between the quantities themselves, right? You know? But that would be looking at what they are absolutely, right? Yeah. Okay? So is the difference, is it specific? Is it a further difference of the second kind of order here for the Trinity? No, see, in creatures, if I generated you, right, you see, then there'd be a particular order between you and me, because I generated you, right? And you should honor me, right? Okay? In some sense, I am before you as a cause, and so on, right? But when you apply this to God, right, you keep the difference. The Son is from the Father, right? But you deny the, what, genus, that the Father is, in any sense, before the Son. But I say, you should understand that in these simpler things, because the Trinity is the most difficult thing to understand in the whole. But go read Thomas, and he asks, you know, with the scientia, right? In God, right, huh? Okay? And, of course, the scientia is first known as it's found in man, right? And the genus of scientia is really, what, it's a quality, a hobby to us, a disposition, right? It's an accident, right? See? Well, none of that can be said of the scientia of God, right? Okay? But what we know by this scientia, right, God knows even more so. Right? Okay? And he doesn't know it ever in habit, but always actually. See? So we have to remove everything of imperfection from that, huh? Okay? Well, the order that I see in double and half, rather than it be four and half, or at least it's an order of relation, just as if you were to do a picture where you do a cruciform thing with four dots, to look at it as a whole, you can't say that this one's before that, you're just looking at it as a whole, so you see a symmetry, so you see an order based on symmetry that there's no before and after. So that's another type of... Yeah. But you're taking order here in the strict sense where it means a before and after, right? You know, when Aristotle talks about beauty there in the, what is it, 13th book, I think it is a wisdom, and he says, you know, the three main forms of the beautiful are order, symmetry, right? And the limited, huh? So, I mean, the distinction there between order and what's symmetry, right? So, I mean, sometimes we generalize, right, the word order and apply it to any kind of relation, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? But that's not the strict, the proper sense of the word order, right? So would you apply then for a double and a half as more of a symmetry, then? No, I would say before and after is the definition of order, right? Mm-hmm. Symmetry is more a, what? A value, right? Okay? Like I was talking about the symmetry of these works around the Apology of Socrates, right? You know, the Mino, the Euthyphro, the Apology, the Crito, and then the Favor, right? Okay? Well, they're in this symmetry, right? Okay? Now, the other animal is the Apology, because the Apology is not a, what? Dialogue in the ordinary sense, not a conversation. It's really Socrates' legal defense in the courtroom, right? Okay? Now, you have two dialogues here, the Mino and the Euthyphro, which chronologically are taking place before the Apology, right? The Apology is Socrates' defense in the courtroom, right? And the Euthyphro, he's gone down to what we may call the courthouse, the King Archon's place, where he's going to find out about the charges against him, right? So they've been filed against him, right? In the Mino, no charges have been filed against Socrates, but one of the people who later on brings a charge against Socrates, goes off in a huff, you know, and very angry at Socrates, and Socrates says, go off and try to calm him down for the good of Athens. That is not the good of Athens, okay? Then, it takes place to Crichto, after Socrates has been found guilty and sentenced, right? And Crichto comes with a plot to spring Socrates, right? Out of prison. And Socrates asks whether this is, you know, the right thing to do, right? And, you know, he already said, shoot, you should try to do this. And then, the fatal takes place on the last day of, what, Socrates' life, right? Okay? Now, why did you have this symmetry here, huh? Well, the first thing he knows, of course, is the Apology is something different, huh? And those are arranged around him, right? Now, the first thing he knows, of course, is that the Euthyphro and the Crichto are much shorter, and the Mino and the Phaedo are much longer dialogues. It's even a quantitative symmetry, right? Okay? But, when you start to read these dialogues intrinsically, you see there's a certain, what, connection between them. Because in the Euthyphro, you discuss what piety is. And you don't get too far as far as finding out exactly what piety is. But in the Crichto, you have the example of Socrates' piety towards the city of Athens. Where are you? argues that he should, what, abide by the decisions of Athens, even though he might be wrong in this particular case, but because he's a citizen of Athens and has agreed to live under this country and so on, right? And this, in a sense, casts light upon what piety really is, which wasn't seen too clearly. There's a certain connection between them in terms of the size of them, but in terms of what is being discussed. Well then, the Mino and the Phaedo, in many ways, correspond, because the Mino is very much an introduction to logic, and in the Phaedo we're told that we