Logic (2016)
Lecture 53: Fallacies from Speech: Figura Dictionis and Equivocation

Transcript
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You know, when we talk about color sometimes, Aristotle will talk about it as being the end of the transparent. So the eye goes out to the end of the transparent and there's the color, right? It doesn't seem to go from the eye out to the end of the transparent. My eye has gone out to that painting over there. My eye is studying that painting. The studying is from my eye to the painting, right? In fact, we can understand that, there's a little danger in this sort of thing, right? Makes sense, doesn't it? I think we've got some text, you know, that sort of thing, right? Look at the example here on page two here, right? From the De Veritate, right? It's amazing I have this in my thing here. I just got through rereading the... I just finished it in time when the grandchildren descended upon me, you know? I'm angry. It's got to be the Latin there, huh? Praeterea, morver. The same cannot be agens et patsiens, right? The mover and the moved, right? Unless in this way that one part of it is moving or acting and the other moved or undergoing. This is clear in animals as is proved in the eight books of physics or natural hearing. It said intelligens et intellectum se habend ut agens et patsiens, right? See? We're talking about here, right? The definition, right? Ergo non potes esse ut agens totum se intelligat. So what fallacy is being made here, right? You're imagining, right? It to be like acting upon and undergoing, right? Kicking is in what category? And I like to call that category acting upon, right? Her star used the word, what? Poien, right? We do it for making, too, right? That thing, poien, pasking, right? Acting upon and undergoing, huh? To the theory it should be said that intellectum et intelligens non se habend ut agens et patsiens, huh? What is this Thomas talking about, huh? He's talking about the fallacy of what? Diction, right? Said ambo, but both have themselves as one, what? Agens, right? Quam vis quantum ad modem o quendi? Right? Vidiantur, with agens et patsiens, right? Significare, right, huh? Okay? Vidiantur means what? Imaginative here, right, huh? So that, like... Yeah, I mean, he's saying that the understanding and the understood, right, are not like, what? Aging and patient, yeah, acting upon and undergoing, right, huh? Kicking and kicked are like acting upon and undergoing, and kicking... Unlike they are. Yeah, yeah, see? But understanding and understood, not like acting. So when I know the table, is it on the table, the table doesn't on the table? Yeah, yeah. What I'm trying to understand, I thought, if we take the senses... I'm acting on that painting when I see it, right? You know? So seeing the painting is not like, what? Kicking you or hitting you or something, yeah? But isn't the painting acting upon you? Maybe so, yeah, yeah. But the seeing of the painting arises from the, what, union of the two, right, huh? So, it's not that the one understanding of seeing is acting upon the thing understood or seeing, right, huh? But it seems to, what? Secundum quantum ad modulo quendi, he says, right, huh? I think he's talking about this kind of a fallacy, right, huh? What do you imagine this to be? Because grammatically, it seems to be the same, right? I mean, why does our, what does our, what does our, what does that tell us about our knowing these acts? And which is more known to me? Kicking what it is or seeing what it is? And we kind of, yeah, yeah. Now, that was in question 8, article 6, objection 3. Now, objection 11, and not 11, right, huh? Whoever operation falls between the agent and the patient. Like I was saying, right? Kicking is between you and me in a couple of senses, right? We're enemies now. And, sed intellectus, sed intellectum, se habant, ut agens et paciens, huh? Okay? Since, therefore, nothing falls in between a thing and itself. Oh, magnificent. It's impossible that an angel understand himself. Can you kick yourself? One party you can kick, another party, right? But, but, can I hit my, you know, I can hit this fist, but can I hit this fist? And that's clapping with one hand. Yeah, yeah, yeah. To the 11th, it should be said that the operatio intelligibides, right, is not a media secundum rem, right? Now, he doesn't repeat the thing that he said in the other reply there, but, you know, but it's in the modem o quendi, right, that it seems to be that, right? So you, you dummy, you imagine something to be other than what? It is, right? What's his name? Shelly, right? Poetry, right? Imagination delights in the likeness of things, right? Reason wants to know the differences of things. But it shows you kind of why imagination can be a cause of error, right? Because likeness is what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. I'll always be reading the play of Shakespeare, I always read Shakespeare's plays, of course, but the comedy of errors, right? And what's the basis for the comedy of errors, right? Yeah, yeah. He kind of doubles up in the Roman ones because he has two pairs of twins, right? People are being mixed up, right? And so one of them is married to this woman and they confuse the other brother with the