Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 60: Motion, Place, and the Eight Senses of 'In'

Transcript
================================================================================

Go out and lose, right? Okay, you see that? So that's the second thing you want to bring out, right? That it's an imperfect, right? An incomplete act. Okay? You see that? Because my being in the room is the complete act, right? But now I don't really have this ability to be in the room, right? As such, but I'm, what? Pulling the room, huh? But then there's a third thing, right? Is coming into the room the same thing as standing in the doorway? Standing is not motion at all. Is becoming hot the same thing as being warm? What's the difference between coming into the room, where you're parked in the room already, right? And standing in the doorway where you're parked in the room too, right? What's the difference between the two? Because one is not the same as the other, right? Standing is not the same as motion, isn't it? Well, again, you said as such, right? To go back to your thoughts and words. As such is always opposed or usually opposed to what? By happening, right? And if I'm standing in the doorway, it's accidental to standing in the doorway that I ever come in more. Maybe I'm checking IDs, huh? I have no intention of coming further in the room, right? I may go in further, I may not, right? But does it belong to standing in the doorway as such to go any further in? Does it belong to being warm to become any warmer or any hotter? The mother might want the milk to be warm, but not hot, right? So the baby can drink it in comfort, right? Okay. Do you see that? So, but is it accidental to coming through the doorway? So long as I'm still coming through the doorway, is it accidental that I come in more? No. No. If you take the way coming in more, right, in order to a further, right, act, then I stop coming in. And so long as the water's becoming hot, it's going to be, what, hotter, right? Right. So that's the third thing, right, that this is bringing out, right? That this imperfect act is in order to a further act, right? Or on the way, you would say, to a further act, otherwise you stopped it, right? I'm just trying to see more clearly how that is expressed by ourselves, words, insofar as it is able to be, insofar as it's still going to be, in other sense, more. Yeah, it's not the act that it already has, you know, the full act that it already has, like by being a man or by being a philosopher or something. So that last part, then, it's really kind of equivocal. It means a number of different things. Yeah. But it's, in a way, covering all three of these things, huh? Yeah. Otherwise, it's not really separating, right, motion from everything else. You see, I'm making a comparison here to something maybe easier to see, right? What is the difference between learning, which is like emotion, and knowing something imperfectly? Or take these three things. Knowing fully something, right? And knowing it imperfectly, right? And then learning, right? Are they the same thing, the three? Well, you can say the man who knows something imperfectly doesn't know it fully or perfectly, right? Right. The man who's learning something doesn't know it fully or perfectly, right? Right. Okay? So obviously, in that sense, learning and imperfectly knowing something are both distinct from knowing something fully or perfectly, right? But is there a difference between knowing something imperfectly and to be learning it, right? And notice, the man who imperfectly knows something, he may be fed up with the subject, right? I'm not going to study that. You know, we all have our enemies, right? And so, you may have no intention, right, of ever learning the subject more, right? And I took the course because it was a requirement for graduation, right? Or something of that sort of, right? I had to take a course in this course or a course in this area or something, right? You know? So, this ill-disposed student has no intention of ever, what? Going further, right? You see? Okay. So, it's accidental, you could say, right, to imperfect knowing that you ever know this subject more, right? But so long as you're still learning, right, you're going to know it more, aren't you? Right. Yeah. So, you could say learning is an act of the ability to know on the way to what? Knowing more, right? Imperfect knowing a thing is an incomplete knowing of it, but not on the way to any further knowing. See? You see? And once Dion would come down, right, and he used to pay his way down from Quebec there to St. Paul, right? The old former students of Dion, right? And Dion said each time he'd come down, he'd see that my old teacher, Kasurik, was wiser than the last time he saw him, right? And the other guys, they seemed to be the same. So Kasurik was always what? He was still learning, yeah. Yeah, yeah. And I suppose the teacher shouldn't be that way, really, because, I mean, right? But some people, they just kind of, what, level off, right, at where they're, you know, they're formal training, you know, and then they just kind of feed themselves the rest