Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 85: First in Change: The Indivisible Moment of Completion

Transcript
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One being divided, all will be divided. And as we'll see more fully later on, to be limited or unlimited will be found in the same way in all, right? We touched upon that earlier, remember? We talked about that in particular. But notice, if all these things are divided similarly, which one is really most fundamental? The thing that's being moved, he says. For all to be divided and to be unlimited, fouls especially from the one changing. The divisible has been shown before. The limited will be clear in the things fouling. Why does he say it's more fundamental? Which is more fundamental, motion or the thing in motion? Because motion seems to be almost like an accident to the thing in motion. It's really kind of the thing in motion that holds it all together, right? Because, you know, I hit the baseball in the infield and knock it out of the ballpark, huh? And that motion is what? Being along to the wall. Yeah. One part of the motion is over and, you know, in the past and the other one's to come and so on. The only thing that seems to be there throughout the motion is what? The ball, yeah, yeah, seems to be what's responsible for the unity of it, huh? Yeah. Okay? And time seems to be more property of motion, right? Than motion of time, huh? So the thing in motion is kind of the fundamental thing here. If that was not divisible, would motion be divisible? That's the reason why, you know, you can't really have a point moving very well, right? So I can come into this room, and it takes me a little while to get in the door. Not too long, don't exaggerate. But, you know, when I'm coming into the room, part of my body is through the doorway, and part of it's still outside, right? Okay? And I couldn't do that unless I was divisible. But if I was a point trying to come in here, could I come through the doorway and have part of me outside there, part of me in here, right? I'd have to be either altogether out there, or altogether, what? In here, see? I don't seem to be able to, what? Have this divisible motion, right? And if it took me the point some time to get through the doorway, then what? Me the point would have to be divisible, right? You see? So because me the point is indivisible, there can't be any time or motion that's divisible for me the point. Right? So in the geometry of speech, you know, of a point by its motion making a line, he's not speaking emotions, strictly speaking. That's the imagination doing that, huh? Not really motion. So in a way, you can start to see maybe that what he says there is true, that divisibility is found first in the, what, thing that moves, right? And if that thing was really indivisible, you wouldn't be able to have a divisible motion and a divisible time and so on. Now, let's try to start here at least on reading 7, right? Reading 7 and 8 are going to go from the discussion of the division of motion and these things to the order, right? But in the 7th reading, the discussion will revolve around whether there is a first in motion somewhere, right? And in the 8th reading, the question will be more about order, right? But as I say, those two are connected, right? Because first is defined by what? Before and after, right? So the first is that which is what? Before everything else, right? And it's not after anything. You can maybe add that too, but so there's before everything else, right? Okay, so words like first and words like last, right? They have as many meanings as the word what? Before and after have, huh? So when you understand those central meanings of before that Aristotle gives us in the categories, he also enables us to see the meanings of what? First and last, right? Okay. So that when Aristotle talks about first philosophy, he usually refers to wisdom, not as metaphysics. That's the name that came in after Aristotle, right? From Andronicus of Rhodes. When Aristotle refers to what we, you know, commonly refer to as the metaphysics of Aristotle, or I call the 14 books of wisdom, but he usually refers to it as first philosophy, right? And if you read Descartes, you'll see him using the term first philosophy, right? But for Descartes, first philosophy is what you have to, what? Learn first. Yeah, yeah. And that would be first in the corresponding to the third sense of before, huh? Before in the discourse of reason, huh? Before in our knowledge, huh? But in that sense, Aristotle would have to call wisdom last philosophy. See? And Thomas, like in the beginning of his commentary on the Libre de Causis, right? He gives the order of all the parts of philosophy and the order of learning. And it's, you know, logic, mathematics, natural philosophy, political philosophy, and last of all, what? Wisdom, right? Okay? There are texts in Aristotle indicating that roughly, too, that same order, huh? Goethius or Salat, too, huh? So what Aristotle calls wisdom first philosophy doesn't mean first in the order of learning, okay? So when Descartes speaks of first philosophy, he's using the word in a quite different meaning in Aristotelism, okay? Aristotle means it's first maybe in the order of dignity, right? Which would be corresponding