Logic (2016)
Lecture 49: Dialectic, Doubt, and the Discovery of Truth

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Well, it may occur in some places, in other places not, you know, but there was some open-mindedness there in Spain at that time, you know. Basically the difference between the Sunni who reject reason and the Shia who accept reason, that's the difference. Well, I'm curious because I wonder if the Summa, Contra Gentilius, would be a very useful evangelization tool. Some of the Muslims who have come and are involved in highly technical, highly professional realms. I'm thinking of a lawyer that I knew who became, I think, the head of a university or something, but being steeped in Western legal reasoning and logic to a certain degree, that preparation might have made some chinks in the armor for which something like that. I also think, you know, that if you went to Muslim universities and they really respected, you know, Avicenna and… Yeah, yeah. So, I'm not talking to them, you know, but apparently they kind of forced out this philosophy, you know, I think, in their thing in their… Yeah, I suspect too, you know, I don't know too much about what they actually teach about these things, but I gather from what people have told me anyway, that they don't really think that God is bound by the principle of contradiction, right? Yeah. And so it's kind of hard to… Yeah. And, you know, Thomas always, you know, speaks of God's will as having a reason for what it does, right? But the will of God is kind of arbitrary, right? Yeah. Yeah. So why can't he be a trainer? What? By that reason, I mean, using the principles of Jiu-Jitsu, you say, well, why isn't it? Why can't he be a trainer? Yeah. You know? Yeah. You see, apparently Mohamed, it even says a lot, because they were polytheists when he started, and he was trying to, you know, react against them, you know, and then it seemed like the orthodox Christians, I don't even want to call them orthodox, had stepped back into kind of, you know, pantheism or polytheism. Yeah. And he learned about Christianity from heretics and English. Yeah. So here's a great idea. One of the issues is that the Wahadi brand of Sui Islam has been pouring a huge amount of money into the universities in the West to spread their version of Islam. And so, it's quite amazing how they have all these Muslim study departments that they funded through Saudi money. Wahami. Right. Okay. So, I'll get into that. There's a course there. I was talking about, why does this become my attributes, right? Well, partake the attributes and say, what does somebody mean, right? Because, you know, I know it's Thomas, even in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the, in the questions. There's always, somebody's always quoting Augustin or Damacy or something like that. And sometimes it's a little bit of a way to understand what they're saying. So, if you argue from that as a probable opinion, you might know exactly what they mean, right? And that requires this thing here, right? At the same time, you say, you know, um, if I say this is a probable thing that reasonably looks before and after, right? Then I can say that it looks before and after in each of these, what, different senses, right? So, if it's probable, the reason looks before and after, and before and after has four or five senses, right? Then the reason looks before and after in each of these senses might be also, what, probable, right? You can kind of indicate that, right? So, I can multiply in my, what, probable, what statements, right? Or we find out that act is before ability and what? Many ways, right? It's before in causality and in being, right? And act is before ability and what? Knowledge, right? Because ability is known by the act that it's ability for, right? So, the ability to see is distinguished from the ability to hear by the acts for which each is an ability, right? Seeing or hearing, right? So, act is before ability and what? Being and in causality and in what? Knowledge, right? And in goodness, right? Maybe not in time, but perhaps in duration, let's say. Take it where Abraham was. So, you can kind of see the reason why this would come next to this, right? Now, which is more like the second, the third or the fourth, right? Well, here, though, you're distinguishing things, right? Oh, I'm sorry. Yeah. And here you're distinguishing things, too, with differences in things, right? I'm sorry. Yeah. I'm thinking the word considered. And so, you might even, you know, see the distinction in words, but you don't see a distinction of things, too, right? It's something similar, right? And this one here, then, is left in fourth place, right? And this is very important for, what, discovering things, right? And I know when I taught the philosophy of science, and I read some of the scientists, you know, who not only are, you know, men eminent in their scientific field, but they also, some of them are historians of the science, too, right? And they see the importance, right, of being able to see a, like this, what, ratios, right? I'm thinking of Einstein there, where he's talking about, we're three-dimensional creatures, you know, coming to realize we're living in a fourth-dimensional world, right, huh? And he compares that to a two-dimensional creature, discovering that there is, what, a third dimension in his universe, right, huh? Right. Kind of ingenious, you know, huh? Those kind of issues in life is there, right, huh? And that it's easier to talk about what would be for a