Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 56: Defining Motion: Aristotle's Definition and Modern Errors

Transcript
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Therefore, we must know clearly and distinctly what motion is, right? It doesn't follow, right? The fact that we're sure about motion might, if anything, be a sign that maybe we don't know too clearly what it is. Like we're sure we're alive, right? But exactly what life is is not too easy to say. Now, as you say, Descartes is often called the father of modern philosophy, and he's the first of the philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries who are called the rationalists, right? And he's followed by Spinoza as a rationalist, and then by Leibniz, right? But they all have a mathematical bent, the rationalists. They're rationalists in the sense of mathematics, huh? A science that to some extent is independent even of experience, right? Now then you have, on the other side, in the 17th and 18th century, the philosophers that they call, not rationalists, but empiricists, right? And they're mainly the British philosophers. And usually they start with Bacon, right, who's almost a contemporary Shakespeare, right? But who's a propagandist for experimental science, right? Knowledge is power, right? And then later on you have Locke and Bach and Hume, right? And finding Mill, right, huh? Okay. And they're called empiricists, but from the, what, Greek word for experience, huh? And they're men who have not so much trust in reason, right? But want to get experience more, right? Okay. And then, you know, starting with Kant and going on from Kant all the way to Einstein, right, huh? That kind of sets the parameters of their discussion, right? You know, Einstein said, the whole question is, what is the role of experience and what is the role of reason, you know? There's some combination of the two, right? In science, they're trying to understand, you know, the relative role of the two, right? But those first ones, there seems to be a little bit of one-sidedness, right? Okay. An emphasis upon what reason can accomplish even independent experience, huh? Which you see. And then a kind of dependence upon experience to the point of almost distrusting reason, right? A bit, huh? Of course, there's a reason to distrust reason a bit. But experience is not enough, right? Sometimes they think, you know, that they can exaggerate it to the extent, even experimental science, to which experience could give rise, you know, to experimental science. You just make it more and more experience than the top of science. It isn't a different way at all. But anyway. Now, one of the famous empiricists, of course, is John Locke, right? Who has some disagreements with Descartes, which we won't go into now. But Locke also rejects the idea of a definition of motion. And he gives more of a reason, maybe, than Descartes, because he divides our ideas into simple ideas and composed ideas. And the composed ideas can be, what? Defined, right? By their parts. But the simple ideas cannot be defined. And motion is a simple idea. Therefore, there can be no definition of motion, right, huh? Okay. Now, a more general statement relies the thinking of Descartes, perhaps, and John Locke. A statement that is by no means original to them, right? And that is that not everything can and not everything should be known by definition. Sorry, I'm sorry to send that. I say there's a statement underlying, to some extent, the thinking of both Descartes and of Locke. But a statement that is by no means original to them, right? A statement which Aristotle made before them, that not everything can be defined, right? And not everything should be defined, right? That there are some things that are known without definition. Okay? And if there wasn't something known without definition, you couldn't define it all. And Aristotle, of course, sees that even more clearly than Descartes or Locke, right? And it's similar to what we have with statements, huh? Reasoning, if you recall the definition of reasoning, reasoning is coming to know or guess a statement through other statements, right? And if you come to know, in the sixth sense, a statement through other statements, those other statements have to be, what? Known already. Okay? Now, if every statement was known through other statements, if every statement was in need of being known through other statements, would you ever know any statements? This would go on, what? Forever, right, huh? In fact, you couldn't begin to know any statements, because the statements you used to prove any statement, some would say, well, prove those before you used those, and then prove the ones that you used to prove those. See, you couldn't begin it all, right? So, unless there are some statements known without proof by other statements, right, no statements would be known. And, of course, there are some statements known, we say, through themselves, meaning not through others, right? So, if you understand what an odd number is and what an even number is, huh, it's obvious that no odd number is even, right? If you understand what a whole is and what a part is, it's clear that a whole is more than one of its parts, right? And so, it's those statements that are known, right, without having to be proven by the statements, that are the beginning of all of our knowledge of statements, huh? And so, in a way, the problem of knowing, in