Natural Hearing (Aristotle's Physics)
Lecture 1: The Proenium and the Order of Natural Philosophy

Transcript
================================================================================

that you're learning from nature you're hearing, listening to nature yeah, you're hearing about nature and you're also listening to nature when Immanuel Kant is describing physics in the modern sense he has interesting proportion and he says that in physics in experimental physical sciences there, we learn from nature, not in the way that a student learns from his teacher but in the way that the judge learns from the witness there's some truth to that, right? because as a good scientist would tell you we never perform all the experiments that we could perform, and we just choose to perform this experiment because we have this thing we want to test and so we hear only what nature says in response to our question we don't sit down and just listen to nature or whatever she has to say so the witness doesn't get on the stand and just say what everyone wants to say keeps his mouth shut until we ask him a definite question but in this book here we're listening to nature like a student listens to his what? teacher the student listens to all his teacher has to say okay? you see the difference there? interesting proportion there I don't think Kant realizes that we should listen to nature first as a student listens to his what? teacher, right? later on we have to listen to nature in the way that a what? the judge or the lawyer listens to the witness huh? okay? Kant wants to listen to nature only in that second way huh? but I say we ought to listen to it first as a student listens to his teacher huh? of course hearing is the what? the ear is the sense of instruction from another huh? and we have a fragment of Heraclitus huh? one of the greatest thinkers the central thinker in human thought he says wisdom is to speak the truth and to act according to nature giving ear thereto that's what Gerstow is doing here right? he's giving ear thereto huh? so he's listening to nature and what nature has to say about nature okay? at the same time you'll see that this is fairly close to what we naturally understand we'll see that when we get further into the book huh? so in a way we listen to nature the basis of what we naturally understand so there's a lot of reasons why this book could well be called the book of natural hearing huh? there are actually eight books and we're going to be reading just certain parts of these huh? okay? now the reading the division to readings is the one you find with Thomas huh? into lexios huh? and lexio could be translated lecture or reading but I like the word reading huh? so if you ever look at Thomas' commentary this would correspond to the first lexio in Thomas' commentary okay? now I think we've spoken before haven't we about the difference between the logical division of a work and the editorial division of the work can we speak about that when we talk about the Bible for example? I mean if you take the gospel of St. Matthew right? the editorial division of the book is in the 28 chapters huh? and the chapters down to verses and so you can refer to any chapter or verse that you want to right? but now when Thomas divides the work as a whole does he divide it in 28 parts? no he says the gospel of St. Matthew is emphasizing the humanity of Christ right? as man he came into the world he proceeded through the world and he left the world the gospel of St. Matthew is divided into three parts okay? corresponding to those three huh? so the logical division the division that helps you to understand the book right? is much different than the editorial division the editorial division is just a convenience for referring to any chapter or any particular passage okay? okay? Now, just about every book of Aristotle's is divided into two parts at first. And the two parts are proportional to the way we divide Shakespeare's Rome and Juliet. Now, how would you divide Shakespeare's Rome and Juliet? The process. The prologue and the play, right? Now, not every work of Shakespeare's has a prologue, right? There's a prologue at the end of the eighth. But in Romeo and Juliet, you have a prologue and a play, right? And the prologue is very small compared to the, what, play. But it prepares the way for the, what, play, right? So the prologue to Romeo and Juliet is written in the form of a Shakespearean sonata. Two households, both alike in dignity. In fair Verona, where we there are seen, From ancient grudge, break to new vitally, Where civil blood makes civil hands unclean. That first quatrain sets the stage, you know. In the city of Verona, right? Two powerful families are in conflict to the point of shedding blood, right? In the second quatrain, From forth the fatal loins of these two foes, A pair of star-crossed lovers take their life, Whose misadventure pitches over those, To with their death bury their parents' strife. So he's introduced now to that, It's going to be a tragedy, right? Something, he mentions pity there, right? Whose misadventure pitches over those. And then the third quatrain mentions the other emotion, That tragedy arouses fear. The fearful passage of their death-marked love. And the continuous of their parents' rage, Which not but their children's end. Now the door is traffic of our stage. And he has a little cup of it, To which of you, with patience and years of ten, And what here shall miss, our toil shall strive to mend. Okay? So the prologue, in a way, Is preparing you for the kind of play it is. It's even more clear. He gave me the eighth there when he says, I come no more to make you laugh. You know, he says. He's got to do something very tragic and serious. You know, and, okay. So, um, Woman and Juliet then is divided into the prologue, Which kind of prepares one for the kind of play it's going to be. And