two-dimensional creature to discover that, you know, even though I don't seem to be a part of my experience, you know, that the facts are, obviously, I'm living in a three-dimensional world. And something has led us to say that we're living in a fourth-dimensional world, right? I heard, I read these scientists saying, you know, that this has been probably the most fertile thing for discovering science, right, to see what the likeness of ratio is, huh? You think just of, you know, going from the water wave to the, what, sound wave to going to the light waves, right? There's a certain, what, proportion there between the three, right? And so you're understanding the water wave in some sense is preparing you for understanding the sound wave, right? In some way for understanding the, yeah, yeah, yeah. So it's very, you know, the idea of likeness there, huh? Aristotle very often argues from, what, ratios, likeness or ratios, huh? Seeing something, as they compare, what, genus is to difference, like matter is to, what, form, yeah. An animal is able to be a dog or a cat or a horse or something, right? And wood is able to be a chair or a desk or a table or something, right? Or crucifix or something, right? And this seems to be somewhat like this there, right? Remember the order of the senses of end? The first sense of end is we're in this room, right? The second sense of end is my tooth is in my mouth, right? The third sense of end is my, what, genus is in the species, right? Now those are all senses of end where what is in something is actually there, right? We're actually in this room, are we, you and I? My teeth are actually in my mouth, and the genus is actually in the... understanding of the what species right then you get to the fourth sense which is what yeah this is something where the species is not actually in the genus is it but potentially right and then what comes next form in what yeah so species is to genus a bit like what form is to matter right you don't overextend the likeness there right but there's some like this there you have to see in what way they are like right because the genus can be said in the species right can matter be said in the form is the shape of the table a kind of wood not pretty said of it is it the shape of the table is wood the shape of the chair is is wood but the species is what some way has a genus said of it right a dog is a animal right cat is an animal right okay but there's a likeness now you've got to consider what the likeness is though right so the genus an animal in some sense we could say is able to be a dog or a cat but you have to add this what difference to make it be one or the other right or a triangle is able to be scaling or isosceles or equilateral right then okay but you have to add this actuality to it right then okay because all trinus is contained by three sides it doesn't say whether they're all equal or two of them are equal or another equal right could be any one of those right well wood is able to be what a table or a chair or a desk or crucifix or something right there's a likeness there isn't it see but you don't want to extend the likeness more than you should right now see and the distinction of genus and species is that a real distinction or distinction of reason by being a man by being an animal we need two different things yeah man is an animal right by form and matter we do not the same thing are they so there's a likeness there right but you have to you know the famous thing here the aristotle's choice of the word there huh consideration right um you have to consider in what way the genus is to the species like matter is to form right or maybe even that the genus is to the difference maybe right like what yeah so you have to add something right to wood to make it a chair or a table or crucifix right a certain form right then and you have to add some difference to get a what quadrilateral to get square to get uh oblong or to get uh rhombus or rhomboid or trapezium you play that distinction of five kinds of what quadrilateral right but four of them are really what um parallelograms right and then the trapezium is just to kind of cover all the oddballs yeah yeah and you don't bother much just trapezians but i think it's kind of beautiful to see that right now but likewise when you say you know that there's a uh a tooth is in my mouth right the genus is in the what species right is that there's a difference there there's two ways right you wouldn't say my mouth is a tool as a tooth or a tooth is a mouth right but you might say the genus of the what you might say dog is an animal right so there's just a difference there right so i can i can i can use a third and fourth tool both right i have to find the difference between uh genus and species and um whole and part right now it's kind of unusual too you know that genus and uh species in one way is like forming matter the other way it's like part and whole right now you see so it's kind of you know there's a lot to be considered there in terms of what way those things are what alike right and then you say well um is form in matter like whole and parts or is it like um species and genus or is it like both of them yeah but you know we take the first three senses of to begin right um something is said to be more actually in that which it is right you take the next three senses right something is in something in what ability right what kind of passive ability and then in the uh was it the seventh sense right um i've got you in my power right that's the