to the fourth sense of what? Of first, huh? And that's why he calls natural philosophy, huh? In the sixth book of wisdom, he calls natural philosophy second philosophy, okay? If there were no immaterial substances, if all that existed were material things, then natural philosophy would be wisdom. Natural philosophy would be first philosophy. In fact, the Greeks, before Plato and Aristotle, identified wisdom with, what? Natural philosophy, huh? And it's only after the great Anaxagoras, and especially Plato, and then finally Aristotle, that they began to have good reasons to think that there existed immaterial things. And then they realized that natural philosophy is only a kind of wisdom about natural things, but not about all things, right? It's not wisdom simply, huh? And so then, what Aristotle calls it second philosophy, he means, I think, second in, what? Dignity or worth, huh? See? Not second in the order of learning, you see? You know, logic first, and then geometry would be second, right? Okay? But no, so when you call wisdom metaphysics, you know, originally it means, meta means after, huh? Metta metaphysics, after the books in natural philosophy, after natural philosophy, therefore. And then you're using the word after there in the third sense, right? In the order of learning, huh? In that way, you call it. ...actual philosophy, metamathematica. Well, today, you know, people are sure would understand it. You know, in another sense, right? Metamathematics. And we could call geometry metatologica. You see? But I always cringe, you know, when I go into, you know, borders or some bookstore, you know, and you get the, you know, one section of books there, you know, the occult, you know? Metaphysics and the occult, you know? I hate to admit that I'm a teacher of metaphysics. You know? So, I don't refer to it as the 14 books of the metaphysics or the 14 books of wisdom. I, you know, it sounds much more impressive anyway. Which is interesting, right? 14 books of wisdom. But it's only a better way maybe of referring to it, you know? Or the 14 books even of first philosophy, but as they say, because of Descartes, you know, people might take it in the wrong sense, right? And that sense of first that Descartes is using it in is more known to us than the sense which Aristotle is using it. It's the third sense as opposed to the fourth sense. And we generally fall back upon the earlier senses because they're more known to us, huh? So, in reading 7, we're going to find out about first. And in what way there is a first in change and in what way there is not a first, right? And that's a very impressive discovery, huh? Okay. In mathematics, huh? In arithmetic, is there a first number? What's the first number? Two. Two. Thank you. I'm glad you're educated. But now, is there a first line in geometry? It would have to be then the shortest line, right? Because the first number is the least number, right? It's lesser than all the other numbers, huh? So is there a first line in geometry because of the what? Infinite divisibility. Yeah, yeah, yeah. If a point was a line, you see, then the point would be what? First line. It would be the first line, yeah. But there's a point of any length. No. No, so it can't be the first line if it's not a line, see? Just like one can't be the first number if it's not a number. Shakespeare was aware of that, by the way. Oh, where does he say it? Well, in The Phoenix and the Turtle, the great love poem, see? There's a very subtle one there, but he says, he's talking about how love murdered number. Because love made the lover and the loved one. And one is not a number, see? But then he has reasons, you know, trying to figure out, well, how can two be one? He really was brilliant. Of course he was, yeah. You know, when Homer, not Homer, when the great Socrates, you know, is talking about death and going down to the end of the world, he says, but it won't be wonderful, you know, to be talking with Homer and so on, and we won't be able to talk with Shakespeare, you know, if we get to the right place, huh? I was listening to EWT on the other night there, and there was some, I was McBride, one, one, one, one, some priest, good, good guy, this guy, good guy. But he was talking about, I think, Dr. Michelangelo, I guess. And Michelangelo was, had some cry, but didn't like the way he was doing his painting. I mean, you heard the story, but kind of funny. And he went to complain to the Pope about it, right? And he came back in the chapel the next day, and Michelangelo had painted a picture of this cardinal in the painting, but he'd put him down in, you know where, down to hell. Like, you know, the way down, he put his enemies, you know, and he didn't think much of it. It was about his post down there, right? And so he was even more indicted, right, about what McBride was doing. He went back to see the Pope, and he went, and he says, you know, he said, can you at least get me out of hell? And the Pope says, I have no control of that, just over purgatory. He'd get somebody out of purgatory, he'd get somebody out of hell. So he let it stay, I guess, I don't know if it's still there. He didn't go into, I mean, it's kind of a really interesting story, but. The papers today, by the way, they're reporting, it's such a stupid