the strict sense now, knowing the truth of statements depends upon what? So, working your way back to those beginning statements, and then building your way up from them, right? Okay? So, if you prove something by syllogism from them, you can use that to prove something else, maybe, right? And you see this marvelous thing the way you have in geometry, right, huh? Where you start off with statements that are known without having to be proven, and through them, you syllogize other ones, and you keep on going, and I don't think Euclid could ever have to stop. And I sometimes take his statements that he's shown and show something he hasn't shown, you know, but nothing too profound to report to you. Okay? But, the same thing could be said about definitions, right? If every part of every definition, like part of the definition here of motion, I mean of nature, right, motion, if it was in need of being defined, or needed to be defined, and no part of any definition was known without being defined, would you ever be able to define anything? No. This would go on, what, forever, right? And it's really the same argument, basically, for definitions, as we had for what? Statements, right? And sometimes I give a third thing that's like that, that's maybe easier to see for some people, but it's a similar principle. If I run across a word that I don't know the meaning of, I go to the dictionary, maybe, and look up the word, right? But they explain that word by other words. And if I don't know what one of those words mean, right? They have to go and explain that word, right? I looked it up in the dictionary. But that's going to be explained by the words, right? Okay. Now, can all words be known in that way, through other words? No, because that would go on forever. One thing, right? There would always be another word you have to look up before you know the meaning of any words. But furthermore, you couldn't even begin to know words because you come into this world not knowing any words. So, if you have to learn all words by other words, you couldn't begin to learn any words. So how do you learn the first words, huh? Not through other words, huh? You learn the first word by associating something that you sense, right? The sound with something that you sense, huh? I used to have a tape of my firstborn there, Paul, there in the high chair, you know, trying to teach him the word cookie. And his attempt to pronounce the word cookie is making a big deal about it. I don't know if the tape is lost now. I don't know where it is. But they say that's the way to learn a foreign language, huh? You know, to not associate the foreign word with your English word or your native word, but with the object directly, huh? And I know myself, you know, some of these prayers I know of Thomas is like the auto-rotative ote in Latin, right? And sometimes, you know, like you'll say, visus, taktus, kustus, in te valitura, right? Instead of thinking of, what, sight and touch and taste and so on, you know, I think of visus, you know. I don't see him there. Taktus, you know, I can't feel him there, right? Kustus, I can't taste him there, right? But I think of my senses rather than think of the, what, English word, you know. But that would be the way to learn a sense of foreign language, huh? So, but you see the similar principle there, right? Not every word can be known by the words. But after you know some words, then you can use those to know other words, right? So the same principle, in a way, is with definitions, okay? Now, as Thomas said about the Latin Averroes, he says, they speak as if wisdom began with them. And Descartes and Locke, you know, speak as if, right? They saw that not everything can be defined, right? And this old fuddy-duddy Aristotle hadn't seen that. They speak as if, right? Because, to my knowledge, they never recall the fact that Aristotle had said this before them, okay? Now, the question is, where does the buck stop, as the old saying goes, right? You know? What is that thing or things that you know without, what, definition, right? And that's a different question than saying, in admitting that there has to be something somewhere known without definition, right? Now, Aristotle, in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, when he talks about act and ability, he says, act cannot be defined. And we shouldn't try to know everything by definition, okay? But he's going to use act and ability to define, what? Motion, right? Now, it's a sign, you know, of how the moderns, you know, didn't read the Greeks, right? Very carefully. That they don't recall the general thing that they agree with in Aristotle, right? That Aristotle always said before them, right? That it must stop somewhere, right? There must be something known without that. But they don't recall in particular what Aristotle said was where it stopped. You know, either dishonest or they don't know that. So there's a defect there of one or both, huh? One of those things, at least. It's pretty common, huh? Warren Murray used to joke about, you know, all these statements made about the ancients, you know, by the modern scientific mentality. And they have all these hypotheses about what the Greeks said. But they never test their hypotheses by going back and reading them, right? It's kind of funny, right? I mean, they insist upon the experimental method and they accuse Aristotle or something of not, you know, having, you know, learned