active ability right i didn't move you you better obey me when i give you your command right huh they show all these these films from uh north korea you know you see them and of course they're showing up the you know whatever his name is the leader there up at the thing there and they're you know marching like you know the nazis you know the legs like that but then these other things are going by with the you know tanks are going by with the with the uh you know the uh rockets and so on right and uh you know the military guys like this you know it's you know they're standing up and the thing goes by the stand here like that you know you know to the to the to uh fearless leader yeah yeah yeah yeah so you better obey me yeah you you don't uh you might be in trouble if you didn't uh you didn't uh kick your legs up in your march by by the yeah it must be exhausting you know to march that way for very long i don't know how much that's just it so the first three senses of in right there's a likeness isn't there now which is more like like genus in species my tooth in my mouth or you me in this room the genus in the species yeah because more like a park right now obviously the genus is in the definition of the species right now like a part in the whole right now i in this room is a part in a whole you might might say that this woodwork here is is in this room yeah as a real part of the room but am i really a part of this yeah yeah yeah you see part of the cross you know right so i mean you could say maybe one is more like the other than the other, right? But there's a lifeless there, right? But you have to stop at me to consider that, right? And how did Aristotle ever, or Thomas actually in this case, right? Thomas ordered the eight senses that Aristotle had given them there in the fourth book of actual hearing, right? Fourth book of the physics. He had ordered them by their, what? Lifeless, right? Aristotle had given them the starting point there saying that the first sense is really to be in this room, right? It's the easiest one for us to understand, kind of, huh? You know, what does Aristotle take up in book four of natural hearing? It's place and time, right, huh? Tied up with the empty tube, I just mean. Everybody's a little skeptical about the empty. But place and time, right, huh? But in the senses of before, the first sense is tied up with what? Time, right? The first sense of in is tied up with place, yeah. Notice how, how, how, how, if you take the word where, right, huh? Isn't where, first of all, is it just to you, place? A guy woke up in the hospital, where am I, right? You know? You get lost, where am I, you know? But now, you know, we're asking, raising the question, where would you put grace, right? What category would you put grace, huh? Remember that? I was just reading the De Veritate, and Thomas, you know, speaks of grace as being in the, what, in the quality, right? In the first species of quality, but it's not, probably speaking of habit, it's different from the, from the habits, but it's in that species. But notice, I used the word where, right? Well, I mean, what do you use the word where for? Okay, doesn't that suggest it's where it belongs, right? You grow up your mother's, you put things where they belong, right? We have these kind of great secrets in there for holding a book. So, we'll read a book, we'll stay at the table, or something like that. And both of them had disappeared, we couldn't find them. And then I did a little search the other day there, and I found both of them, right, you know, so, so, so, so, I always said, where were they, you know? And then we had two of these nice letter openers, you know, and we're always, you know, mailed that, you know, you gotta look to see if there's anything important in there, you know, and you open up the things, and we couldn't find either one of them, you know, I don't know where they are. Where are they, you know, huh? But then you put it, you put it where you're supposed to put it, you know? That's kind of the first sentence, huh? But the fact that we use the word where, we, we, Aristotle's talking about, Tom's talking about body, right, huh? Body is into, what, general, did you know that? Oh, substance and. And quantity. So, if you're talking about just the dimensions, right, then the three-dimensional is the body, right, huh? But then body is also the name of a, what? Yeah, that's one of the places there in the second one, right? You know, see what genes it belongs to, right? Well, if body is both in the genus of substance and in the genus of quantity, right, then the word body must be, what? Yeah, must be a different sense, right? And most people can't make that distinction, right? Now, Descartes is kind of my beating boy. I wrote my doctor thesis, conferring Descartes and Aristotle on the three roads, right? Three ways of going forward. But Descartes seems to make the substance of material things, right? The length and width and depth, right? So, I asked a joke, I said, Descartes never grew up. Because if your substance was your size, right, huh? Your dimensions, then when you grew taller, you would not be the same person, right, huh? You know? So, my size is something, what? Accidental, right? Although it's closest, you might say, to my material substance, right, huh? But body, right? So, if something is in a different genre, right, it can't have the same meaning, right? And, you know, I told you how Deconic used to like the word predicament, you know, and the word predicament, right? Because