fact, you know, the Pope's remarks of it, you know, because they're saying he's giving a mixed message, right? He's like, well, of course, he condemns unequivocity, you know, this abuse system going on. But then he speaks, you know, of how people can be forgiven, you know, and there's always conversion, you know. But they're speaking as if he was talking about, you know, he's not sure whether they should go back or not. He's talking about a man who can be forgiven his sin, it's always possible, you know. I mean, where there's life, there's hope, right? You know, he was thinking about they're going back into active duty, you know, as a priest there, you know. He's talking about, you know, he's not saying that they're necessarily damned, right? They can still repent, you know, if they're evil and so on. He's very severe about the evil, but he's still holding out the possibility of divine mercy, you know. But he had no understanding of these things, you know. And so I said, you know, there's a mixed message coming, you know, from him. And one of the headlines said that, you know, one of the articles. And I said, it is really very, very annoying to see this. But anyway. Now he's first going to show in what way there is a first in change. Since everything changes, changes from something to something. Something we saw back in our first studies there, right? Back in the first book of natural hearing. The changing necessarily is in that which it has changed when it first has changed, huh? Okay, that's going to be a first there, right? Everybody's going to manifest this, huh? And he's going to go on to show that that first is something indivisible. For the changing leaves behind that from which it changes, or it itself fails, huh? Now why does he have that dichotomy there? Well, when I leave, my house will come here, right? My house doesn't cease to be. But I leave it behind, right? But when I go from sickness, say, to hell, the sickness we need. So there's two different kinds of change, right? Okay. You got that? And to change and to leave behind are either the same, or leaving behind follows change, huh? And to have left behind, to have changed, for each has itself to the other in a similar way. That's interesting there. Thomas, in the commentary, he speaks as if, it's called change from the term to which it goes, right? Okay. And it's called failing or leaving behind from the term which it leads, right? Okay. Now, I've talked about this to you before. There I put change on the side of the term from which. Remember that? Okay. Now, when I talk to students about this, I often take the example. I say, are you going home for Easter vacation? Are you going home for whatever the holiday is, right? And you speak, you know, you say to your roommate or your friend that you're going home, right? Okay. And meanwhile, back home, your mother is talking about your coming home. Okay. Now, the first thing I ask is, are you and your mother talking about two different trips or not? No. Okay. Well, the next question is, they're talking about the same trip. What is your mother? What is your mother? Just speak a little different language, a little bit of vocabulary you have. Is that the reason why she says it, right? And we say, there's some difference here in meaning, although not in the reality, you see? Because you are at the point of departure, right? And that's why you say going home. Your mother is at the destination. So she says, you're coming home, right? And that's the same trip, right? So that's clear enough, right? Now, when you use the word becoming, there you're thinking of what? The term, the term, the term, the term. And you can see that clearly because the word coming is right in the meaning of it. So we're studying Aristotle in the 12th reading, if you recall. And he's talking about how everybody speaks about becoming and so on, right? And he wants to manifest, right? That in all becoming, there are three things and so on, right? And he takes for granted that in all becoming, there's something that comes to be that wasn't before. And then he wants to show, he shows briefly, although kind of like an afterthought, that what comes to be, comes to be from something. You don't start from nothing, right? But the main thing he tries to bring out is that what you start from, in one way remains, in another way is lost, right? Okay? So, the thing that he takes and doesn't try to show at all is obviously on the side of the term, to which, right? Okay? Okay. Now, sometimes I say, if I contrast out the word change, is the change referring to the same reality or not, huh? If I talk about the soft becoming hard, is that any different from the change from soft to hard? You put the butter in the refrigerator, right? The soft becomes hard, right? Okay? Or there's a change from soft to hard, right? Okay? Is that change from soft to hard anything other than reality than the soft becoming hard? No. Okay? But are these just synonyms or do they have some little difference? Like these two, right? Well, here you're looking at it from the point of view of that to which you're going. So, you have change. It's not clear from the word, but you're thinking more of what you're leaving. When you say that, you know, everything changes, right? Are we thinking of the