need an art about arguments, which is what logic is. To my knowledge, it's the first time that someone has explicitly said we need the art that we call logic, right? In the Mino he develops an argument from what? Recollection, right? For the immortality of the soul. He recalls that in the Phaedo, but then he gets an even stronger argument from recollection. In the Mino, you get the distinction between right opinion and epistemia, knowledge in a strict sense. And Socrates says, I know there's a difference between the two, which is very unusual for Socrates to claim to know anything. In the Phaedo, Sebes is pushing Socrates to come up with an altogether what? That's a necessary reason, right? Okay? And when Socrates in the Mino is asked by Mino, you know, what is the difference, really, between right opinion and knowledge, huh? Because in both cases you're thinking what is true. But he says that in the case of knowledge, what you think is tied down, and it's tied down by an account of the, what, cause. Okay? So it's kind of introducing you to what demonstration is that we speak in logic, right? What's the syllogies of making you know the cause, and that which is a cause cannot be otherwise. In the Phaedo, when Socrates is being pushed by Sebes to come up with a necessary reason why the soul survives death, right? Well, Socrates says, well, that's a difficult thing, you're asking. And let me go back to my experience as a natural philosopher, because a natural philosopher is most of all talking about clausism. That's a natural philosophy where you first, you know, reach the four kinds of clausism that there are. So you see that similarity, right? That assertitude, the best reason you can give is the reason why it must be so, and that's usually the cause, right? So they illuminate each other in various ways, right? And in the Phaedo, Socrates is saying, one opposite can never be the other opposite, right? That's why he's so sure that guessing, or opinion, and knowledge are not the same thing, because one is certain, and the other is not certain, right? And even if someone said, you know, Socrates, you don't know that, you just guess it, but they're different. He'd be admitting a distinction between guessing and knowing already, right? He says that Socrates has one and not the other, right? Either Socrates knows or he's guessing. The guy is saying, right? He's saying that you don't really know, but you're guessing, right? But they're already admitting that distinction, right? So, or again, in the Mino, you know, when Socrates is asked whether virtue can be taught, Socrates keeps on saying, again, what virtue is first, right? And here he gets into a discussion where the soul is immortal, without really determining what the soul is. And so the deficiency there is pointed out to what you learn in the Mino, right? So as you read these dialogues, you're struck by the what? You know, that kind of connection between the two. There's kind of a symmetry in a way, right? And I mentioned how this is the same symmetry that you have in Shakespeare's It's Every Night's Dream, huh? See? But there, you know, you begin in the court of Athens, right? And then you go to the home of the peasants who are trying to prepare a play for the marriage of Theseus, and they popped up. And then you have the, what, forest scene, you know, all the mix-ups in the forest. And then you go back to the house of the, what? Oh, peasant. Peasants, and finally you end up in the court of Athens, right? So in terms of the place where it takes place, you have this perfect symmetry, huh? Oh. And then I noticed like in, say, a Mozart Mass, maybe most Masses, there are five things you put to music, right? Oh. The Kyrie, the Gloria, the Quedo, the Sanctus and the Benedictus, and the Agnus Dei, right? The Kyrie and the Agnus Dei are prayers asking for the mercy of God, or the mercy of the Lamb of God, right? The Gloria and the Sanctus and the Benedictus emphasis more upon glorifying God than asking for His mercy. I don't have something to add in the Gloria, but basically they're praising God. The Quedo is the odd, a different one, right? It's actually a professional belief, it's not really a prayer. So you have that same symmetry, right? So in a sense, you know, my arm, you wouldn't say maybe one arm is before the other, I can tell you I'm strong in the other, but I'm symmetrical because one arm is more or less the link to the other, right? One leg is the link to the other, right? You know, my eyes and my ears, I'm symmetrical, right? Yeah. So it's a little different, the idea of symmetry than that of, what, order, right? How is this limited related to the beautiful? Limited, the third one? Well, that's a very interesting thing because, quote the shock homes there, right? In that story there, the Norwood Builder, right? Where the man is trying to make it appear that he's been killed by somebody, right? Now he has a feud with this woman who didn't marry him years before. He's going to make it appear as if her son has murdered him, right? Okay. Okay? And burned his body, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? And he makes a very convincing case because this young man had come to see him about something, right? Mm-hmm. And this thing has happened to me the afterwards, et cetera, et cetera, you know? And it's very convincing to everybody, and even Holmes at first