of their life, right, and, you know? But there's a real difference between that, right? You see? And that's why each time you saw Kasurik, he seemed to know something more, right? You see? And then it seemed to be just where we left him, you know? That's what he said. I mean, I just call him Monsignor, right? But there's a real difference there, huh, between Kasurik and the rest, huh? You know? Kasurik could always be coming down, you know, in college, and we had these little things, or, you know, you could put your books and so on, like, have a little, you know, thing. I'd be, you know, there putting my books or my hat or whatever, there's a code in there or something, you know? Kasurik, I'm like, wait! You know what? He saw something, you know? He's got to tell me right now before he goes, you know, any further, you know? And so, that's learning. What do they say, though, in the spiritual writers, they say, you know, if you're not going forward, you're going backwards. That flies to knowing, too, I don't know. But it's supposed to apply to the spiritual life, right? You know, if you're not getting better. You're probably not staying the same, you're probably getting worse. So, maybe memory eventually starts to, you know, Boulay used to always talk about that, right? Now, all this stuff goes away from you if you don't keep on, what, thinking about it, huh? So, I guess we should stop here at about 5, right? So, we'll finish up this second reading at least of motion, and then we're going to look at time, right, huh? Time is, in some ways, more important for theology, because then we can talk about eternity, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. And, uh, okay? Mm-hmm. He's going to set them all individually, so he sets the first clock at a certain time, then he walks down the hall and sets an o'clock at the same time, and he keeps walking. It's just about to be all off. He turns a little bit late at 24. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds. Or the luminal oranges, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Praise God. And help us to understand all the truth. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. So we're in the second reading here, I think. So let's start from the beginning, so we won't be called a bit of what we saw last time. Having divided act and ability according to each genus. So in each genus, the ten highest genera, substance, quality, quality, and so on, you have something in act and something in what? Ability, right? There's something able to be a substance and something that is actually a particular substance, right? Something able to be 5'10 and something that is actually 5'10, right? And something which is able to be hot and something that is, what? Actually hot, right? And something that is able to be a grandfather and that is actually a grandfather. And so on, each category, right? So we don't tack on act and ability as if they were another category, another genus, right? But they crisscross, you might say, they divide each genus, huh? Of course, strictly speaking, we don't put God in any genus, huh? Because that would limit him, right? Among other things. But we do, what's speaking of as being pure act, right? So in some way, the distinction between act and ability is of even greater universality than the distinction of the ten genera. Because you can divide each genus by act and ability, and then we can also, what? Speak of God in terms of act, huh? Plato in the, what, dialogue called the Sophist, right? He says, gives a kind of definition, in quotes here, of being, right? What could act upon something or what? Be acted upon, right? So Aristotle has one of the main divisions of being, right? Into act and ability and a whole book devoted to that in the metaphysics, the ninth book of wisdom. So he says, having divided act and ability according to each genus, the act of the able to be as such is, what? Motion. Now that definition there has three, what? Parts, right? And the genus is, what? The act, right? Okay. And then, of the able to be, that's the second part. And then the third part is, what? As such, right? Okay. Now motion here, as we've said many times, is a translation of kinasesis in Greek there, but sometimes the word motion in English gets too, what? Narrow in our understanding, and we use it just for change of place, right? But he's using it in the broader sense here. Such as alteration, which is a change of, what? Qualities, right? As alteration of the alterable, right? It's the act of the alterable. Growing is the act of the, what? Growable, right? And decreasing of the decreasable. I guess you get to be my age, you start shrinking, they say, right? Old age, right? Aristotle's always reminding us of that. Generation of the generable, and corruption of the corruptible, and in general, motion of the, what? Moveable, right? But notice he's not defining motion as the act of the movable, because then he'd be defining it in a way by itself, right? Okay? So he defines it as the act of what is able to be, huh? As such, huh? Now he's starting to manifest that definition in the second paragraph. That this