this method and not having appreciated it sufficiently or something, you know? But then they make all kinds of, you know, statements about what the ancients actually said or thought, right? And don't go back to verify the hypotheses in the text, right? But anyway, it's... Okay? Now, in talking about something simple, too, if something is simple, in motion, not so simple, it's divisible forever, maybe, as he ended at here, right? But even if something is simple and has no parts, does that mean you can't in some way define it, huh? When I define a Shakespearean sonnet, you know, I say it's a likeness of thought and feeling, right? In 14 lines of iambic metameter, divided into three quatrains with alternate rhyming and completed by rhyming couplet. Okay? But in a way, defining it in a way, partly through its parts, right? Okay? Or we say water is H2O. That's not that good definition, but something, you know? But it's got parts, right? Well, if something had no parts, could you define it? It might seem at first sight, no, right? But what about the point, for example, in geometry, huh? Well, maybe the point has no parts, so you can't define it through its parts, right? Does that mean there's no multiplicity that could serve for speech rather than just a name? The definition is always a speech. It's never one name, right? And it's more distinct than one name, huh? And so it seems you have to have some multiplicity to have a definition, right? And if the thing is simple, like the point, and it has no parts, then where's the multiplicity that could serve as a basis for what? The parts of the definition, right? Well, there's something to be said for that, right? But maybe the point is something of another thing. Just like health is something of a what? Another thing, right? I mean, health is not something that exists by itself, is it? Health is something of the body, right? And so if you wanted to say what health is without trying to be too profound, you might say health is the good condition of the body or something of that sort, right? Because it's something of another, you can say what it is of this other, right? And then you have a multiplicity, right? Okay? Not because the body is a part of health, but because health is something of the body, right? Do you see that? Okay? Now, suppose I say that a point is the end, or limit be the one, of a line. Well, a line is not a part of a point, right? And it's not a point, right? But it can be used to make know what a point is, because maybe the point really is something of a what? Of a line, right? Okay? So actually, to our senses, what's most clear is bodies, right? And then we speak of a surface as being the end of a body, right? And then we speak of a line as being the end of a surface. And then the point as being the end of a line, right? Okay? So there may be a multiplicity that will serve for a speech, right? This is a name, right? No part of it signifies a name by itself, right? This is a speech, right? That makes, that signifies more distinctly. Thank you. What a point is, then the name or word point can signify, right? Okay? And why do I say all that, huh? Well, first of all, as I hinted there, maybe motion is not as simple as they think it is, right? Okay? But maybe the parts of motion aren't too useful in defining motion, nevertheless, because a part of motion is motion. Right? Okay? Just like you're saying part of a line, well, it's a line. It can't define a thing to itself, right? You know, so I mean, you know, so though a motion is not really a simple thing, it has parts, right? Maybe those parts aren't too useful in defining it, right? Okay? Now, sometimes a mathematician tries to get around this and say, what, a line is composed of an infinity of points? Now, of course, sitting aside the problem, we're going to have to know what a point is to a line, but if a line were composed of points, right, then maybe you could make known what the line is by saying it's composed of points, or infinity points, right? As a matter of fact, it isn't composed of points, as we showed earlier in the course, and we'll see again when you get to book six, right, the book on the continuous, right? Okay, now what's this got to do with motion, right? Well, even if motion doesn't have parts, or even if the parts that it has don't enable you to define it, right? Because the parts of motion are like the parts of a line on the same thing, basically, right? Okay, so it's a short motion. But, is motion like the point there, or like hell? Is motion something that exists by itself, or is it something of another? Something of another. In other words, you go bowling, which I don't do, but I mean, you go bowling, is it rolling that goes rolling down the lane? You go for a walk, is it walking that walks? When something falls to the ground, is it falling that falls? It's always something other than the motion that is in motion, right? It's not the falling that is falling, it's a stone that's falling, isn't it? It's not walking that goes for a walk, it's the cat that went for a walk, but the man went for a walk, right? It's not growing that grows, right? It's the dog or the tree or something that grows, right? The man. So motion is never the thing in motion, is it? So, motion is always the motion of something, right? Something other than itself, right? Just like health is always, what, a condition of something other than itself, right? Okay? So motion is