thinks that, you know, maybe the son is guilty of this, right? Mm-hmm. And, of course, the builder is concealed in the house, right? He's concealed himself in a, you know, in a compartment that, you know, the big ability, you know how to make it as a hidden chamber, right? But then one night the builder comes out and he tries to add one more bit of evidence, right? Holmes. And Holmes catches that, right? Mm-hmm. And so he realizes what's up, and then he figures out they just have a hiding place in the house, right? So what he does is he gets some burnable material there, right? And he starts kind of a fire out there. Fire! Fire! And of course the guy starts running out. He's caught and exposed. He's not dead at all. But anyway, in the act of conversation, you know, Holmes, you know, Holmes is talking to Watson and how clever this guy was, you know, he really made a very convincing case. And he even had him, you know, for a while thinking that the son was maybe guilty of this, right? Mm-hmm. But he lacked the supreme gift of the artist, he said. Oh, that's right. Yeah, yeah. Okay. Yeah. Oh, it's like Chester, he says, art and morality are a lot like each other. You have to draw the line somewhere. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so he makes that comparison in the beginning of the, you know, second book, the Nicomagian Ethics, right, where he compares moral virtue with, what, art, right, where too much or too little is something bad, right, huh? And of course I've seen people, you know, without even thinking of what the Holmes says, you know, when they praise Mozart, right, huh? They say he's a man who always arrives at his goal and never goes beyond it, right? He always knows when to stop, right? And I have a book by, you know, a critic on Venice, you know, on Venice, and it's art, it's a very interesting book. But of course he's praising Titian, you know, and Titian always knows when to stop, right? It's interesting to remark about that, huh? You notice that with Shakespeare, he knows exactly when to stop, you know, it's kind of a subtle thing, huh? Most people don't know when to stop, including myself. Nowadays songs never stop, they're just kind of fade away. Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. How do you get into this long discourse here? Oh, I don't want to. Yeah, yeah. And I was saying, you know, sometimes I think the word order is broadened to mean any kind of relation, but then that's, you know, a broad or loose use of the word, right? In a strict sense, it means before and after, right? But it's also something different than symmetry, right? Okay. So I explained this thing as symmetry, right? I think I mentioned, you know, McNeil's division of world history, right? In the three parts, huh? The first part of world history is called the period of Middle Eastern dominance to about 500 BC, right? And in the middle part is the Eurasian cultural balance from 500 BC to approximately 1500 AD, right? And the third part is the rise of the West, right? Okay. To me, it's kind of symmetry there, right? Because you have the dominance of the East, right? And the rise of the West, right? And in the middle, the Eurasian cultural balance, right? Oh, yeah. You know, I think it makes a lot of sense to this division, I mean, as far as you can divide history at all, you know? Sure. And, but I think it appeals to us because of its, what? Symmetry. Symmetry, right? Yeah. It's like, ancient, medieval, modern, there's no symmetry there. But this does, huh? Yes. And Heisenberg remarks about how this young man reading the Timaeus of Plato, where Plato has this Pythagorean theory of earth, air, fire, and water, the four elements of Empedocles. But he has a geometrical, right? Explanation of them in terms of geometrical figures, huh? But he uses the, what? The so-called regular solids there at the end of Euclid's elements, huh? So these things, like the cube and the sphere and the decahedron and so on, right? They're all nicely, what? Symmetrical, right? You know? Which one is big, we have a before and after there so much, but, you know, but you speak of it as being symmetrical, huh? So we're down in the middle of page 12 here. Let's come back to where we were. Not only is it necessary that the changing has changed, on the third paragraph there on page 12, but also what has changed necessarily was changing before. For everything that has changed and something to something has changed in time. For let it have changed in the now from A to B, or maybe the time from A to B. It has not changed in the same now in which it is in A, for it will be at once in A and in B. And it has been shown before that what has changed, when it has changed, huh? Is not in this. If in another, there will be a time in between, for nows are not next to each other. So if in each now it has moved some distance, right? And so now before that, right? But they can't be next to each other, or touching each other. There must be a time in between which it's moving, right? So before we now, when it has moved some distance, right? It's moving. Okay. So since it has changed in time, and all time is divisible, in the half it will have changed, and in the half of that again, and always thus. Thus it will be changing before. Further, you can show it another way, what has been said is most clear in the magnitude, in the things that are continuous like