is motion is clear thus. For when we say the buildable is such as an act, it is being built. And this is being built, huh? So obviously the word buildable is what? Taken from the word able, right? It names a certain, what? Thing that is an ability, right? Okay? And when you're building the buildable, that's obviously an act of that ability, right? So he's manifesting that it's an act of some ability, huh? But again, we wouldn't define, what, being built as the act of the buildable, would we? Okay? He's manifesting that it is the act of something, right? Okay? Just as it's true to say, motion is the act of the movable, right? Okay? That's not a definition of motion, because you'd be defining motion in a way by itself, right? But it's nevertheless a true statement, right? So you're manifesting in that true statement that motion is the act of something that is, what, inability, huh? Okay? Likewise, also learning and rolling and growing and ripening and aging and so on. Okay. Now, since some things are both in ability and in act, although not at once or according to the same, for example, something could be hot in act, right? It could be actually hot, but it's able to be cold, right? And something else might be actually cold, but able to be, what, hot, right? And in that way, many things act upon and undergo from, what, each other, right? Reminds a little bit of what Putin says, that for every action there's a, what? Reaction, yeah. And these are the movers that we know first, right? Or they even, what, act upon each other, right? So you're very far away from the, what, unmoved mover when you talk about this kind of a mover, huh? Okay? But it's every mover of this sort, right? Both acts upon things as acted upon. This is something he takes up in the late, last books of the, of natural hearing. For all will be at once acting upon and undergoing, right? Notice, they act upon something else, which is in ability for what they actually have. And they're acted upon by something else that has an act, something that they only have in, what? Ability, yeah. And that, you know, makes one think a bit of the famous statement that every agent, everything that acts upon something, does so insofar as it's in, what? Act, right? And it's acted upon, or it's able to be acted upon, right? Insofar as it's in, what? Ability, right? Okay? Thus the natural mover. Notice, huh? He calls it the natural mover. What does he mean by the natural mover, huh? Well, nature was defined as, what? Beginning in cause of motion, rest, and that which it is, first as such, not by happening. So he's talking about a mover that is, what? Subject to motion itself, right? As opposed to the unmover. Thus the natural mover is movable for everything such moves being moved itself, right? Okay? And those are the movers that are most, what? Known to us, right? The moved movers. So there's no question that moved movers exist, right, in the world around us. Okay? And hence it seems to some, right, that every mover is moved, right? Okay? But in the seventh and the eighth book of natural hearing, he's going to reason out that there's what? Yeah, a mover that moves without being moved itself, right? Okay? Okay. But concerning this, it will be clear from other things in what way it is. So... So... So... So... So... So... So... So... So... Okay, he's just kind of, what, letting you guess what he's going to show later on in books 7 and 8. For there is something that moves and is, in fact, what? Immovable, right? Who is it? Is it James or Jude? I always get those guys mixed up. He says there's no shadow of change in God, huh? It's one of the canonical epistles, huh? Is it James or Jude? I can't remember what it is. James, okay. James, yeah. James, yeah. So he says there is motion whenever the able to be, being an act, is actualized, not as such, but as movable. I say as such, and he's going to start to explain that, huh? And he's really going to really only partly explain that as such here, right? Other places he takes it up again, like in the 11th Book of Wisdom, right? He'll some days unfold more, like I was doing the other day, huh? Let's see what he says here. I say as such, for bronze is able to be a statue, but motion is not the act of the bronze as bronze, huh? So it's not the act which something already has, right? Okay? He says for it to be bronze, huh? To be actually bronze, and to be an ability are not the same. Since if they were simply the same by definition, the act of the bronze as bronze would be what? Motion, right? Okay? They are not the same as has been said, huh? So the bronze, or it's, wait a minute, don't take it, he's staying bronze. The bronze is actually bronze, right? And that act, or by it's actually bronze, is not its motion, is it? Okay? But its motion is the act that comes to it insofar as it's able to be something, right? But it isn't yet. He says it is clear in the contraries, huh? The ability to be healthy and the ability to be sick are other. In some way they've got to be other, right? You've got to be careful about this, huh? Are the ability to be healthy and the ability to be sick, that you seem to have