Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 61: The Eight Senses of 'In' and Equivocation by Reason

Transcript
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Adulateral is in, there's no word in now, it is in the definition of what? Square. It's in the species, square, right? Okay. And likewise the differences are in there, right? What's the fourth sense of the species of the genus, huh? And I've got to ask, why is that not three? I would have thought four was three and three was four, so... Okay. Well, notice, huh? The original meaning of whole is what we call the composed whole, the whole that is put together from its parts. Okay. Okay? But then sometimes later on we call it universal, a whole, but a universal whole, right? It's not put together from its parts, but it is what? Said of its parts, huh? Okay. Okay? And, you know, we tend to use the word general and the word what? Particular, right? Okay? And the particular, as you can see in the English word particular, the Latin word, it comes from the word for part, right? So the particular is like a part of the what? General, right? And of course the text we saw in Aristotle earlier, the general particular, right? The Greek word for general there is katholu, catholic, right? But catholic, katholu in Greek means according to the whole. You see the word whole right in the word katholu, just like we see the word part in the word what? Particular. Okay? So, you could say dog is a part of what? Animal, right? Okay? Okay? It's a different kind of whole in part, see? But the definition is still a what? Composed whole. So this kind of a whole is more like the original sense of whole than is the what? Universal. Universal. The word cat is composed of c-a-n-t, right? Okay? So c is in the word cat, right? That's a part in the whole. And the definition, right, of square is composed of these three words, right? Equilateral, right-angled, quadrilateral, right? Okay? But the genus, like animal, is not composed of dog, cat, and horse, is it? Otherwise, to say a dog is an animal would be to say a dog is something composed of dog, cat, horse, elephant. Right? But it's said of its parts, right? Okay? But nonetheless, we sometimes speak of the species as if it were particular in the genus, as general. In fact, you have the same root there, genus, as general, right? And we speak of the universal whole. So it's in some way like a part in a whole, right? Yeah. But a much different sense of whole than the composed whole. So this kind of whole is more like that. It's a composed whole, right? And this is not a composed whole, but it's a universal whole. Okay? So those are two different kinds of genus? No, no, no, no. Two different senses of in, though, right? Oh, okay. See? So genus is in species in one way of being in, and species is in the genus in another way. Okay? And notice how when we speak in daily speech, yeah? We might say, you know, in the definition of square, I would put quadrilateral, weren't you? And I'd put equilateral in, put in, right? The definition, right? Okay? But then we might use that same phrase. I would put dog in the genus animal, and I'd put tree in the genus, not animal, but I'd put it in the genus plant, wouldn't you? Mm-hmm. Okay? But the sense in which dog is an animal, and the sense in which animal is a dog, it's a different sense of in, right? Mm-hmm. Animal is in dog is a defining part of what a dog is, huh? A dog is a four-footed animal that barks, or something like this, right? Okay? That's not the way that dog is an animal. Dog is not a defining part of animal at all, is it? Okay? But in some sense, you might say that dog is a part of an animal, right? It's a particular animal, right? You see that? So, you still have something of the idea of part in a whole, right? But the species in the genus is interesting, right? Because is the species actually in the genus? No. Remember the difficulty there of our good friend John Locke, right, huh? Where he wanted to put equilateral and isosceles and scaling actually in, what, triangle in general? It's all and none of these things, he says. Yeah. But actually, equilateral and isosceles and scaling are in triangle in general, only in, what? Ability. Ability, yeah. Yeah. And that leads on to the next meeting now, right? Which is a sense of which form is in, what? In matter. Yeah. I'm thinking, you know, of how form at first is only in the matter in, what? Ability, right? And of course, notice the word species, of course, or the Greek word aidos is, I've got the idea of a form, isn't it? In fact, in English, we can use either word, right? And we might say that democracy is one, what, species of government, right, if I'm going to use a Latin word. Or the Greeks would say it's one aidos, right? In the genus, in the genus, right? We might also say that democracy is one form of, what, government, right? So notice, this is not so much like the part in a whole, in any sense, right? But it's like this, insofar as the species is in the genus in ability, and the form is in the matter, what? In ability, right? Okay? So this is like that meeting there, right? Now, it always struck me, you know, that only Thomas probably is the only guy who could have, after Aristotle, that is to say, who could have ordered these meetings, right? Because it strikes me how form and matter is something, in a way, in a sensible world, isn't it? It's like a piece of clay in one various shapes. Why, these senses here are more in the mind, right? And it's very strange that the sense in the mind should be before the sense in the, what, in the sensible world, right? But you don't realize how obscure matter really is, right? And, but in terms of the likeness here, you can see how