a predicament is a situation you're in that's, you don't see a way out of it, right? And this is true about predicament and category, right? So, you've got the word for category there. If you're in one predicament, you're in there forever. You can't go and wander into another predicament, right? You're stuck in this predicament, huh? It is interesting how we're taking this example, you know, of the likeness of the senses of a word right now, and how we have to stop and consider in what way, you know, genus is to what species, right? Are genus and species like whole and part? Do you see how life is between them? Or are genus and species like matter and form? Well, again, you've got to be more precise though right now, you see? You can say that the genus is to the species like what part is to whole, right, huh? But the species is to the genus as what form is to matter, yeah. So, very subtle, right, huh? But notice, we're talking about different senses, right? The eight senses of in. Yeah, yeah. The way these tools are, what? Connected, huh? Like each other, huh? Very much like each other, huh? So, although we put the third tool as Aristotle does, the third, right, as being closer to the second, right, huh? There's a connection between the second tool and the, what, fourth tool, right, huh? Because Thomas seems to be ordering those senses of in by the likeness of them, right? Now, I know myself and I think, you know, I'm kind of a fanatic there to defend Shakespeare's definition of reason, right, huh? And so, I go to the first, second, second post predicament to go to the senses of before, right, huh? Well, I'm kind of struck by the likeness between the second and the third sense, huh? And they say, well, that kind of present this way. I say, as something can be without something else, but not vice versa, right? So, likewise, something can be known without knowing something else, but not to be verse, right? So, it's a real life, isn't it? Do you see that? See? Um, marble can be without the Pietas there, the Michelangelo there in the Vatican, right? But the Pietas cannot be without what? Yeah, yeah. And I can know what a number is without knowing what a perfect number is, huh? I've found for many years of teaching, students know what a number is to some extent, but they don't know what a perfect number is, right? But can you know what a perfect number is? They'll know what a number is. I say, I like this stuff, don't you? I say, I say, um, just as the letters C, A, and T can be without the word cat, can they be without the word cat? Can the, are the letters C, A, and T, can they be without the word cat? Yeah. Like in the word act, right? Or they say Joshua, T, A, C, right? They don't refer to their alma mater as T, A, C, right? Um, it's like WPI over there, you know? the Worcester Polytechnic Institute. WPI can be without WIMP, right? WIMP can be without WIP, right? I see something like that, that I can know what a number is without knowing what a perfect number is. But I can't know what a perfect number is without knowing what a number is. I can know what a quadrilateral is without knowing what a trepensium is. I certainly can't know what a trepensium is without knowing what a quadrilateral is. I was trying to remember rhombus and rhomboid, you know. So my memory device was rhombus ends with S, right? So it's a square that's going to jerk, right? Then rhomboid is the oblong jerk, right? So I can know what a quadrilateral is without knowing what a rhombus is, and vice versa, right? Or I can know what a quadrilateral is without knowing what a parallelogram is, right? That's a big word, right? Or I can't know what a parallelogram is without knowing what a quadrilateral is, right? A parallelogram is a quadrilateral whose opposite sides and angles are what? Equal or something like the definition of a parallelogram is a marvelous thing right now. Its limits are what lines never meet. But they have to meet to form a figure, right? Yeah. But its not the parallel lines. No. The less your muscle. Yeah. So you see how those four tools are very closely related, aren't they? I remember Einstein talking about, you know, Louis Dubreuil's discovery of the wave mechanics and so on, you know, and how he says, you can find, he says, a proportion that doesn't mean anything really, you know. And you can see that Louis Dubreuil, you know, was carrying out his seeing his proportion, right? He had a theory that they called the French Comedies, he says, no, no, let's test this, you know. And it turned out to be, you know, it was a marvelous thing, you know, to read about, you know. Warren had lunch with him, you know, with Louis Dubreuil in Paris there, you know. But I actually think about, what's his name, the Russian physicist there. He went to see Louis Dubreuil in Paris and Louis Dubreuil, you know. Gamal, Gamal, he didn't speak French yet, really he spoke English very well, you know. And he wanted to speak to Louis Dubreuil in English, Louis Dubreuil in Paris, you know. He insisted on speaking in French. And then Gamal went over to England, right, where he was at home to do English very well. And Louis Dubreuil came over to get a talk in England, and he gave him perfect English. But he wouldn't talk, he wouldn't talk to Gamal in English, right? In Paris, right? He talked. Contaminate the air. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I don't know why you're so insist upon that. You really speak English. They had to come as French. Yeah. But the Parisians treated him terribly well. How he was American, he did not speak French. Yeah, yeah, yeah. How great, right? Well, my friend Rodney Milka, he spent his junior year abroad there, you know, in France, right, huh? And so he got kind of this bug, you know, to travel and so on. And he'd come home and he'd work for a while, you know, and then he'd go to another country, you know. So he went to Spain, right? And the Spaniards are much more friendly than the French. They're much more helpful, you know, in helping you to speak their language. Oh, really? And, but he tells me of coming back from Spain, going to France, to the United States. And he got into France again, coming back if he'd been to Spain for six months or whatever it was. And he went into a bar, you know, drinking, and the guy said, he served him the drink, service, which means tip, you know. And that guy said, the man, he did tip and he served, you know. And he said, you know, service modif. I remember when he fucked that out. Rodney. So. And he's a neighbor, he's friendly with, you know, he's a guy who liked good music, you know. He had a whole collection of Haydn, you know. Most of all Haydn's things, you know. I've never seen anybody with a collection that's big in Haydn. And he went to, he reached to Minnesota and got a degree in botany, you know. He died young, you know, but he left money in his, what, will to Rodney, you know. He was quite a good sum of money, you know. And that's just the time when Rodney had run into the girl that he married here in England. And his mother was debating, should I tell him about this inheritance or not? You know. Then I'm sorry, but you know, I'm wondering how to support this wife, you know. So. Okay. Now. Now. Now. I'm going to go to the third book of wisdom, okay? Now, the reason why I'm going there is the third book of wisdom is entirely dialectical. And I'm not going to be going through the third book of wisdom. But in the first alexio, you might say, of book three, right? Aristotle gives four reasons why he's going to proceed dialectically in this third book, right? And, you know, Thomas talks about how these four reasons are reasons not only why he has this book of dialectic here in the 14 books of wisdom, right? But also why he has dialectic in the book of physics, right, in the books of natural hearing and the ethics and so on, right? But he said what's unique about the third book here is that the whole book is dialectical. That's not really the point I want to break here so much, but it's because of the affinity between dialectic and, what, wisdom, which Averroes had talked about, too, right? In Aristotle, he compares the wisdom to both dialectic and, what, sophisticic. Sophistic, and the likeness consists in their universality, see? See, the sophist is a man who, what, wants to appear wise, right? Although he's not really wise, huh? And he'd rather appear wise than be wise. See, well, the true philosopher is a, what, lover of wisdom, right? He'd rather be wise than appear wise, right, huh? But because the wise, the sophist is trying to be, what, wise, he's kind of a know-it-all, right, huh? Tries to get the appearance that he knows it all. He's got to in some way be, what, completely universal, right? And so, when you study the fallacies, right, huh, like the fallacy of, what, of equivocation, take the most common mistake, huh? You can use that in any part of philosophy, right? You know, I can argue equivocally, right, in natural philosophy, and I can do so in ethics, and I can, you know, into the orphan place, right? So, I'm kind of a man of universal, what? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, and dialectic, you know, you can use these four tools anywhere, right, right, you know? So, there's something universal. Of course, one of the attributes of the wise man is that he knows all things in some way, right? That's one of the first, on the premium, you know? So, there's a real reason why a whole book is devoted to dialectic, because of the likeness, in particular, between dialectic and wisdom in terms of their, what, universality. Okay, it's kind of an amazing thing to see this, right? And the fifth book of wisdom, you know, is all about, what, distinguishing the senses of the words used in wisdom, and used, what, in the axioms, and used to some extent in all of our knowledge, right? Because they're so universal, right? The whole book is it, right? Now, you know, we've talked about the fourth book of physics, where he distinguishes the eight senses of in, right? He doesn't have a whole book devoted to distinguishing the senses, but the fifth book is all about, what, distinguishing the senses of words, right? It's kind of a strange thing, right, huh? But it shows the affinity between this and, what, dialectic, right, huh? Okay, so, he says aninke, right? And that means necessary, okay? Prostane epizetumenene episteme. It's necessary for the, what, the one we are now proposing to proceed, right? Episteme is a word for science, huh? To first for us to go through, right, huh? About those things about which one ought first to, what? To doubt. Find what's really doubtful. Because you're trying to find what you don't know. And when something is doubtful, there's a sign that you don't know something, right, huh? Okay. Now, these are whatever things others have spoken, what, differently about, right? So, if the famous thinkers before him, right, have said different things, right, huh? And each of them had some kind of reason for what he thought, right? Well, you