here, right? Are they two abilities in the way in which the ability to walk and the ability to talk are two abilities? Like a negative, to be sick would be a negative as opposed to the ability to walk would be a positive thing. But notice, I can walk and talk at the same time, right? But can I be healthy and sick at the same time? Oh, I see. Okay. See? So if the ability to be sick and the ability to be healthy were really two different abilities in the way the ability to walk and talk are, then I could be healthy and sick at the same time. Why not? Right? But, and this is something you'll point out elsewhere, right? That in a way the ability to be healthy and the ability to be sick is the same what? Ability, right? Okay. Or take a little different example here, right? If you have a piece of clay here, this piece of clay is able to be a sphere and it's able to be a what? Cube. Now, are they two different abilities in the clay? Now, the ability, say, of the clay to be a sphere and the ability of the clay to be, let's say, cold, right? They might very well be different abilities. They would seem to be so, right? So the clay could become, what? A sphere and become cold at the same time even, right? But, can it become a sphere and a cube at the same time? Yet, you can distinguish the ability to be a sphere from the ability to be a cube because a sphere and a cube are not the same what? Thing, right? And so, if the clay was becoming a sphere, right? That would be an act of its ability to be a sphere, not an act of its ability to be a what? Cube, right? Even though it might in some way be the same what? Ability, right? Okay. Or you're becoming healthy, take your word for it, you're becoming healthy is an act of your ability to be healthy, right? It's not an act of your ability to be, what? Sick, right? Okay. So even if they might be the same ability of the thing, in a way, they're not defined in the same way, are they? There's some distinction there. Okay. And so it's all being brought out by the word qua, or as such, right? The ability to be healthy and the ability to be sick in some way or other, but not as other as the ability to walk and talk are, right? For to be sick and to be, for otherwise, right, if they were the same ability and there's no distinction at all, then to be sick and to be healthy would be, what? The same thing, right? But the subject able to be healthy and sick, whether moisture or blood, or whatever it is, is one in the, what? Same, right? Since they are not the same, just as neither color nor visible are the same, it is clear that the act of the able as able is, what? Motion, right? Now, as I say, as a little addition there, and I think it comes out more when Aristotle gives the definition of motion again in the 11th Book of Wisdom, if you're going to separate the act which is motion from every other act, what do you have to understand, maybe, in that third part of the definition? Okay, perfect. Yeah, yeah, that's the act of what is able to be, insofar as it's still able to be, right, insofar as there's an ability there that has not yet been, what, fully actualized, right? Okay, and maybe something else you have to understand in there, what is that? That it's ordered to a further act. Yeah, yeah. Per se. And if it's not, if you're not going to go further, if it's not on the way to something further, right, then it's not motion either, right? Okay? So go back to my, you know, simple example there. I said, I'm out in the hall, I'm actually a man out there, I'm actually a philosopher out there, in case you didn't know. But I'm not actually in the room, right? Okay? But I'm able to be in the room, right? So the one out there who's actually a philosopher, and actually a man, he's what? Able to be in the room, right? Now is this motion of coming into the room, is that the act that he has whereby he's a man? Okay? Or the act whereby he's what? Actually a philosopher? No. It's the act of him insofar as he's what? Able to be in the room, right? Okay? Now, is it a complete act of that ability to be in the room? Is this fully being in the room like I am now? Is that my coming into the room? No. So my ability to be in the room is still what? Not fully actual, it's still there's still an ability there to be what? For the realized, right? Okay? So it's the act of what is able to be, not insofar as it's now actual, because that would be my being in the room, right? But it's the act of my ability to be in the room insofar as I'm still in ability to be in the room. Okay? So that shows it's not, what, pure ability, and it's not pure act, right? It's something in between there, right? Right, huh? Okay? Now, that might seem to be enough to define motion, but then someone says, yeah, but what about the man who stands in the doorway, right? See? His ability to be in the room has been partly actualized, right? Okay? But is standing in the doorway coming into the room? Is standing motion? That'd be a contradiction, right? Well, then you see that it's accidental, the standing in the doorway, that you ever come in more. And one might stand in the doorway, you know, to check, you know, talking