Logic (2016)
Lecture 30: Post-Predicaments: Opposites and Distinction

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of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. God, your enlightenment, move us, God, to know and love you. Help us, God, to know and love you. Guarding angels, sweep the lights of our minds, oar and loom our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us understand all that you are greeted. Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. Just reading Thomas there, and the day very taught you, you know, that the saints, you know, they don't see everything that they can see in God, right? But they see everybody who's asking them for their prayer. So, that's good to know, right? So, usually when the commentators talk about the post predicaments, they point out that they're the names of things that are found in more than one category. So, if someone asks you, you know, what about motion, right? Because things in motion sort of catch the eye and what nuts there is. That's a pretty important thing, right? And old man Aristotle says that motion is the first meaning of act, right? It's a nice book there and so on. And what category does that belong in? Well, it's found in substance. It's found in quantity and quality and it's found in where? See? So, it's found in four, right? No, it's not a motion of motion, right? Okay? It's a very subtle thing, right? Okay? But it's found in four categories, right? So, you can reduce it to the categories, but not as if it's going to be in just one particular place, right? Or opposites, right? Well, there can be opposites in more than one, what, genus, right? Because opposites are very important for distinction in general, right? And in every category you have a before and after and a what? Together, right? Because in every category the genus comes before the what? Species. When you divide a genus into two species or three species, they are hama together, right? Simo, right? Okay? So, um, distinction and before and hama together, see in English, these are found in all the categories, right? And then we start to talk about to have, right? You first start to the categories, right? You can have a virtue or, you know, some knowledge. You can have a certain height or size, right? You can have, what, your clothing. So, we've been talking about that, right? So, um, that's the first thing they point out, right? Okay? Now, second thing I think you'd say, though, is that we don't learn the categories to stop there in the life of our mind, right? But as you go into the various parts of philosophy, which logic is only a tool, right? You can be like Aristotle in the, um, second book of the soul, right? He says, oh, substance is one genus, right? And then he divides substance into matter and form and composite. And which one is the soul, right? Because the soul is in this genus, right? Or Thomas is in the prima secunde, right? And he's going to take up the riches and the vices. Oh, there's a genus called quality and under that there's a species called habit or disposition. And under that comes, you know, you see? And now we're at the part of the, uh, study of the soul there on Wednesday nights there where we're starting to get into the powers in particular of the soul, right? Oh, that's in a genus there called quality, right? It's in the second species, right? So, but you don't want to stop them. You're going to, you know, continue to divide or subdivide these, right? And then you will, what, use opposites maybe to divide and you'll be ordering them, you know, for and after and, and hama together, right? Simo, you know? So, uh, uh, the, I think you'd say that the post predicaments are not only to show you how you can lead back to the categories, things that are found in one category, but these, they're laying down the kind of the basic, what, uh, uh, things for, uh, subdividing these things, right? Especially the first ones, right? Distinction seems to be formal distinction to be based on opposites, right? And, uh, so, uh, and then of course, in general, to me, these things are of universal importance, because you know the definition of what, uh, reason, right? And we recognize that to look before and after you have to look for distinction, right? And opposites are important for distinction and before and after is, it sits there, right? So it has universal importance for the life of the mind, right? Um, I was thinking, you know, about the, the, uh, these words too, being equivocal by reason, right? And, uh, going back to Shakespeare, you can say that how does reason come to understand a word that is equivocal by reason? How does it? Well, you could say, to begin with, by a large discourse. First of all, discourse, you're going from one sense of to be in, to another sense of to be in, to another sense of to be in, and all the chief senses, and you can say that to go from one sense to another, you've got to see the connection between one sense and the sense, right? But also the distinction between the first and second sense, right? And it's a large discourse because these words that are equivocal by reason, they