this meaning is more like a part in a whole than this is. But this meaning is more like that than this is, because this is actually in there, and this is only in there in ability, and this is like that. It's an ability, right? So it's exactly where it should be, in the middle, right? But, it's very interesting when you talk to somebody, and you say to somebody like this, you say, suppose you have a piece of clay, right? In the shape of a sphere. And then you mold it into a cube, right? What has changed, the clay or its shape? What would the average guy say, do you think? What would you probably say if you were not? It's my chance of reacting, huh? Shape. Yeah, you'd say the shape had changed, wouldn't you? Huh? Weren't you? Even though we speak today, you might say, you know, the weather has changed, right? Rather than say the air has changed. Right? Okay. Now, what has changed? When you say that the shape has changed, you're imagining the what? Genus to be what is changing. You're saying the shape, that's the genus, right? Has changed from sphere to what? Q, right? As if the genus had changed from one species to the other. You're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape, you're saying the shape that's not what's going on at all is it it's the matter the clay that has changed not substantially but accidentally right the chain it's a clay that was a sphere that now is a cube right it's not the genus shape that used to be one of its species about the other species right you see the idea it's very striking remember when i first noticed this you know when i was he's saying to my brother richard there in the other room you know he's got struck by that right you know it's interesting that in her way of speaking we tend to think of this before that right attitude has changed we sometimes say right or his mood has changed right has his mood changed has the genus changed from one species to the other huh it doesn't change his mood right it's you that changed from being sad to being joyful or vice versa or something right being upset to not being so upset about something right huh see it's not your mood that has changed you know virtue and vice are habits right now when i go from being virtuous to being vicious has my habit changed i've gone from being virtuous to being what vicious i'm the one that's changed right the genus habit is not changed right right yeah yeah we speak that way right but it's not really the quality it's not that's the genus isn't it yeah the genus is not changed from one species to the other right but the individual has changed maybe accidentally not substantially in this case right but the individual who has changed so did you change to the condition of your body change from the sick to healthy or did you change from sick to healthy but the genus so we're thinking of the genus as kind of a matter yeah yeah but again that shows the likeness of the two right see you know when a person blushes right we might say what the color of his face changed right from white to crimson red or something right you're really embarrassed by something right uh but has the color of his face changed or has his face changed yeah it's the face that was white that is now red right huh it's not the genus color that was one of its species and now colors the other you see but we're apt to speak the way aren't we yeah like color changed huh color's different yeah yeah that's really the face it's different because two colors are different to begin with right two species of color are different to begin with right but my face that's different now than it was before right it was white before now it's red or you know you see the weather's changed I think you speak it that same way right as if the genus right the weather was different now than it was before right it was white before now it's red or you know you see the weather's changed I think you speak it that same way right as if the genus right the weather's changed I think you speak it that same way right as if the genus right weather was good now it's bad or the weather was bad and now it's good right so that's kind of a you know you start to think you realize how Thomas has ordered these things perfectly right you see little things like that okay now after this he puts the sense in which the whole is in the what parts now he saw that proportion earlier when he talked about the four kinds of causes remember when Aristotle goes through the four kinds of causes and then he goes through the three corollaries right and then he comes back to the four kinds of causes right and he says it all parts in our way like what matter right so that the whole is to part something like form is to what matter right so this is proportional to what to that right okay now what's the seventh sense huh the seventh sense is going to be in a way like these three senses because in these three senses because in these three senses you have something in the ability of another right but it's kind of a passive ability right now we go to the sense of something being in the active ability of something I've got you in my what power right okay so before the battle there you know we're in the enemy's hands and he says no no we're in God's hands right okay okay but to say we're in God's hands means we're in the what power of God right and we have that expression it's out of my hands you know if we see that sometimes meaning I don't have any control over it it's out of my hands out of my control right I have the power over this matter so in the power of the agent right the mover the maker whatever it might be but that's an active ability so it's like these senses here see well in these senses up here something is actually in something right here