something of another, there you have a multiplicity, right, that could serve as the basis for a speech to be more distinct than just the name. You could say, what is it of another, right? You see? Okay? So when locks is the simple idea, what does that mean, huh? Does it mean it has no parts? Well, motion does have parts, right? So you have to go back and say, well, it doesn't do you any good to look at those parts to define it. That may be true, but it doesn't even see that, right? It has parts. But there's another multiplicity besides having parts, right? And that is to be something of a, what? Of another, right? Okay? You could stop and consider that, right? Okay? But now there's a difficulty in, maybe in defining motion, nevertheless, in that way, right? Because what are you going to say motion is of, huh? It's something of the thing in motion? Well, you can't actually say that, because the thing in motion, that phrase, includes motion, right? And you'd be defining motion by what? By itself, yeah. Okay? Now, you could avoid the obvious use of the same word by saying motion is something of the movable. In fact, it's the act of the movable, right? The movable is able to be in motion, but it's not always so, right? So motion is the act of the movable, right? And someone might say, what do you mean by movable? So what's able to be in motion? So you're actually defining it by itself, right? And Aristotle, you know, this is part of dialectic, right? One of the places in dialectic there is to examine the definition to see if you're trying to define the thing by itself, right? And Aristotle says, well, in some cases, you know, he's very clear to do this because he's using the same word, right? But in other cases, it's hidden until you define what that part means, huh? Aristotle's example is very simple, huh? The sun is a star that appears by day. Or the sun is a star that can be seen during the day. You say, well, what do you mean by day? Well, the sun is the definition of day, so you're really defining sun here by itself, right? The sun is a part of the definition of day, which is now being put in the definition of this. So if I say that motion is the act of the movable, right? Some might say, well, what is movable? What is able to be moved? Or what is able to be in motion, actually? We need defining motion by itself, huh? Okay? So the mere fact that motion is something of another means, doesn't mean that there's some problem there in still trying to define it, right? Okay? Now, what is Aristotle going to try to define motion by? Well, he's going to use act, huh? His definition of motion, right? Because motion is an act, huh? Even though it's not a definition to say motion is the act of the movable. It's a true statement, right? Okay? But it's circular, right? But it's still true, right? Okay? So, he's going to make use of act and ability, or the able, to define motion, right? Now, is there some reason to think that that might be the way to approach the definition of motion, to act and ability, huh? Well, as I say, there must be some truth. You say motion is the act of the movable, right? Even though that's obviously circular, right? But you are bringing in, that's a true statement. And so, when you say act, you've got what? The word act, obviously. When you say movable, you've got the word able, haven't you? So, it's a true statement, but it's circular, right? Okay? But it hints that maybe act and ability have something to do with this, right? Okay? Now, let's take something else. When I'm standing out in that hall, am I actually in this room? But when I'm standing out in that hall, am I able to be in this room? Yeah. Okay? And now I'm actually in this room, right? Now, how did I get from being able to be in this room, but not actually in this room, to actually being in this room? Motion. Motion, yeah. Yeah. Okay? And I'm 5'10 officially, I guess. And at one time in my life, I was, what? Not actually 5'10, I was, you know, a grasshopper, right? But I was able to be 5'10, right? But now, I'm actually 5'10, huh? How did I get from ability to act? Growing, which is another kind of, you know, motion here, we said, is being used in a broader sense. So, I'm preaching. Okay. right okay and i make tea in the morning and i put water on the stove the water is cold but it's able to be what hot in fact boiling right and but i don't deport until it's actually hot now how's it get from what the ability to be hot to being actually hot some kind of change going on here right okay so motion or change seems to be sort of in between ability and act right or going between ability and act so without saying that you have a definition there you can say well um you're going uh from ability to act to motion right so motion ability and act clearly has something to do with motion don't they okay so we're trying to see if there's a way to define into this okay now let's go back to the example i first started with here coming into the room right huh okay i'm gonna make two statements about this right okay say coming into the room is the act of what is able to come into the room coming into the room is the act of what is able to come into the room true or false that statement it seems true yeah yeah okay my ability to come into the room right is actualized when i'm coming into the room right okay so this statement here is true but now is that a definition of coming into the room can you define something by