tend to be very, what, universal, right? Like the word in or the word be, you know, that these are very universal, right? So it's by a large discourse in the sense of discourse about the universal, but about the very universal, right? that you are coming to understand these, huh? And then insofar as you're seeing their order there, right? You can say, you know, in, in the famous text there in the fourth book of natural hearing, the so-called physics, right? Where Aristotle takes up place, right? He distinguishes these eight senses, right? So by a large discourse, he distinguishes eight chief senses of to be in, but then Thomas looks before and after it to see the order of the eight there, right? Aristotle has already said that to be in place of the first sense, right? So the first sense of to be in is to be in this room, right? And second sense would be my teeth are in my mouth, right? And it's kind of like being in this room, isn't it? My teeth are in my mouth, a little bit like we are in this room, but you're not really part of this room, right? You're not glued to the, to the wall or glued to the, you're to the seat, right? But my teeth are in my mouth as a, what? Heart, right? But if you hit me in the mouth and then it's in my mouth just as in a place, right? But so long as it's attached, right? And these, these electrical outlets, you can see they're kind of part of the room, couldn't you? See? And you're not really part of the room, but you're in the room, right? So I can see the distinction between the senses, right? So it's by a large discourse that I come to what? understand these things, right? Now some people, I guess, you know, the, uh, one of my students is in Boston University now in philosophy. Of course you read some of these modern guys, you know, they want to have, you know, everything you're difficult really, you know? And, uh, do we need equivocal words? You know, words equivocal by reason? If you didn't have these words, you couldn't talk about things except to think you can, what? You know, note your senses, right? You couldn't, uh, talk about God or the angels or even about the soul, right? You'd be, you'd be really, uh, you know? That's what Gabriel Marcel had, I think I didn't realize the reaction to that tendency, he used to call, in a place in these senses of univocal only. He said, uh, I can never be any place except in my senses. Yeah. I can never be any other time except right now, so that there's no universality there. They call it a consensus absence, and that's, I think, is critique of some of us. Uh-huh. Yeah, no, it's natural that we, that we extend these words, right? You know, the mind, the mind, the mind, in this common discourse people will use in and those different senses of knowing, you know, the topic. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So it's not like you can destroy language. Yeah, you're going against language, you're going against, you know, it's natural to us to do, right? When I read the, I read, uh, you know, reading them. I've read the modern philosophers, right? But, uh, it seems to me, you know, that Shakespeare's wiser than any modern philosophy. Now I wouldn't say that Homer was wiser than Aristotle, I don't think that is true, but I think Shakespeare is wiser than any modern philosopher. I'm just rereading him a little bit of his poems, you know, and one he calls Time, He Tired, and then another one I was just reading the other day, he calls Time's Our Master. I recall what C.S. Lewis said, you know, and C.S. Lewis said, you know, what do you mean you have time, huh? Time has you, he says. I remember, you know, when we were studying Time in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, right, called Physics, but the fourth book there we have Place in Time, and we started on Time there, and Aristotle raised the question, is Time more the cause of things getting better or getting worse, and what's the answer to that? Yeah, yeah, yeah. In other words, in the course of time, if things are just let go, you know, they're not going to get better, they're going to get what? Yeah. I remember saying to Deconic, you know, saying, well, you could apply this to the question of when nature is acting for an end, because the evolutionists, you know, are kind of denying that nature acts for an end, but things get better in the course of time, as contrary to what the poet would tell you, right? See, why does Shakespeare say that time is a tyrant, right? Well, time, or a master, you know, like you're a slave of it, because the tyrant rules you not for your good, right? And it's actually harmful to you, right? Well, time is more the cause of what? Yeah, yeah. And so things, you know, my car used to, I'm trying to ruin the car, but it's getting worse as time goes on, right? The house is getting, you know, you keep on painting and all that sort of stuff, right? It gets pretty shabby-looking, you know? Money a little. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so time, you know, has us in its power, right? And it's not for our good. And so Shakespeare was wiser in these things he says, right, even than the modern evolutionists and the modern philosophers, right? Now, as a student of Shakespeare's definition of reason, right, and looking before and after, and when you look before and after, you see, you have to see distinction, right? Well, then I'm struck by the fact that he begins with opposites, right? And then he goes to the senses of before, and then he goes to what? The senses of hama, right, huh? The universality of this together, right? Now, the way he proceeds with opposites here is, you've got to be careful now, right? Because the order in which he gives the opposites, he says it's said in what? Four ways, right, huh? Okay? Aristotle's good at giving distinctions of what? Four, right, huh? What distinction of four was among the anti-predicaments? Which distinction of four? The universal substance. Yeah. Yeah. And that distinction was based upon opposites, right? Some are a set of another, and others are not a set of another, right? Some exist in another, and not exist in another, right? Okay? So, set of another, not set of another. Exist in another, not in another, right? Not exist in another. And so, it's pretty easy to see how you get the four, right, huh? I sometimes say this like crisscrossing two distinctions of four, right, huh? So, if you wanted to, you could put the two substances on one side and the two accidents on one side, right? Or you could put the two universals on one side and the two individuals on this side, right? Okay? Now, Aristotle has another famous distinction there of the four kinds of cause, right? And does he divide, would you divide the four kinds of cause into one and three, or two and two? What would you do? But probably first into two and two, right, huh? Yeah, yeah. So, matter and form are intrinsic causes, and mover and end are what? So, when God says, I am the Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end, he's talking about himself as a mover or maker, and the end, right? He's an extrinsic cause, right? He's not the matter of which these creatures are made. He's not the intrinsic form of them, right? But he's the maker, the mover of them, right? And he's the, what, end, right, huh? So, that's a pretty good distinction, right, huh? Okay? Now, sometimes, you know, and I get to talk about the four kinds of causes, and I'd say to the students, you know, and how many senses of cause is God a cause, right? I sometimes say two and a half, yeah. Because sometimes Aristotle distinguishes form into the intrinsic form of things, right? And the model or exemplar that they're modeled after, right, huh? So, in that sense, God is a cause in, what, three ways, right, huh? And last night, they were talking about the vegetative powers and so on. And Aristotle talks about how the soul is a cause in some way of the, what, body, right, huh? And how many of the four senses of cause is the soul a cause of the body? Yeah. It's the first act of the natural body and a substantial forfeit. So, it's a cause in the sense of form. Yeah, it's a mover of the body, right, huh? And it's also the end of generation, yeah. So, it's three of the four, but it's not the matter of the living body, right? It's not a cause in that sense. Well, that shows that those three causes have something in common, right? What separates those three, whether it be in the soul or when we say God has something in those three, right? Or two and a half of those threes. What is that, what's the cause between that and matter, huh? It goes back to another famous distinction of being and to act in what? Potency in the passive sense, right? So, matter is what? The ability to be formed, right, huh? But form is an act, right, huh? And the agent of the mover moves other things insofar as it's an act itself. An act is the end or purpose of ability and so on, right? So, they have what? In common the idea of being an act, right? The end is an act, huh? So, that's pretty important, that distinction of ability and act, right? Even for understanding the causes, right? So, sometimes you can divide, distinguish the four into one and three, or into two and two, right, huh? You take Shakespeare's plays, right, huh? There's about, what, 37 plays, right, that they have in a pre-edition of Shakespeare. And you could set aside ten of these plays, which they call even the original edition, they set them apart separately to the history plays, right? Because the history play has got a little bit of an intrusion there, right, upon the poet's imagination, right? Because you can't entirely neglect the historical data. He writes a history play, right? And there's, you know, things he wants to emphasize, you know, cheering, you know, patriotic audience and so on. Shakespeare takes a few, you know, liberties, you know, with the historical stuff. But you have to kind of, you know, so set those ten plays apart, you know. It's involving special problems because of that, right, huh? If you take the 27 remaining plays, right, how would you divide those 27 plays? Well, I would divide them probably at first into three, right? Have the ten tragedies and the five comedies and then the plays in between. They're