Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 5: Common and Private Experience in Natural Philosophy

Transcript
================================================================================

resist the Greek influence, but I mean this is part of my province, that they think we've written official texts in Greek, yeah. The knowledge, like the reticular knowledge of scripture studies come to know more facts and things about the times of the patriarchs. It seems to me, you know, when you read the modern scriptural scholars, they don't really illuminate the scripture as much as Thomas does or Augustine does, or his fathers, and they don't seem to know what's most important, you know. I'm not saying they haven't made some contribution, I think they have, but not as obvious. It's not much of a contribution to understanding scripture. I did try reading it for a while, they're not scholars known in Psalms, you know, they're not interested in the way Thomas does this come to hear the Psalms. The Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more carefully. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand all that you've written. In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. Amen. You have an eye, or an ear, or a nose of the mystical body of Christ. I was reading the commentary here in the first epistle to the Corinthians. Of course, St. Paul is making this comparison between the church and the body. And at first, he mentions, you know, the eyes and the ears, and the hands and the feet, and how the eyes can't say to the ears, if you don't need you, and vice versa, and the same way with the hands and the feet. Well, the way Thomas understands the meaning of those parts, that the hands and the feet refer to the active life, and the eyes and the ears to the contemplative life. But, in the active life, the eyes are the bishops, in fact, that's where it comes to that, the scope, the physical, and the feet are the rest of us, right, who are kind of being directed by the hands, and the hands direct the feet. And then the eyes and the ears, the contemplative life, and the eyes are the masters, like Thomas, who's teaching us, and then the ears are the, what, the learners. And that fits in with what Aristotle said, too, in the metaphysics there, that the eye is more the sense of discovery, and the ear is more the sense of being taught, the sense of learning. But then, in a subsequent text there, he also brings in the nose. And so Thomas explains that, and he says, there are the masters, those who can understand these things by themselves, and teach the rest of us. Then there are the ears, who can, what, learn and understand what the masters, they're saying, but they depend upon the masters. And then there are those who, who are neither of those, right, but by kind of being close to these, they get a little bit of a, the perfume, you might say, the odor of this, and they're the nose. And you probably see that, you know, in the contemplative life, too, you know, where people might come up to the monastery, you know, and they get kind of a whiff of the spirituality of the place, but they can't really, you know, enter into it fully, or, you know, sit down, read John the Cross, or somebody, you know, very serious writing, you know, about these things, but they can get kind of a, have a whiff, you know, of the spiritual life. It's interesting that the author of A Cloud of Unknowing, he, he compares the nose as the organ of the spirit, metaphorically, as the organ of discernment. Yeah, yeah. So, to not, So we have a question here now about the first reading in Aristotle's first book of natural hearing. It was about the scopas, the aim or the goal of natural philosophy, which is to know natural things in the light of their causes, so ultimately know their causes. And then the rest of it was mainly an explanation of the order in which we should try to understand natural things and their causes, and that order was the general before the particular. But in giving the reason for that, that the general is to the particular as the confused is to the distinct, and then the more general premise that the confused is before the distinct in our knowledge. He also gave not only three kinds of signs, or three kinds of examples to show that in fact we know things in a confused way before distinctly, which also in a way touched upon other kinds of confused and distinct besides general in particular. And then he, what, gave a reason, right? In terms of the confused being more known to us, but the distinct being more known by nature, or more known simply. And that's going back to the, as he says, the inborn or an actual road. Okay? So this is one of the most important texts where Aristotle elaborates this aspect of the natural road that goes from the confused to the distinct. Okay? I said I bring a little thing a little thing that you can have. And so let me give you maybe here, I think we've got about ten copies, right? Right? Ten copies of each other. Okay, stay on here. So, I don't think we'll go through this right now. This is kind of a, gives you kind of the whole picture of what the natural road is. So, and for your, I think we've talked about these things from time to time, since you get it in a disconnected way, as it comes up in the text of Aristotle, because there's no one place, I think, where Aristotle brings together all the different things he says about the natural road. So, I talk about what a road is in our knowledge, just to refresh your mind on that, and state what the first road is, and why the first road is, right? What is. And then why you have to see every before and after along that road to really understand it. That's what a road is, something, an order in our knowledge, huh? The before and after. And then I distinguish the different kinds of before and after. There's