husband, right? So he goes to eat dinner with the other woman and he's kind of falling in love with the sister of the other woman. He says, you shouldn't be complimenting me, you know, you can take care of my sister, you know, and be a faithful husband, you know. And he's falling in love with the sister, right? And so this is one thing after another, right? Comedy of errors, right? Of course you have the word, of course, the native English word in there too. You mistake somebody, right, or somebody else, right? You ever mistake somebody? I remember in one of the plays there at the two sisters, one of them was in the play and the other sisters looked alike, you know. And it was a very good play, you know, and so on. So I wanted to congratulate the sister. Oh, that's my sister. So these things are funny, right? And they say, you know, sometimes, you know, girls who really were, you know, twins are very much alike. They switch dates, right? And see what it's like to go out to the other guy and hear his platitudes and so on. He's got a wonderful sense of humor though, you know. I mean. I mean. You know, girls are really, really look alike, you know, it would be that way, you know. Even my brother Mark and I weren't twins, you know. My brother Mark, he's a year and a half and older than I am, you know. We're all twins, you know. He's the older brother, you know. But I mean, the students would get mixed up, you know. Depurposed, impurposed, you know. The scheduled courses, you know. Depurposed, impurposed, you know. Occasionally you get a student who would mix up and mix up the two of us, you know. And it's kind of funny, you know. Yeah. So he says to ad un decimum. Operatio intelligibides, right, is not a middle secundum rem, right. Secundum rem, he said, right. As opposed to secundum modem loquendi, right. Where it seems to be something that it isn't, right. Very tricky, huh. So it's not secundum rem, media in the middle between intelligence and spectrum, right. Or you might say secundum rem, that kicking is really in the middle between you and me, right. Said proceded, right. From both. It proceeds from both. According as they are, what, united, right. So I bet most of you don't know that, right. And they kind of imagine, right, huh. The scene goes out of my eye, over to you, right. Yeah, well you're awfully smart, you know. Now, if he was kicking me, I'd know he was acting upon me, you know. But he's sitting there, you know. Did you ever use the expression, my eyes fell upon? No, but in your daily life, you know. You're looking for something from my glasses, right. So my eyes fell upon it, right. People speak that way, don't they? You never say that? I'm sure. As you said, it's probably more true to say that my eyes, I was struck with her beauty. Another article we're going to jump to an article here, right. De Veritati, Question 8, Article 8. Whether the angel is knowing material things through some forms, or by the essence of the one knowing, right. I was talking about that earlier, right. Okay. The angel knows some things by knowing himself. He doesn't know everything, right. So he needs these other forms, right. Well, this is Objection 10 in the odd 10, right, huh. The objection contains the fallacy in the reply, you know. That's where Thomas has seen this. For more efficacious is the angel in knowing than the fire in. Right. Yeah. But the fire burns without this that something combustible will be in it. They are the same thing as before. To the 10th it should be said that the one knowing does not have himself to knowable as the, what, burning combustible. Of which one is the agent and the other is the patient, right. How is it really? But the knowing, the knower, and the knowable have themselves as one beginning of, what, knowledge. Insofar as from the, what, knowable and the knower coming together in some way. In some way that comes about, what, knowledge, yeah. It's just clear from the forequad. And therefore, ratio non secretor, right. Now, it's a different kind of thing here. There's all different examples, but all the examples are the same, what, kind of, yeah, the same kind of thing here, huh. But now a little different thing here, huh. Scriptum super libera tu sententiarum, you know about that, huh. So you're going to look at Thomas, huh. There should just be a small eye there, right. Yes, I just caught that. Yeah, yeah. He, drunk, Hebrews, right. Killing somebody, right. Homicide. Sins by two sins, huh. Drunkenness you might say, right. And homicide, right. And account of which he merits two, what. Condemnations. Yeah. Nothing ever prevents the quantity of the, what. Through ignorance to be lessened from the, what. What is going before, right. Whence in the process of the argument is figura dictionis. I know he's using the technical term there, right, huh. This is the name of the, what. Third kind of, what. The one from imagination, right. Okay. Quia mutat there, discreetum in continuum. So you're, you're putting, what. The discrete as if it were, what. Two. As if it's more in the sense of being, what. Continuous, right, huh. Okay. But maybe, you know, you're being drunk, right. That means that you're less than ten to kill a person than you did. Right. You know. You're maybe striking out because