not quite tragedies or exactly pure comedies, right? In Renaissance they were, you know, I realized there's some kind of play in between tragedy and comedy. Didn't know what to call it. They called it a tragedy-ash comedy. Didn't know what they called, you know. Did you see words like that, you know, Shakespeare's black or comedies or, you know, something or it's, you know, something. I did it. I did it. there's something in between right okay and then you subdify what's in between i divide into two right you have the love and friendship plays which are close to comedy and then the mercy and forgiveness plays which are you know the six of each of those right so there i first divide the four into what three right huh things can actually do that right and then you know because aristotle just divided the plays you know in the in the book and the poetic art into tragedies and comedies they hadn't distinguished anything in between but as the renaissance uh people consider to sing there's something in between isn't it quite right and then they what they um in shakespeare you can find maybe two kinds of plays there you know so how would you divide the four kinds of opposites into two and two or one in three yeah yeah yeah they're kind of different right because one opposite tends to exclude the other opposite but in the case of relatives right if i'm shorter someone else must be taller right if i'm a son someone else must be a father right and so on right so one opposite kind of involves the other right okay that's very important you know when you talk about how in the trinity right and distinction has to be by the opposite it's just not what relatives right father and son and not by uh dead ones but notice the order which aristotle gives it here right it's kind of strange right he gives the what relatives first right and then what's he give second yeah and then having and lacking right and finding the contradictories right okay he probably began this with uh towards something or to organization because that's one of the ten categories right and then he takes the one that is closest to that which would be contraries because in contraries you have opposites they're what species of the same genus so they have in common a common subject and a common what genus right so virtue and vice right they're both habits right and they both have the same subject right so justice and injustice are both in the will right okay and they're both in the same subject or genus rather a habit right okay so they're more alike double and half right which are in the same genus you know based upon quantity and so on and then it comes to what acting upon i mean not i mean uh having and lacking right and they don't have a common genus because the lack is the being of something but they have a common what subject right so a blindness is not just not seeing which would be the contradictory but it's what none being of sight and something that by nature is able to have sight and and should have sight in the first sense right and finally come to contradictories where there is no the medium common right and so with contradictories they say one of them must be true right you either see or you don't see carry it well there's nothing another alternative right um and so either you either see or don't see but even the stone either sees or doesn't see in case the stone it would be it doesn't see right but now have sight or blindness does everything either have sight or blindness well the eye the stone doesn't see but it's not blind either right in your eye you have sight or you're blind so which is more opposed right of which is most opposed of these opposites yeah yeah so sometimes they're still ordering the other way around right but because he's talked about the ten categories and one of them is relation right he starts at that one and then takes the one that's closest to relation which is contraries and then further away having a lacking and last of all what yeah yeah and some of those texts i guess you had to do see tom aristotle or thomas ordering you know the reverse way right now but the uh if you don't see you can't be seen right and if you're blind you don't see right and if you have sight you're not blind right and if you're good you're not bad and if you're just you're not unjust and so on right but in the case of of relatives they seem to demand that the other one be right if double is half must be right so there's no security there that you're still rights in the order right but you can see there's another order that's maybe more important than this one right well why can't you have the distinction of the divine persons based upon what contradictories well one would be in terms of being a non-being well every person is is god god is i am who am right so you can't have what that right you can't even have you know havoc and lacking because lacking is a kind of non-being too right and even contraries although they're both species and therefore not something to give what's not some indication right one contrary always seems to be lacking something in comparison to the other right like cold seems to be