a before and after of different kinds of knowing along the road, like sensing is before memory, memory before experience, and so on. And then the order in which things are known along this road. I think we've talked about that before. And first the order in which different things are known, like sensible things are known before things cannot be sensed, and various things. And then the order in which one and the same thing is known along this road, okay? And then finally from that, we can lead on to that thing that Aristotle talks about, that what is more known to us is less known by nature, less known simply, and vice versa. And that's what I talk about on page, what, five and six, which I've talked to you about already. So I've talked about, I think, these things, you know, in passing, but these all together. And then starting on page seven, I just gave you some of the more common consequences of these different aspects of the actual road, huh? Okay? So I think I'll leave you with that. And if you want to ask me anything about it next time, but I'll leave it with you now rather than, okay? I think I'll give you kind of a, you know, kind of a more complete knowledge of the road as a whole. But here or somewhere else, you might go into this or that aspect of the road more at length, huh? Okay. Now, one thing that might be important to point out, too, the reason Aristotle gives here might seem to be applicable to any form of reasoned-out knowledge. But I think you've got to be careful, and if you ever have a chance, or if you ever have a chance to look at Thomas's commentary in Boethis' De Trinitate, Boethis' De Trinitate is really a tremendous, tremendous work, and Monsignor Dion used to say, you know, they say it's the same Boethis who wrote this and wrote this other work, you know, but I don't believe that he says, he's kind of joking, I think, huh? But De Trinitate really, you know, engages the mind of Boethis, and his mind is up for it, and so on. But also in that road, he does a lot of sapiential things, things that belong to the wise man, where he distinguishes natural philosophy and mathematics and wisdom, various parts of looking philosophy. And then he talks about the way they proceed, and he's, with the brevity of wisdom, he says that natural philosophy proceeds rationabilitaire, reasonably, and then mathematics proceeds disciplinabilitaire, learnably, and wisdom proceeds intellectualitaire, in an understandable way. And Thomas will have a whole, what, article on one word, you know, with all kinds of things to be said, huh? So I said it's a thing worth studying, you know, at some time for itself, but the reason why I bring it up here now is that he was explaining, you know, what sense does natural philosophy proceed reasonably? And Thomas will distinguish three different senses of proceeding reasonably, but the sense that applies to natural philosophy is the one where reasonably is named for the nature of reason, huh? Now, it's natural to reason to get its knowledge from the senses. And you could say natural philosophy is the closest to the senses. As Aristotle said in ancient times, and as Einstein said in the 20th century, natural philosophy or natural science, it begins and ends in the senses, huh? So the natural road, you might say, is especially followed in, what, natural philosophy. So it doesn't mean that natural philosophy alone does this, but especially it does it. So, if you look at what is being taught here mainly in the first reading, that we consider things in general before in particular, you might say, well, is that really the way geometry is, huh? Well, to some extent, the geometer talks about what a triangle is before he talks about what an equilateral triangle is. He talks about what a quadrilateral is before he talks about what a square or rombus is, right? But if you look at geometry as a whole, it's not from the general to the particular, but from the simple to the composed, from plain geometry to, what, solid geometry. But if you look at natural philosophy as a whole, yeah, we talk about change in general, and then we talk about the particular kinds of change. So as a whole, it's characterized more, by general to the particular, than is the mathematics, huh? Now, he doesn't make it, he doesn't unfold it here, but Thomas does elsewhere. A second aspect of the road of natural philosophy, and I mentioned it last time, in that first paragraph, and as far as its elements, huh? Well, elements refers especially to the cause we call matter, right? And you could say that he's touching upon the fact that natural philosophy goes, what, towards matter, huh? Okay? And it actually does this twice, huh? One, as you go from the eight books of natural hearing towards the books on the universe to the books on generation and corruption, you're going down towards matter. And then you start to study living things. You start by studying the soul and the kind of abstraction from the body, and I'm specifically on the soul, and then you start to study more of the bodily aspects of the living thing. And as you go forward, you go deeper and deeper down into what? Matter, right? So, as far as the order of consideration, as it's called, order of determination, huh? natural philosophy. I think these are the two most basic things. It goes from the general to the particular right and it goes towards what? Matter. Now in geometry it's something quite different. The first thing you notice in geometry is it goes from the simple towards the composed. So you take up the cube before the, excuse me, the square before the cube, right? The circle before the what? Sphere. And notice the cube is not a form of square. It's composed of six squares, etc. And the sphere is not a form of circle, but you rotate a circle around and you get a sphere. So it's as simple as the composed. The more you study