fact that nothing stays the same? Are we looking at it from that point of view more? Or when I go to somebody's house and I haven't been there for a while and the little child has, what? I say, mind's changed, right? Aren't I thinking that he's departed from the way he was? He's not the same, right? But now, in this text here, I found this in the commentary, you seem to be saying the opposite of what I'm saying now about the word change, right? Because he's saying change and, or Aristotle, you spent the words of Aristotle there. Change and what? Departing. I was saying reality, right? But departing is, in terms of the starting point, right? You're leaving that behind, or it's easy to be, and change, you're changing into something, right? Okay? Now, is he targeting me or not there? It wouldn't have to be. If you're either going home, you could say leaving school. Leaving school, going home, coming home. That's true. Yeah, yeah. Let's see, leaving school is changing your location. Well, again, the word change may not be as explicitly one or the other, right? So, in between, right? So, if you contrast change as becoming, change seems to have more of that from which, right? But if you compare change with leaving behind, right, okay, then change seems to have more of the other, right? Just like the lukewarm compared to the hot would seem to be cold, right? But compared to the cold, it would seem to be hot, right? Now, the old thing where you're supposed to have three pails of water, and one's hot, one's cold, one's lukewarm, and you put one hand for a while in the hot water, and the other hand in the cold water, and you put a boat in the lukewarm, and you're supposed to be getting a different, what? Sensation. Sensation, right? So, the one hand, it seems cold, and the other hand, it seems hot, you know? You had these sudden changes in the weather that we had, you know, in the last week or so, and people say, oh, it's so hot, you know, and the habit was in there complaining to me about the heat, when you take the heat back to Worcester or something. And, but I say, it hits you more, right, you know, the first day, because your body's not adjusted to the warm or weather, right? So, maybe he's not predicting me, right? So, no, it's what you're doing when you're changing from, let's say, soft to hard, you're leaving soft behind, right? Or soft is disappearing, right? And so, when that change is completed, then what you're left behind is completely, what? Left behind, right? Or completely lost, huh? Now, he wants to manifest that when the change is completed, one is in the, what? That to which he was changing, huh? And in no way in that from which. He's going to manifest, as Thomas says, first in change between contradictories. And, incidentally, the Greek word there for contradiction is just like the Latin word, contradiction. Interesting, huh? Contradiction, huh? Contradiction is often given as one of the four kinds of opposition, right? But it means, what? Said or guessed, right? Contradiction, huh? The Greek word is opti, which is contra, and then phasis, anti-phasis. It's kind of interesting that he means that way, right? Because there's another kind of opposition that we've talked about earlier, remember, in the course, we're talking about changes between contraries, right? Contradictory is another kind of opposition, but they both come from the word contra or against, huh? But contraries are a different kind of opposition, huh? So the opposition between, let's say, black and white is an option of contrariety, between virtue and vice, right, huh? But the contradictory would not be between being, let's say, white and being black, but being white and not being white. But usually Aristotle, I think in the character of my writing, when he talks about the stoppage and the contradiction, he usually do it in terms of statements, right? Okay? And that would bring in the addiction, right? But you could also say it with simple terms and say, right, the opposition, the contradictory of being white is what? Being white. Not being white. Oh. Yeah, the contrary would be being black, right, huh? See? Okay? And then when they apply it to statements, you see, The contradictory of every woman is beautiful is what? It's the contradictory of everyone Yeah, yeah, see which is equivalent to saying some woman is not beautiful Okay, but the contrary everyone is beautiful is what it's not as nice a statement. Yeah It's no woman is beautiful, right? Those things seem to be furthest apart right But in terms of truth and falsity they could both be what false say, okay? Every man is good. No man is good, right? Every priest is good. No priest is good. Those are contrary, right? Okay, and it could both be false, right? Okay, but the contradictory of every priest is good it is Some priest is not good, yeah, and the contradictory of no priest is good Yes, some priest is good, right? Mm-hmm The contradictory cannot both be true And they can't both be false, huh? See, see, but some priest is good, and some priest is not good They can both be true, right? So they don't seem to be opposed at all, right? See, so One in the same person could think, right? That some priest is good, and some priest is not good Mm-hmm But no one person could think that every priest is