then the play itself, Which is a major part, obviously, right? Okay? Well, almost every work of Aristotle Is divided into what they call the Proenium. And, Sometimes they call the other part, The Proctopus. But the main body of the work, man. Now, Proenium is a Greek word, Which could be, perhaps, Translated by the phrase, Baving the way. Okay? And the Proenium, of course, is very short. You occupy, usually, The beginning of the first book. But not even the whole of the first book. So it's a much smaller comparison to the, what? Whole, right? But in some way, Prepares the way or paves the way. We look at the Proenium, remember, Wisdom, beginning by physics. Okay? And the most essential thing in the Proenium Is what is called the Skopas, huh? The aim, huh? What you intend in the book, right? But then sometimes you go on and say something about Why it's desirable, And how we're going to proceed, And so on, right? Okay? But it prepares the way, huh? Tartatus, You have it in the Latin, Now, you use that for the main body. But it means, what? Draw it out. So the Proenium tells you what it's all about In a very, what, Decise way, But in a way that prepares you for the work, huh? And the Tartatus is, of course. If you look at De Verbum, The Constitution, Divine Revelation, In the Second Vatican Council, huh? If you get the official text, The Latin text, right? It's at the very beginning, The Proenium is identified as a Proenium. And it's really a masterful Proenium, huh? If you study that, huh? You may miss it, huh? But in the English translation, I have the call introduction. Introduction is a what? Leading in. two right see that's already going into the matter you see so it should not be called introduction in the translation but the translator doesn't know what a premium is and how premium differs from a what from an introduction right okay if i can give a whole course let's say assumption that might be called introduction to something right okay very common college reduction to this event science right but you actually go into it away right premium just to say very shortly beginning what you're aiming at and maybe something what i'm going to proceed okay so this first reading is harry's premium to natural philosophy okay now if plato had already spoken a bit about this he wrote to the um teneosa which is not so much a dialogue but teneus speaking about the what origin universe and so on the cosmos right but he has a premium first which is magnificent premium and socrates of course just sits and listens okay and when uh he finishes the premium you know socrates applauds they give us a premium he's yeah and you look at the greek of that premium and aristotle's premium to the comeback in ethics they're very even the words seem very but similar right okay so plato saw that need you know in treatise huh to have a premium right okay it's analogous to the what overture in a what symphony in an opera sorry yeah which would be different right the overture of danjavan would be and kind of set the mood but it's most likely a prologue in a play right okay now what is our scholar going to do in this premium he's going to do two things just two things one is what we're aiming at right okay what the scope boss is okay okay and secondly and this take up most of the thing he's going to talk about the order in which we should consider these things we're aiming at right okay so the aim there is in the very first paragraph and all the rest of it will be about the order there okay so let's look at the first paragraph here he says since understanding and knowing why in all sciences of which there are beginnings or cause elements come to be from knowing these for then we and that's not the editorial way it means we the greek philosophers right for then we think we know each thing when you know its first causes and first beginnings and as far as its what elements huh it is clear that in the science of nature one should first try to determine about the beginnings now those first words in that paragraph since understanding and knowing why thomas in his commentary takes understanding which is a greek word identi there to refer to knowing what right okay and knowing what and knowing why are both from knowing what causes huh okay but use these three words instead of just the word cause right beginning causes elements okay and thomas points out how aristotle shows the character of those three words the meaning of those three words in the beginning of the fifth book of wisdom okay and then he raises the question of what how he's using those three words here right now in the fifth book of wisdom the first three words are beginning cause element and beginning is more general than the word cause every cause is in some way a beginning but not every beginning is a cause and the stock example is that of say a point a point for example is the beginning of a line but it's not really the cause of the line, right? The beginning of the day is not the cause of the day, right? So beginning is more general than what? Cause. That's very important incidentally to talk about God the Father and God the Son, right? Because you really shouldn't say God the Father is the cause of God the Son, then God the Son would be a creature, right? But you can say that the Son proceeds from the Father, right? And so the Father can be said to be a what? He can begin, right? And sometimes, you know, that's one meaning they give to the words there, John. In the beginning was the Word, right? The Word was in the Father. Father is in I, and I in the Father. The Father is the beginning. So beginning is more general in meaning than what? Cause, right? Although many of the meanings of beginning refer to causes, right? And all causes can be called beginnings, right? So in Esther, I was thinking very precisely, you know, in the fifth book of Wisdom, when he's really giving his most