that, because the magnitude at which the changing changes is continuous. That's something that changed from C to D. If then C, D is indivisible, the partless will be next to the partless, which we saw was impossible in our study of the continuous. Since this is impossible, what is in between must be a magnitude, and must be divisible without end, without limit, huh? Thus it changes in these before. Necessarily that everything which has changed, changes before. There's the same demonstration, he says, in things not continuous, as in contraries and in contradiction, if you take the time. Again, let us take the time which it has changed, and again we will say the same thing. Thus what is changed, changes, and the changing has changed. And to have changed is before changing, and to be changing before having changed. Greek word there is protoron, right? Same word you have categories there. And the first will never be taken, right? There's no first distance you have moved, and there's no first what? Distance you'll be moving. Okay? There's no first time that you have moved, right? How much time does it take to move some distance? You tell me. See? Because any time you give me that it has what? Moved some distance as the first time which has moved some distance, and part of that time it will have moved a, what? Lesser distance, right? Okay? It was the first time which there will be some, some moving. So if it's been moving for an hour, it's also been moving for half an hour, right? And for a quarter of an hour, and so on, any divisible, right? So before it has moved any distance, it will be moving. And before it's moving any distance, it will have moved some distance. So there's nothing first. It's a strange reality, isn't it? So can you say something then like, time is that which is between two nows? Yeah. And since there is an infinite number of nows... Yeah. Before every time, there's a now, right? There is no first. Yeah, there's a now you're going to be in before you've gone any amount of time, right? And before you're in that now, you'll give yourself amount of time. Suppose we try to use this early argument, there's something that's becoming, it's going from not sphere to sphere. There's a first in which it's a sphere. Suppose the door is going from not open to open. Mm-hmm. And is there a first when it's open? Yeah. That's what we spoke about in the earlier reading, right? In the seventh reading, huh? There's a first when it has completed the motion, right? Yeah. Okay. And that's indivisible, right? But there's no first in which it's in motion, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. But is there a first when the door is open? It's something indivisible, yeah. You're talking about the completion, yeah. The opening, that would be... Yeah. It's now it's closed. Yeah. But you're talking about when the door has gone entirely beyond the thing, right? No, the first... Oh, the first... What's opening, you mean? Yeah. And then there is a now. Because that's indivisible forever, right? Mm-hmm. And even according to the door itself, right? Because half of the door is going to get beyond the beam there, right? Mm-hmm. And a quarter before the half gets over, and so on, forever. Okay? But there's a first in which something is completed, right? Mm-hmm. And that's indivisible, right? Okay? Okay. And we'll come maybe back to that, then, because that's something Aristotle develops again in the eighth book, right? Mm-hmm. We'll come back to that difficulty that Hegel has, right? But let's maybe finish this reading a little bit here. Mm-hmm. So at the bottom of page 12, he's summing up this now. Ah. Thus what is changed, changes, and the changing has changed. And to have changed before changing, and to be changing before having changed. And the first will never be taken. And the cause of this is that the partless, the indivisible, right? Is not next to the partless, right? Remember how Euclid defines a point which has no parts, right? Partless. For the division is unlimited, huh? It can be divided forever. Just as in increasing and decreasing lines, huh? It is clear, then, that what has come to be, necessarily, was coming to be before. And what is coming to be, has come to be. And whatever things are divisible and continuous, huh? You never start me frizzed back to this city. In the ninth book of metaphysics, when he's talking about this paradox that comes up with these abilities that you seem to acquire by doing what they're an ability for, you know? It's a question he raises in ethics, too, you know. He says, how does a man become courageous as he acquired the virtue of courageous, of courage, rather? One becomes courageous by doing courageous things, right? And you become modest or moderate by doing moderate things, right? And you become just by doing just things. But if that's so, then the objection goes, you must already be courageous, right? If you're doing courageous things. And it's sort of like saying, you know, how do you acquire the ability to play the piano? Well, the only way to acquire the ability to play the piano is by playing the piano, right? But if you play the piano, you must be able to play the piano, right? So how can you be acquiring the ability to play the piano when you're playing the piano? Presuppose that you have the ability to play the piano, right? So something would be before itself, huh? You