lacking something very to eat right or black seems to be lacking something in person or something like that okay so now we said that there's a connection between the four kinds of opposites and what distinction right and we saw aristotle using the opposites right so when he distinguished between universal substance and individual accident to universal accident individual substance right what kind of opposition did he use what yeah yeah said of another and not said of another exist in another as a subject not exist in another in the subject okay when he distinguishes in uh no he didn't distinguish the species of what substance right because it'd be a wise man to know that there are material and immaterial substances but if you divided substance into material and immaterial that would be what the philosophers called the immaterial substances so separated substance right being separated from matter right but when he divided quantity into discrete and continuous how did he divide it yeah yeah when you got yeah yeah yeah when you get into qualities right you get into habits right you might divide them into what yeah virtue and vice right okay okay okay okay so these opposites are important right now relation is kind of the odd odd animal isn't it huh i know when you read thomas when he's talking about how the members of the other persons in the divine trinity are distinguished right you'll you'll give the reason why it can't be by contradictories or by contraries or by advocate lack and it's elimination there's only one left right which is galatians right and that's the way the father and the son might suggest it you know but we don't have the names you know for the holy spirit so well to name it right now okay there's also a distinction there of relatives that's what i remember years ago before i know what it meant there was an axiom i read in a theology book in god all things are one except where there's the opposition of religion yeah so you have to you have to I admire Aristotle's ability to see relation as a kind of opposition, right? But it's kind of a unique one, right? You kind of distinguish that from the other three. I would tend to do that, right? I wouldn't try to divide the opposite into two and two, would you? And there's a real order among contradictories. Yeah. Exactly that order they go, right? If you're going to put a relation in the same order, you'd probably pick it fourth, right? Maybe it demands its correlative, yeah. Kind of interesting, huh? So, a question about opposites, huh? Maybe it's one of the Texan times, you know, and he gives this other order, right? Which is more sapiential, right? But this one is kind of in accord with the order of the categories, right? A relation is one of the ten pairs we talked about, and now he kind of starts with that, right? It's kind of subtle. How do you use all these? You can say, in a way, that negation is a, what? A being of, what? Reason. Reason, yeah. Sometimes Thomas will take after substance, an accident, he'll put next as, what? Motion is a mixed kind of being, right? And then you get, what? Negation, right, huh? So, you know, the Greeks all said, you can't get something out of nothing, right? My friend Warren Murray says, you know, to find some of these crazy modern scientists, the universe, you know, rose from nothing. They actually say that, right? Somebody behind these Greeks, huh? But if you said to somebody, you know, do the Greeks mean something when they said you can't get something from nothing? Do they mean something by the word nothing? It means something, huh? Yeah, nothing. Yeah. It's not the same something as something. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So you're kind of, by your mind, making nothing something you can talk about, right? And I told you about my Greeks joke there, you know, philosophy is the only subject we can get paid for talking about nothing. This is a joke, huh? But remember I was a little boy, and I'd say, what if there was nothing, absolutely nothing? I had to figure that one out. I'm saying now, I know there would be nobody around to know that there's nothing here, but would there really be nothing here? Actually, actually nothing. Nothing is nothing. Well, when you say nothing is nothing, right? You're using the word is there, right? That's what it is. That's St. Bobbitt. I just said that's how our mind is impressed with the existing being. Yeah. We can't even think of nothing except in terms of being. Yeah. We can't even talk about it. We can't think about it. Yeah. So, the commentary is our own. Well, it seems so, yeah. Yeah. And, you know, I often used to quote Shakespeare there. He says, to be or not to be. That is the question, right? And I'm taking it out of context, right? It's part of my use of it. I say, why is it a question? You say, yeah, because you can't both be and not be, right? And so, all these, you know, question of disputate that you have in Aristotle and in the, what's his name, Heracles' dispute, he says. And you have, I'm reading the disputed questions about the potencia, and I'm rereading the veritate and bonitate, and I read