Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 22: The Mover and Matter: From Heraclitus to Quantum Theory

Transcript
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Yeah, it makes the water boil, it makes the hot air rise, it changes things, right? Okay, so you have those two opinions that touch upon the mover and Heraclitus. The thing is, before Heraclitus didn't see the mover clearly, didn't speak about it based on the fragments we have. Then you have Empedocles, who introduces love and hate as the movers. Love that brings together, right, the elements, hate separates them. And then finally you have Anaxagoras introducing the, what, greater mind as the mover, huh? So let's look at the first reading here, which is taken from Heisenberg's, actually from his Gifford Lectures, huh? But they printed it with the title Physics and Philosophy, but it's the Gifford Lectures he gave. And he has one lecture there where he talks about the early Greeks, an interesting one. And he says, in the philosophy of Heraclitus, fire as a basic element is both matter and a moving force. That's interesting that he sees that. And we saw that there's a little difficulty in combining the two. Because what makes fire a good mover as being so hot makes it, in some ways, a bad guess as the first matter, because you're limiting the matter to the one quality. And therefore it makes some sense to separate the mover from the matter, as Empedocles begins to do, right? Where earth, air, fire, and water are more the matter, and love and hate, the movers, huh? Although sometimes he has love and hate get mixed up with them, too. But then you get the Anaxagoras, and they're very separated, right? The greater mind, huh? And matter, huh? Okay. I know that Heisenberg goes on to say, we may remark at this point that modern physics is in some way extremely near to the doctrines of Heraclitus. If we replace the word fire by the word energy, and there's somewhat similar things, we can almost repeat a statement word for word from a modern point of view. It's a very striking thing, huh? Energy is, in fact, the substance of which all elementary particles, all atoms, and therefore all things are made. So with Einstein's equation, E equals mc squared, right, huh? You can get mass out of what? Energy, right? So energy is like the matter. But it's also, energy is what enables you to do something, right? And therefore it seems to be like the mover. And energy is that which moves, huh? Energy is a substance, since its total amount does not change. And the elementary particles can actually be made from this substance, as it seems to be in experiments on the creation of elementary particles. And notice, in these high energy experiments, when the particles collide, sometimes you get particles with more mass than the original ones. Where does that greater mass or matter come from? From the energy with which they, what, collided, huh? So energy seems to be the matter out of which things are made, huh? Energy can be changed into motion, to heat, into light, into tension. Energy may be called the fundamental cause for all to change the world, huh? So you find the ad that you can say, energy is the beginning of all things, huh? That's what the physicist is saying, huh? Now, I think you've got to be careful in that comparison, because the energy of the modern physicist is much more, what, the abstract thing than the fire of air tires. And secondly, the energy of the mathematical physicist appears in the universal equations of modern science. An equation is something mathematical and abstract. But you see that comparison I make sometimes to the logic and to the, even the form of syllogism. Just take the form of syllogism. Now, sometimes Aristotle says that the premises are, to the conclusion, as the matter. Now, why does he say that? Well, if you take matter now in the broad sense, not matter in the very concrete sense, but matter in the broad sense, for any parts out of which something is made, can be said to be its matter. Well, you can say the conclusion is made out of the subject C and the predicate A. And the two parts of the conclusion, the subject and the predicate, are already found in the what? Premises, huh? So, he gives, in the broad sense of matter, but not the strict sense of matter, the premises are the matter of the what? Conclusion. But now, if you look at what, in logic, we call the middle term, B there, that's not a part of the conclusion, is it? But B seems to be the what? Mover. So, it brings together A and C, huh? Okay? I'm going to send you an example there. I know this, one of my former students, that she thought this man and this woman would make a good match, right? So, he arranged a party, which everybody there was a married couple, except for these two. So, they ended up talking to each other. In a week or so, they really didn't get married, and they're married now, and have children, and so on, right? Okay? Is he a part of the marriage? No. No, the parts are just a man and woman, right? But he's the instigator, the mover, the one who arranged to bring them together, huh? But notice, in the syllogism, I can separate more the aspect of which is like matter, and the aspect which is like the, what? Mover or maker. Now, the universal equations of modern science, I don't know if you can separate the aspect of being mover or matter so well, right? But the universal equations are like the premises of the syllogism, insofar as you can, you know, deduce or calculate something from that. But again, you don't really have a