good, and no priest is good See? And he couldn't think that every priest is good, and some priest is what? Not good, right? Mm-hmm Okay But the man But one man thinks every priest is good, and another man thinks that no priest is good They could both be mistaken, right? But if one man thinks that every priest is good, and another man thinks some priest is not good One guy is saying the true, and the other guy the false And you know that even, you know, without knowing which is true, which is false You know that one is true, and one is false, huh? See? See that? Mm-hmm Yeah Okay So that's... So he's talking about now a change between contradictories, huh? See? You either are a sphere, or you're not a sphere, right? You either are a man, or you're not a man So when you change from between contradictories, huh? When you change from not being a man to being a man, or you change from being a man to not being a man, and you die When the change is completed, which term are you in? Which limit are you in? Which... Now when I change, when I die, when I change from being a man to not being a man, right? When I've died, then I'm not a man, right? Mm-hmm When I was generated, I had to change from not being a man to being a man And when I had been generated, then I was a man, right? Okay? So he's going to talk about that Since then, one of the changes is that according to contradiction When something has changed from not being to being, it has left behind non-being, right? It will therefore be... It will therefore... It will be therefore in being, right? For everything necessarily is, or what? Is not, huh? Yeah, I see. And sometimes, Thomas there, like the text there, I think is in the posturalytics, you know, but he puts those as the two fundamental statements, huh? It's impossible to be and not be, and it's necessary to be or not be. Mm-hmm And sometimes the first one people want to call the law of contradiction, you know, or the law of non-contradiction, right? You know what they call it? Because they have the guilty of, oh, right? You see? And the other, the law of excluded middle or something, right? And I think I mentioned how it was Weitzacker there who wanted to have new logic to avoid the law of excluded middle and talking about some atomic affairs, right? And it's because, you know, of the old difficulty of understanding, what? Ability, right? Okay? And they wanted to, what? Avoid having to say that the particle is here, or it's not here. But they couldn't really quite understand, what? The potency of ability, right? But Heisenberg, you know, understood the potency of the ability, right? That's what he admired so much in Aristotle. So I sometimes call these two axioms, the axioms about being and un-being, right? But it's really two of them, huh? You can't both be and not be, and Aristotle's enemies are more precise, you can't both be and not be at the same time in the same way, right? And you must either be or not be, if you're taking to be or not to be in the same sense at the same time, right? Okay? And those are the most fundamental of all statements. People are kind of amazed when you say that they are. But notice, any other statement is going to be either affirmative or what? Negative, right? Either going to say that something is, or going to say something is not, right? But not both. So in a way, this is presupposed to every other, what? Statement. Yeah. So. Two and three, when you distinguish two from three? Yeah. That would be just based on contradiction? Opposition? Well, you see, contradiction will enter into the other kinds of opposites, right? But, you see, when you get to the next kind of opposition, which is privation or lack and having, right? Well, then, lack is really none being in a subject, right? Able to what? Able to have it. Yeah. Yeah. See? So, everything either sees or doesn't see. By doesn't see, you mean something in the negation of that, right? But not everything sees or is blind. Mm-hmm. See? And therefore, the opposition of having and lacking is not as great as the opposition of contradiction because you have something in common. Maybe a subject, right? Able to have something but doesn't have it, right? Mm-hmm. And then when you go to the next kind of opposition, which is that of contraries, right? See? Then you have, in addition to a common subject, you have a common genus, right? So, if I have the virtue, then I lack the vice, right? If I have the vice, I lack the virtue, right? But the vice is not simply a lack of the virtue, but the vice is also a habit, a real, honest-to-goodness, a real habit, a real disposition, a real inclination, right, to go to excess or defect or something, right? See? So, it's not simply the non-being or the lack of the habit of the virtue. So, in vice, then, you have a common subject and a common genus, right? So, you have some things in common, right? Okay? And the opposition of a relative is much different from the other three, huh? Because in the case of relatives, one doesn't really take away the other. So, if something is double, it doesn't take away something being half. In fact, if something is double, something else has to be half, right? See? See? Virtue eliminates vice, right? Blindness eliminates, you know, sight, huh? But double doesn't really eliminate half. In