you're mad at them or something, you know. You're drunk and you killed them, right. So. I'd like to diminish it, right. That's a different kind of thing, right, huh. But it's discreet to the continuous, huh. That's really kind of an interesting thing there, huh. Okay. Look at the next text here from questions de potentia. Okay. Moreover, all denomination. Remember that was a word we learned at the beginning of the category. Yeah. All denomination is from a form. But a form is something inhering in that of which it is. Since, therefore, God is named by relations to creatures, it seems that these relations are something in God. To the eighth, it should be said that that from which something is denominated is not necessarily always a form secundum rei naturum, right. Secundum rei, right. Secundum rei naturum. Since it suffices, right, to be signified per modem forme, grammaticiae loquendo, right. Man's denomine from action and from what? Clothing, right. Mothers of these aren't which realitare non sunt forme, right, huh. Where you're being deceived by form adiccionians. And again, important thing here, you know. That was a really difficult thing, those relations are reasonable. One heck of a thing, right, huh. At times earlier, it was recently there where he was talking about how when a mistaken man comes to know the truth, right, are there two changes there? Well, I'm talking about generation corruption. There's the corruption of his error, right, huh. And the generation of his, what, novels, right, huh. So the real distinction of two changes there, right, but they correspond. What about if a man is ignorant, huh? And then he comes to know something who's ignorant of, huh? Is there a generation of knowledge? Yes. But is there... Yeah. Well, that would be none-being becoming none-being, right? Or a different kind of non-being. That's how you're not going to change, you know? Because that's a being of reason, right? The negation of negation, right? How many speeches of non-being are there? Which category of non-being? Yeah. This is actually amazing when Thomas goes through these things, you know, but you've got to kind of start to see that, you know, he's correcting somebody, right? Now, we'll... Broad texture from the... The Trinity, right, huh? Now, the objection. Moreover, if the Father and the Son are one beginning of the Holy Spirit, that's what we say, don't we? It's either the one which is the Father or the one which is not the Father. But you can't give you the one of these. Because if it is the one that is the Father, it would follow that the Son is the Father. If the one that is not the Father, it would follow that the Father is not the Father. It should not, therefore, be said that the Father and the Son are one beginning of the Holy Spirit. Doesn't the church say it is? The one beginning? You know, they mentioned this before, that Aristotle in the three books on the soul there was talking about knowledge there. He's talking about what the early Greeks said about knowledge, right? And what they said about knowledge was incorrect, because what was his name? The famous one from Empedocles, right? By earth we know earth, and by water we know water, and air by air, and fire by fire, and love by love, and hate by hate, right? And because we have all these things in us, that we know them, right? Well, there's some truth behind that, right? Because the thing known must be in the knower before it's what? Known, right? As Aristotle points out in the sixth book of Wisdom, sixth book of First Philosophy, the good is primarily in things, right? But truth is primarily in the mind, right? Okay? So I'm trying to learn something, I'm trying to get in my mind, right? But I'm trying to love God, I'm trying to go out of myself, into God, so to speak, like he said there, right? In the play, right? He dwells there, right? Where love is. So Christ says, you know, where your treasure is, there your heart shall be, right? I left my heart in San Francisco, right? And so on. Now, you're saying the Father and the Son are one beginning, you've got this problem, right? This objection, right? To the fourth, it should be said that these two, to which the Father and the Son are one beginning that is the Father, or one beginning that is not the Father, right? Which is the either-or argument that he had in the objection, are not contradictorily opposed. Mind this guy, huh? You can always say, you know, like Sirach said there about Aristotle, compared to Thomas, I got the brain of an egg over. Once it is not necessary that one of them be, what? Given. In the case of contradictory, there's no third alternative, right? Either you're drunk or you're not drunk, right? There's no third alternative. I say you're partially drunk, right? I tell that you're drunk. For when we say the Father and the Son are one beginning, right, huh? This that I say beginning does not have a what? One. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But it's a confused supposition for two persons, what? Together, right, huh? Okay. Whence in the preceding there is a fallacy of the figure of diction from a confused supposition to determine one. What the hell, Thomas? Who's going to... Who would see that except Thomas, right? Right. You know? I'm glad he wrote it down. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Now, this is another objection, right? Moreover, if the Father and the Son are one beginning of the Holy Spirit, top of page five there, right, it seems a converso, it should be said that there is what? That the one beginning of the Holy Spirit is the Father and the Son. But this seems to be false because what I call a beginning here, it either supposes or stands for the person of the Father or the person of the Son. And both ways it is false. Therefore, this is false that the Father and the Son are one beginning of the Holy Spirit. Because this that I call a beginning, Thomas says, right, huh? What to the fifth, he says, it should be said that this is true, that the one beginning of the Holy Spirit is the Father and the Son. Which is it? In case you want to do it. Because this that I call a beginning does not, what, stand for one person only, but indistinctly for two. This has been said. And then the next objection, right? Moreover, one in substance makes the same. If therefore the Father and the Son are one beginning of the Holy Spirit, it would follow that they are the same, what, beginning. But this is negated by many, right? Therefore, it should not be conceded that the Father and the Son are one beginning of the Holy Spirit. And the ability to breathe the Holy Spirit, right, is common to the Father and the Son. The Holy Spirit doesn't have the ability to breathe the Holy Spirit. Yeah. But the ability to breathe the Holy Spirit is common to the Father and the Son. Amazing. To the sixth, it should be said, it can be said that the Father and the Son are the same beginning, according as beginning stands for, and it confused mystically for two, what? First and single, right? You know, what you should say about reproduction there, right, huh? The husband and the wife one beginning of the child. I'm not getting involved in that too much. They do have, you know? Might be some sense, but be careful about that, right? Let's take a little bit here. Presupposed to see the next one, huh? It should be said that equal and unequal are said according to what? Quantity, huh? For one in quantity is called what? Equal. Just as one in quality is called like, and one in substance is called the same. This is clear in the fifth book of metaphysics. Quantity implies the notion of what? Measure. Which is first found in numbers. Second in magnitudes, huh? Numbers is put first in. species quantity, and in some other way in all the other genera. This is clear in the first book of Metaphysics. On each genus, that which is most simple and most perfect is the measure of all others. Notice that's interesting, huh? Simple and perfect go together, right? Now, when Thomas takes up the substance of God in both summas, right, he takes up the simplicity of God and the perfection of God, what? Next to each other. Simplicity before the perfection, right? But they're right next to each other, right? And one reason Thomas Gis are putting the two of them together is that in material things, right, the more perfect is composed. So the stone is simpler than the, what, tree, but the tree is more perfect and more like God than the stone. Do you agree, Bernard? And I defend that statement by saying, you know, that we have the metaphor, right? The Lord is my rock. And a metaphor is based upon likeness, huh? There's some likeness, right, of the rock, too. But in Peter's confession of faith, which it is built on, he says, Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God, right? So life is something found in God, right? He's alive. It's not a statue, in case you didn't know that. And so the tree is in some way alive, huh? Although life is hidden in the tree, right, huh? That's why the tree doesn't get, the plant doesn't get named from anima, right, like animal does, right? Animals clearly alive, right, huh? But the animal is more composed than the, what, more complicated, I'd say, than the, what, yeah, human beings are even more complicated than a cat or a dog, right? Yeah, yeah. And so, you're knowing God kind of via negativa, right, huh? So if you're thinking of God in terms of the creature and knowing him from the creature, you say, well, the simpler thing is, right, simplicity and perfection don't go together, right? Yeah. So you want to curl it up right away, right? So you go from simplicity, you want to talk about simplicity of God and talk right next to it about what? Yeah, so that's kind of interesting reason he gives, right, huh? And I'd like to kind of say, you know, that if you could take a kind of, you know, Dante-esque ascent, you know, up as he does sometimes, where he's going up from hell to purgatory, but go up to the nine choirs or orders of angels, right, he'd see as you go up, they get simpler and more perfect. Well, it's quite just the opposite thing in the immaterial world than the material world, right? And you'd be kind of suspecting, oh, no, it's at the end of this as you go up. Something that's all together is simple and universally, what, perfect, you know? But you're kind of being prepared for that as you understand it. It's amazing, right? You know? My teacher, Kasurik, said, when you first see your guardian angel, he says, this is God, you