it's more in the ability of something these are more in the passive ability this is the active ability so when I was teaching a love and friendship class you know someone asked me what does it mean to fall in love okay this is kind of a common expression right I said well I can have one one meaning but I think it's which one of these seven meanings do you think it is seven yeah yeah I've fallen into the power of love right love is controlling all my movements now right okay like the beginning the two gentlemen of Verona right where Proteus is very much in love you know and he's you know his friend kind of sympathizes with him but he's he nevertheless admits he's you know his friend's acting like a fool right so he's he's he's in the power of love right love is controlling his movements huh what's the eighth sense of in huh yeah yeah one is in the what the good right in the end right the words of our lord there where he talks about not gathering up these earthly material pleasures or wealth rather where thieves stick in come in and steal and rust and so on right you know but uh in heaven right then he says where your what treasure is right there your heart will be right and uh he's using the word where there right but he's talking about where in the eighth sense here right so the song I left my heart in San Francisco right huh so you might say uh the opposite of that my heart's not in it and I have to correct exams my heart's not in it let's take some exams I'll start and say when I retire I'll say I won't miss this I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll say I'll So you see, my heart's not in it, it means you don't really, what, like this or love it, right? Augustine has that famous phrase there, where he says, in Latin, I guess, it's, you know, got a style that you lose when you translate it, but he says, you know, the soul is more, what, ubi amat, then ubi animat, the soul is where it loves than where it animates, right? But let's see, it loses the style there because of the words, right? The soul is more ubi amat quam ubi animat, right? So it's more where it loves than where it, what, animates, right? Okay, so when the soul of the saint is loving God, then the soul seems to be more in God than in the, what, body, right, and like when St. Paul was, you know, brought up to the third heaven, right? Every time it's a commentary, you get the various meanings of that, the third heaven. But whether it's the body or not, he doesn't know, right, huh? If his soul is still in his body, he was not aware, his soul being in his body, right? So the soul seems to be more in the good, right, in God, than, what, in the body, right, huh? But he's touching upon these two senses, right? But notice, in the Latin, the best in there, you know, he's the word ubi, which is the Latin word for what? For where, right? The soul is more ubi amat quam ubi animat. Animat is the word for soul, animate. Now, you can see, just by considering the senses of him, how important a word this is in all of our thinking. And you have to distinguish those senses, huh? And if you mix up these senses, then you have, what, really a, what? Fallacy. Yeah, you have, beginning with the fallacy of equivocation, right? You have the fallacy for mixing up different senses of the same word, right? And so, just like we were talking about earlier there, huh, we often tend to fall back upon a, what, earlier sense, huh? Because it's more known to us, huh? So when I say that the clay didn't change, but its shape changed, right, I'm really falling back upon this sense here, rather than this here, right? But, when our good friend, Antigris, when he says that everything that comes out of matter must be in matter, right? Otherwise, you'd be getting something out of, out is the opposite of in, right? Something out of nothing, right? Okay? In a sense, he's not really understanding the way that everything is in matter, right? And he's imagining, falsely, right, everything that is in the ability of matter to be in matter like in a place or like a part in a whole. And, I think I mentioned how Weitzacher there, the student of Heisenberg, who's supposed to have, what, taken up Kant's theory of the origin of the solar system and perfected, right? But he's a scientist who explained why the sun can go on so long without burning up, right? But he says when we imagine something, we make it, what, actual in our imagination. So, there could be this false imagination, and we saw before, too, when we're studying Pedocles and Anaxagoras, how the only kind of change that seemed real to them was change of place, right? So, they're cut off before they get up here, right? Okay? You see? So, they fall back upon the earlier senses, so there's more than one kind of fallacy there, but there's going to be... among other kinds of fallacy, the fallacy of equivocation, of mixing up to consensus. So, he's imagining everything that's in the ability of matter, everything that's in matter in this way, to be in matter in one of these earlier senses. And then he gets into trouble because he's, what, he has to fit them all in there. He's got to fit an infinity of things in there, and one way to do that is to make them infinitely small. And then Aristotle points out that there seems to be certain, what, limits as to how big or how small things are in the actual world, right? So, the grass doesn't grow as tall as the trees, right? And so on. You don't find a man as small as a molecule of water, right? So, a man can't be infinitely small, and so on. So, he gets into those troubles. But as I mentioned, in the 20th century, he had the same thing, right? Because when they were studying the elementary particles, he saw that out of any elementary