Logic (2016)
Lecture 29: The Final Six Categories and Post-Predicamental Concepts

Transcript
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So that's the reason why we're talking about it is what? Something being silly would be something outside of you, right? Now Aristotle, I mean not Aristotle, but he knows it, of course. Position, why is there a separate category for position of parts but not for the position of time? Okay, if you're talking about that sense of position. But the order of time, right, is kind of the definition. So time is defined as the number of the before and after in motion, right? The before and after in the motion of the sun, or the current motion anyway, of the sun around the earth, right? When you number the before and after in that motion, Aristotle raises the question there in the fourth book of Natuariah whether time would be entirely without the numbering soul, right? That's interesting, right? Everybody's saying that, right? Okay. But you already got in the idea of time the order, right? And the definition of it, huh? Why'd you say that? But to say that I'm in this room, well I could be standing, I could be sitting. I said, well I'd be laying down. I'm not going to lay down here, but. You know, the Romans used to lay down when they ate their meal. That would be uncomfortable to me the way to eat my meal. I don't know about you guys. I did too much. So, but to say I'm in this room doesn't bring that out, does it, huh? Whether I'm standing or sitting or laying down, laying on the floor, or sitting in the chair, or standing up. You know, professors used to, you know, they kind of lean on the lectern, you know, and so they kind of go forward like that, or waiting for them, they've got to go over, you know. So, yeah, I tend to do that, you know. I'm kind of afraid to do it myself, you know, going forward like that, but they do that. You know, this dude's going to, it's going to happen. So, position has something in common with time, which is the order, right? But it's an order in the parts and place, right? So, put third, right? Then the fourth thing is something, what? What's the fourth species or genus? Yeah. This would become one of the main meanings of have to have, right? In both segments, right? And have seems to be found in Habituas, and found here, right? They kind of need to give a lecture on this category, right? Because it's man's category, right? And so you contrast man with the other animals, right? The other animals have their clothing as part of them, their body, you know, their fur and so on, right? They shed some fur in the summer, you know, to be more comfortable and so on. But man's got to have, what? Put on, yeah. And then man has all these, what? This is a big fairy, I have a tuxedo, right? And, uh... Going to the beach, you can wear something. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And, you know, if the bride's getting married, you know, I mean, how much did she pay for that dress, you know? Did Daddy pay for the dress? That's a whole other sense of hats. Yeah, yeah. The hats were hats. Yeah, yeah. And, uh, but, you know, I noticed, I mean, the difference, we have to have different clothing for different, you know, the priest says maps, he's, he's clothed differently, maybe, than he is when he's, and, uh, the military man obviously has to have different, uh, things, right? And, uh, so we, it's just something about man, that he needs these, right, uh, that he wouldn't, you know, wear the same clothing, right, or doing some menial tasks, right, and meeting the president or something, or meeting the pope or somebody, right, uh, or getting married, or whatever it might be, right? Oh, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Well, I like to, to translate that, uh, acting upon and undergoing, right? You can say acting upon and being acted upon too, but undergoing. Now, maybe he, he, he, he puts the four before the acting upon undergoing, because the first four have a certain connection with quantity, don't they? Because where and when are connected with what? Place and time, which are species of continuous quantity. And position, of course, is the order in place. And even, you know, clothing, it's got to fit, you know? The size, if you're always talking about, what's your size, you know? I don't know what the size is of anyone. Ask my wife. Yeah. Yeah. And, uh, so those four, those first four kind of, right, have a connection with quantity, right? By acting upon and undergoing seems to have more of some connection with what? Uh, quality, right? You see? Because the, they just take, you know, the third species, for example, quality there, right? Uh, or, but take the second one, ability, right? Mm-hmm. That's tied up, right? Acting upon undergoing. So, but acting upon undergoing, uh, something that's being said upon, is said of you for reason of something outside of you, right? So if I'm kicking you, I'm acting upon you, right? Mm-hmm. And you're being, acting upon, undergoing something, right? Mm-hmm. And so, uh, one is from me to you, and the other is in you from me. So, you're being named something outside of you, right? So what's the difference between being hot and warming something? Well, hot is talking about the quality that's in you, right? And, uh, that's in the third species of what? Quality, right? Okay. Okay. But if I'm heating you or heating something, right? That's gonna be something outside of me, right, eh? See? So the stove in itself is hot, at least when it's on, but, uh, you gotta bring something to the stove to heat it up, right, eh? And so, you're acting upon something outside of you, right? See? You gotta bring in something outside of you to understand what this is, right? If you speak of something becoming hot, huh? Is that the same thing that's undergoing? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, it's a change of quality, and it's going to be called alteration, I guess, is the name they use for it, right? And it'll be one of the species of change that you talk about in the post-prediments, right? But being warmed or being heated, that seems to be an undergoing, right? So what's the difference between, you're just saying becoming hot, you're not talking really about something outside you that may be causing this, right? You're just talking about inwardly your body is acquiring this quality, right? It's something incomplete in the genus of being hot, right, or warm, right? See? But if you're being warmed, you're making something outside you that is acting upon you, right? Okay? First, I was already briefed with those last six categories, right? It's not as important as the first four, but they're still, you know, always talking about where I've got to be when, you know, and so on, right? Yeah, I'm going to work today, you know? Oh, so do you mean. A woman's like, you know, I'm going to work today. His wife always knew his schedule, he couldn't remember. Yeah, you didn't know where I was supposed to be. You didn't know where I was supposed to be, so when he was someplace and he sent his wife to telegram, I said, where am I supposed to be now? You know, I was thinking, I was reading in Thomas there, you know, he's talking about God's knowledge, right? And the question is, you know, things like, is God's knowledge variable, right? Does he know something he didn't know before? Or does God know future contingents? All these different questions, right? Well, the key thing, you know, in understanding how God knows future contingents is that God's knowledge is not in time. His knowledge is, what, measured by eternity, if you speak of it being measured, right? And eternity, as we learn from the way this is a definition, right, is totissimo perfecta, possessio, et interminabilis. It's very hard for us to understand that, right? I was thinking about the similar problem people had with place, right? The Greeks before Aristotle said, whatever he is must be somewhere. If it isn't somewhere, it doesn't exist, right? So in the Russian astronauts and up in the sky, there's no God up here, you know? It's kind of funny that they should try to get a little kind of a blow freak. Destroy all religions. But, you know, you use the expression, you know, when your soul dies your body, right? Well, that's originally naming a change of place, right? So where does your soul go, right? I don't know what that's not talking about. That's really important to know. But will your soul be in some place when it leaves the body? Well, we tend to imagine that, right? Because we can't imagine something not being in place, right? And so if we can't transcend our imagination, you know, the soul isn't somewhere. It doesn't exist anymore, right? It's gone. I mean, gone in the sense of, you know, non-existent, right? And it's very hard for us to overcome that, right? You have this problem when people come into, you know, the universe, right? Where is the universe? Well, I mean, if it's in some bigger place than itself, then it's not the universe yet, right? And so they think, you know, it's got to go on forever necessarily, right? And Aristotle, of course, came to the conclusion that the universe is, in fact, finite, right? And that there's nothing outside the universe, right? You know? That's very hard for us not to understand, right? And the same thing in regards to the soul, right? Well, I was thinking, you know, of the fact, you know, reading these articles again in Thomas there, he's talking about God's knowledge being in eternity and that, so that the past and the present and the future are all present to God, right? So what I did 20 years ago is present to God now in his knowledge, right? You know, what I'll be, you know, I guess I'm around here, but, you know, what I'll be doing, you know, five years from now, that's present to him, right? That's very hard for us to understand, right? Because just like we live in place, we live in time, right? And so we can't understand that very well, you know? It's very hard for us to transcend it, right? We use it in space in terms because there's a place in terms of God's of all time. Yeah. So we can see it all at once. That's kind of the imagery. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's kind of curious. Yeah. I mean, you can't transcend your imagination, right? People have a hard time doing that, right? And so even with these names, these words that are equivocal by reason, you've got to be led gradually from one meaning to another meaning, you know? It's very hard for us to do that, huh? I mean, the consideration of the eternity of God is attached to what consideration of God? What? Unchanging, yeah. Now, you see, that's why you have to study, you know, motion and time and natural philosophy before you study the definition of eternity, right? Because it's attached to the consideration of God's being unchanging, right? That he's eternal and not... But the definition of eternity negates things that are in the, what? Things that are in time, right? Things that are measured by time have a beginning and end in time, right? And even while they're around, they have a, you know, before and after, right? But neither of these is found in, what? Eternity, right? So he says, totus simo, right? But simo will meet as one of the most precedents. But simo negates, what? Before and after, right? And then perfect possession of vitae interminabilis, that doesn't have a beginning or an end. So God's life doesn't have a beginning or an end. My life, and my life sitting on this earth, has a beginning, right? In 1835, my mother's womb. And I don't know when