Logic (2016)
Lecture 50: Fallacies, Deception, and the Two Sources of Error

Transcript
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a third book here of wisdom, but he does it in many of the other parts of philosophy, right? It's only really in, what, geometry, maybe, in Mathematicae, right, which are, you know, Euclid's elements are only dialectic there, right, because it's so, what, certain, yeah, but in all the other parts of philosophy, right, you need this dialectic, huh? Thank you, Stapp. Fourth, really about, okay. Yeah. Hmm? in the name of the father and the son holy spirit amen god our enlightenment move us god to know and love you help us god to know and love you guardian angels strengthen the lights of our mind order and lighten our images and arouse us to consider more correctly saint thomas aquinas angelic doctor help us to understand all that you have written father son holy spirit amen i was thinking about my knowledge i'm not my knowledge you know i'm not my love right so me and my knowledge are two different things we're connected in some way but and me and my love are not the same thing right but my knowledge and my love are not the same thing either even if i happen to know and love the same thing right my knowledge and love of that thing are not the same right so if i know god and i love god my knowing god and my loving god would not be the same thing right and that must be true it seems to me even in the next world right huh even if i know god face to face and i love him more than i could love him on this earth uh still my knowledge and my love with him would not be the same thing right but now in the case of god now is there any distinction any real distinction distinction of things right between god and god's knowledge of god did you know that that's what he knows everything he knows right is by knowing himself but is there any distinction in things between god and his knowledge of himself same thing right and same thing for his love right is god and his love of himself two different things that's very strange right and is god's love and god's knowledge two things god is something that is both what the knowledge of god and the love of god you know sometimes we see you know scripture it's saying you know god is love and so on right you say god is knowledge too or god is wisdom right and uh the same thing so he's something that is both knowledge and love why not my experience of knowledge and love they're always two different things right he's he's very um strange god right huh he's altogether simple right yeah yeah yeah he's gonna be kind of you know fascinating yeah i can apply it too to this thing here you know the text from thomas and the one from macbeth here right now they're both talking about how a mistake can come from what the defective reason or it can come from the the will right okay look for a minute a minute here at the uh macbeth on air do you have all that text you know start with the thing here macbeth the play opens with the words of the three witches right those instruments of hell right the whole of act one scene one is devoted to their conversation in 12 lines ending with the couplet which expresses with the brevity and beauty of shakespeare the two errors we can make about the good and the bad and touches upon the two sources of those errors this is the couplet fair is foul and foul is fair hover through the fog and filthy air but before we unfold all this reason we should concentrate our mind upon the words by looking at the poetic devices shakespeare shakespeare here for there is rhyme as well as reason in these words the lines of course rhyme fair and what air and there is much alliteration beginning with the letter f fair and foul foul and fair fog and filthy right and then he uses what kind of meter huh it's trochaic right it's the opposite of what yeah yeah and you know aristotle remarks how the iambic is closest to daily speech and sometimes in daily speech without thinking of it we fall into iambic right now but trochaic being reverse well shakespeare likes to use trochaic for something that's kind of not usual ordinary right um shakespeare as he often does for unfamiliar creatures right he's using trochaic and catalectic that means you're leaving out one of the feet one of the one part of it okay now the first line touches upon the two possible mistakes about the good and the bad one can think that the good is bad the fair is foul right where the bad is good the foul is fair if one can make the first mistake one can also make the second and vice versa right i was using that you know when i was talking about how shakespeare not shakespeare but aristotle says you know that uh a man can think he doesn't know what he does know and he manifests it by the fact that a man could think he knows what he doesn't know we can go in either direction right you know so you can go and think that the fair is foul if you can think that way you can think the foul was fair too because you can't tell them apart but the second line right touches upon the two sources or causes of the above errors for the cause of error is either on the side of the what mind the defect of the mind as thomas will say and this is signified by the word fog right so our mind is often the fog confused right now okay or on the side of the heart and this is signified by the word filthy right shakespeare emphasizes these words fair and foul and the possible confusion of the fair and the foul when he has macbeth just before he and vanquo meet the three witches say so foul and fair a day i have not seen this gets nothing the way he is and after the witches have hailed macbeth with