fact, it requires that there be a half, and vice versa. It's just that I can't be double to myself. I have to be double something other than myself, right? So, there's some kind of distinction there, right? So, the distinction between the Father and the Son in the Trinity and so on is really based on what, that's a relative thing. That's why it's so significant, as we're saying in the Gospel of St. John, right? You know, when you look at the actual Greek text, it seems to me that the Latin and the English translations don't lose something, you know? Because it says, we translate it in English, in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God, right? But what's the Greek there for with God? What's the preposition in Greek? Pros. Pros, yeah. What does that mean? Well, it means toward, right? Toward. Yeah. Now, Aristotle talks about relation, right, in the categories. He's much more concrete than the abstract regulation, huh? Was it true? Yeah, what he calls that is pros-ti, towards something, right? Okay? That's much better than the word relation, huh? The word relation is to abstract, you know? And sometimes people, you know, speak of, you know, there's a big relation between us, right? As if relation is something in between us or something, you know? No, I am towards you, a teacher, you are towards me, a student. I am towards you, a father, you are towards me, a student. I am taller than you, you are, you know? You are shorter than me. So it's towards something, huh? And in logic, when they translate that pros-ti, they translate it into Latin as ad-aliquid, right? Yeah. But when they translate pros-ti, right, towards God, they translate it with God, right? It kind of loses the sense, huh? But if you know the logic, and you know something about relatives and so on, that Greek word pros-ti, right away jumps out at you, you know? My teacher, Kisuri, never pointed out to me in particular, I think about the Gospel of St. John, but he always pointed out to me how concrete Aristotle's way of speaking was in the categories, huh? That he never called it relation, he called it towards something, you see? And how good that way of speaking was, Aristotle, I had there, you know? So he kind of re-impressed upon my mind, you know? That this is to be towards something, right? It's not something absolute, it's towards something, right? Am I double or half? It's four double or half. Well, in itself, you couldn't say one or the other, could you? But it's double towards two. It's half towards eight, right? Am I taller or shorter? What would you say? In myself. By myself. It's nothing absolute, is it? Towards, see? Towards somebody, I'm taller. And towards somebody else, I'm shorter, right? You see? That really gets the idea of it's towards something, right? You see? And so when you read the Gospel of St. John, which is maybe the most important text we have there in the Trinity there, in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was, what? Towards God, right? And the Word was God, right? And then he goes on, you know, that although he was God, there's still distinction, right? This was in the beginning, towards God, he comes back, right? You know? You know? I don't know. I can't have been the first person to see that, I don't think. You know? But I don't remember Thomas ever, you know? Yeah, it's curious. And, or even Augustine, you know? Yeah. You know? And it seems to me they would have, you know, studied Thomas into the logic, right? So he would have been known, you know, what antiquity was. I mean, Albert has that, and he talks about... Would he have had the Greek text? Well, I mean, he doesn't, you know, work with those other Greek texts, and how much Greek he knows, but, I mean, occasionally Thomas does stop and talk about the Greek Word, and I see him do that in the commentary, you see? Yeah. And the Gospel of St. John is, in some sense, the greatest work, right, of the Bible. Sure. And, you know, like Pius XII said, no one can be a Thomist if he doesn't know Thomas' commentary on the Gospel of St. John. You know, this is kind of the high point there, you know? Sure. And, of course, you know, Thomas, he's following, you know, very closely, especially Augustine and John Chrysostom, right? Mm-hmm. And he's always, you know, saying what they say about the passage, you know, he talks about, you know? But... I think Chrysostom would have picked it up or something. Yeah, but... I mean, somebody did, you know, I don't claim to be original, you know, I mean, things are not, but it's, technically, it's an important thing to see that, you know? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Sometimes, you know, the Greek has something, you know, surprising. Yeah. Sure. I think I mentioned that, too, about the commandment of love. You know, in almost all the translations I've seen, you know, you should love the Lord your God with your whole heart, with your whole soul, and so on, right? And they use the same preposition with all four, or three or four, whatever it is. But then when you get to the Gospel of St. Luke, if I remember correctly, the word he uses, the preposition he uses with heart is different than what he uses with all the other ones. You should love the Lord your God from your whole heart, and with your whole mind, and with your whole soul, and so on, right? Your whole strength, see? But use the word from with the heart, huh? Mm-hmm. You see? That's interesting, huh? Mm-hmm. Because love, that you're talking about there, which is a love of charity, that love is in the will. It's not in the mind or in the other parts, but all the other parts, all the other powers are commanded, you might say, right? Are moved, right? Informed by that love, right? But nevertheless, that love is related to the heart in a different way than it is to the mind, right? Mm-hmm. You see? Because the love is in the heart, you see? And so the Gospel of Luke there brings it out more clearly by saying, I shall love the Lord your God, from your whole heart, and in your whole soul, and in your whole strength, you know? So they use a different preposition, right? So little subtle things like that, you know? Mm-hmm. It's good to know the Greek if you can, you know? I'll never get around to learning Hebrew, you know, but, but you say you read Cornelius Lapidus or something like that, you know, and the parish used to read sometimes the book of the Old Testament, and the translation you have, and even the ones coming back to the Septuagint, the Hebrew tends to be much more concrete, huh? Mm-hmm. And so, you know, instead of saying something like, you know, I was kind to the blind man and I guided him across the street, you know, like we might say, he would say, you know, I was an eye for the blind man. Yeah. Oh, man. So it's not meaning, you know, false in translation, but it lacks the, the, the piquancy of the, of the Hebrew, you know, and says, yes, you're kind of struck by that, you know, so, but Hebrews, I just never, never learned Hebrew, never get that far. Hard enough for me to learn whatever Greek I learned, you know. You should, you should come earlier on Wednesday, Father Ratham comes down to teach Hebrew. The, uh, well, one assumption is to learn some Hebrew, you know, so I decided to go to him and ask him about a word there, you know, and that's as far as I'll get, you know. But, uh, Father Peter was my Greek teacher, right? And, uh, only one other guy, just two of us in the chorus, taking the Greek, uh, me and Warren Murray, and, uh, Peter come in, you know, and recite your Greek, uh, irregular Greek forms, you know, and you're telling me what he walked back and forth from his, and he asked, you know, what do you want to learn Greek? I said, well, so I can read Aristotle, see? He said, well, he says, I know a young man who wanted to read Aristotle, but he never really learned any Greek, so he never, but, uh, whatever Greek I learned was, you know, he got started here with Father Peter, anyway. He's a good man. So that distinction between nature and reason, what kind of, you're making a distinction, so you're using some kind of opposition? Well, I, again, it's, um, there's obviously opposition that Aristotle talks about, that nature is determined to one, right, and reason is, what, open to opposites, right? So one is determined to one and the other is not determined to one, right? Okay, but that's not the whole story, right, see? Because, uh, uh, reason is a nature, too, okay? But it's not just a nature. So it is determined to something, but then you're considering reason as a nature, huh? Okay? Just like there's a two within three. So, notice, when you say three is... not two. Well, there are various ways you could say. You could say three is odd and two is not odd, right? Okay? Three is half a six and two is not half a six, or two is half a four and three is not half it, right? But none of that means that there's not a two in three, is it? That three includes two plus one, see? There's no way there's a two in three, right? And there could be a two without a three, but not a three without a two. So reason is a nature, and Thomas has various ways to explain that, but that's one way. When you say any distinction, it's kind of based on opposition, but it's not, there could be more than opposition to make a distinction, is that right? Well, what does Christ say? The Father and I are one, right? Yet there's a distinction between them, right? So you misunderstand the distinction between the Father and the Son, right? There's no distinction in what is absolute in the divinity, huh? Only what is towards another. So there's no distinction between God the Father and the divine nature, and there's no distinction between God the Son and the divine nature, huh? So the Father is in the Son and the Son is in the Father, right? The Father and I are one. One God, huh? We get towards each other, right? We're distinct. The Son is from the Father, right? Could you give a definition of distinction? I don't know if I give a definition of it, but there's always got to be, well, actually, you know, we distinguish two kinds. It's really an equivalent word. We distinguish two kinds of distinction, right? What they call the formal distinction, right? Which is based on opposition, and the distinction that we meet here in the continuous, huh? You know, where one point is here, another point is there, right? Okay? And, but you see, when you study the Trinity and the distinction among the members of the Trinity, Thomas was saying that he's perceived by an either-or syllogism, right? And