would have the ability to play the piano before you had the ability to play the piano. What's the answer to that, see? Well, one answer we give is to say that you're able to play the piano before you've acquired the ability to play the piano in a different way, right? You see? It requires, what? Great concentration, right? And great effort, and you, you know, make mistakes and so on, right? You see? And it's too built in what you're doing. But after you've acquired the habit, right, then it becomes easier to do it, and you don't make the same mistakes and so on. And the same way in the case of courage. After I acquired the virtue of courage or the virtue of moderation, I don't have the same struggle to do what is right, huh? As I did beforehand, right? So, and I don't have, and I have more stability in doing it, right? So, it's not like, you know, ad hoc, I've got to, you know, really concentrate in order to not eat or drink, right? Okay? And it says before, the virtue might be alcoholic, right? He has to call his buddy, you know, because he's got a tremendous urge to drink, you know, and he knows if he does, he'll go wrong, right? Well, such a man doesn't really have the virtue, right? So, it's a certain difficulty and instability, and in that case, you're not able to do it with, what, ease, or able to do it in the way you're able to do it later on, right? So, it's not exactly the same ability before and after, huh? But in this here, you can say, right, in a way, something like this is there, right? That after I've played the piano for a while, I have played the piano, and now I have something of a what? Of a habit, right, huh? So, if a kid has been playing the piano for a year, he has something of a habit, right? And then, but he continues to play it, and he'll have something more of it, right? Okay? So, it's like this in a sense, huh? I have moved a certain distance, and I'm moving further, and I have moved another distance, right? So, I'm kind of building up a habit as I go, what? Along, right, huh? Okay? So, he comes back to this sometimes, and he refers back to this. It is clear, then, that what has come to be necessarily was coming to be before, and what is coming to be has come to be in whatever things are divisible and continuous. Not always, however, what comes to be, but another sometime. There's something out there that is the foundation of the house, huh? And things are not simple, right? Likewise, in the corrupting and what is corrupted. For right away, there exists something unlimited in the coming to be and the ceasing to be. And there is neither coming to be without something having come to be, nor having come to be without something coming to be. And likewise, in ceasing to be and having ceased to be. Should be seized, I guess, there to be. For there is always having ceased to be before ceasing to be, and ceasing to be before having ceased to be. It is clear, then, that what has come to be necessarily was coming to be before, and what is coming to be has come to be. Or for there will not be a first in which it will be. Now, let's go back to this problem here. This is the way they go, argues, right? Others have argued this way. They say, in this change between contradictory seven, when, let's say, what is not a sphere is becoming a sphere, right? Well, there is a time in which it is not a sphere. That is represented by this line here, right? There is a later time in which it is a sphere, right? Okay? Time in which it is a sphere. Now, is there any time in between those two times? Since it is not always a sphere, there is an end of the time which is not a sphere, right? And since it is not, was it always a sphere, there is a beginning, right? But it is a sphere. Now, can there be a time in between those two times? Because there is nothing between not being a sphere and being a sphere. There is no fair alternative, huh? To be or not to be, okay? Either are or not a sphere. So, can these two, can the last now in which it is not a sphere, and the first now in which it is a sphere, can they be two different nows? If they were, you'd have a time between them, right? Therefore, the last now or the last instant in which you are not a sphere must be the first instant in which you are a sphere. Okay? So, Hegel says, in that instant, or in that now, you both are and are not a sphere. So, it is a contradiction in what? Becoming, right? Okay? Now, that is impossible in something both be and not be a sphere, right? So, what is the solution to that, Jeff? It is that now really is not time, because time is between the nows. Okay. Okay. But there is a now in time, isn't there? There must be sitting in a now in some way when you have a time that's limited, right? Because the end of the time has to be a now, right? So, it seems in this example, you'd say there's a first now in which it is a sphere, but not a last now, which is not a sphere. Yeah. Like I was talking earlier, huh? If during this time it's becoming a sphere, right? When this time is completed, which is the now, right? It has become a sphere, right? So, that now, it has become a sphere, okay? And there was no last now in which it was what? Not a sphere. Yeah, yeah. This is a way that's the universe of that. They'll say there's no first, right? Mm-hmm. But now you're saying there's no last now in which it's not a sphere. Yeah. Okay? They can take the last time, but