should consider what they had to say, right, huh? Okay. But now he starts to give the first reason, right? It's really marvelous what he says here. It is before necessary, huh? Pro ergo, right? For those wishing to, what? To discover. To diaporesi kalos, huh? To doubt well. I'm always struck by that. Because when I read the modern philosophers, they're all filled with doubts, obviously, right? But they don't doubt well, right, huh? Now, if you pick up, I tell you, I'm reading the, what, disputed questions on truth and goodness, right? The question is disputati di veritate, right? Okay. Twenty-nine questions, right? And each question's got many articles, right? Sometimes we use ten articles. But you have, what? Disputatio, right, huh? You have arguments, sometimes fifteen arguments on this side, and sometimes ten arguments on this side, right? Okay? They all begin that way, right, huh? Assume the theologiae has got an abbreviation of that, right? So you maybe have just three or four, you know. But the real thing is a question of disputati, right? You've got, you know, as many as fifteen, twenty sometimes, you know. But you're attacking from every angle, you might say, right, huh? But you're proceeding, what, dialectically, right, huh? So he says, it's, what, necessary, right, huh? He says, for those wishing to, what, discover, right? You porisi, huh? Pro ergo, it's necessary before, you might say, right? To doubt well. Okay? So how do you doubt well? By giving the arguments on, what, both sides and so on, right? Then you doubt well, right? The moderns doubt without, yeah, yeah. And then it goes on in the same first argument here. For the later, Eusteron, right, that's afterwards, euphoria, the discovery afterwards, is a lucis, an untying, right, see, of the things before doubted, right? And one is not able to untie who doesn't know the knot. Okay? But the doubt of the mind, huh, shows this about the thing, right, huh? Insofar as it doubts, it is in a condition like the one who undergoes his chains or something, right, huh? So I can't walk forward if you've got my feet tied together, right? And if you have arguments on both sides, and they both seem good, you know, and I say, you know, to this dummy, that looks pretty good argument, and then I go on to this side, and that looks pretty good too, you know? You know? And my brother Mark and I were going to, you know, get these stupid professors straightened out, you know, by locking them up in a room, you know? And you drop in the objections, you know, on one side, and the objection on the other side, and make them stew in the objections on both sides, and before you give them the, what, the body of the article, right, which would be untying it, right, and then the reply to the objections, right, which is sometimes reply to the objections on one side if the truth is all on the other side completely, and sometimes to both sets of objections if there is defects in both arguments, huh? Okay. So insofar as it delts, it's like one tied together, right, huh? One's legs, right, huh? Now notice how we use that expression, you know, in sports sometimes, you know, when somebody hits a thing that ties up the game, right? I use the expression, don't we? Yeah, this game is all tied up! You'll see that when the guy's announcing it. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And then somebody gets up in, you know, the last half of the ninth, and it's a home run, and the game's untied, right? See? Okay. So he's saying that the man who's heard, you know, reasonable arguments, not necessarily true, you know, arguments, Yeah. he's saying that the man who's heard, he's saying that the man who's heard, arguments that seem to make some sense right on both sides um his mind is really tied up right but the untying of this knot right is the discovery of something right and uh that's the way discoveries are made right so something uh seems to what contradict something else and so you realize there's something i don't see here right and the subsequent discovery will be an untying of that what about the atom right so insofar as it doubts in some way he is like the one you know tied up with the with the chains that we don't say fettered for both is impossible to go forward right now okay that's the first reason he gives right now you have to proceed dialectically first because dialectic reasons from what probable arguments to opposite what yeah so every one of these disputed questions right questions disputate right here a classic dispute right that's he said that right um you have arguments on what opposite sides right now it's possible to have probable arguments in both sides right and therefore your mind is tied in a knot right but that's not bad right but the subsequent discovery of something you didn't know before will be the untying of that knot right okay that's the first reason he gives right it's the reason for dialectic not just in this book but in other places huh he goes on on account of which right women's have considered the difficulties right all of them before right him for the sake of this right him okay and now he starts to give the second reason right the second the third reason you'll see that they're kind of what tied together right and he says an account of also the fact that those seeking without doubting first right are like those who don't know where they're going where are you going you're going in the direction of untying this knot if you haven't seen the knot you don't know where you're going see that's kind