matter in a strict sense here. In A. Fort Siori, in mathematics, you don't have a matter in a strict sense. You have neither matter nor motion in mathematics. So you're kind of shadowing those realities. So you've got to be careful not to push the comparison too far here between the abstract equations of the mathematician and the fire of Hercules. Nevertheless, this is a remarkable Heisenberg statement here, isn't it? You know, it's like, you know, that in a very general way, we're saying something like what he said, right? Or he's saying something like what we're saying. And we have that same confusion, right? And that's why the Marxists like to go back to Heraclitus and to this idea of fire as the beginning of all things, because they don't want to separate the matter and the mover. Once you start to separate the matter and the mover, you're going to move away, you end up with an immaterial mover, you're on the way to God, right? And so you've got to go back to the confusion, you see? But the confusion here comes first in our thinking, right? So Heraclitus has not clearly separated the mover and the matter yet, into the mind. And of course, in modern science, mathematics doesn't really contain matter or motion, so it lends itself to the same confusion. Now, the other thing we met in Heisenberg is that war is the father of all things. And war is a struggle of opposites. Now, that's a thought that comes back very much in the moderns. Hegel's dialectical method is that. It takes it over from Heraclitus. And Marx took it over from what? Hegel. But you see it also in Darwin there. Look at the reading from Darwin. All nature is at war, one organism with another or with the external nature. Of course, he's going to see this war as the, what, source of evolution. And that's why Marx dedicated his work to Darwin. In fact, there's an exchange of books and so on, right? Not that Darwin was a Marxist, but there was that similarity of thought. And the second reading here from Darwin. There must be in every case a struggle for existence, either one individual with another or the same species, or with individuals or distinct species, or with the physical conditions of life. And this is behind the, what, origin of things, huh? I quote Lennon for these nice, concise ones. In its proper meaning, dialectics in the Marxist sense, which goes back, of course, to Karl Marx and ultimately to Hegel, right? It's a study of the contradictions and the very essence of things. And in materialism and imperial criticism, development of things from matter, right, is the struggle of opposites, right? War is the father of all things, huh? So you can see a certain similarity between the two positions of Heraclitus on the mover and the moderns, huh? Okay, now the next two readings are in comparison with a little bit of... And perhaps the most clearest one, the one where Einstein, in his sort of history of the main ideas in physics, the book called The Evolution of Physics, he says, The great achievements of mechanics and all its branches, its striking success in the development of astronomy, the application of its ideas to problems apparently different and unmechanical in character. All these things contributed to the belief that it is possible to describe all natural phenomena in terms of simple forces between an ultra-objects. Through the two centuries following Galileo's time, such an endeavor, conscious or unconscious, is apparent in nearly all scientific creation. And there's an interesting quote from Helmholtz, he's a very famous scientist in the middle of the 19th century, and we still reprint his books, right? They're very important. Notice what Helmholtz says. Finally, therefore, we discover the problem of physical material science to be to refer natural phenomena back to unchangeable, what? Instead of saying love and hate, he says, unchangeable, attractive and repulsive forces, right? Whose intensity depends wholly upon distance. The solubility of this problem is the condition of the complete comprehensibility of nature. Well, Einstein says, thank God it isn't. But anyway, it's just limited to that. But it's kind of interesting, right? They try and reduce everything to what? Not love and hate, but something like that. Attraction and repulsion between unalterable particles, huh? But as it's a mathematical thing, right? You know, it diminishes inversely as a square and so on. Notice the one from Newton, and Newton, of course, is so famous that the physicists of the 20th century called the physics of the 17th, 18th, and 19th century, they call it either classical physics, which doesn't mean the Greeks, obviously, classical physics, or Newtonian physics. That's their common way of speaking, huh? Because he's kind of the model for all these things. But he says, I derive from the celestial phenomena the forces of gravity of which bodies tend to the sun and the several planets. Then from these forces by other propositions, which are also mathematical, I deduce the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon, and the sea. I wish I could derive the rest of the phenomena of nature by the same kind of reasoning for mechanical principles. That's what I understand I was talking about, huh? For I am induced by many reasons to suspect that they may all depend upon certain forces by which particles of bodies, by some causes hitherto unknown, are either impelled toward one another and cohere in regular figures, or are repelled and receded from one another, right? That's the same thought that you have when you get down