itself they call it circular defining right okay just like circular reasoning right if you use a statement to prove itself you don't have any proof really huh okay so the statement is true but what circular right okay but now since by coming in the room is we actually got into the room right let's make another statement here and say coming into the room is the act of what is able to be in the room is this still circular am i defining coming into the room by coming into the room or am i defining it by something else yeah it seems to be something else yeah i'm defining it by the ability by by being in the room right by the end yeah yeah okay so you can say about this here is that it's not circular but is it true no see some might say well the act of what is able to be in the room is being in the room right so you might say this statement is what false okay see oh in other words you know we see a part of the truth before we see the whole truth right and we're looking for a speech that is both truly said of motion right otherwise it can't be the definition of motion right and a speech that is not circular that does not contain the very thing i'm defining in it right well this has one of the criteria the speech is true right the speech is true right truly said of motion but it not it's circular this here is not circular so avoid that but it's false i need something that is both true and what not circular right okay now sometimes people will try to define motion in this way they'll say it's a going from ability to act right okay but does that avoid really circularity to say it's a going from ability to act yeah yeah so you seem to be defining motion still by itself right now okay so it's not easy to define motion right now but now on second thought right when i'm coming into the room am i not partly in the room when i'm coming through the doorway you know and you know coming through the doorway here right i tell you the room i'm partly in the room aren't i right see so that my ability to be in the room in the room is partly actualized right in my coming into the room right so when i say coming into the room is the act or the actualization or the actuality of my ability to be in the room that's not entirely false is it because when i'm coming into the room i'm partly in the room right so my coming into the room is in fact to some extent imperfectly and completely an act of my ability to be in the room you see okay now um as opposed to being fully in the room like i am now you see so if i added here something like coming in the room is the imperfect act of what is able to be in the room right as opposed to being fully in the room right that would seem to be what true right okay right okay just like when i'm filling up my my glass right the ability of the glass to be full is not fully realized right but it's partially being realized right okay but now suppose i stop in the doorway like and i'm stopped now right am i coming into the room now i'm standing in the doorway right checking people's ids or something okay now when i'm standing in the doorway like i am now i'm partly in the room aren't i but i'm not coming into the room am i so to say that coming in the room is to be partly in the room is true right but standing in the doorway at the salesman with this thing through the door which i don't have any further right um it's also partly being in the room but that's not motion is it see so i have to separate coming in the room both from fully being in the room and from standing in the doorway right okay is it too late now go on i got mass yeah okay that's fine that's fine okay so how do you do that i'm sorry doctor could you repeat the question how do you what yeah yeah yeah you say um when i'm coming into the room right i'm partly in the room right right okay but when i'm standing in the doorway i'm also parking the room right so i have to separate coming into the room both from fully being in the room which imperfect or something like that does right right That doesn't separate it from standing in the doorway, right? See, that's also imperfect. Yeah, active ability to be in the room, right? See? Okay. So, what's the difference between standing in the doorway and coming through the doorway, right? Well, now you again see the importance of the distinction between the as-such, right, and the by-happening or the accidental, right? See? It's accidental through standing in the doorway that you ever come further in, right? You may or you may never come in further, right? But so long as I'm coming into the room, I will be in the room more, right? If I haven't stopped coming into the room, right? So long as I haven't stopped coming into the room, so long as I'm still coming into the room, I will be in the room more, right? Okay? So, Aristotle wants to bring out both of those, right? But likes to kill two birds with one stone, right? Okay? So, he says, motion here is the act of what is able to be insofar it is able to be. Okay? Now, what does that second, that third part of the definition bring out, huh? What brings out, first of all, that's an act of the ability to be that has not been, what? Does not fully actualize it, right? Because it's an act of what is able to be insofar as it's still able to be. Right? Okay? But at the same time, it shows that it's an act on the way to a, what? Further act. Further act, right? Mm-hmm. While standing in the doorway, right, is not, as such, or anything