of a marvelous thing right now now now sometimes when i begin an article with thomas you know if you're not familiar with it i haven't looked at it for a long time i say what the hell is he is he raising a question about this i don't see any difficult i know this and then it ties me in a knot right with the arguments in both sides right and now i realize that there's something hidden here that i don't see right my mind wouldn't be thinking it is so and there's not so at the same time more or less as i hear one army aggressive inside right and maybe ten reasons to think it is so and ten armies to think is not so right uh if there wasn't something hidden from me right whatever is hidden from me is what yeah and i can't go forward until i untie that knot right but that will be the the untieing of that knot will be the discovery right of what was hidden from me right and what i thought i might have known i don't really didn't really know right i was going to untie this oh my god okay but then he argues he said he's like a man then he doesn't know where he's going because you're going in the direction of untying that knot how can you go in the direction of time that not you haven't seen the knot already right you don't know where you're going that's the way the moderns are right i like the expression he used earlier there you know he's talking about the reasons now for doubting well right what does that mean to doubt well it means to yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah and then the third argument which is the other side of the coin right and in addition to these things if they what they won't know when they found the thing or not right okay how do you know you've arrived yeah yeah yeah see you haven't seen the the knot right then um you don't know where to go which is the direction you untied the knot but you don't know when you've arrived until the knot is untied once the knot is untied uh then you know you've what found it right so the modern flossers don't know where the knot is right and so they don't untie the knot and make the discovery right and then if they uh but if you do do it right then uh you also know where you're going right and you know when you have what arrived you know it's beautiful to read to read heisenberg's book there and he's talking about the his conversations with niels bohr right then and they're in copenhagen right and they were what trying to figure out you know quantum theory right and they said um you know they're almost in despair the two of them you know can nature really be as absurd they said as it seems to us in these experiments right didn't seem to make any sense right so what doesn't make sense is a contradiction right and you're always puzzled when when you have what's like a contradiction right but you know where to go now right the direction of untying that knot and you know when you've arrived the knot is in fact untied right so they get to you know they're driving each other mad kind of you know so finally uh we're saying i'm going off skiing you know so up into the mountain skiing right and heisenberg stayed in what cobenhagen right and they both worked out a solution right and uh they came back they compared the solutions and they saw the compatibility right you know but um heisenberg you know he got so excited at least he started to see the solution you know he went back and he started calculating you know on the basis of it you know and and he was making all stupid kind of mistakes he knows better finally he calmed down and everything came out perfect all the numbers just did one number after another you know he knew he had arrived you know so you won't know whether the thing has been found or not right unless you saw the knot firsthand right for the end to this one is not clear right okay but to the one who was doubted before it is clear now we can untie it right the contradiction disappears and now the fourth argument he gets right further uh one is what in a very position towards judging if one is heard right the thing of the what the arguments of those disagreeing right now just he makes a comparison to the courtroom right so what do you have in the courtroom one guy's trying to prove he's guilty and someone else to prove he's not guilty right well if you've heard the reasons for thinking he's guilty and the reason of thinking he's not guilty right presented by you know two different lawyers uh you're in a better position to judge right if you just heard one of the lawyers yeah yeah yeah because there's the advocacy writing writing and oral expression where you have the basic facts that you can't change but you're putting a spin on it to favor your side so yeah that's why you're talking about both sides but he compares it to what takes place in the courtroom right now well you notice the similarity between dialectic and what rhetorical reasoning right you know there are reasons that you can give in the court for his being guilty and the reason you can give for his not being guilty right have you heard only one of these you might you know just go along with it because there's some you know likelihood right that he's guilty or a likelihood that he's not guilty right but you're in a better position to judge if you're both willing right so maybe for marvelous reasons right now now thomas in in his commentary if you look at it there um explain these four again you know i'm trying to do now but he'll say for these reasons aristotle uses dialety not only in the metaphysics right in the in the in the