to Himmels, right, in the 19th century, huh? Traction and repulsion. It has no meaning better than Empedocles knows his love and hate. But you have these contrary causes there, huh? To bring things together and separate them. Do you see that? Now, the passage from Einstein, there are several, and you could take many other scientists who do talk about a greater mind besides Einstein, but Einstein's the most famous, huh? In many places he talks about this, huh? It's a very interesting text here. He says, That's a very strong statement, right? Notice he's saying certain, huh? It is, huh? Are you sure about that, huh? Now, why is it akin to religious feeling? Well, because religion says that there's a, what? Greater mind, right? That made the world, right? Okay? And that's why the world is understandable. It's made by an understanding, huh? So he says, when you get doing scientific work of a higher order, you have to be convinced that the world is basically, what? Rational or understandable, huh? Okay? See, that's interesting, huh? Now, he says, This firm belief, a belief bound up with deep feeling, in a superior mind, huh? That reveals itself in the world of experience, represents my conception of God, huh? Now, notice, huh? The likeness here between Einstein and Anaxagoras is that they come to this as a natural philosopher, or a natural scientist, huh? Seeing the intelligibility of the world. So, because Anaxagoras was not a believer in the Greek pagan religions there. We mentioned how he got in trouble for saying the sun was a hot stone when the sun is the god Apollo, right? And, of course, he's before Christ, right? He doesn't have any connection with Christ at all. As far as you know, he's no connection with revelation made to the Jews, huh? So, it's an actual philosopher and not a believer of the religion that might be around that he comes to this, right? The same thing is true about Einstein. Although Einstein is Jewish, you know, of origin, he was not a believing Jew, right? Nor did he become a Christian or anything else, right? So, it's as a natural scientist that he comes to the idea of a greater mind, huh? Okay? And there are many other scientists that could point to that they have that. So, James Jean, the British astrophysicist, speaks of God as a supreme mathematician, right? They say all these different mathematical things, huh? But now, notice the next statement of Einstein, huh? In common parlance, this may be described as pantheistic, huh? He's influenced by Spinoza there, right? But notice, now, pantheism is identifying pan, which is a Greek word for all, with theos, which is a Greek word for God. So, his greater mind, his superior mind, as he calls it here, is mixed up with things, right? Not separated like Anaxagoras. Now, I see this in other places, but he never gives a reason for saying why the greater mind is mixed up with things. Why Anaxagoras gives a very good reason for why the greater mind has to be separated from things. And that's what Anaxagoras is thinking, is more advanced than Einstein's about the greater mind, huh? But we'll come back to that pantheistic rumor. Why does Einstein have that? But the last sentence is like what I was touching upon already. He was not a believing Jew or Christian, like that. Denominational traditions, I can only consider historic and psychologically, they have no other significance for me. He was not a believer, okay? So he comes to it, as I said, as an actual scientist, huh? Now, you see, Einstein doesn't give any reason why he thinks that the greater mind is mixed up with things, right? So I suspect that he's influenced not so much by argument, like Anaxagoras is, but by what? Customer. Okay? Now, you've all read Democracy in America, I assume, huh? Well, as you know, the second volume, the first volume, is dealing more with American institutions, starting from local government, state government, going to the federal government. The second volume is more of a general one. The second government, the second volume, rather, is contrasting democratic customs with aristocratic customs. So it's beautiful. He goes through the influence of this upon the mind and upon morals and upon manners and upon government and so on, right? And in the first book of the second volume, he's talking about the effects upon the arts and the sciences. And he gets to chapter 7 here, and it could be longer, but it's interesting that he sees this. And entitled, What causes democratic nations to incline towards pantheism? And just to give you a few paragraphs in here, I think we can develop more. But me, such a principal author here. It cannot be denied, he says, that pantheism has made great progress in our age. Now, he's in the 19th century, right? The writings of a part of Europe bear visible marks of it. The Germans introduce it into philosophy, and the French into literature. Most of the works of imagination published in France contain some opinions or some tinge caught from pantheistic doctrines, or they disclose some tendency to such doctrines in their authors. This appears to me not to proceed only from an accidental, but from a permanent thought. Now, you know, what he says, about the Germans there, if you read through the Incheidians, the Symbolor, right? We have the official pronouncements of the church, right? Throughout the 19th century, you see, they're always correcting some German professor, you know, a Catholic professor who may be, you know, teaching, you know, in an academy university or at least teaching in a university, but they're