further, right? It's altogether accidental to standing in the doorway that you ever go in further, right? You might stand in the doorway just to check people's IDs, but you don't intend to go in, right? Or you get your foot in the door and then I'm not changing it further, so. Do you see the idea? Or you're working for terrorists there at the doorway or something. Okay? Do you see that? So, this third part of the definition separates the act, which is motion, both from the full act, which is being in the room, right, and from the partial act that is not, what, or do you think further, right? Okay? Now, to take this in another kind of change from change of place, right, let's look at my example of the water there, right, huh? When the water is becoming hot, right, something of the ability of the water to be hot has been, what, actualized, right, okay? But, it's going to be actualized more so long as the water is becoming hot, or still becoming hot, right? As opposed to being warm, right? If I take the thing off the heat, right, it's going to have something of the heat. It's going to be warm, right? But in being warm, it's accidental that you ever go, what? More, right? See? So being warm is a partial act of the ability to be hot, right? But not on the way to any further act. It's accidental to that, right? Like the mother who might warm the baby's milk bottle, right? She doesn't want it to be hot, right? She wants it to be warm, right? And, you know, they're on the wrist, you see if it's the one to burn the baby, right? They want it to be hot, right? See? She wants it to be warm, right? So what's the difference between being warm and becoming hot? Because when one is becoming hot, it already has some warmth, right? It has some of that heat. But it's accidental to being warm than it ever become what? Yeah. Yeah. Any more than it is, right? But so long as you're becoming hot, you have an act that is on the way to further act. That's essential to it, right? Otherwise, you've taken it off and you've stopped the thing. It's the one to motion. See? So this is the way our style defines it, the act of what is able to be as such, insofar as it's able to be, right? But you have to understand at least two things, if not three things, in that third part, right? The two things you're emphasizing is the fact that it's an imperfect or incomplete act of that ability, right? And therefore, it's insofar as it's still able to be, right? And it's on the way to a further act, right? It's ordered to a further act, right? If you take away it's going further, then you stop the motion. Now, it's a little bit like if you define learning, right? If you define learning as the act of the ability to learn, that would be true, but circular, right? If you define learning as the act of the ability to know, you'd avoid the circularity, which would seem to be identifying it with the same thing as knowing, right? But when one is learning, his ability to know is somewhat actualized, huh? But so long as you're learning, you're going to know more. So learning is the act of the ability to know insofar as you're able to know, right? And that able to know means what? Not only that the ability has not been fully actualized, right? But it's going to be actualized more. As opposed to the student who drops out of the course, as I say to the students, right? You may drop a course, and you go away imperfectly knowing something, right? But you're not learning. You see? You see? And if you never, you know, may never go back to that subject, right? So it's not the same thing. As long as you're still in class learning, you're going to know more. But it's accidental to imperfectly knowing something that you ever go back and what? You know? You might intend at some time to go back, and you might not intend to go back, right? But in either case, you know something imperfectly, huh? There are many things that I know imperfectly that I have no intention of going back to. I think they're more important than this, right? You see? By other things, I know imperfectly that I plan, you know, if I live long enough, to go back and study that some more, right? You know? But it's accidental to imperfectly knowing, right? Whether I do or do not intend, let alone do or not go back and go further, right, sometime, right? See? But if I'm not going further, I've stopped learning, right? Once you and Dion used to say, you know, he came down, he used to come down to visit the old students. They didn't find him down to be his way down. They think, you know. He'd say, you know, they all seem to be in the same place where I left them. Except for Kisarik, my teacher. Kisarik was always, what, you know? Kisarik knew more than the last time he saw him, right? You see? So, I mean, you know, some people, you know, they get this certain thing and that's it. They satisfy this imperfect knowing and other people are always, what, learning, right? There's always something to be learned, right? But they're always going to go further, right? Others just kind of, they're satisfied with that. You could teach high school or even college, you know, with what you know already, right? And be a playboy in your spare time or something else. And then you would imperfectly know something but you would be learning, beating yourself. It's okay, Socrates says, right? They accused Socrates of always saying the same things about the same things. He said, well, that's better