present and future titles right now he's going to be king right benquo right says good sir why do you start and seem to fear things that sound so fair we have said that by the word fog shakespeare signifies metaphorically the cause of error in the side of the mind this is made explicit in the hilarious scene from twelfth night where the simile of fog is used now volio has been locked up and tweeted and do you know this play it should be a very great play huh when one of the last times i was reading twelfth night you know i had two three copies of it and i just read the whole play in one copy and i took the other copy and read the whole play over again it was a magnificent play right one of the loving friendship plays magnificent play um now volio has been locked up right and treated as a madman as a result of the prank played upon him in the subplot of the play huh now volio is locked up in a dark room that's the way he treated a madman right and has the following conversation with the clown impersonating sir topas huh through the door i am not mad sir topas i say to you this house is dark the clown uh he's imitating the priest there what it is madman thou heiress i say there is no darkness but ignorance in which thou art more puzzled than the egyptians in their fog similar images are used by shakespeare in the following passage from the tempest where he speaks of darkness and ignorant fumes and the charm that prospero has cast upon alonso right sebastian and antonio prospero speaking the charm dissolves apace and as the morning steals upon the night melting the darkness beautifully said so their rising senses begin to chase the ignorant fumes that mantle their clear reason right beautiful you couldn't say it better than that could you shakespeare's words the ignorant fumes that mantled their clear reason clearly confirm that fog or something like it signifies the cause of error on the side of reason or the mind that's why you are deceived in your dreams, right? Because you're cut off from your senses. When you wake up and you use your senses again, you go oh, thank God, just a dream. We have said that the other alliterating word used in the couplet from Macbeth, alliteration refers to what? The beginning of the words, right? As opposed to accent, I mean rhyme at the end. The word filth signifies a clause of error on the side of the heart, or the ability to desire, right? When the heart becomes vicious, or we acquire a moral vice, our reason is blinded by this filth of our heart. And that I'm not making a wild guess about the meaning of the word filth in this couplet from Macbeth can be seen from a magnificent passage in Anthony and Cleopatra, where Shakespeare again uses the word filth in describing how reason is blinded and led into error. Anthony is a speaker. But when we in our viciousness grow hard, it's kind of like a habitual thing, right? Oh, misery on it, right? Thomas says in the Summa Congenitides that error is a major part of misery. Oh, misery on it. The wise gods seal our eyes, the old spelling. In our filth drop our clear judgments. Make us adore our errors, right? Laugh at us while we strut to our confusion, huh? The first line, when we in our viciousness grow hard, speaks of us when by repeated bad acts we have acquired the habit of moral vice, huh? For habit being a disposition that is difficult to change, it's suitably described by the word hard, huh? The next word, so misery on it, suitably precede the description of the process of which we come to adore our errors. As is said in the fourth line, since as Thomas Aquinas observes in the Summa Conte Gentiles, error is a great part of misery, huh? Thomas and Tomahui can't be perfectly happy in this life, right? Part of it is because of error, right? That's a great part of misery. The line, the wise gods seal our eyes, is suitable because he who does not live in accordance with reason is suitably punished by being deprived of the act of reason, huh? The next part, in our own filth, drop our clear judgments, make us adore our errors, should be contrasted with the above phrase from the Tempest, the ignorant fumes that mantle their clear reason. Ignorant fumes is on the side of reason or the knowing powers, while our own filth refers to the viciousness in our heart or desiring powers. When our clear judgments have been dropped in our own filth, we proceed to the absurd conclusion of adoring our own errors, as marvelously said, and making ourselves laughable as we proceed to our own confusion. Confusion here is the opposite of glory. The above passage from Anthony and Cleopatra seems to speak of the filth of our heart as the cause of the error whereby we think the foul is fair and the bad is what? Good, huh? There's another passage in Shakespeare where the filth of the heart is spoken of as the cause of the adverse error, where the good seems bad or the fair to be foul. This is in King Lear, after Albany is upbraided as evil and unnatural wife. Gone or well, she's one horrible creature. No more! The text is foolish, right? It's like you're quoting the Bible, huh? And as in Albany says, wisdom and goodness to the vile seem vile, filth savor but themselves. Now, if you want a contemporary illustration of what Shakespeare is saying in the witch's couplet, you could not take a better example than that of the errors about abortion. Those who support abortion are saying, are trying to say that what is foul is fair. And when they attack those who oppose abortion, they are saying that what is fair is foul. But notice the fog that surrounds our position. Pro-abortion is called pro-choice. The painful murder of the unborn, termination of