careful determination of these words, he points out that beginning is, what, more general in meaning than cause, right? But a lot of times we use beginning and cause almost interchangeably, because that's the kind of beginning the philosopher is interested in, because he wonders what and why. And then he's looking for beginnings in the sense of causes, right? Now, element is much more particular in cause. Actually, we'll meet later on in the course that there are four kinds of causes. The matter out of which something is made, right? The form it has, shape, ratio, order it has, then the mover or the maker of it, and then end or purpose, huh? What element is used just for the, what? The matter. The matter, yeah. He says much more particular, right? Okay. Now, you mentioned these three. There are three words that are very common with the Greeks when they talk about causes. So Aristotle may want to simply, what? Indicate that there are many kinds of causes by using these three words, right? And later on, we'll sort out the different kinds of causes. Or Thomas suggests that you can also, what? Adapt these different kinds of causes. You can adapt element to matter and beginning, especially to the, what? Mover or maker. So we say God is the beginning and the end of all things. We use the word beginning there to mean the maker of all things, huh? And then cause, for those two kinds of causes, form and end, huh? But not every science will use all these four kinds of causes, huh? Natural philosophy uses all four, but not everyone does. So, if you want to be very strict in the use of these words, beginning is more general than cause, right? Cause is more general than element, right? But you'd also use them almost synonymously. Just like Aristotle, remember, in the metaphysics used art or science for a knowledge that's universal without distinction between art or science. And he referred you to the ethics where he distributes them carefully, right? Okay? Well, here you can refer back to the metaphysics. You want to use the words very precisely. But you use them more loosely, right, to mean many kinds of causes, huh? Maybe they hint that there being different kinds of causes, huh? Do you see that? Okay. And especially element there in terms of matter because the rest of it doesn't emphasize it here. When he says, and as far as its elements, huh? He's hinting at the idea that natural philosophy goes, what? Down into matter as it goes on. And it actually does that twice, we'll see, in the whole of natural philosophy. When you go from the eight books of natural hearing to the book on the universe and then to the books on generation of corruption, you're going down towards matter. And then again, when you start with the three books about the soul, and you go down to studying later on, the body more in detail, you're going down towards, what? Matter. Which is just the reverse of what you do in wisdom. In wisdom, you go towards the, what? Immaterial. The actual philosophy goes towards matter. Just the opposite direction, huh? And when Aristotle says that we should first try to determine the beginnings, I don't think he means ...means that what we know first, or will know first, is the beginnings or causes, right? But it's first in our intention what we're aiming at, right? We're aiming at knowing natural things by their causes, right? We're aiming at knowing natural things in the light of their causes, huh? We're aiming at knowing what natural things are and why they are the way they are, right? And both what and why, as explains in the positive analytics, are answered by knowing the, what, cause, huh? Okay? So Thomas referred back to the positive analytics in explaining understanding and knowing why, right? And he takes it as referring to what Aristotle talks about in the second book of the positive analytics. Understanding what and knowing why, huh? But they're both through knowing causes, okay? Did I just say that or did I too fast? Okay? So that's the first paragraph, huh? What we're aiming at, huh? Okay? We're aiming at knowing natural things in the light of their causes, huh? Okay? We're aiming at knowing what and why natural things are as they are, right? It's another way of saying we're aiming at knowing their causes. Because knowing what and knowing why is through knowing the cause. Now, the rest of the first reading is concerned with the order in which we should consider natural things and their causes. And the main thing our style is going to say is that we should consider natural things and their causes in general before in what? Or in particular. Okay? Now, basically what he's going to do there is to give a reason why we should do that, huh? And everything else is related to that reason, huh? Now, we can state the reason in various forms. I often state it in the form of an if-then syllogism. Okay? And this is the if-then syllogism. So, if the confused is before the distinct in our knowledge, then the general is before the particular in our knowledge. So, if the confused is before the distinct in our knowledge, then the general is before the particular in our knowledge. And then, but, it confused, in fact, is before the distinct in our knowledge. Now, if you lay down those two statements, what follows, is the serenity? And it was before the particular in our knowledge. Therefore, the general is before the particular in our knowledge. So, that's going to be the central argument of the whole rest of this first reading, right? And everything else that he says is to back up something in an argument. Now, very often you find, huh, that one and sometimes both premises in a syllogism have to be backed up, right? But sometimes one of the premises is already known or it's kind of obvious, right? Okay? Now, of these two here, huh, look at the first one here. If you know what we mean by confused and distinct, huh? Confused