it's kind of arbitrary, right? Mm-hmm. Say, oh, it's not up until time now. It's not a sphere, right? And this is the way Aristotle solves this problem of, and then what he has, right? There's a contradiction in it coming, huh? Mm-hmm. Yeah. Now, in the Middle Ages, you have the same problem in theology, because when they're talking about the Eucharist, right, there's a time in which, under the appearances of bread and wine, there is bread and wine, right? Okay? So, for some time, there is bread and wine on the altar, okay? And then, in a later time, there is the body and blood of our Lord. Okay. Now, this time in which there is bread and wine on the altar, it comes to an end, right? Okay? So, there is a, you would see, a last now, last instant in which it is bread and wine, right? See? And then, since the body and blood of our Lord is not always there, there has to be a first instant, or now, in which there is the body and the blood of our Lord. Okay? Okay? Okay. Thank you. Thank you. Is there any time in between those two? No. So, then the last instance in which it is bread and wine would have to be the first instance which is the body and blood of our Lord, and now you've got heresy. Just one moment. You see? Yeah. That's enough. That's a great idea, right? You say that these coexist, right? This has been often condemned with the Church. So, they couldn't solve it with theologians, see, you know? But Thomas solves it in the same way that Aristotle solves this. And there is no last instant, no last now in which it is what? Bread and wine, right? But there is a first now in which it is the body and blood of our Lord. Now, if that solves the difficulty, but it's that arbitrary that Aristotle says that there is a first now, right, in which it is a sphere up here, or a first now in which it is the blood of our Lord, and there's no last now in which it is not a sphere, or just an example, a last now in which it is the bread and wine, is that sort of the arbitrary that you just choose one rather than the other, right? I mean, he's always saying, well, I can say the universe and say, see, there's a last now in which it is the bread and wine, but no first now in which it is the body and blood, right? And there's a last now in which it is not a sphere, right? But no first now in which it is a sphere. That would also avoid the contradiction, right? See? See? That he never had the change. Yeah, when, this goes back to what we saw in the earlier reading here, right? The seventh reading, right? The first part of the seventh reading, where Aristotle was saying that when a thing is changed, it's in that which it has changed, right? And there's a first when it has changed, right? And that first is what? Indivisible, right? Okay? Well, that means that what? The indivisible, which is first changed, already is pertaining to that too rich, rather than that from which you're going, right? Yeah. Okay? And it goes back to what he's saying here, that change is also leaving behind something, right? Okay? So when the change is completed, and even Hegel's going to admit, right, the change is completed in that now, right? When the change is completed, this has been left behind, whatever you're starting from. See? So when it has changed from this to that, it's in that and not in this. Because changing from this to that is leaving this behind. And so when the change from this to that is completed, this has been left behind. And the change from this to that has been completed in the now, so that now, it isn't the term to which it's changing, right? So it's not arbitrary in Aristotle's part, right? They just say, well, well, we can't have the same now for both, right? That is, obviously, you're forced by the axiom that something can both be and not be, right? You're forced to say it can't be the same now, right? But it's not arbitrary that He says, there's only a first now, which it is, this sphere, and no last now, which is not a sphere. It follows the very fact of what He showed there in the seventh reading, that when a thing has first changed, it has left behind what it was and is in that to which it has changed. And it's first changed in the invisible, if He goes on to point out, right? So the invisible here, it's in that to which it's changing, right? In the same way down here in the case of the Eucharist, right? It's a beautiful example of how philosophy is useful, good philosophy, in the theology, right? Sure. And how, you know, you could run into a similar difficulty. The Coddy has a nice article on that. It's unfortunately in French, you know, but some of the articles have been iconic in the whole theologique and philosophique are in French or in English, right? But it's called in French the paradox of given there, part of contradiction, right? The paradox, right? Of coming to be by contradiction, right? This to that, right? But then it goes into some of the, you know, problems that the theologians had, which were now just the ones that he's kind of about Hegel there, right? And I think that, in some ways, is more difficult to solve than the apparent contradiction that Hercules is talking about, you know, where day and night are the same thing because day becomes night and night becomes day, huh? You know, somebody says, well, can the, the, do the healthy become sick? See? Well, if you deny it, the healthy becomes sick, then you've got to