correcting him for his, what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. And Kuhn and Rana, right, in the 20th century, they have many statements that sound that sound. Pantheistic, huh? You've seen them, huh? They kind of waver back and forth to have some of these unorthodox and things more pantheistic, you know, and so on. So, you know, the existence of this tendency, right? It's clear. If there is a philosophical system which teaches that all things, material and immaterial, visible and invisible, which the world contains, should be considered only as the several parts of an immense being, who alone remains eternal amidst the continual change and seamless transformation of all that constitutes them, we may readily infer that such a system, although it destroys the individuality of man, or rather because it destroys the individuality, will have secret charms for men living in democracies. It's because of this emphasis upon equality, right? You know, this idea of Heraclitus can seem very, what, aristocratic, you know, and undemocratic. To have, you know, the greater mind, right? God altogether, what? Independent of things, right? He says, all their habits of thought prepare them to conceive it and predispose them to adopt it. It naturally attracts and fixes their imagination. It fosters the pride while it soothes the indolence of their minds. Isn't that a marvelous thing he said? I often, you know, refer to Star Wars, you know, and the force be with you. You know, that, but they've all heard of that or seen that or something, right? And of course, that's a pantheistic notion of God. And after you die, you become a part of the force, and maybe the good side of the force, the bad side of the force. But I mean, this is not the result of any thinking, but it just naturally occurs to the author of those things. Among the different systems by whose aid philosophy endeavors to explain the universe, I believe pantheism to be one of those most fitted to seduce the human mind in democratic times. Against it, all who abide in their attachment to the true greatness of man should combine and struggle. Most fitted to seduce the human mind, and even the mind of Albert Einstein himself. So, in my comparison of Einstein and Anxagoras, I point out that they both come to the idea of a greater mind from the order, the intelligibility in the world. But Anxagoras goes further to see that this greater mind must be separated from things, otherwise it couldn't really rule them out. While Einstein is kind of carried away with the customs of the modern world. And so, in democratic customs, there's nobody that speaks with more understanding of them, and then they talk with him, he sees that, huh? It's very striking, huh? Very striking. But perhaps, you know, experimental science, too, or mathematical physics, and so on, would incline one day of pantheistic notions. Because everything is based upon, what? Equality there, too, huh? The equation, huh? People kind of wonder, huh? When he talks about the love of freedom and the love of equality, he says, for most men, huh, the love of equality is greater than the love of freedom. They'll give up freedom to a very less extent to get more equality, and therefore you have to really fight for freedom, you know. But so, if equality is the dominant thing in democratic customs, it's only the dominant thing in mathematical physics, too. The equation, all things are forever equal, as the next thing was said, huh? You know, that's the basis of this thinking. So, this idea, you know, of a greater mind, it's altogether, what? Distinct from the mess of other things, right? And having all knowledge and all power, it's awfully undemocratic. Well, that's why it seems all to be attending for this communism, too. Yeah. That whole idea of this equality, of course, you can't have that, you know. You're always going to have that separation of power. Yeah. Yeah, where it really becomes distinct at that point. Yeah. Yeah. We heard someone say recently that Tellyard Chardin, whatever his name is here, Tellyard, and I suppose it's probably the ultimate pantheist, you know, said he's just very misunderstood, because people are coming from a Thomistic thing, and they have to understand he's just Augustinian. Okay. Let's look at the last two thinkers here on page 9, Lucippus and, what, Democritus. And these thinkers were spoken of as friends in the sense that they shared common thoughts, anyway, kind of take them together. It's interesting, if you look at the fragments from Democritus, most of the ones that have survived are ethical and political fragments. Even though Aristotle speaks of Democritus as having greater familiarity with the natural world, than the others, if he was more into the details, at least, in the natural world. But we don't have a lot of fragments for him. Let's look at the fragment here from Lucippus. Nothing happens at random, but everything comes to be from reason and by necessity. There's a reason where everything happens and it had to happen. Now, if you know the history of modern science, you'll recognize, and what Lucippus says here, what was the absolute principle of modern science in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, and even into the 20th century? This principle in modern science was called the principle of determinism. Okay? And so he's stating it here, huh? Now, the principle of determinism in modern science is saying, a lot of times they explain it in terms of past and future. They'll say the past necessarily determines the future. That's