particle, you could eventually get the rest. Then the well-known foreman, as Heisenberg speaks of it in the Unified Field Theory lectures, every elementary particle is composed of all the rest, right? See? Well, notice the word composed there, right? You're back in the composed hole, as opposed to the universal hole, which is more like the way things are actually in matter, right? When Heisenberg speaks on his own, then he goes back and forth to Aristotle, right? He compares, you know, the first man to what Aristotle says, that it's in ability, right, to be these things. Then we saw our friend, what, John Locke, right? He can't quite understand the sense in which the species is in the genus, or the difference is in the genus, only in ability, right? And so, what are those three lines, right, in the definition of triangle in general? Well, if you just look at three lines, and think about three lines, and try to imagine three lines, you've got to imagine them as equal, or, you know, two of them equal, or none of them equal, right? And so, which one is it? He can't take one rather than the other. So, it's all and none of these, he says, right? Well, he can't distinguish, you know? It's all of these in ability, not in act, right? But he can't see the distinction, so he says it's all and none of these. It's like you take the three and you're round them together, you know, and then you've got that general idea of triangle. And that's why he says it's hard to get that idea. He's trying to show, you know, he's kind of attacking what Aristotle said in a way that the general is the one in particular, right? And he's trying to show, you know, how hard an idea really is, right? Because you've got to think about his being all and none of these. And then, of course, you know, Barclay comes along. He doesn't see the distinction either, but he sees the absurdity of saying it's all and none. So, he says, there are no general ideas. Now, you see the moderns doing that, too, in logic, because they can't understand the universal whole. And so, they want to substitute for the universal what they call class, right? Now, Albert the Great, I think, correctly teaches us in the beginning of logic there. The first thing to be considered in logic is really the universal. What's common to many instead of many. And so, the very first thing to be understood, they don't understand. Notice the difference between saying, in a way, man and mankind, right? Mankind, maybe, is more the, what? Human race, right? And that's a collection, huh? That's a, in a way, like a, what? Composed whole, right? Okay. And, but universal is not that at all, right? It's not composed of the individuals, but it's said of all of them, right? But it contains of all, not actually like a class does, right? But it contains of, what, non-intrupancy, right? It's like, you know, if I have a class here, and I say my, my philosophy of nature class, right? Okay. Well, class is really a composed whole. And you people are part of that class, right? So, class there is not said of any one of you, is it? You know, you're not the class, and you're not the class, right? But together, you, you, you. Compose the class, right? But now universal would be like student, right? Because you're a student all by yourself, right? And you're a student, and you're a student, and so on, right? What's the difference between a student and a class then, right? You can see the modern biologists sometimes, they don't want to talk about the universal so much they'll talk about the animal kingdom, right? Maybe just, you know, loose use of words, but I think their affinity for that word kingdom is that it seems to be more what? A collection, a class, like a kingdom is, right? I hope in the kingdom is the kingdom, or is a kingdom, right? But they're all part of it, right? I am in my family in this sense here, right? You know, in the kingdom in this sense here, right? But I am in man as opposed to beast in this sense down here, right? And put, place me in this species, and that universal, right? Man is said to me rather than beast, I hope. Okay? You can learn a lot from this, huh? I think I mentioned how when I was first teaching logic and assumption there, and I was thinking about the English expression, to think out, or to reason out, right? Philosophy is really a reasoned out knowledge, right? As a result of thinking out things, huh? And, but is there more than one meaning of the word or phrase, thinking out? So, when I think out, for example, the parts of a whole, right? I'll just take this for example from logic here, right? I can think the logic of the second act, which is something easiest, okay? When I think out that a statement has a noun and a verb, right? I'm thinking out in the sense of out opposed to the sense of in here, okay? So, Aristotle has thought out the parts of the statement, which are noun and verb, right? But he's also thought out the definition of statement, speech signifying the true or the false. But now he's thought out in this sense here, right? That's a different thinking out, isn't it? And then he thinks out that a statement is either affirmative or negative, affirmation or negation, right? Right? Now he's thinking out the, what? The species of statement, right? You see? Okay. Now, sometimes he thinks out the order. Like we've been thinking out Thomas Aquinas. He thought out the order of these eight senses, right? Well, that's like the sense here. Because the order is to the things order, like form to matter, right? Okay. And sometimes we think out a statement from understanding its parts, right? So if I think about what an odd number is, right? And I think about what an even number is, I might think out that no odd number is