say, well, if you're healthy, you're always going to be healthy. I mean, that doesn't agree with our experience. I can tell you that. You don't have experience, right? And vice versa, do the sick ever become healthy? Huh? See? Well, if you don't admit that the sick become healthy, you're going to have to say that if you're sick, you're going to be always sick. Tough, tough luck, you know? Abandoned all hope you would enter here, right? The infirmary. But then, what does the word becomes mean? Yeah, I mean, to break it down, grammatically, it means comes to be, right? Okay? Now, if the healthy come to be sick, then they would be sick, right? And if the healthy were sick, then something would both be healthy and not healthy. Be healthy because it's healthy, but because it's sick, it's not healthy. And because it's sick, sick, it's sick. But because it's healthy, it's not sick, it's supposed to be, right? See? So, it seems either you've got to say that one opposite becomes the other, which is going to involve a contradiction. Day is night, and night is day. Or are you going to say that it could always be day? You know, don't expect night tonight because day can't become night, huh? Now, how do you solve that apparent contradiction? See? Because, notice, notice, if you become a Christian, let's say, right, by baptism, then you are a Christian, right? You are what you've come to be, right? If you become a geometer by studying Euclid, then you are a geometer, right? If you understand Euclid, right? Okay? Okay? See? See? If you become a monk, right? You know, then you are a monk, right? Right? So, if day becomes night, then day is night. See? I mean, if you don't mean that, why do you say it? Because it's not just the philosophers that speak that way, huh? And sometimes you hear people say, you know, love turns into hate, you know, and, you know, that the poets like represent this, you know, how those who love themselves very much come to hate each other very much, or hate sometimes turns into love, right? You know? Those who can't stand at each other all of a sudden tend to love each other. It's interesting to represent this in a play, right? But does love turn into hate? See? Could love ever be hate? Huh? See? So why do we speak that way if that isn't so, see? Because in appearance, the spirit's a contradiction, right? And Heraclitus points it out, maybe he, does he really think they're now the same thing? I don't think he does, but he points out, and he speaks as if they were, right? And so Parmantius said, well, then there can't be any change. It's all an inclusion, right? Aristotle would say, what? day can't be night, but there is change, right? So what's the way out of this? What's the answer to that? Day becomes night by accident, by accident, Mm-hmm. That's kind of a subtle thing to say that, isn't it? It's kind of interesting we speak that way, though. The heart becomes soft, the wind dries out, right? You see? But it's a little bit like, you know, saying that the cook, what, played the piano, right? It's not the cook asked cook to play the piano, right? But because cook happens to belong to the pianist, right? We can say that the cook, by happening, by accident, played the piano, right? It wasn't as, as pianist, I mean, as cook. but it's a little bit like, that he knew how to play the piano, right? And vice versa, we could see that the pianist cooked dinner, right? But it's not through the art of playing the piano, but he cooked dinner, I hope not. Right? You see? But it's kind of an unusual thing, isn't it, that we speak that way, huh? So you're forced to understand this kind of distinction, and between the as-such, or as somebody call it, but to itself, right, you could say the cook didn't play the piano through himself, meaning through being a cook, okay? In other words, saying almost the same thing. As a cook, he didn't play the piano, right? And so it's not really the hard as-such that becomes soft, right? But that to which hard happens, namely the butter, that as-such becomes soft, right? But here, it's a little more difficult, isn't it, to solve it, because it seems to make sense to say that the time in which you are, what, not a sphere, is limited, right? Right? So it has an end. If it doesn't have a last, an end, it will go on forever, right? So the end of, what, time is a now. Any period of time is a now, right? So you tend to imagine that there must be a last now, which it is, what, not a sphere. See? And then you get into trouble, right, doing that, huh? Because either that's the same or different. In either case, you get a problem, right? It's not the same now, you've got time in between, which is neither. And if in that time in between, it is a sphere, well, then you put that time in between with the time that's a sphere, right? If in that time in between it's not a sphere, we'll put that with the time you're not a sphere, right? So eventually you've got to erase any time in between, right? And then the two nows must become one. Unless two nows could be, what, contiguous, right? They're next to each other, but two nows never are. There's two, it's like two points never touching each other. There's always something continuous in between. There's always a time in between then, right? So in this case, there's no time in between. It's got to be the same now. Now's not a time at all. What? Now's not a time. It's