geometry, the more you see that's the way you have to go. Then, you know, in studying my master here, who's Euclid, I notice the second thing about geometry. And that is that it tends to go from the equal to the what? Unequal, right? And you notice that right away in geometry that when Euclid, say, numerates the species of triangle, he'll give equilateral triangle first, then isosceles, then scalene. And he gives the species of quadrilateral to be square first, you know, and oblong and rhombus and then rhomboid and you get less and less equality if you go on. Even when he gives the axioms, he gives the axioms of equality first. Quantity is equal to the same or equal to each other. If equals the idea, equals the result, it's equal. If equals, it's attractive. If equals, it's also equal. And then he gives the axiom of inequality. The whole is more than the part, huh? And you'll see that in the theorems, huh? You know, the most famous theorem in some way in the first book of Euclid, the one that ends up the whole book, you might say, is the Thagorean theorem. And the Thagorean theorem, as you know, says that the square in the right-angled triangle, the square in the side opposite the right angle, is always equal to the squares that contain the right angle. And when you get to the second book, and towards the end of the second book, you find out the theorems for the obtuse angle triangle and the acute angle triangle. And the obtuse angle triangle, the square in the side opposite the obtuse angle, is always greater than the squares on the sides, huh? That's more like a theorem of inequality. And then in the acute angle triangle, the side opposite the acute angle, the square in that, is always less than. He tells you how much is less than and how much is more by those theorems, huh? So the theorem of equality comes before the theorems of inequality. And more than that, if you examine the actual proof of those ones, he uses the Thagorean theorem, the theorem of equality, to prove the theorems of inequality. Now there may be some exceptions to this somewhere, right? But for the most part, certainly, geometry proceeds from the simple to the composed, and from the equal to the, what, unequal. So it's quite different from what natural philosophy does. Now when you get to wisdom, huh? At first sight, it might seem that wisdom is a little bit like natural philosophy, because you consider what they call the communia, the common things, like being and act and ability and so on, before you consider the, what, immaterial substances, the separate substances, what we call the angels, and ultimately God himself. But it would be better to describe this as going towards the immaterial. Because he considers, first of all, those things that could be in matter, but don't have to be in matter, the common things, and then he goes towards the things that cannot be in matter, cannot be material. So he's going towards the, what, immaterial. And then you see, hey, this is like almost the exact opposite of what he's doing in actual philosophy. There he's going down towards matter as the science goes on. Here he's going away from matter towards the immaterial. And when you study even those common things, and the most clear example is in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, where he takes up act and ability. In the first part of the Ninth Book, Aristotle talks about act and ability as they're found in moving or changing things. And then he rises in the middle part to a completely universal consideration of act and ability, where it can be even understood in immaterial things. So if anything, he's going from the less universal towards the more universal. Or he starts by saying a few things about, a number of things in Book 7 and 8 about material substance, then he gradually leads you up to a general understanding of substance that will be the foundation for talking even about the immaterial substances. So in a way, he's going from the less universal to the more universal in that way. When he talks about the one, he begins with the one, which is the beginning of number, right? To the one that is convertible, equally universal in being. So in the two things that you see in the wise man, that he goes towards the immaterial, and that in a way he leads us up from the less universal to the most universal, he's proceeding in exactly the opposite way to the natural philosopher. And then the mathematician, in an entirely different way again, he proceeds from the simple to the composed. And of course, if anything, in theology and wisdom, we do the opposite, because the last thing we know is God, and he's the simplest thing of all. So we don't go, you know, start with the simple, we start with the composed and work our way towards God, who's the simplest thing there is. Just the opposite of the geometry. So as Thomas and Boethius before him and Aristotle before them say, you know, they make a mistake, we try to proceed in the same order, in the same way, in what? Every part of philosophy. In fact, there's many other differences besides those, those are just in regard to the order of termination, the order of consideration, but they're entirely different in all three sciences. If you've read the Summa Contra Gentiles, he shows how the order in theology, you know, revealed theology, and the order in natural theology and philosophical wisdom are just reversed. Yeah? So, that's only one of the seven things that you have whereby one science differs from another in the way they proceed, the order of consideration. But that pertains to the third road, we're talking about the first road, right? So you have to realize that at first sight, although the reason Thomas or Aristotle gives here for considering things in general before particular would seem to be applicable to any science, and to some extent it's true because it