know? I mean, it's a wonderful picture he is, you know? So simple and so perfect, you know? And the angel will say, no, I'm not God, you know? But you go up and say, this is God, no, this is God, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no Inim January, id quads in pichimus, perfectissimus, kind of, thinking of the hard things, is a measure of all the things, as in color, whiteness, right, and in motion, the daily motion, right, so we use for time, right, sun's apparent motion around the earth, right, okay, for each thing, the more perfect it is, the more it exceeds to the first of the genus, from which it is clear, the perfection of each thing, according as it's to be observed, is its measure, right, and from the first beginning, huh, similarly, its quantity, and in this is what Augustine says in the Sixth Book of the Trinity, in his quae non mole magna sunt, right, concise word, the same is meleus quae meus, huh, so when you say God is more than me, what does that mean? Non mole magna sunt, right, he's meleus, right, huh, he's better than me, but when of each form not subsisting, its being consists in what? Being in its subject or what? Matter, right, huh? In two ways is quantity or perfection can be considered. In one way, according to the, what, ratio of its proper species. In another way, according to the being that it has in matter or in a subject, right, huh? Now, according to the ratio of its own species or kind, the forms of diverse species are unequal, but the forms of one species, right, some are able to be equal, some not, huh, for it's necessary that specific beginning be taken in something indivisible, but the difference of this beginning varies the species, and therefore, if in this beginning there is addition and subtraction from necessity, the necessity of the species are what? Parried. Once the philosopher says in the Eighth Book of Wisdom, I'm only talking about substance, right, the Seventh and the Eighth Books are about substance, right? In the Seventh, he leads you by the hand from logic to talk about substance, and then in the Eighth Book, he leads you by the hand from natural philosophy, right, huh? So he says that they are, what, like numbers, right, huh? So there's a little truth in what Plato said, right, huh? I got your number, right? Okay? Now, why do we say that, right, huh? You see? Yeah, it's different. Yeah, yeah. You say, well, take something I know a little better here, like soul, right, huh? Okay? The soul of the plant has what? The ability to feed itself, to grow, and to reproduce its kind, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Now, the animals have that, you know, but in addition they have what? Sins, right? Okay, and emotion. So they call the plant one, the tree, the dog or cat, maybe would be two, right, huh? Now, the lower animals don't move around from one place to another, right? But they have sensation like the seafood there and those things, yeah. And then you get to the higher animals, right? And they have all the senses, right? Senses are nothing at a distance, right? The ear or the eye or something. And then that's number three, right? And then man has all that in addition, understanding, and willing, so he's number four, right? So, you notice what my friend Shakespeare said. What is a man if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed? A beast? Yeah, see? He must have known this stuff, Shakespeare, huh? He's a great natural genius. Yeah. Well, I don't know. I'm ready to go. Yeah. If your chief good is to eat and sleep, then you're no more than a beast, right? One less. Mm-hmm. So Aristotle says that the species of things are like, what, numbers, right? In which a unity added or subtracted varies as species, right? So you take away the use of reason from man and so on, and will, therefore, and then you really move on to the beast. Some forms, what, get their species right through something of their, what, essence, right? Just as all forms, absolutely, whether substantial or accidental. And in such is it possible that in the same species, according to this word, one form is more than another. For one whiteness is not considered by itself, abstractly, right? More whiteness than another, right? Some forms, there are, which get their species from something extrinsic to which they order, as motion gets its species from its, what, term. Once one motion is closer to another, according to its, what, nearness or distance from its, what, end. And she'll come more into my house than the salesman has got his foot in the door, right? And some are found qualities which are dispositions in order to something, as health is a certain, what, commensuration of, humorous, yeah, very simple biology, right? In order to the nature of the animal, right, which is called to be healthy. And therefore, some grade of commensuration of humors or fluids in the lion is health, which in man would be infirmity, right? Because therefore, according to the grade of the commensuration, health does not receive its species, but according to the nature of the animal to which it is ordered, right? It happens also that in the same animal, one's health is greater than another, right? Insofar as there can be a diverse grade of commensuration of fluids, right? Which