really impressive stuff, you know, putting objections against truth, you know, delicious nourishing, you know. But, you know, when you raise a dialectical question, it's, we use the word wither, right? Whether the human soul is immortal or not, right? Whether the angel can naturally see God or not. Well, it can't be both, right? And this is kind of the, you know, metaphysics there, right? But this is the fundamental thing, you know, the fundamental statement, you know. It's, Aristotle says it's by nature the, what, beginning of all axioms. Now, the axioms are the statements known through themselves or by themselves by all men, right? But the first axiom, then the rest of them, is something that I would both be and not be at the same time in the same way, right? So, you know, it's kind of axiomatic that an odd number can't be an even number, right? But if an odd number were an even number, then something would both be and not be divisible into two equal parts, you know? So, would something be nothing? But nothing could be something. You're forced, right, with these common things to admit that the words are equivocal by what? By reason, right? Something is, nothing is something in the mind, right? That's what you think about, huh? But it's only a being of reason, right? That's a strange kind of being, right? But Aristotle was the guy who could see the distinction of these things, right? Having and lacking, would that also be? Having and lacking, would it also be? Having? Having and lack of privation and the other kind of... Well, you see, the contrary is, they can both be, right, huh? The contrary, yeah, but how about privation and having... Yeah, yeah, well, the lack is the non-being of something and a subject able to have it, and in the fullest sense should have it, right? And when it should have it, you know? So the lack is in the subject. So that's a kind of non-being, you know? The lack is in the non-being, yeah. So it's not real in the way that one contrary, you know? So that if I have a vice, it's not just the lack of the virtue, but it's a real inclination to do what I shouldn't do, right? And so if I'm really a coward, right, you know, I really have inclination to run away when I should stay and fight or defend the country, you know? Sometimes when they divide beings of reason, they divide them into negations and things of that sort, and then relations, right? There's relations of reason and there's negations. They're kind of forced, you know, to say that they are in some way, right? Because the mind makes them to be in some way. You know, my friend said that nothing is more true than you say something is itself, right? Socrates is Socrates, right? And nothing is what? Nothing, right? That's proof. If nothing is not nothing, nothing must be something. You get some problems saying that, right? If you're in a kind of diction, I should say the word something has got what? Many meanings by reason, right? Gotta distinguish those, right? But Hegel kind of denies that, right? And for Hegel, you know, becoming is what? Kind of a mixture of being and unbeing, right? That's if I have the two together, right? And so... You know, in Hegel, you know, being and then comes an unbeing and then boom, becoming, you know. It's kind of uniting being and then being, right? So Shakespeare, as I said, is wiser than all the modern philosophers. To be or not to be that is the question, right? But for Hegel, this is okay, right? Hegel had written hell, that's true. Yeah, yeah. I'll say. It would have been in German. Well, Hegel's most enjoyable, you know, when he writes about fiction and things of that sort, you know. It's kind of, you know, it's an appreciation, you know. And I used to argue with my colleagues here, you know. Some of them wanted to maintain that painting was higher than music. I said, that's ridiculous, you know. And Hegel obviously puts music, you know, before painting, right? They try to argue, you know, that, well, music is too emotional, you know, or it's not all at once, you know, and so on, you know. But music is really closer to drama, right? It's really kind of a plot in music, right? You know, it takes Mozart, you know, my wife's favorite concerto, Mozart is the 23rd concerto, the A major concerto. Her brother Mark was his favorite concerto, you know, Mozart. I think Warren Murray's favorite one, too, you know, it's one of my favorites, right, and the greatest of the concertos, you know. But it's within A major right now. But even harmonically in the first movement, there's some underlying, you know, that's just sadness, you know, it's kind of hidden, you know, but there's something there, you know. And then the second movement is what comes out, you know, it's some kind of a minor key that's very tragic, you know, and so on. But it's kind of resolved at the end, you know, it starts going into C major, and then you have this kind of unalloyed joy in the third movement. So it's kind of beginning, middle and end, you know, beautiful, beautiful concerto, but the 23rd, you know. I used to have a writing out of the plot of the thing, you know. I was kind of influenced