about checking everybody now at the airport and so on. I might stand in the doorway just to check people, you know, just to let nobody in who doesn't have the proper credentials, right? Okay? I have no intention of going in further, right? I'm not invited to the party, I'm just there to check everybody who's trying to get into the place, huh? You see the idea? Well, when I'm coming through the doorway, as long as I'm still coming through the doorway, I'm going to be in more, right? Otherwise, I stop coming in. So, it's an act of disability on the way to a further act of disability, huh? So maybe you have to understand all three of those things, finally, in the last, what, part of the definition, huh? So does the able-to-be include lack? No. In some sense, you'd have to say it, yeah. But A was more than one meaning, too. Yeah, that's what I was wondering. So in the definition of motion, there's a difference that it sometimes includes lack, and it's if you're able to be but or not. I see what you're saying, but I want to be careful about that. Okay? And it's certainly an imperfect act, but I don't know if I put lack in there in the definition, so if you're speaking. But certainly involved in it, yeah. Seems like a thing of semantics there. Like, I'm in the room, I'm able to be in the room, or I'm not able to be in the room. Yeah. Because I am in the room, so I can't be able to be in the room. That's what I've learned from how you're going to use the language there. Yeah. But I think what he's saying there is that it's not the act of what is actually in the room. Okay? It's not the act of the actual. Okay? Because that's more what we call form or something of that sort. But not motion, huh? That's form or being, if you wish. The act of the actual. Okay? Could you define motion by first defining coming to be? That's not necessarily involving motion, that is, I'm able to be it, no, I'm actually it. But there wasn't necessarily emotion there. But, so the emotion would be the act of what is able to be, insofar as it's still able to be. I mean, able to be, I mean, able to become, sorry, it's what is able to come to be. You're talking about, you're talking about coming that's, that's, uh, between contradictories, you mean, or something, or what? Well, coming to be, um, isn't necessarily motion. Yeah, yeah. So then the motion would be the act of what is able to come to be, insofar as it's still able to come to be. I don't know if I get you exactly. That it's able, um, so the, the, if the coming to be, um. I mean, what you're saying here, I think, is, is there a becoming that's not all, that's all at once? Is that what you mean, or what? Talking about that kind of becoming? Yeah, if there's a becoming that's all at once. Yeah. There'll be something different than this, it seems, right? What he's defining here. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. It won't. Yeah. Okay. Well, let's wait on that, you know? That's more difficult. That's a place. Okay. Now, um, we're going to go from here to, to time, but maybe we should stop and just say a few things about place, right? Okay. Now, what he, what he does, of course, in the second part of book three, uh, is to talk about the infinite. But really, the consideration he has of the infinite in book three is more fully made in the, uh, next books on the universe, the deceleron mundo, as they call it in Latin. And then, uh, but the kind of infinity that you have in every motion, um, is really taken up in the, what, sixth book, which we're going to look at later on. Okay. Okay. But now in the fourth book, he takes up place first, right? And then time, right? And we're not going to be looking at place, at least this time around. Uh, motion or time is more important for our purposes, but not to leave you an entirely ignorant of place, huh? Uh, let's just say a few things about place, right? And, uh, who would lead us to distinguish between the place of a body and the body itself? Who would lead us to distinguish between those two? When we see the body, one body leave that place, another body come into the same place. Yeah, if there's no locomotion, no change of place, you probably would not distinguish between place and, what, the body and the place, right? Okay. Now, what is this place, huh? The bodies are in, but this place is not the body itself. What is this place, huh? Let's not look at all the possibilities, right? Take the more common possibilities, huh? A lot of people identify place with some dimensions, right? Okay. And, uh, this is a very common thing in modern science. They tend to use the word space instead of place, right? But they think of place as being the dimensions, huh? That a body occupies, right? Dimensions that the body occupies. And these dimensions more or less equal to the body, right, huh? Okay. Is that what you think place is, or what? Do you think it's what place is, is the dimensions that, what are you going to say? Well, it's like another meaning, a location. Yeah, well, location means, like, number for place, isn't it, huh? Yeah. Yeah, yeah, locus is the word for place, so you see, location sometimes, right, for