is still solved, things that are super-deemed in nature. And in one way, in the same way, in science, right, which receives unity for the unity of the subject. Once in one, there can be geometry more than another, right? Insofar as he knows more conclusions, ordered to a knowledge of the subject of geometry, which is magnitude. Likewise, according to the quantity of perfection, which forms have according as they're in matter or subject, some forms of one species are unequal, insofar as they're in something more or less. Some are, what, not able to be in them more or less. So we argue here that no substantial form can be received more or less, huh? Same way for a double, right? These kind of relations, huh? One thing would be more double than another. No, there are some forms, yeah, some things. This is in there, because it's going to help to clear up things that comes out later on. But forms which neither give their species to the subject, nor do they, what, get their species from something, that according to its definition is indivisible, right? They can be in something more or less as, what, whiteness and blackness, huh? So one man can be more courageous than another man, right? Be more temperate than another man. From these, therefore, it is clear, as Thomas says, that in two ways something can have itself to diverse forms concerning, what, equality and equality. There are some forms, there are, which are, which in the same species do not receive any equality, even in themselves, that one of them is greater than another of the same species, nor in their being that one is more in its subject. This sort of, the substantial forms. There are some that do not receive any equality in themselves, but only according as they are in the subject, as whiteness and, what, blackness, huh? Some receive any equality in themselves, not according as they are in the subject, as a triangle is said to be a, what, greater triangle, right? And the lines of one triangle are more than another, of the order to specify one thing. For one surface is not more triangular than another, right? Are you making a distinction? No, no, why this text isn't it? Okay. Some things are which receive any equality in themselves and according as they are in the subject, as health and knowledge and, what, emotion. For emotion is unequal, either because it goes a greater distance, or because it moves the mobile more swiftly. Similarly, knowledge is more of one than another, either because he knows more conclusions, or because he knows the same things better. Similarly, something can be healthy, healthy can be unequal, either through the grade of commensuration, one is more suitable to perfect equality than another, or because one has that grade in a way more firmly than another, right? Okay, that's a mouthful, Thomas. Don't worry too much about that, huh? Now, this question, that's the reason why this horrible text was before us, right? It should be said that to many, right, errors happen about forms, from this that they do not judge about them, from this that they do judge about them, just as they judge about, what, substances, huh? Now, why is this? This happens, or it seems to happen, because forms, per modem substantiarum, are signified in the abstract. This is the fact of formative xionis again, isn't it? With albedo ver vertus, right? Or something of this sort. Whence some, fouling the mode of speaking, right, judge about these as if they were, what, substances, huh? And from this proceeds the error of those who posit a hiddenness of forms, right, huh? As of those who, what, posit forms to be from creation, right? For the guess, right, estimate, right, that it belongs to forms to come to be just as it comes to be, what? Substances. Yeah. And therefore, not finding from what their forms are generated, they laid them down to be created or to pre-exist in matter, right? That's hard to see, right, huh? Okay. Let's say you've got a piece of clay, right, in the shape of a sphere, right, huh? Now you can mold that into a, what? Cube. Cube, huh? Where'd that shape come from? Yeah, it had to be created, right, huh? Because there was no, well, there was a form of a cube hidden in the sphere of clay, right, huh? You just kind of revealed it, right, huh? Is that the way it came about? The sculpture, you said. It was there, I just shipped away the waste. Yeah, yeah, that's the way Michelangelo said it. It was in there, the form of it. Yeah, yeah, it's a Michelangelo said it, huh? Yeah, just revealing the thing that's hidden in there. But you're kind of imagining it as something that exists by itself, right? Like a substance, right, or in itself, right? And it's either got to be hidden in there. else it's going to be created right in both cases you're imagining form to be something like a what substance right terrible this last lowly one right this can raise to all these crazy ideas are you are you giving uh existence to a form or you're forming the matter yeah you see you're getting just into a form that wasn't before and you're going to have to say it's either created right or it's what hidden in there right it's kind of interesting that i was thinking of the position of socrates in the dialogues there you know where he says that learning isn't