pregnancy, and those who are opposed to abortion are said to be interfering with their rights as a woman. Anything to avoid calling a spade a spade. The fog is so thick that it would take the knife of reason to cut it. Such a smoke screen is thrown up before the eyes of the public so that in the words of the tempest, ignorant fumes mantel their clear reason. Likewise, in the sight of the heart of desiring powers, there is the filth of two of the capital vices which to drop our clear judgments. The most fundamental vices, the vices that draw other vices and sins into the service of their ends, are divided according to the goods of man. Pride is concerned with the good of the soul, lust and gluttony with the good of the body, and avarice with the exterior goods. The force behind abortion, like that behind the hard pornography run by the mafia, and the more insidious pornography pushed by Hollywood, involves a union of two capital vices, avarice and what? Lust. There is avarice in the part of those who perform the abortions, and lust behind those who have them, and sometimes avarice in those who kill their offspring to avoid having to stretch the paycheck to provide for another mouth. In the union of two capital vices, then, there is more than enough filth, which to drop our clear judgments. If we add the inane glory of the politicians who seek abortion lobby money, we have a union of three capital vices covering the whole spectrum of human goods. Yeah, yeah, yeah. There's a bit of questions about evil, right? You know, the most complete tweet of the song. If you're interested in evil, that's the thing to read. We want to really know why evil. So, let's look at the first of these ones here, which is touching upon the goals of the sophists and how they are achieved. Just a little bit here. We can see, we can perhaps see some of the order of the goals of the sophists and the parmenides of Plato. Refutation of the respondent is his first goal, right? Get you to contradict yourself, right? The student says, Professor, you just contradicted yourself. That's ready to get the good things up. Then, next best thing is getting the respondent to say something false, right? Third, getting him to say something paradoxical. Next, to say a false. That's an effective grammar, right? Sollicism. And fifth, to repeat himself. Anyway, you want to come to the main thing here. The distinction of the ways into what? To Alexander, who, Alexander Aphrodisia, so that's the name of the Greek sound, named after Aphrodisia, he has a commentary on the, and sometimes they divide these into what? Fallacies from speech and fallacies from outside speech. But then later on, Alexander corrects the second, not corrects, but says explicitly, from things, right? Okay. The author of the Deo Fallaces, now this is a work attributed to Thomas. It's in the Mariette edition of Thomas' philosophical short works. But there's some question about it, you know? Some think he wrote it right after he was, when his brothers kidnapped him or something, you know? He's writing for his fellow students there, you know? But we're not too sure. We're not all together sure, but it's a very interesting work, you know? And Albert and Thomas, you understand the second group are from, outside of speech, right? Is from, what? Things, right? So Alexander's saying that, too. Now, this also corresponds to the distinction order of the second and third and perhaps fourth tools of dialectic, you know? Because the second tool of dialectic was to what? Distinguish the senses of the word, right? And the second and the third and the fourth seem to be looking at things, right? Finding the difference of what? Things, right? And then considering the likeness of things, right? You know, when you're thinking about something, especially when a philosopher's thinking about something, what's his goal? What's his end or purpose? What's the purpose of thinking about something? Hmm? Say it again? You could say it, yeah. Maybe more precise to say... We think about things for the sake of thinking them out. And what do we think out, right? Well, maybe seven things, right? The first might be to think out a distinction. And then there are thinkings that are not divisions, right? But we can also think out a division, right? And then the third thinking out is thinking out a what? Definition. So you put those three together. Taking out a distinction, taking out a division, taking out a what? Division, right? Division and definition, I should say, yeah. But you can see, in a way, a definition is a division, right? Because you divide square into its, what, genus and differences, right? But not every division is a definition, right? And division is a kind of distinction, right? That's the distinction in particular of the parts of some, what, whole, right? So you're thinking out those three things, right? A distinction, a division, or a definition. And what's the fourth thing? Well, what comes after distinction? So thinking out order, yeah. It may be an order of the senses of the word, equivocal by reason, right? It might be the order of what? In goodness, right? Of things, right? It might be the order of which things are known, right? To think out in order, right? A good example of the two being separated there, in Aristotle and Thomas, in the fourth book of natural hearing, the so-called physics, right? Because Aristotle thinks out the eight senses of what? In, yeah. But in the text that we have, he doesn't, what, think out the order, right? And Thomas says, we're going to think out the order, though. Imitating Aristotle in the fifth book of what? Wisdom, right? And Aristotle is given the