even, right? Or if I think about what a whole is and I think about what a part is, I might think out that a whole is more than a part, right? That's the sense of thinking out, opposed to this, right? Now, reasoning out, huh? One kind of thinking out. What sense of thinking out is reasoning out? Seven cents. Seven cents, yeah. The premise is the conclusion is in the power of the premise, yeah. And so you're thinking out the properties, right? Like Aristotle thinks out that every statement has an opposite statement, right? Thinking out a conclusion, right? And to some extent, we tend to think out in the order here, the words itself, right? We're going to think out, let's say, the definition of statement before we think out the species of it, right? We're going to think these things out before we start to think out conclusions about these things, right? We're going to be, you know, thinking very good. So I went up to Simon Tsujian there. I already had my doc and everything, but I go up there and check. And when you think of this way of speaking, you're thinking, I don't know, reason how I was talking about this. He thought, that was very good, he says, but you can't speak that way in French. Then he said, that's a good example of how English is superior, he said, to French for philosophy, right? He often made that point, huh? But you can see how concrete English is there. You know, one that's harder to reduce there, when you think out the meanings of a word, right? Okay? Which sense of in is that opposed to, or which one is it most opposed to? Like the first or the second first? Yeah, I think it's like the first sense is kind of strange. It's not so obviously reduced to that, right? But you know how you can, you know, have a box, you put something in that box, right? Well, words are a little bit like that, right? I mean, there's no necessary connection there between the sound and what's the meaning, right? So it seems a little bit like that, right? That's kind of the fundamental thing you have to do, you have to think out the meanings of a word. I know there's a sense of thinking out, I guess, huh? We should talk about thinking out the meanings to an end or something like that, right? That is, that's or not. Is it a different sense if we say, before someone makes a statue, we say, you know, the shape, you know, Moses is in the rock. But after it's made, we say, Moses is in the rock. That's both the form and the matter, but it's different, right? There's a difference there, yeah. But I don't know if that stinks within us, right? But the place of this comes from the fact that originally the matter is in what? Ability, right? Being active in the matter has been actualized. We'd say the matter is to the form as ability to act, huh? What about when we say, you're in my heart? That's a little different than the eighth sense. Yeah. My heart is in... Notice, what Aristotle does, and Tom is following him, they don't distinguish all the senses of the word, right? Okay? They distinguish what you might call the central senses of the word, right? But other senses can be led back to one of these, huh? By a certain, what, proximity. And that does the same sense, huh? And the one that Thomas mentions here in the commentary is the one that's relevant to actual philosophy right now, in time. Right? Okay? Now, Thomas reads the question. Why doesn't Aristotle speak of the sense, this sense of in, in time, right? Let's led back to what sense? First. First, yeah, yeah. And the reason why, it doesn't mean it's the same meaning, no. But the reason why it's led back to that, is that both place and time are in a way in extrinsic, what, measure. So the one that is said to be in that extrinsic measure in both cases, huh? And that's something like that when you take up the word beginning, right? The first meaning of the word beginning... is um the edge of the desk here is the beginning of the desk right okay and then if you have a motion over this desk by chalk right the beginning of the motion starting from here is going to correspond to the order in the desk right and then the time it takes going down there right so the beginning in motion and the beginning in time are led back to the beginning of the desk that sense and the the order right so if i if i drive from here back to my house at five o'clock then the before and after the order of the road corresponding to that will be the before and after in my what in in my motion over that road right and then the time right okay so if i'm going from this town here to this town here and this town is before that town my motion here to here will come before my motion here to here and that from here to here and the time i'm going here will come before the time here and time here right so they're very similar right but they're all different senses right but the uh senses of beginning or before in place in motion or in time are led back in one sense okay but sometimes they're close to another time i mean another sense that that you see sometimes is is um uh some will say um i gotta be into shape okay or we say you're in good health right okay you're in good shape right now what sense of in would you lead that back to the fifth is it like the fifth what fifth form no see it's it's this is the reverse of that right because you're more apt to say that the form is in matter right that's what's a central sense right from act to say that the form is in matter than the matter is in the form oh yeah we are saying the deficit yeah okay see yeah it's more true to see maybe the health is in the body right yeah and the body is in health because body is the subject of the health right so in what sense am i in good health in a genius and a kind i'm saying this it