something that happens in time, or it has a limit of time. So it seems like that's where that problem comes in, saying, oh, now, well, it's both, no. It's a little bit like what they have in the limits that they talk about calculus or something, leading into calculus, and then say something like this. Suppose you have a circle here, right? And you inscribe in the circle a square. Okay. That circle, that square doesn't equal the circle, does it? But now if we bisect each of these arcs and draw two lines from there, we have a polygon with twice as many sides, right, which is closer to the area of the circle, right? And we can bisect those and draw, what, lines again, bisect each one of these and so on. And so, as you keep on dividing, the polygon gets closer and closer, right? Okay. Well, then the moderns imagine, falsely, that a polygon with, what, an infinity of sides would be equal to, what? A circle. Yeah. And then you have a straight line corresponding, or coinciding with a, what? With a circle, yeah. And then you have a condition eventually there. But really, this is a limit that you, what? The circle is a limit here of these polygons constructed in this way by bisecting the thing, right? And you can go on forever, but you're never going to reach, what? You're never going to get a polygon that's actually equal to the circle. Right. And when he kind of talks about this, he says there's a kind of, what, of union in our mind of the polygon of the circle, right? Mm-hmm. Because I can speak of the circle as the limit, the circle, there, is the limit of polygons constructed in this way that we indicated, right? Okay? Now, if I think of the circle's limit of polygons constructed in that way, in my understanding of the circle, it's a polygon, right? Yeah. And so the kind said here, this is a faint imitation of what the angels have, right? But the angels know two particular kinds of things by one idea. Huh. But for us, it always takes different ideas, huh? Yeah. See? So the idea we have of a circle is never the idea we have of a polygon, right? Huh. But here we seem to, what, have an idea of a circle and a polygon at the same time, right? Huh. If I think of circles being the limit of the polygons, right? Okay? But at the same time, you see that's a limit that is never what? Reached, right? Right? It's a little bit like that when you take the time in which something is not a what? Sphere. A sphere, right? Okay? So you've got this time here. And this time here, it's not a sphere. And this time here, it is a sphere. And we're saying that now, it belongs to a sphere, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? But as I approach that, right, I get closer and closer to that now, right? But I never, what, quite reach it, do I? Mm-hmm. There's always, what, it's a period of time, right? Mm-hmm. I'm not saying it's small and small, but I can never make it equal to that now, right? Mm-hmm. There's always going to be a period of time and therefore never now. What's approaching that, right? Mm-hmm. It's kind of like an extrinsic limit, so to speak, huh? Isn't that, can we say that there's no last now just because it's continuous? Because you can't have a last now next to the first now because it's continuous, you can't have it touching last now, touching the... So just by definition, continuous, you can't have a last now. So is there a last now in which I will be alive? See, but my time on this earth is going to come to an end, right? Okay. So you might think there's a last now that I'm alive, but is there? No. There's a first now when I'm dead, right? Yes. I mean, I know exactly, but the change from being alive to being dead, right, when that change is completed, when I'm first dead, in other words, right? That's something indivisible, right? See? But there's no last now in which I'm alive. It's a little bit interesting, you know, with the, with the epic Koreans, I guess, you know, some people trying to, um, tell you, don't be afraid of death, right? Because death can't happen to you, right? You can't die when you're alive. There's some truth to that, right? I don't know, I don't think they saw it this way, right? But they kind of argue that when you're dead, you won't be around, so you won't, you won't experience death, right? Because when you're dead, you won't be, so you won't be around to experience death. But there's some truth to that, right? You see? You see? That, uh, I'll never be dead when I'm alive. I think it kind of puns on Hegel's misunderstanding that, though, right? Hegel thinks he's, uh, he's dead when he's alive, right? In some ways he is. It seems to feel like, well, the problem is conceiving of the now as time, because he's saying, oh, I shouldn't be saying now, and so it's as though he's looking at now as time, but it's not, I mean, something happens in time, but it's not as time. yeah. But the problem comes in because he has a last now, which it is not, you know, a sphere, whatever it may be, and, uh, as well as a first now, which it is. Yeah, but I'm just saying that you say, you know, sphere, not sphere, right? We have this now. That now occupies absolutely no time. No, right. But you could be something in that now, see? Right. Yeah, yeah. But the reason that there's no last now, does it come from, does it come from the definition of becoming? right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.