by Aristotle there in the critics, right, and they say, Why is the 23rd Piano Concerto one piece of music, right? Why isn't it a concert of three, you know? Well, it's got to be that the three movements in some way form a beginning, a middle, and an end, right? To listen to Mozart's 27th concerto, the last concerto, you know, is farewell to the world, right? And of course, they always talk about the fact that the Swiss performed at the Gate of Heaven, that was the end of the place that was performed at it. But, you know, you can see this resignation in the second movement, right? In the third movement, he has a childlike melody, right? He develops, you know? He's a childlike thing. Unless you become like a child again, you'll never get to heaven. It's beautiful, you know? Absolutely incredible, you know? I mean, how can you make, you know, painting make that equal to these things, you know? These guys, you know? And Hague was good when he was giving the order, you know, of the fine arts, right? I mean, you put drama first, right, no? And then you put music, and then you put painting, and... Yeah, that's kind of, yeah, that's kind of complicating things a bit there, you know? Because it's kind of a, what, play in a sense, isn't it? Right, it's sort of like it all, right? Yeah, yeah. I mean, it's taken my wife to see a movie version of a fellow, and she was so disgusted with a fellow. I mean, to see it's vice-fidelity, you know? How could that be so stupid? Sometimes, Thomas gives us a distinction of distinction, right? And what's this distinction of distinction, right? What's the distinction between what they call formal distinction, which is by opposites, right? And what they call material distinction, which is by the division of the, what, continuance. So, what is the distinction between the ones in number, huh? Yeah, yeah. In other words, number arises, the number that is a species of quantity, it arises from the division of the, what, continuance, right? So, there's a, what, theorem in geometry, you can bisect, say, a straight line, right? I get two lines, right? You can bisect them, and now you get three and four, and so on, right? And since it's divisible forever, numbers can increase forever, right? So, the distinction of ones in number, the species of, which is a species of quantity, arises by the, what, division of the continuous, right? But now the distinction of, what, virtue and vice, let's say, right, huh? That arises by, what, a formal distinction, right? By opposites, right? The distinction we had of substance and accident, and universal and singular, right, huh? That was by opposites, right, huh? The distinction of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit is a formal distinction, right? Not a distinction to cutting up one God and making three, three partial gods. Yeah. That's interesting, there's a distinction of what? Distinction, yeah. Yeah. Or sometimes they give a, you know, a division of division, right? Because you have the division of the universal whole, right? Division is kind of, what, a distinction of the parts of some whole, right, huh? If you've got the two major kinds of, what, distinction of wholes is the composed whole. They call it the integral whole a lot in the text, too. I think composed whole is a better way of naming it. Composed means put together, right, huh? Okay. And then the universal whole, right? So you have two kinds of division corresponding to these two, right? Some more of it. There's also another kind of protestative whole, right? Don't get into all those things right now. So there's a division of division and a distinction of distinction, huh? Yeah. And there are statements about statements, right? But it reflects the nature of the mind that can come back, what, upon itself, right? Reason knows what reason is, huh? And so reason can define itself, right, huh? It's kind of interesting. So we can define other things like square and circle, et cetera, right? But then you can also define square, what, itself, right? I mean, definition itself. You can do that, huh? So you can distinguish the kinds of opposites. You can also distinguish distinction. And you can know that you know the distinction of distinction. That's true. That's true. That's true. That's true. Here, Stella makes use of that fact. Reason can come back upon itself. You understand there are many true statements. I tell you, that's what Chick, uh, uh, in England, I think it's supposed to be Oxford. It's a lot of water around Oxford. So is this, it's an appropriate place for a university where people are doing a lot of reflection? You know, reflections in water. Well, they're all wet, do you? Maybe that's true. Now, I don't know if we have to look at the second chapter here about opposites, because there's a more particular question. But even in the first chapter, the chapter 10, right, huh? After he distinguishes the four, right, huh? And he says, what? Whichever ones are said towards something, right? Whichever ones are said towards something, right? Whichever ones are said towards something, right? Whichever ones are said towards