clue that the first sense of in is to be in this room. And Thomas therefore thinks out the order, starting from that, right? All the way to lift my heart in San Francisco, right? Remember that? So that's the fourth kind of thinking out, right? Well, then I thought, you know, gee whiz. Maybe the fifth one should be what? I mean, the second and the third tools are thinking out a distinction or thinking out, right, a division or something, right? But what about the fourth one there? Is that thinking out a distinction or a division? Aristotle says you've got to consider the likeness, right, huh? You're thinking out the likeness of things, right, huh? That's the, what, fifth thing you think out, right? Okay. And what's the sixth and the seventh? Thinking out. Hmm? The difference is already involved in thinking out a distinction, right? Think out a distinction, think out a division, think out a definition, right? Think out order, right? Think out what? Like, likeness? Yeah. Think out a statement. And then the seventh one is to think out a what? A conclusion. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Of course, there's a different sense of thinking out in these cases, right? You think out a conclusion, what sense of in is that? Corresponding to that sense of out. Which one is it? Yeah, out has as many senses as in, right? So what sense of in there is opposed to out? You see, if out is the opposite of in, out has as many meanings as in, right? As Aristotle says, one of the tools and the, one of the places to look, right? To look at the opposite of the word, right? What is it? Well, yeah, I bet you're in my power, right? See? And you might say that the premises of the syllogism, for example, contain an active ability, right? The conclusion, right? They give rise to it, right? Even, of course, in the definition of the syllogism, right? His speech in which some statements lay down, another fouls necessarily because of those, what? Lay down, right? But you have to think out some statements, right? Even, not as conclusions, right? But as, what? Beginnings, right? So Berquist was thinking about before and after. He thought out the statement that nothing is before or after what? Self, right? And then he thought out the conclusion that you must see a distinction, right? Before you can see order. That's the sixth and seventh, right? Seven is a symbol of wisdom, right? So you're getting some kind of wisdom here, right? By thinking out these seven ways, right? Now, right now we're concerned with thinking out the, what? Ways the mind is deceived, right? Okay. And Aristotle and Alexander following him, right? And Albert the Great and Thomas following him. Saying we could distinguish them into what? The ones from speech, right? And the ones outside speech, right? And that's kind of a distinction by opposites, right? It's kind of interesting to see that. You see kind of the opposition there to the second tool there, you know? Speech. Except a thing, right? Okay. So, and he's going to what? Distinguish the ways that we are deceived by speech, right? And the ways we are deceived by something outside of speech, right? From things, right? Okay. But we have to go bit by bit here, right? Okay. I'll take the quote there on the bottom of the first page here. The Fallaches chapter four, right? From these two things it happens for a man to be deceived. Because something appears, something, right? And is not it, right? Whence the locus sophisticus by another name is called what? Fallacy. Yeah. Fallacy, decisio. Because it is the cause of what? Failing or deceiving, right? As such, right? Though someone is not deceived by it in act, unless he has some ignorance, right? Now, just as the dialectical places are distinguished according to diverse relations from which most of all is caused the firmness of argument, and arguments are taken there. So also the sophistical places, or fallacies, are distinguished by the moving principles, right? From which there appears to be firmness in the sophisticated arguments. This happens in two ways. In one way, ex parte voces, right? When an account of the unity of the voice, one believes there's a unity of the thing signified by the voice. Just as those which are, what? Here's the example of the dog, right? It's kind of a common example. You're very familiar with that, huh? Okay. Another way on the part of things, right? From this that some things in some way come together, simply they seem to be one, huh? This has been said above about the accident. Now, here you have Albert the Great, huh? The commentaria in Libri's book, The Spensical Refutations of Aristotle, right? It's a physical refutation, not a real refutation, but you appear to be refuted, right? Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Now, see, he speaks of the two ways there, right? Secundum operentiam exceptum in dictione, right? In speech, right? And the other modes are extra, outside of speech, right? But you could also say affirmatively, secundum rem excepti, right? They sometimes divide them into those from speech and those from outside of speech, but the second is also said to be from things, huh? A little text from Albert there. And therefore, at the end of it, he says, the beginning of deception is in speech and the fallacies in what? Diction. And the fallacies outside of diction is taken from, it's in the thing originally, right? Now, in every fallacy, both in diction as well as outside of diction, there is generally deception from this that one cannot discern the same thing and what? What is the same and what is other, right? Now, go back to the thing we talked about, huh? With Shakespeare, huh? We said