just one way popularly stated it, necessarily determines the future. There's no room for, what? Contingency, right? No room for luck or chance. Those are just names or your arguments of what the real causes are. Now, you can see clearly in the modern thinkers that this thought is associated with the mathematical, what? Sciences of nature. And in mathematics, you have complete determinism. There's no, what, luck or chance there, huh? There's nothing like matter that could give rise to contingency, or like free will that could give rise to contingency, and so on, huh? And math. So, if you're studying the natural world mathematically, you're accustomed to think of it in deterministic terms. And they often quote, you know, Laplace there in the 19th century, where he said, if you knew the position and the momentum of every part of the universe at any point in time, you had a super-calculating mind, you could tell the whole future forever, you know? It's a necessity, huh? Because this produced a lot of crises, because people, you know, thought that man is more or less subject to this, and therefore it seemed to say that there's no such thing as free will, and all these things. And others say, well, no, no, we do have free will, so maybe there's nothing wrong here. But anyway. But this was the absolute principle of modern science, in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. And one way you can see that is that when the other sciences, besides the physical sciences, physics and chemistry, the other sciences are trying to be more scientific, and they're trying to, what, imitate the rigor, you know, and the scientific character of the physical sciences, they will always insist upon this principle of, what, determinism. Now, one book that I often use to show this is a book by the famous French physiologist, Claude Bernard. He's a very famous physiologist, he's one of the fathers of modern physiology. And one book that we sometimes used in the philosophy of science course is called An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine, experimental biology, An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine. And this is a book that's reprinted, you know, in English in our time, you know, Harvard University reprints it, for example, right? That they changed to have. Now, in that book, Bernard is trying to make biology more scientific than it was maybe in the first part of the 19th century. It was about around 1860, huh? And if you look at this book, it has three parts to it. And the first part is a general description of the experimental method. And if you look at this book, you can look at this book, you can look at this book, you can look at this book, you can look at this book, you can look at this book, Part two is a description of the experimental method in biology in particular. Part three are more detailed examples from his own work as a physiologist illustrating the experimental method in biology. If you go back to that first part, which is describing the experimental method in general, in many ways he has a very good understanding of the experimental method. A very bad understanding of philosophy and theology, but a very good understanding of the experimental method. And one thing that he says that always sticks in your mind is that he says that doubt, doubt is intrinsic to the experimental method or the scientific method. Doubt is intrinsic to it. He sees that even after a hypothesis has been tested and confirmed, and maybe tested and confirmed many times, you still don't know for sure that it's true. And it may be suitable at some later time to test it again, right? And you may possibly find that it is not correct, right? Now, I think I explained that when you did logic, right? But the reason why this is true is because of the form of the argument. You're saying if H is so, if my hypothesis is so, then P is so. It's a prediction you make, right? Okay? Now, if you go out and you observe or experiment and you find out that P is in fact so, does it follow that H is so? No, that's not a syllogism that we saw, huh? And so elementary logic will tell you that this is not done. So, if my hypothesis is that purpose dropped dead last night, when he was in class all the time, if purpose dropped dead, I predict he'd be absent from class. He's absent from class, therefore he dropped dead. I tell him that's wishful, but it's not a logical thing, see? So, given the form of the confirmation, the state of precisely is not a syllogism. It doesn't follow necessarily that H is so, right? So, no matter how many things you predict are true, that come true, right, you still don't know that the hypothesis is so. Now, he doesn't say it as clearly as I was saying, obviously, but he sees that's true in his science, that doubt is intrinsic to the experimental method. Now, Einstein, huh? He says the physicists didn't fully, you know, realize this until the relativity theories. Why? Because Newtonian physics had predicted so many things that came true that they began to think Newtonian physics must be true. And I guess, you know, they tell me that the last planets were found, in this way, you know, that they began to observe and calculate more carefully, and they discovered that the known planets were not exactly found in the past, they should be according to Newtonian physics. But they had so much success in Newtonian physics, rather than question it, they said there must be other planets unknown to us that are affecting the movements of the known ones. And their mathematics is so exact that