pertains to the natural road, is followed, most of all, in natural philosophy. For the reason that Thomas gives following Boethius in the Te Trinitati, that this science, most of all, is in conformity with the nature of our mind, which is apt to get us knowledge from the senses. Okay? Okay, so let's look now at our second page here, which is common and private experience. And like most of the things in this course, this is a universal importance. Just like that text in the confused and distinct is very important for other things as well as an actual philosophy. In logic, why do we define and divide? That's two ways of going from the confused to the distinct. We have to define and divide to go from the confused to the distinct. Now this distinction between common and private experience is very important for understanding what the philosophy of nature is, but also it's important for understanding what experimental science is, and as the reading from Paul VI there, it's very important for understanding what? Theology, right? Okay? Now I begin with the definition of common experience, what is meant by common there. It's the experience which, what, all men have and cannot avoid having. So there's two parts to the definition there of common, when we speak of common experience. it, and it can't avoid having it done. So any way to live in this world without having some experience of pleasure and pain, now you're going to get hungry sometime, you're going to get bumped sometime, you may suffer, but you've got to suffer some kind of pain, right? Okay? And any way to live in this world without experiencing whole and part, well if you take your steak at one gulp, you take your beer at one swallow, you might not experience whole and part, but as it is, you're going to have to experience whole and part even to live. If you breathe in the whole air in the atmosphere, if you only breathe in a part of the air around you, you're going to experience the whole and part. So there's no way to avoid that, you see? So there's some things that everyone experiences and cannot avoid, and that's what we call common experience. Now when I define private experience, I define it as the experience which only some men have. It can be just one man, or, you know. I don't put in the definition that you can avoid, although this is often true, but it's not always true. If a car hits you, you may experience a broken leg. You don't have much choice about it, okay? Now this experience might be acquired by experiment, but not everybody has performed the experiment. Or it might be acquired by prolonged experience, huh? Sometimes it requires special effort and tools. Sometimes it comes about by what you're exposed to by chance, huh? Okay? So, as men, we're never going to have the experience of giving birth to a baby, okay? But all kinds of other things that we'll never, what, as individuals experience, huh? But now, if you had a pet dog as a child, or a pet cat, you might acquire an experience of the dog or the cat that not everybody has. When I was a boy, we always had male cats, and then my daughter, you know, got a cat from her piano teacher. It was a female cat, huh? So the female cat was going to have kittens, and so my daughter was doing her research, she just did it in grade school, lower grades and so on. And she has these books on cats, and one book says that each kitten goes to a different nipple, and the same nipple. I'd never heard this before, and so that's interesting. So, I watched after the kittens were born, and I picked out one kitten in particular that was a little different in its colors and shades, I could follow it, and see where it went. It always went to the same nipple. When you got six little kittens there, seven kittens running over there, if they didn't each go to its own nipple, you'd have, what, chaos, huh? It was very interesting how they do that, how nature has avoided that, what, terrible confusion of it, trying to feed seven little ones at once, huh? So notice, through having a female cat there that gave birth to kittens, I now have an experience of cats that I didn't have as a child, right? And that other people won't all have. We've never had a pet cat, huh? But someone else might have a cat canary, or a pet parrot, or a pet dog, or something, and the different kinds of dogs, and so on. Now, the words philosophy of nature were sometimes used to cover the whole study of the natural world. So if you look at Sir Isaac Newton's major work there, the Principia, the actual title of the work is Principia Mathematica Naturalis Philosophiae, the Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. And in Scotland, I think it is, they still call, you know, the departments are dealing with what we call physics, chemistry, and biology, they still call them, what, natural philosophy. And sometimes, even the modern scientists will call natural philosophy when they're studying the natural world and talking about it just out of wonder, out of curiosity. But sometimes you use the word philosophy of nature, not to name the whole study of the natural world, but to name that part which is based on, what, common experience, huh? And that's a... somewhat customary way. And then we used experimental sciences to name that knowledge of the natural world that's based on private experience. Okay? So as I explain here in the third paragraph, some parts of philosophy do not require any private experience. Our common experience is the only experience required for them. And this is especially true of those parts developed by the early Greek natural philosophers and Plato and brought to an ordered whole in Aristotle's general books on nature and the soul. And I'm referring to two in particular, the eight books of hearing about nature, which I now translate as, you can see, natural hearing, right? And the three books about