that he defines reason by the ability to look before and after, right? But you can't look before and after unless you can look for, what? Distinctions, right, huh? Okay? Now, what does it mean to say that things are distinct? What does that mean? Yeah, one is not the other, right? Okay? So the question is the same or other, right? Now, one reason why the second and the third tools come before the fourth tool, right? Is that likeness is a great cause of what? Yeah. And if you don't see the differences of things, right? Then you can be, what? Deceived. Yeah. We just take those eight senses of in, right? They're very similar, right? And you could be, what? Deceived, right? Because of the likeness among the senses, right? And therefore, if you don't see the differences, you know, likeness is a cause of deception. So he puts those before, right? That's part of the reason he does, huh? He's got probably many more reasons that Perkist doesn't even perceive that, right, huh? I think it's kind of interesting that he says that, right, huh? Okay? It also fits in with, played with Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? Because order presupposes distinction, right? Remember that I was saying before, you know, how I love to torture students, you know? In one sense of before, does one sense of before come before another sense of before, huh? You have a pepper peck to peck to pickle pepper, isn't it? It's bad enough to torture people. It's worse to love it than torture people. Yeah. And I say, what's the distinction in order, distinction in order? That's the other one I'd love to do. Well, you see, things are distinct when one is not the other, right? Things are in order when one is, what? Before or after the other, right? Now, what's the order of distinction and order, right? See what I mean? So you're kind of coming back upon yourself, right? But this is characteristic of logic and the reason, right? You know, there's a book in logic that Albert has on division, right? And you divide, what? Division, right? There's a division of a composed whole, an integral whole, right? There's a division of a universal whole, right, huh? Okay. So there's a division of division, right? Then we talk about definition. There's a definition of definition, right? And there is a, what? Order of order, right? Sensitive order, right? And so on, right? And of course, if you go back to the, what? To the categories there, right, huh? Before he takes up before and after, he takes up what word? Before, before, and after. No, that's after. What's before? You're looking. You're looking after instead of before. Yeah, my gosh. And that's the basis of what formal distinction is, right? Now, if you cut a straight line in half, there's a theorem in geometry. The bisectal line, you know, I'm sure you're all familiar with that. Well, you have a distinction now between the two parts, right? But it's not really a formal distinction. It's what they call material distinction. The division of the continuance, right? The continuance is divisible forever. So you can see how important or frustrating that division might be. But formal distinction is by opposites, right? How would you distinguish between a dog and a cat? Well, I'm not too bright, you know. So I'd say, you know, well, dogs bark and cats don't bark. I never see a cat. I've had much experience with cats, and I never heard a cat bark at me, right? You see? Yeah. And the cat meows, but the dogs don't. Say, what's a contradiction, right? Opposite. Yeah. Bark and don't bark. Meow and don't meow. Okay? And then the dog bites you, and the cat scratches you. But mainly scratching, you know. Okay? So it's by opposites, right? That we distinguish the dog and the cat. And I differ from the dog because I'm two-footed, and he's not two-footed, yeah. He's four-footed, and I'm not four-footed, yeah. Okay? And the fallacies outside of diction, right? The cause and the motive to deceiving is not sermo, right? Right speech said res, right things, although we use, what, speech as a tool to expressing that thing, right, huh? A quote from Albert here. It's not unfitting that in the same bad argument, the paralogism, huh? There are many causes and modes of deception sometimes, huh? It can really be followed up. So you read Aristotle's, their reputation, at least it's right, huh? Inclusion doesn't follow, and the premises are not improbable. Okay. Now, this is kind of a, what, ad bonitatum doctrinum, doctrinum, which is, going back to something more general, right, huh? It's similar to what Macbeth was saying, right, or what Shakespeare's bringing out. Yes. The root of error is twofold, right? Now, one of the things is in the appetite, right, huh? And the other, the defect of the understanding, right? Now, I was saying before, at the beginning of class, that the, um, my reason is not my, is not me. I'm not my reason. Knowledge, right? I'm not my reason either. And I'm not my will. And my reason is not my will, right? So you wouldn't have this in God, and there wouldn't be different things. That's what they are in me, right? And they both didn't cause me what? Yeah, yeah. Okay. So, comparing a little bit to sick man there, right? You find that. Let's in the middle of that paragraph. Thus, also in the understanding, when a man does not have a foundation in truth, right, nor does he have the power by which he is able to judge the truth, by just any difficulty of a question, he falls into, what, error, huh? Whence he's said to be long winds, huh? Sick about questions, right, huh? Okay. Somebody easily picks up a cold or something, right? It's like that, right, huh? You know? He's always catching