place. But what is this, this place, this location, what is it? Is it the dimensions that you occupy? Okay, that's the interrogatory, right? Am I, right? But in a sense, uh, to be aware is not so much place as what? To be in place, right? Okay. Where am I? I am in this room, right? I am in Piddushim, right? So, is this what place is, the dimensions that my body occupy, huh? I mentioned it so I'll stay there when I go away. Is that what place is? I think a lot of people think of it as being that, don't they? Probably the most common thing, you know? Would that then restrict it such that, like what Father Anthony said, if the thing that's in that place moves, and if that space was that same dimension, then something else can only be in that place if it fills that same dimension. Okay. So you couldn't really say something of a smaller size is in the same place. Well, okay, maybe the part of the place, right? Something else would come in there and occupy some of those dimensions, right? Right. But that would suggest that there wasn't any place before the body was there. Well, you're saying that these dimensions that the body occupies are something other than the dimensions of the body itself, right? Because you're making a distinction due to the fact of change in place, right? The fact that one body is where another body was earlier, right? As a sign that where the early body was was not the same as that body, right? Okay. Okay? So, um... So, um... So, um... So, um... So, um... So, um... You've got the dimensions of the body and the dimensions of the place, presumably, right? Okay. Okay? Is that what people think place is? More like, not the volume of it or the dimension of it, but just without the height, you know, more like the length and the width, you know, an x-y coordinate, of course, I don't want to do that. See, if I'm thinking of too much room, you know, isn't that my dimensions, right, or filling too much of the available place or space? This is the way we're kind of accustomed to think of it from Newton, you know, people like that, right? Okay. Of course, people think of space as kind of going every direction, kind of in space, right, and you can be located here or there in this dimensional thing. Well, a couple of things that makes one wonder about this a little bit. And one is, what are those dimensions, right, you know? Is there something there, going back to the idea of the update, is there something there that has length and width and depth apart from the bodies? And sometimes we define a body as something, you know, that has length and width and depth, right? So if place has length and width and depth, huh? Is it in a body? Is it in a body, right? Right. Two bodies here together, right? What do you say? Okay. One is in the same space. Yeah. But one is supposed to be in space, right? Right. But they're kind of interpenetrating each other, right? Right. You know, okay? But no, that's one thing. Now, what are those dimensions, huh? We saw before, I think, when we read Empedocles, right, that he denies the existence of the empty, right? And the empty is nothing, really. Unless you say there's something there, and then it's not empty. Okay? And how can you say, if you say there's something there that has length and width and depth, then you've got another body there, a very fine and subtle body, but a very much a body, huh? If you have nothing there that has length and width and depth, how can nothing have length and width and depth, right? So, there's something, you know, something questionable about those dimensions, huh? Being something real, huh? Okay? But another thing, even if you take them as being real, which has difficulties, why say that the body is in the place rather than the place is in the body? I mean, they're kind of, what, simultaneous, interpenetrating each other, right? Why is one, why would one be said to be in the other more than the reverse, right? Well, don't we a lot of times think of places really like a location of another body? So, for instance, we think of the earth here. Yeah. There on the road, there's a place out there. By the road, well, it's this place that's really on a body, you know, which is the earth, which is something else, that particular volume of the filled body. Okay, the parking lot there, I've got a place here in my car, right? Mm-hmm. And it's got to be big enough for my car, right? Mm-hmm. So, isn't the place that my car occupies there, isn't that in a way equal to my car? But now, if that's so, if you see the dimensions of the place, someone was saying, you know, well, they're in the same place, they don't have a place to put the two in, right? But there, that thought is because you're kind of seeing them as kind of equal, right? Mm-hmm. Why is, why would you say that one is in the other, rather than they interpenetrate each other or something like that, sorry? Well, the body moves out of the place, it leaves it, but the place doesn't really leave the body. Okay, okay. But again, is that a good reason for saying that, one is in the other? We take the first theorem of Euclid there, you know, where you have a straight line