here now is not being used in the sense of being mixed up or mistaken, right? But confused in the sense of being, what? Indistinct, right? Okay? I mean, separate those two senses. If I think that a dog is a cat, I'm mixed up, right? I'm mistaken, right? If I think a dog is an animal, am I mistaken? No. But in thinking that a dog is an animal, do I distinguish between a dog and a cat? No. So knowing that a dog is an animal is not to be mistaken, but it's not to have an altogether distinct knowledge of a dog. It's somewhat confused and determined, right? I just say that a dog is a cat is to actually, what, be mistaken, huh? So he says the confused before distinct, he means the indistinct, right? Not the mistaken. Now, isn't the general to the particular like the confused is to the distinct? If I know in general you're something. Oh no, you're a human being, right? You're a male human being, right? Okay? As I just said, you know, from something to you're an animal to you're a human being, you're a male and so on, I'm coming to know you more and more, what? Distinctly, aren't I? Okay? I don't identify the meaning of general in particular with confused and distinct. Confused and distinct is more general than general in particular. Genual in particular are merely one, what, kind of confused and distinct. So if it's true that we know things in a confused way before we know them distinctly, and the general as to the particular as to the confused as to the distinct, right? Right? To know something in general is not to know something as distinct as to know it in particular, right? To know that the cat is an animal is not as distinct as knowing it's a four-footed animal, and that's not as distinct as knowing it's a four-footed animal that meows and so on, right? Okay? Okay, so you see the truth of the first premise here, right? If-then-one. Now we'll read other examples of other kinds of confused and distinct knowledge, right? In the same reading, right? But I mention here off the bat that these don't mean the same thing as those two, right? Okay? Confused and distinct is more general than general in particular. Do you see that? So Aristotle doesn't really try to manifest much this if-then statement, huh? If you understand what you mean by confused and distinct, what you mean by general in particular, you can see that general is to particular as the confused is to distinct, right? So it would be like if I said four is to six is two is to three. Well, if two is before three, then four is before six, right? Four and six aren't the same thing as two and three, right? But if four is to six is two is to three, and two is before three, four must be four and six, right? Okay? So if the general is to the particular as it confuses the distinct, if that proportion is correct, right? Then if the confused is before the distinct, the general must be before the particular. Do you see the force of the argument? The force of the statement, right? It's based upon seeing a proportion, right? The way I stated here. Okay? It also stays a little bit different to say that general in particular are one form of confused and distinct, right? But you can argue again from the second premise. Now, the rest of what he says is really devoted to this second premise, huh? He's going to give a reason why we know the confused before the distinct, right? And this reason is very difficult to understand at first, huh? It's a very profound reason, huh? Okay? And he's going to do that in that second paragraph, huh? Okay? In the second paragraph, he's going to be giving the reason why we know things in a confused way before distinctly. But then, in the last three paragraphs, he's going to give three kinds of example to show that, in fact, we know the confused before the distinct. Okay? Thank you. three kinds of example to show that, not why, but to show that we know the confused before the distinct. And we will be identifying those three kinds of examples, and under each kind we get an infinity of examples to confirm, as I'll say. Now usually I talk about the three kinds of examples because it's easier for people to see. And then we'll come back to this most difficult reason that he gives. Why? Okay? Like I mentioned, how people wrote their own doctoral thesis on this one page. Right? Especially that reason why involves so much labor, right? Okay? So let's look at the easier thing, the three kinds of examples first to manifest that in fact we do know things in a confused way before distinctly. Okay? So I'm going to erase this here. But you should have in mind how it revolves around this argument here, right? And the reason for the second premise and the manifestation of the truth of the second premise here. By the three kinds of examples, huh? Now the first kind of example that Aristotle gives is from the sensible composed whole. Composed whole is the ordinary sense of whole. Composed means what? Put together, right? Okay? So, it's a whole put together from its parts as opposed to the universal whole which is not put together from its parts but says no. Okay? We touched upon that when we talked about division if you remember. But he takes one that the sense is no, right? A sensible composed whole, right? And he's going to exemplify a sensible composed whole that we know such a whole in a confused way first and then later on more distinctly. We don't distinguish in other words the parts at first, right? But as time goes on we start to do that. Okay? Now, let's take an example of that. Let's start with a sense of taste, right? Let's take taste and smell. I can take all kinds of examples. Let's take a salad dressing, right? Now, sometimes people go to somebody's house and they serve the salad and they taste the salad dressing. Mmm, this is good. You know? Or you go to a restaurant and you have a kind of unusual salad dressing and you ask your hostess or waiter