sounds like more like a proposal for number eight as a purpose and then it sounds rather confused but i'm just really saying this i have to pursue this end of good health you know we have that in mind when i'm saying that though when i say i'm in good health too right but notice huh in a way it's reverse to this one right yeah okay but it doesn't have one of the simple senses matter in form right okay but what sense is it is like this one here see well it's whole and parts right because parts are like matter right whole is like what form right so therefore matter in form is like part in what oh yeah it's kind of a distant cousin of that right okay it seems to be most like that right if if the parts are to the whole as matters to form right and then the matter in form is like part in whole because you see it's kind of a strange sense right so it's not given as one of the central senses right so if i said you're in my heart would that be like the eighth or would that be like form in matter well you see um it'd be more like form in what in matter than my eighth sense right so aristotle was really the first man to think out the central meanings of these words that are equivocal by reason uh there's a reason why it has these many meanings are connected and to think out the order they're right and as i say to my colleagues they say um is a man wise if he understands the words he uses i answer no but is he wise if he doesn't understand the words he uses to understand the words you use is not the end all and be all of knowledge right so i wouldn't say that if a man understands the words he uses then he's wise this is what wisdom is right but if he doesn't understand the words he uses then he is what not wise right okay and so i was saying to some of my students in metaphysics there um where erstell just take up the word being right and of course so many students are taking heidegger too you know and they say does heidegger really understand the word being i say that the word being is equivocal by reason and and distinguishes the senses and thinks out the order of them nowhere apparently he's always talking about being right so he doesn't understand right the very word he's what using and especially using right so and uh we're going to be going on to define time of course i think his great famous book is the being in time right and he doesn't tell you what time is he doesn't understand the word being so i can't take these little pot shots you know what they're worth you know but uh that's very fundamental right and these words um that are especially equivocal by reason these are the words that are to some extent used everywhere because they're so universal but they're also the words that are found in the what axioms right so we say for example one axiom would be that nothing is in itself and you know sometimes you know we use that phrase in itself we say that you know accidents exist in substance right and then we say substance exists in itself right and that's it sometimes but is that to be understood really affirmatively or negatively not in another that's really what it means right when thomas defines substance there in the uh strictly speaking in the uh summa kind of gentiles it's res cui conveniat esse what non-analial right a thing to which it belongs to be not in another not in itself right you see okay but notice now if you couldn't distinguish the senses of in i could end up by putting something in itself right i could say for example that the uh species is in the genus and the genus is in the species therefore the species is in the species right if i'm in the box and the box is in the room then i'm in the room right right but the point is um a distinct understanding of the axioms requires you to what distinguish the senses of the words in the axioms huh and when you say nothing is in itself we what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you mean what you sense of in, right? And we're mixing up two different senses of in, right? When you say the genus is in the species, or you say the species is in the genus for that, you go either way you want it to go, right? The species is in the genus, and the genus that it's in is in the species, the very same species. Therefore the species is in the species, therefore the species is in itself, right? Oh, I guess so. You know, the example I take in class with students is part and whole, right? And I say to them now, you all admit that a whole is more than one of its parts, and they all agree, right? That's one of the axioms, right? The axioms are the statements, right? Known by themselves, by all men. Okay? So everybody knows that a whole is parts, and therefore the whole is more than one of its parts, right? Okay? And then I say to them now, what is a man, right? Well, he's an animal, right? Isn't he? And they say, yeah, he's an animal, yeah. And I say, is that all what a man is? A man is just an animal? You know, I always quote my mother. She didn't like me to say that a man is an animal, right? I said, well, I don't mean just an animal, mama. No, he's an animal with reason, right? Okay, she goes, okay, that's better. Okay? So animal is only a part of what man is. Isn't that true? Of course, they all agree that animal is just a part of what man is, huh? It's not just an animal, is he? It's more than that. It's an animal with reason. And they say, yeah, but animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, and elephant, doesn't it? Yeah, yeah. Yeah. Therefore, sometimes a part contains much more than the, what? Whole. Yeah, I guess that's so, they say. Well, have I really disproven the axiom? I'm mixing up two different senses of the word part, right? When you say that man is a part of