and you have a circle, right? And you do another circle and then you know how it goes, right? Mm-hmm. And, um, now these, part of this circle and part of this circle, they, what, coincide, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. Now, would you say that this circle is inside of that circle? Or would you say that this circle here is inside of that one? It would seem to be arbitrary to say one is in the other, you know? Mm-hmm. Okay. Even if I imagine that one of these circles, you've actually been pulled away, right? Mm-hmm. So, yeah. And why couldn't, you know, if there's something here with lengthened with the jet pipe, why couldn't, you know, move it around too, right? So, the place would have to be just a little bit bigger than the body. It's not that the body's inside. So, the place and body really, they coincide. No. So, why say really that one is in the other, right? That's just the way of speaking there. Well, yeah, because the first meaning of in, is in the place. So, Aristotle doesn't think that this is what place is, right? But I'll just give you a little bit of the, you know, question marks about this, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. He thinks place is more like a jar or a vase, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. And the, what? Inner dimensions of the vase, right? Yeah. Okay. Mm-hmm. So, in this glass here, right, huh? You fill this up to the top here with water, right? And you pour the water out and fill it up with wine or beer or milk or something else, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. And, um, so I was thinking of places not being the dimensions inside the glass, right? But the inner surface of the glass, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. Which is together with the outer surface of the liquid that is in there, right? Mm-hmm. Now, it makes sense to speak of the water as being in the glass rather than the glass in the, what? Water, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. And you see the water is contained by the, what? Inner surface of the glass, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. And there's all, you know, we add other things to that, right, huh? But that's the beginning to see what place is, huh? Rather than it's these, what, dimensions that, what, coincide, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Because then you have a problem with what are those dimensions, right? Is there really something there that's length, width, and depth? If there is, then you have a body there, don't you? A refined cell of the body may be. If there's nothing there that is length, width, and depth, how can you have length, width, and depth there, right? So how do you make a distinction here, right? Right. Between the dimension, a real distinction between the dimensions of the body and the dimensions of the so-called, what, place, right? Mm-hmm. But here I can make a distinction, a real distinction, because I can say the outer surface of the water in here and the inner surface of the glass, although they're together, they're not the same surface, really. And place is not the outer surface of the water that's contained in that, right? But the inner surface of the, what? Containing. Containing body, yeah. Yeah. That makes more sense with our original. confused insight that bodies are in place, right? Not that they are with place, but they are in place, right? Aristotle will go on and add things because he'll say, you have to consider that inner surface in order to the whole universe in some way, huh? Because, take this time as an example, if you've got, let's say, a river that's flowing along here, right? And we've got a post here in the river, right? Well, the water that's flowing around the post, as Hercules said, is always different water, right? So, the surface containing the inner surface of the water containing the post, right? Is always a surface of different water, right? You don't want to say that the post here is changing its place, literally. No. But whatever that inner surface whatever water that is the inner surface of, it has the same, what, relation to the shores, right? Okay? So, there's something in that way immobile, unchangeable about the inner surface. Not that it's always the same body, right? That is containing that post that's at rest there. But, the inner surface of the body, containing it, always has the same order to the bank, and maybe to a larger picture, right? So, it's a little bit on place there for you. Okay? If you took the dimension theory, would you end up saying that its place really doesn't exist? It's probably something in your mind. Dimensions, you mean? Yeah. Yeah, in a way. This is what Kant does eventually, right? And Einstein eventually rejects this space of Newton, right? It's a figment of his imagination. But, I mean, it's something that imagination so easily gets into, right? It's kind of funny, you know, an assumption there. I have a philosophy of nature course, which we always had. But, one time I tried to have a second philosophy of nature course where you could do some of these later books, you know? And, uh, that's