calling right it's kind of what you knew already but you would yeah yeah yeah and uh you know socrates is talking to the slave boy and he says uh how do you double a what and the slave boy says we double the side right and socrates shows him that if you double the side you get a square four times as big right now and then he says well now suppose you have this original square and you've pulled on the side another square just like it and then another square just like it okay so the slave boy is answering all the things that he knows right now so the way to really double a square which is to take the diagonal right to the side of that square comes out of what the slave boy knows so the slave boy is now what we call it the way to it he forgot to you know temporarily how to double square right yeah yeah because that was taking place yeah yeah so it was in the um he was able to know it from what he knew already right but he didn't know it yet from what he knew already and by reasoning that you come to know right but you don't know what you know already right so um if you go back to the the syllogism right yeah just did the ticket the lettered formula for one every b is a and every c is b right and that contains in its power every c is a right but is every c is a one of the premises so in recalling those two premises so in recalling those two premises i can come to know every c is a right i'm not recalling in fact every c is a am i i'm going to see it from the first you know uh time from every b is a and from every c is b right so you're kind of confusing two things right it was hidden in what i knew already was yeah yeah yeah yeah so socrates says he's shown that the learning is recalled yeah yeah recalling what you do yeah yeah you learn by recalling what you know then you come to know something you didn't know through those things that you recall in a sense uh yeah so i know i don't know whether he was inspired by that or not but i know when the itinerary and he tells us now including from the beginning of it and from both of them i know so in editions you know like of euclid you know that they will um give you the reference to what the theorem is used to prove this right so if you've kind of forgotten that theorem or something you know and uh you call it right now and even some editions of thomas they do that right now you know because thomas will say you know in one of the later chapters in summa kind of gentiles you know as before we said you know in parentheses you know but this is not thomas this is you know question or chapter or whatever it is you know which he showed us this thing that he's now using right so you have to make the effort of your calling which you know it's interesting you know in summa kind of gentiles when he goes to a new chapter right if he can uh reason to the conclusion the next chapter from the chapter immediately preceding he will do that first right and it's beautiful like in the beginning of the summa kind of gentiles there chapter 13 is is on the gist of god right then chapter 14 since he's he's even more so than in the summa theologiae he's he's proven by what for motion right that the unmoved mover exists right yeah and he has two arguments for it much more developed in the summa theologiae well then in the 14th chapter he's he's he's mainly what he's saying is new there is that we know more god is not than what he is right and what should be again knowing that he's not he doesn't move it's almost it's clear from the previous this is the 14th chapter which is right after the 13th chapter which is where the five proofs is about so he's he's basing upon the beginning of that previous chapter and then um in the next chapter the 15th chapter is on the eternity of god right what he recalls we just showed that that god is what unchanging right so if god came to be or ceased to be you'd have to change right well if there's no change in god then god has no beginning no end because he's kind of eternal right and there's no time in god and then um he gets in the next chapter he recalls that god is eternal right to show that god is pure act and it's kind of amazing and he goes into their arguments that's kind of helping you know to tie things together right now and then he'll go back into an earlier chapter right now if he can argue from what's in the immediate chapter before this chapter he'll do that first usually right and then he'll call something you know two or three chapters back or ten chapters back or something you know it's kind of funny you know i mean kind of it's kind of good though you know help the little it's nice to see you know right away something from what you just saw right you know and then go back and say oh i can go back to other things just this form is said to be a being not because it itself is if we speak properly at the bottom of page seven here but because by it something is right and thus the form is said to come to be right yeah so in the clay that is in the shape of a of a sphere right it comes a cube right is the shape coming to be he says what speaking right um notice the last line there on page seven secret in informe in digitur non quia ipsa set it's that it's that right by which something is so in what sense is the form said to come to be you