what do you use in your salad dressing? This is very good. You know? I heard people say it, haven't you? They use that sometimes, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Now, what does that show about your knowledge of the salad dressing? It came through the senses. Huh? That it came through the senses. Yeah. But what kind of knowledge do you have of the salad dressing that you just enjoy and you say, what do you use in there? Taste. You don't know the parts and how it was made. Yeah. You can't distinguish the parts, right? See? You have an indistinct knowledge of it, huh? Okay. Okay? I have a friend who's a kind of wine concierge, isn't he? Yeah. And cook and chef and so on. So he goes to Paris, right? He goes to one of these fancy restaurants and they serve you this piece of meat with a wine sauce on it, right? Right. It's delicious, but what do they use? Well, it won't do any good to ask them because that's the secret of the house, right? That's their two-star or three-star or whatever it is. And they won't give it the spy for the opposition, right? So he tasted and tried to pick out what it was. Then go back to his apartment and try to do the thing that sauce. You get something that resembled it, but not exactly the same, right? Then when he had enough money, he'd go back and order the exact same meal. Yeah. Then go back to his estate. Okay? What is that show about this guy, even though he's got a wonderful... It's a taste that he's, what, takes him time, right, to pick out what's being used in that sauce, huh? One time I had a recipe for a Marchand de Vans sauce, right? So we're going to try this Marchand de Vans sauce from France. So there's three of us in the kitchen, huh? My mother and my sister-in-law, Dolores, and myself. And my sister-in-law and myself are making the sauce, and my mother's doing everything else. So it's complicated, right? Not very good, though, right? But a lot of ingredients there, right? And it takes time to be able to pick them up. Take a few examples in the sense of taste or smell. In California, if you have the name of the grape on the bottom of the wine, right, the law specifies the percentage of that grape it has to have in it. It's almost all a target grape, huh? It has a name on it. But then if they have a generic name, like Burgundy, right, that doesn't have to have any particular grape on it. And so the different vineyards would use, what, a mixture of different grapes in the bottled over in Burgundy or Clary or something. And it would be unique to each house, right, depending on what grapes they have and what combination they think tastes good and so on. But from the same house, it would cost less than one with the name of the grape on it. Okay. So my brother Mark is a great wine connoisseur, as you know. He's in the middle of tasting one of these wines, and he says, What are you using there? The guy's being kind of cagey and telling my brother Mark what he's using. So Mark is, you know, Oh, and he starts to tell the guy what's in there. And pretty soon the guy says, Come on in the back room, he says, Taste some of these combinations and see which one you think is the best. You see? But from the other, Mark said he couldn't be the only first one out in California, right? He couldn't pick up a glass and just tell the ingredients. You heard that story of Ron McCarthy there. He had a dinner, I guess, and he had a different wine and a kind of fancy bottle. Nobody knew it, but from the other, Mark said, This is not this. It's going to deceive me and everybody else, you know. Okay. Now, let's take another sense. Take the ear. When you first hear the symphony playing as a whole, right, this is pleasing to the ear, but does your ear pick out all the different instruments? No. No. There's a famous piece by a British composer in the 20th century there, Benjamin Britten. It's called Young Christian's Guide to the Orchestra. You've probably heard that. But he starts out in the orchestra, plays this magnificent theme from Priscilla, and then he breaks it down. The strings play all by themselves, and then the woodwinds play by themselves, and the musicians by themselves, and so on. At the end, he combines it all. And so do you have, what? Young Christian's Guide to the Orchestra. You see what he's doing? He's giving you a more distinct knowledge of the instruments playing together. Okay. I've noticed with the Mozart, Aria, right? My ear is naturally drawn to the human voice singing. And I have to train my ear to listen to the musical accompaniment because it's a nice combination there, to get the full effect of it, right? But I was, you know, I liked very much, as Aria heard years ago, non-pure di fiori from Clemenza di Tito. And only recently I found out that the musical accompaniment is using the basset horn, you see? Oh. Because I got some pieces of music by Mozart looking for the basset horn. It's kind of an unusual instrument that was kind of fashionable in those days, but it's a very interesting sound. And, ah, that's what he uses inside. Oh, my goodness, you know? So that was a great discovery for me, you see? It took me years to sort this out a bit, right? You see? So that's kind of pointed out to me. You see that? So what are you hearing at first? You're hearing the whole, all the sounds that you hear, but you're not really picking out the instruments. When I first was hearing Mozart's Jupiter Symphony, right, his last symphony, and my music-educated friend says, you know what he does at the end of the fourth movement? I said, well, what does he do? It's not exactly what you do. He combines five melodies together. I said, he does? Not in how many times I've heard it, right? See? But he goes through these different melodies, and then at the end, right, he combines them, you know, and he gives us a way, you know? Wow, I didn't know that, see? I didn't know that.