you say, well, is it a formal distinction or a material distinction? Well, a material distinction is to have the continuous. God is not continuous, right? See? So there can't be a material distinction in God, right? Okay? Then you're down to the four kinds of opposition that the philosopher distinguished, right? And then you can't, what? Distinction between being and non-being, that can't be the distinction. And I am who am. And that enters into the distinction between, what, having and lacking, right? Because that's the distinction between being and non-being in a way too, right? And the lack enters into the time phrase, as we saw in the first book, right? Okay? So it can't be one of those three oppositions. So the one left is, it must be, what? I think Gaston, Tatis, and Wathias, right? Pros. But there's a clue to that, then, in the very Greek there of St. John's Gospel, right? That the Logos is pros, ton, theion, right? But then theion there, when you say pros, ton, theion, theion is standing for what? The Father. For the Father, yeah? Yeah. So you see in the creed there, God from God, light from life, true God from true God. Begotten, but not made. One in substance, one in be. Okay, we better not get talking about the Trinity here, because that's the end of all our studies, right? So it says, since then, one of the changes is that according to contradiction. When something has changed from not-being to being, it is left behind non-being. It will be, therefore, in being. For everything necessarily is or is not. It is clear, then, that in the change according to contradiction, what has changed will be in that to which it has changed, right? And if in this, also in the others. For as in one, likewise in all, right? Well, as Thomas says, he begins in that particular change because it's more clear. So all the others means besides between contradictions. Yeah, yeah. He's going to kind of talk about it in general in the next paragraph, huh? But it's particularly clear there because there's nothing in between, right? See? But, I mean, it's not too hard to say that when I go from Worcester to Boston, when I've gone from Worcester to Boston, where am I? Between Boston. Oh, in Boston, right? Yeah, when I have, you know, when I have traveled from Worcester to Boston, where am I? See? Boston. See? Okay. Now, obviously I'm not in Worcester because I haven't begun yet, right? See? So you say, well, why couldn't I be in Framingham when I've gone from Worcester to Boston, right? Well, if I'm in Framingham, I still would have to go from Framingham to Boston, right? And so it would not have been my journey yet, right? See? But you wouldn't even give that objection when I go from being to non-being or from non-being to being because there's nothing, what, in between, right? So either I'm at the starting point when I've completed my journey or else I'm, what, in the destination, right? Okay. So when I've gone from Worcester to Boston, it's most clear I'm not in Worcester anymore, right? Not quite as clear, but pretty clear I'm not in Framingham, right? You see? But there's not even that alternative to being in Worcester or Boston. You go from, what, when you're dying, right? You see? Or when you're being generated, huh? And you've got to be in the term to which to change it all. So what place to change to? Huh? Can't change anything else? Okay? Further, it is clear to those taking up each one if that which has changed is necessary somewhere or in something. Since it is left behind, I mean, you know, that's the reason why it can't be where you, where you, what started from, right? Because you have left that behind, right? Okay? So it doesn't make any sense to say you're still there. Because change and living behind are the same thing, reality, right? Further, it is clear to those taking up each one if that which has changed is necessarily somewhere or in something. Since it is left behind that from which it has changed is necessarily somewhere. It will either be in this or in another. It will either be in the what? The term of the change or somewhere else. If then it is in another as in C, what has changed to B again changes from C to B. For B is not mixed, the change being continuous. Thus what has changed when it has changed changes to that to which it has changed. But this is impossible, right? Okay? That's when I've gone from Worcester to Boston. I'm in Framingham. Well, then I still got to what? Go to Boston, right? So I changed and I'm still what? Changing. And I've already changed. But this is impossible. Necessarily, then, what has changed is in that to which it has changed. Okay? It is clear, then, that what has come to be, when it has come to be, will be, and what has ceased to be, will not be. In general, then, every change has been spoken about. And it is especially clear in the one according to contradiction. That's why you begin from that. Therefore, it is clear that what has changed, when it has first changed, is in that to which it has changed. Okay? Now, we have to stop right by five o'clock. But what he's going to point out now next, though, this is kind of almost obvious, this first thing, but he's going to show that when it has first reached its, what, goal, right, that this is something indivisible. It takes no time. See?