something, right? Whichever ones are said towards something, right? Whichever ones are said towards something, right? These whatever they are what are they are said to be of what their opposites, right? So I'm the father of a son and the son is a father the son of a father, right? but is a His sight something of blindness. So blindness is the absence of sight, right? Or something that's double and then notice he gives the example of episteme, right? And episteme is what? Equality, right, but it has relation falling upon, remember that distinction going back, okay? So he says whatever things are opposed as prosti They are said to be of other things or in some way is said towards what? Others, right? But those things that are contraries Whatever they are said to be in no way are they said to be what? Towards others, right? They said to be contraries of each other, right? But the good is not said to be what? The good and the bad and the bad, okay? He's showing it's a different different sense of opposites right now, okay? So these differences, these opposites differ from one another, right? He says some opposites have no, what? Some countries have no, what? Middle, right? So is there a middle between virtue and vice? Yeah, you could say it, but maybe they're not really habits in the full sense, right? But you might say between black and white, there are a lot of things in between, right? He's taking out health and sickness, one of them has to belong to the, what, body, right, huh? And odd and even, I guess, huh? A set of number, right? It's necessary for one of these to belong, right? I'm getting into the logic of the second act pretty soon, right, huh? Every number is either odd or even, is that true? Every number is either prime or composite, is that true? Every number is either square or cube? No, that's not true. So what does truth mean in an either-or statement? And again, the logic of the second act there, we're talking about truth and falsity, right, huh? What does truth mean in the case of a, what, compound statement? Like every number is either odd or even. Every number is either square or cube. One of those maybe you'd say it's true and the other one's false, right? In other words, you've got to say every human being is either man or woman. You've got trouble now. It's all mixed up now. At least they're willing to admit that, because then they've got a problem. You've got nothing to do with what you are. Now, in the case of a middle, he says, like, between black and white, there's something, right? Not necessarily one of these two belong to the body, right? That's pretty clear stuff. What about good and bad right now, says somebody, right? Is a newborn baby good or bad, morally speaking? I ain't speaking like a Christian now. I'm a Christian blasphemy. Yeah, yeah. This stuff is pretty easy. The students last night there are saying, does God want us to love him? I said, well, now, is there any wanting in God? And it's interesting that we tend to sometimes use the word want, you know, for almost to mean lack, right? But then I read the same thing, right? But wanting is just something you need, right? And that you, therefore, have a lack of rank. So, is there any wanting in God? There's love and joy in God. Is there a wanting in God? See, if wanting implies that you, we say, you know, what's the difference between wanting and joy, right? Well, when you love something and you have it, then you have joy, right? But if you love something but you lack it, then you have wanting, right? Was God lacking anything? See? And does God get something from our loving him? I mean, it seems like human beings, you say, we kind of need to be loved by somebody, right? You know, pop your song, you're nobody until somebody loves you. But we seem to need somebody else's love, right? But does God need our love? You wonder what they're doing to it. Does the Father need the Son's love? It's interesting, because these parts of the soul are called the desiring powers, right? Or appetite, right? But appetite is more, desiring is more wanting, right? It's rather, yeah. And why is it named from wanting? Yeah, yeah. And I think, which is more like motion, love or wanting? Yeah. Which is more like motion, wanting or joy? Yeah, yeah. So things in motion, as soon as you catch the eye, then what not stirs, right? So they name, you know, sometimes this one group of emotions, the concupiscible emotions, right? But concupiscence is wanting, right? And the other one thing, named from what? Harassable. But isn't that, you know, motion, more dominated by motion, right? The harassable person, right? Than any other emotion, right? Going after somebody, right? Coming to blows, right? I get angry with somebody. They call it road rage, you know, stupid stuff. You know, in the newspaper every day, there's some case of somebody guilty of road rage, you know? There's a little there that they got. Yeah, they got in a fight. In a fight, right? Yeah, yeah. Again, you get down to this next kind of opposite. You don't speak of sight or blindness, right? The blindness of sight. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.