the soul, okay, which are often given today the patent title, Dianemara. Okay? So the eight books of natural hearing and the three books about the soul, those 11 books can be understood with only, what, common experience, huh? Yeah? So sometimes I say to students when they gave the Floss Nature course, did you register for a lab for this course? Why isn't there a lab for this course? Like there is maybe for a physics or chemistry course? Well, it's because, it's not because this course doesn't require experience, but this course is, what, based on the experience you already have, huh, and can't avoid having, of the natural world. See? Why the physics or the chemistry or biology is based on an experience that not everybody has, and this lab is an attempt to get a little bit of that experience that not everybody has. Do you see that? That's why they have a lab. Okay? Now, the knowledge based on common experience is going to be more general, as you might expect, than the knowledge based on what? Private experience, huh? So you could syllogize from what we saw in the first reading, that if a knowledge of the general comes before a knowledge of the particular, then knowledge based on common experience is before knowledge based on what? Private experience. That's based upon seeing that knowledge based on common experience would be more general. than knowledge based on what? Private experience. So if you're talking about pleasure and pain in general, you can, you know, assume that everybody has an experience of pleasure and pain, right? Now, if you're asking, you know, how painful is it to give birth to children, you'd have to talk to probably a woman or something. Because not everybody would have an experience of that particular, what, pain, huh? See? Which is worse, a broken leg or giving birth to a baby? Well, I don't know. But maybe somebody has experienced both of these pains, but I haven't, huh? See? So we wouldn't all have the experience sufficient, right, of our own, to be able to discuss, you know, the pain of a broken leg or the pain of an abscessed tooth or pain of giving birth to a baby or whatever it might be, right? But if you're talking about pleasure and pain in general, yeah, everybody could talk about that on the basis of their common experience of pleasure and pain. Do you see that? Yeah. But notice how that's much more general to be talking about pleasure and pain than be talking about the pain of childbirth and so on, huh? So the distinction between common and private experience is necessary for understanding the distinction between a knowledge based on common experience and a knowledge that requires a private experience and for understanding, therefore, what philosophy of nature is in this, what, more narrow sense, right? Or it's not being used to, you know, if for a while natural philosophy and natural science were synonymous, natural philosophy was from the Greek word and science from the Latin word, huh? But now we tend to use often natural philosophy only for that part of the study of natural things for which common experience is sufficient, huh? And we call experimental sciences that part that requires a private or special experience. Do you see that? Now, notice, just as you shouldn't identify general and particular with confused and distinct, because that's only one kind of confused and distinct, so you shouldn't identify knowledge based on common experience and knowledge based on private experience with general and particular. You could say in geometry, say that the knowledge of what a triangle is is general compared to the knowledge of what an equilateral triangle is. That's not two different kinds of experience for those two. Okay, so knowledge of the general is before knowledge of particular is more general than knowledge based on common experience is before knowledge based on what? Private experience. Is that clear enough? Okay. Now, in the next two readings here, they're taken from two very famous and very great scientists of the 20th century. Niels Bohr, the man who began the modern atomic theory back in 1913 when he applied the quantum to the atom, and he was known at that time as being the man in the world who understood the atom best, and he came to Germany and gave a series of lectures on the atom, and they called it the Bohr Festival. It's been known ever since as the Bohr Festival, and Heisenberg was present for these, huh? He was a young student at the time. And what's interesting is that Bohr gave his lecture, and in the question period, Heisenberg posed an objection, and Bohr gave a reply to it, but he kept on looking over at Heisenberg, you know, like he was impressed with his fans, thinking that he was very young. And when he got tools of the lecture, he came over to Heisenberg, and he says, let's go for a walk. And he went for a walk, you know, back and forth, a couple of hours, and Heisenberg said it influenced all his future thinking about the atom. And he talked about the immense impression that Bohr gave on him. So, now, Bohr was known for, you know, after he became world famous, he set up an institute for the study of theoretical physics in Copenhagen, and this became a place where men came from all over the world to study under him, like Heisenberg came from Germany, and Oppenheimer from the United States, and Gamal from Russia, and so on. And many, many of these men who studied under him, they went on to get the Nobel Prize themselves. Einstein was kind of a loner, but Bohr was, you know, more gregarious, you might say, and they had tremendous influence upon these men. And they looked up to him like a son looks up to a father. They would speak, you know, of Pauly's filial reverence, Heisenberg's reverence for Bohr. So he was very influential, you know, with the younger generation, the physicists and the future Nobel men. Now, this particular