why I submitted the course and so on and got approved. And, the name of the course was Motion, Place, Time, see? Right. And, it came out on the Scheduled Courses, Space, Time, Motion. But, somebody just did it without thinking, you know? They just, you know? Things like a modern, right? But, kind of your imagination there is apt to go in that way, huh? Now, Aristotle, you know, takes very seriously that word in, huh? It's a very important word, the word in, or the phrase to be in, right? And, he distinguishes, in the Tweet of Sun Place, eight different senses of the word in, or to be in, huh? But, he doesn't order the eight senses, huh? Okay? And, Thomas Aquinas, in his exposition there, the fourth book, he says, well, we're going to see the order of these meanings now in the way that Aristotle sees the order of the meanings of the beginning, let's say, in this book of Wisdom, right? Okay? Now, this doesn't mean that Aristotle, undoubtedly, knew the order of these meanings, but he doesn't happen to give it there, right? That we have. So, Thomas figures out, thinks out the order of the eight meanings in the same way that Aristotle thinks out the order of the meanings of beginning, or the meanings of the word end or limit in the fifth book, huh? Now, this is one of those words where we name something that can be sensed, and then we carry it over to things that are less sensed, or can't be sensed at all, but by a certain, what? Likeness, huh? Okay? Like this kind of ratio. And so, Thomas is going to start with the meaning that is most obvious to our senses and our experience, huh? And then he's going to order all the meanings going forward from that. The one that is most like the first meaning, and then gradually move away from it, huh? Okay? Now, meaning that is most clear to our senses is the one we'd be concerned with, huh? In place, right? Now, this is the very first meaning of in. In, like for example, you and I are in the room, right? Okay? But more strictly speaking, we're in a particular part of the room, right? Okay? That's what is easiest for the senses to get at, right? Okay? My water is in my glass, right? Okay? Now, the second sense he gives is that of an ordinary part is in a hole. My teeth are in my mouth. That's it, right? Okay? Part in the hole. This is very much like the first sense. And if you were to hit me in the mouth and loosen my teeth so I could take them in and out, my teeth would be in my mouth as what? In a place. In a place. And no longer as a part in a hole, right? If I could take my little saw here and cut a hole here, right here in the middle of your table, and that piece I could take up and then put back in again, right? Like a little chai, you know, and my grandfather now was a father too. You know, there's all these things. We put the thing in the square peg in the square hole and the round thing, right? But they're in there as in a place, right? Okay? So if you just cut this out, then you can take it in and what? Take it out, right? And it's in there as in a what? Place, right? Okay? So someone's got false teeth. Their teeth are in their mouth as a what? Place. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Of course, the stuff, they get some, you know, he's advertising on TV, so they're supposed to glue it down so you could eat an apple or something. My dentist always told me, you know, you want to save your natural teeth, right? You know, keep them in good condition. You know, you want to, you never quite get these false teeth to work properly. But they're trying to, in a sense, get back to what? The second sentence, right? Yeah. By something that kind of attaches it, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? And so, you know, sometimes you hear about these dental surgeries where they're going to implant a tooth in your mouth, right? Oh. They do that now, right? Yeah. And then the thing really grows and you've got what? It's really a part of your mouth now, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? And you know these things like, you know, heart transplants and liver transplants and all these other transplants, right? Of course, the body, you know, usually tries to reject these things because they're an alien, right? But somebody can overcome that to some extent. So, you can see how close this, what, second sense is to the, what, first sense, right? Mm-hmm. Because once the part is no longer attached to the whole of which is a part, it seems to be in there simply as in a, what, place, right? Yeah. Do you see that? Yeah. Now, the third meaning that he gives, huh? Kind of strikingly does, huh? Because it's something really in the mind, huh? The sense in which a genus is in the, what? Species. Species, huh? Mm-hmm. And in general, a part of a definition is what? In the definition, right? Part of definition in the big definition. Now notice, the definition is a whole, right? It's composed of the genus and the, what, differences, right? So the definition, let's say, is square as an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral, right? It's a whole composed of those three parts, right? And so we could say...