what? Animal, right? You're thinking of animal being a universal whole, which is said of man, and dog, and cat, and horse, right? And the universal whole is always said of more than one of its parts is. And then when you say that animal is a part of man, you're thinking of the definition of man, right? Which is a composed whole, right? And that composed whole contains more than just the genus, what? Animal. It contains, you know, reason and so on. Do you see the idea? But, I can catch the students on that, see? Because they can't distinguish those two meanings of whole and part. And so, this is what happens, you see, with the axioms that some sophist, right, gives an objection to one of the axioms. And it may be as simple as mixing up two different meanings of the words in the axioms. And then you seem to be, what? Contradicting the axiom. And therefore, the statements that are most known to us, the statements upon which all other statements are based, right, turns out to be, what? False, right? And everything is called into question now, right? Everything comes tumbling down, you know? This is what the sophist likes to do. And of course, these are also the words that are used in wisdom, most of all, because of the universality of wisdom, right? So, in distinguishing the central senses of the words used everywhere, Aristotle's at the same time distinguishing the words in the axioms, and the words that are used especially in wisdom, right? So, he's killing three birds with one stone, right? See? I found this, you know, very useful in logic, right, to know this, right? But it's useful for understanding the axiom, which I think is why he brings it in there, because, you know, nothing is in itself, right? He wants to bring that out, right? And, but you couldn't understand or defend that axiom without this, right? I think I should try to understand some time, but they'll, and I'll say, if I'm in the box and the box is in the room, aren't I in the room? Yeah. So, if A is in B and B is in C, is in A in C? See? Okay? So, if the species is in the genus, and the genus is in the species, that isn't the species in the species? So, it isn't always true that nothing is in itself. I guess not, you know? So, see, is Aristotle still wise because he, he, he, he, what, understands these words? No. But if he didn't understand these words, then he wouldn't be wise, right? As far as I can see, you know, um. Um, John Locke doesn't understand these words that he uses. Uh, what's his name? Uh, I think he doesn't understand the words he uses, right? Huh? I'm not saying Aristotle's wise because he does understand the words he uses. I say they're not wise because they don't understand the words they use. You see the point? Yeah. Um, in the fifth book of wisdom, uh, Aristotle takes up the word has, right? And he gives a number of senses of has, he, he does this in the categories, too. But he points out that in a way the meanings of has, there are as many meanings of have, or has, either word we're going to use, as what? In, right? In a way, it's kind of just the reverse, right? Okay? So, uh, for each sense of in, there's a, just like, like there's as many senses of out as there are of in, right? Right. And that's kind of obvious. There'd be as many senses of out as there are in. Um, so you don't have to distinguish the eight senses of out. You can see them right away from the eight senses of in, right? Just like in that reading I gave you from the categories, you see the five senses of the four central senses and the crowning sense of, of before, you know the five senses of what? After. After, yeah. But here, Aristotle's pointing out that in a way the different senses of has is, correspond to the different senses of what? In. And, uh, you could say, for example, that what? Um, uh, a species has a, what? Genus. We'd say it quite readily, right? We could say, um, uh, the genus has, what? Species, right? We could say the whole has parts, right? We could say the place has you, right? Remember the famous words of, uh, C.S. Lewis, right? He said, what do you mean you've got time? Have you ever seen those words of this? What do you mean you've got, you know, it's like, I only got five minutes, you know? What do you mean you've got time, he says? Time has you. That's true, right? You know? Time has you. Because you're more in time than time is in you, right? And, you know, Shakespeare often refraged that, you know, we have to do, we're times, it's almost times, what? Servants, right? We have to obey time, right? You know? In the class, gotta go. You know, middle of a thought, you know? You see the kids there, you know, you know, you don't have to look at the clock to realize that class is over, you know? The students can tell the students, you know, they're getting very restless down there. And time gives you the hint, right? So you can say the matter has a, what? Form, right? Okay. And sometimes we combine them in the same sentence, right? You can say a whole has parts in it, right? It even helps you to understand the word has a bit, huh? Thomas, when he's saying scripture, you know, huh? Come up there because, you know, Christ will say, the Father is in me and I in the Father, right? And Thomas says, what sense of in that is, right? In Christ, he'll say, you know, that Aristotle doesn't know about the Trinity, right? So there may be a sense of in there that Aristotle didn't see because he didn't, you know, didn't have faith, right? Okay. Although sometimes he'll say it has a distant likeness to this or that sense, right? Okay. And he'll explain, right? But he always recall this, right? That comes up. I'm about to say, I don't have to worry about that right now. It's interesting that the first meaning of it.