reading from Bohr, the very beginning here, there's three volumes, you know, of Bohr's essays, and he's known to have what? You know, over and over again, just to write what he wanted to say. And notice this opening remark. The task of science is both to extend the range of our experience and to reduce it into order. Well, and I can show you a million texts from the Great Scientist, but the two parts of experimental science, the empirical part, which comes in the Greek word for experience, the part devoted to what? Gaining experience that not everybody has, which may very often require an experiment, but you can also sometimes make a prolonged observation. And then the theoretical part, they call it, sometimes the mathematical part, whereby you reduce this, what, experience in which you observe to some kind of, what, order, right? Okay? Now, I contrast that with the fundamental parts of these two philosophies, where the task of them is not to extend the range of our experience, but to understand the experience we already, what, have our common experience, huh? So you see the contrast there between that and what you're doing in the eight books of natural hearing, or the three books about the soul. There we're not trying to extend your experience. We're trying to understand the experience you already, what, have of motion or change, or of life, in the case of the Dhyanima. In the three books about the soul, you're really basing yourself upon our common, inward experience of being alive. That's what it is. Now, but notice the second thing that Bohr says there, and this is kind of... surprising when you think about it, and to reduce it to order. That strikes me as very strange, because in the case of the philosophy of nature, Aristotle's not trying to reduce our experience to order, he's trying to find order in the natural things. And Bohr is saying that we are, what, reducing, not even things, but our experience to order. I said to a friend who's very learned in science, and has a degree in science as well as in philosophy, and I said, now, is that an exaggeration? He says, no, that's what they're doing. And I think you can understand it most of all from the fact that they order their experience, in physics at least, by mathematics. And the mathematics is worked out quite independently of the natural world. And then they take something from math that they can use to order their experience. So, in that sense, they're like introducing, what, order into something that, rather than finding an order in it, huh? They bring the principles of order, right, from pure mathematics, and they use it to order this experience, huh? And so, you're not finding an order in things, but you're, what, bringing something from mathematics to order your experience. A very strange kind of knowledge. Come right down to it, huh? Okay? But I want to emphasize, you know, the first part especially, to extend the range of our experience, huh? We're going to be basing ourselves upon an experience that not everybody has, huh? And that's why you have that empirical part. Now, most people don't know this too much, but there's actually a division of labor in experimental science. And some scientists are labeled empirical physicists, and others, what, theoretical physicists. I have a book in my office, say, which is the collaboration of an empirical and theoretical physicist. So, the division, there's a division of labor there to begin with. And you can see that the experience that is the basis of experimental science is not necessarily had even by the scientists, huh? Especially by the theoretical scientists. Einstein's special theory of relativity, kind of one of the immediate impetus for it was the Mickelson Morley experiment, huh? American physicists. Well, as you might expect to name it, the Mickelson Morley experiment. It wasn't conducted by Einstein himself, right? So, the experience that is the starting point for Einstein's theorizing is not an experience that himself has. Then you get to, let's say, the general theory of relativity. General theory of relativity had to be tested during an eclipse of the sun. And they didn't test it until after the First World War, because of the commotion of the First World War. But right after the First World War, they sent scientific teams down to the Southern Hemisphere, where there would be an eclipse in that part of the world. And the most famous team, and the one that confirmed it, was the one edited by the British astrophysicist, Sir Arthur Eddington. And Sir Arthur Eddington called Einstein long distance and told him that his theory had been confirmed. And Einstein said, I knew it would be. But the point is, that the experiment that started the first theory of relativity and the experiment that, say, confirmed the second theory, were not conducted, even observed by Einstein. You see how private it is, huh? And I was just, I was looking up Heisenberg again in the internet, you know, or email, whatever it is. And actually, they got a little recording of Heisenberg's voice there talking about one of his theories, but I couldn't hear it too well, but anyway. But they're giving, you know, some more little things about his life and so on. And he was, of course, working with Sommerfeld, I knew that, the theoretical physicist. But at that time, the German universities were still paying emphasis upon empirical physicists. And he had empirical physicists, the theoretical physicists, who were responsible for his degree, right? And the tension between the two, you know? Because Heisenberg was much more into the mathematical and into, you know, working in the lab. And they tell stories, you know, of Bohr's Institute there, theoretical physics. You had empirical physicists working down the labs, and the theoretical physicists were upstairs, working out the mathematics and ordering this.