a cold, this kid or something, you know, huh? If you know, maybe you're like that, I don't know. I'm a great place to blow my nose from... time I arrived at school until about noontime and then it stopped. I don't know why. For as Boethy says, so the intellect is to reason as the, what, circle is to the center. For reason runs around, right? Discurred. Shakespeare said, right? Yeah. Runs around. Considering acts and the defects in the relation of one thing to another. Now unless it resolves to an understanding of the true, right? Vain is reason, right? Does reach its goal. When it takes the, what, truth of the thing, it has it as work like the center, right? But some people run around and do not attain the truth, right? Always learning and never coming to a knowledge of the truth. Interesting the ways of speaking here, right? Notice what he says here. And he says, because in some things the doubt comes comes about from the, what, ex parte re, right? In ad equibis, ex parte verborum, et nominum, right? That's the same distinction, right, that we met in Alexander and in Albert, yeah. Okay. He's kind of applying it to this text here, right? He says, questiones, because in some things the doubt comes about from the part of the thing, and others from the part of words and names. And so he regards the first, right? He says, questiones about things, which questions do more than what? Building up of God, which is in faith. And secondly, the pugnas verborum, right, huh? You're fighting with words, right, huh? Okay? Who only follows words has nothing, right? Book of Proverbs, right? And it calls the pugnas verborum when the dissension is for words only, right, huh? Okay, another little text here at the bottom of page three there. The fallacy is sometimes ex voce, sometimes ex re, right, huh? There's so many texts here to make sure this is the teaching, right? Mostly it says here on page four now, it's kind of interesting text. Likewise, right, faith can be, what? Corrupted by fallacy, right? The heretics. Just as any science can be corrupted. But as it's said in the first book of the Refutations, that's the abbreviation of the quorum, right? Fallacy is sometimes from, what, speech, from voice, vocal sounds, sometimes from the thing. Once there's a fallacy in diction and exudiction on it, right? Again, you're always saying those two ways of saying it, huh? And thus faith is sometimes corrupted through some disordered, what, vocal sounds, huh? As Jerome says, that's a famous quote, I mean, verbis in ordinatis pro latis, from words put forth, what, in a disordered way that comes about heresy, right? And he says, avoiding, what, gofane newness of voices, right? She shouldn't be called the mother of God, but the mother of Christ, huh? You know, let's see, watch out for these guys, right? So he gives an example there from the story, it's right. Christo tokus, huh? Not, you know, theotype tokus, huh? Now, St. Paul speaks there at the end of that paragraph. Formum habens honorum verborum, right? Healthy words, huh? Which you have heard from me in faith and love in Christ Jesus. Profana and vanilocuia debita. And sometimes we're corrupted by reasons that are reale sophistikos, right? That means some things, because real comes from what? Res, huh? Some things. Now, next thing to see here is the way Aristotle and commentators divide the places, you know, deceiving people from language, right? And how many ways will Aristotle distinguish here? Six? Six? Now, I don't want your mind to break down. You know, you know, you can't possibly understand distinction. Six, right? Yeah. And then the two or three must be subdivided, right, to get to six, right? So we're going to meet the meeting here, huh? So at the bottom of page four, you're all there. Locorum egetur sophistiquorum sive felacearum, right? Quedum surindiccione, quedum extradiccionum, right? Now he's going to subdivide the first of those two, right? That's the distinction into two, right? Okay. Indiccione quedum locus sophisticosi felacea. This is the one now from speech. Quando principium motivum sive sive causa operentia est exparte voces. Exudiccionum vero quando est exparte re. Okay. It's the fundamental. That's a distinction of two, right? Ex parte autum voces as principium motivum sive causa operentia ex eo qued una vox multa significat qued contingent per multiplicationum vocum. Est autum multiplex triplex. Okay. So he's going to divide the causes of all fallacies into two and the first one into what? Three. Yeah. And what do they call? Actual potential imaginative, right? Okay. Now what the hell does this mean, right? See? Well sometimes a word or a speech actually has many what? Meanings, right? And that gives rise to two kinds of fallacies. Equivocation, right? Where the word before actually has many meanings, right? The word in actually has many meanings, huh? The word being is actually many meanings, et cetera, right? Okay. The word cause has many meanings, right? As Deconic said, you know, every respectable word in philosophy has many meanings, right? Okay. So it actually has many meanings. And sometimes a speech has many meanings, right? Now, let's take some of my favorite examples of that. You let the student in there already. The hairiest I never had. You know the ones I like from theology, right? You say the word of God is, so the word of God is not a name, but it's speech, right? It has parts that signify something by themselves. But does the word of God in the beginning of that and at the end mean the same thing? But other ways, no? Yeah. So in Vatican II you have a document called Verbum Dei, right? What's it talking about? Yeah. But what's