the ridiculous planets were, and they could trade in the telescopes, and that's all they found in the last planets. That's kind of an amazing thing, right, huh? You know? So, Einstein said before the theories of relativity, many scientists were thinking today, you know, this must be true, huh? And then all of a sudden Einstein showed that with a different hypothesis, he could predict what Newton predicted, plus some things that Newton couldn't predict, right? And now it became crystal clear, Einstein says, that hypothesis is never known to be true. It always remains a system of guesses, he said. Of course, obviously, the more predictions you make, the more probability there is, but you never know, never share. So, in that sense, Bernard has a very good understanding of the experimental method. You see that? But, when it comes to this, he says, but we cannot doubt, he said, that is the principle of determinism. To doubt that would be to doubt science. Well, then you can see how that's kind of the absolute principle. You can doubt everything except this, huh? You know? If you doubt this, well, then science is out. That's it. So, it's like the sacred, absolute principle of modern science. So, you can see that when they're trying to make biology more scientific, they realize that there are differences, you know, between biology and physics and so on, but to be scientific, you have to keep determinism. That's what they thought of, right? Now, it takes something even less scientific than biology, like psychology, right? My favorite example is Freud, huh? And Freud, on dreams, huh? Now, if anything seems to be at random or not have a reason or necessity, it's our crazy dream. Uh-huh. And my cousin Dow used to have these crazy dreams, and we'd count them in the morning, and we'd all laugh. Uh-huh. And this one dream that I remember he had, he was being chased by a tiger in his dream. And he's running away from the tiger. Did I tell you this before? Huh? He's being chased by a tiger, and he's running down the street, running around this way. And finally, he turns the corner and runs down, and it's a dead end. No way out. So, he turns around to face the tiger. And as the tiger comes up, it says, How would you like to buy a raffle ticket? So, he's laughing. You know, I mean, this is all irrational, right? You know, that's what dreams are, right? Along comes, what? Freud, right? Just a minute now, huh? There's a reason why you dreamed that last night, right? What seems to you to be, what? Something irrational, and has no reason for it, huh? Something that just happened, you know? Oh, you see? No. So, Freud writes his treatise on dreams, right? And we're going to find out something about you from your dreams, right? And why do you dream this, huh? So, you know, I take that as a good example, because in something as apparently irrational as dreams are, like this dream of my cousin and so on, Freud thinks that to be scientific, we've got to what? We must admit that you had to do that last night, huh? And we're going to use that, then, as a way to probe into your subconscious or some other part of you, right? But there you see how that's the absolute principle for them, the principle of determinism. Now, Aristotle was to reject this, huh? And he was to reject it because of his understanding of matter as potency or ability. And we'll be coming to that later on, huh? In the 20th century, the principle of determinism was challenged, finally, in quantum theory, huh? And it was Heisenberg who first formulated the principle of what? Indeterminism, huh? But as Heisenberg said, quantum theory reintroduced Aristotle's understanding of what? Potency or ability, huh? Now, that was a tremendous shock, right? And in that respect, you can say that the quantum theory was a greater change in modern science, the science of the 20th century, than even relativity theory. Because the two relativity theories didn't, what, call into question the principle of determinism, which had been the absolute principle. But quantum theory did, huh? And that was a tremendous shock, huh? Mm-hmm. Now, the, it was under, you know, Niels Bohr and the physicists associated with Mike Heisenberg that this first came out, huh? And so it became known as the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Theory because that's where Bohr was, huh? So finally, we used to have these international meetings of physicists, what they called the Solvay Congress, huh? Mm-hmm. And I guess the final showdown was in 1927, huh? Where Albert Einstein and the father of Weybe Kang's Louis de Broglie, right, arrived at there trying to attack the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Theory. And Einstein would get up, you know, one day, and then he would, he'd present a thought experiment, right, that seemed to refute the Copenhagen Interpretation, and Bohr would stay up all night and come back the next day and replied to Einstein, see? And I guess the last one that Einstein, his last attempt to break it down, it was quite a, you know, stunner at first, huh? And they actually have a picture of Einstein leaving, you know, after he proposed it, right? And he's kind of walking out with a real confident look at his face, you know? And Mules Bohr is tracing after him, you know, with a very worried look at his face. And, well, anyway, Bohr stayed up the whole night, right? And he came back the next day and he showed that Einstein had overlooked something from his own theory of relativity that refuted his objection. And that was the last time that I...