it's going to come to an end, but it's going to have an end, right? So I have a beginning and an end in my life, huh? And so he struck, you know, I was at the bicentennial of Mozart's birth, and then the bicentennial of his death, right? You know, he had these, you know, concerts, you know, and so on, you know? My mother said, what do you want for your birthday? I said, the bicentennial of your concert! The Minneapolis, or they call it the Minnesota Orchestra now, but they had two concert votes, Centauri to Mozart, and one was instrumental music. And I remember them doing his first symphony and his last symphony, right? You know, the same concert, right? What a thing. And then they did the Cosi Vantuti, one of his operas, right? You know, you know, concert version, where they come and they sing and everything, and they don't do all the acting out, you know? But it's just as good, the music is going to hear, you know? And so, I was at, you know, bicentennial conferences, because he lived when he, what, he died, he wasn't quite 36, he was in his 36th year, but he had his 36th birthday. Yeah, how much his accomplishment was, you know? Oh, the pieces, you wonderful pieces, yeah. The way you could do it all these years. Yeah, that's what I said, yeah, yeah, I mean, yeah. You're twice as like, yeah. But Thomas didn't do that long either, you know? That's when Aristotle says, the mind is best at the age of 49. Right, I mean, that's my plan. I just said, I've got to go down, you know, I was going up and I got 49, and I was going down. But I was struck by, you know, how hard it is to us to trans, us comparing, you know, kind of transcending place, right? And most people think, whatever it is, it must be Sunday, right? You can't transcend time or so. So, getting that half hour, right? Sure. Okay. So, do we have to belabor the last six categories anymore, do you think, or not? Now, it's customary to divide the book called The Categories into Do we have to do that? Do we have to do that? Do we have to do that? Do we have to do that? and the first part is called the what anti-predigaments yeah and then the middle part is called the predicaments right and then the last part is called the post-predigaments right now what were the anti-predigaments how many anti-predigaments were there to be in the first five yeah okay five foot and i think there's five post-pregaments too right okay yeah oh yeah see see so um what are the five anti-predigaments it's still called for a little well he he had um he didn't begin there though he said that's one of them right but then he began with the uh uh things are named equivocally they have a name in common but the definition according to the name is not the same and then things are named what equivocally and then things are sometimes named denominatively now the great commentator said why does he that's a distinction of three right but why does he give that distinction right well he says what is said of all ten categories like being or one is said what equivocally of them right within each category what is above is said but what is below univocally right and then going from one category to another you get what you get denomitivity right so i'm a man i'm not a quality right but you can denominate me from a quality i'm a geometer or i'm a magician or you know i guess i'm kind of healthy you know about twice there on the ice the other day yeah yeah yeah but anyway um i always say you you break something you're gonna it's gonna finish you off you're gonna be you're aware about it so that's one thing they point out and it kind of prepares the way right because the ten categories are ten what genera and genera are said what genus is said okay okay well there's a division um that they call it ton legomenon a thing said right and then a division tone on tone right of beings that's what it's called yeah it's not very well said though okay in the greek it says at the beginning of chapter two there ton legomenon right of things said or those said ton legomenon some are said according to sumplokane which intertwine you know okay and some without right and there he seems to be distinguishing between uh the first and the second active reason right huh because example he gives of of what sumplokere is man runs or man wins or something right without sumplokese man runs you know it's just one of these things right okay okay so um how's that prepare the way of the categories huh yeah but but legomenon are they said with or without sumplokese yeah without yeah yeah so you can't put uh man thinks or man man healthy man in the category right because that's combining two different things right and you can't put it really a statement there right man is healthy or is that ball category there's things like man or health that are going to be placed in there right so that's important too right then you have the one you you it stands out in our mind of course is um tone what on tonus is in the greek right the distinction tone on tone and that's a distinction of what universal substance particular or individual accident and then substance yeah and it's interesting what aristotle does there right because he wants to contrast them by their opposition right so universal substance is said of another but does not exist another individual accident exists another but it's not said of another so what's affirmed in one is denied in the other right and they kind of stand out very good right like a lot of times when i'm talking about composed whole and universal whole right i say composed whole is put together for its parts but not set in them universal hole is just reverse set of its parts but not put together from them right you know so it's very clear what he does right takes things like that and then he goes to what universal accident right which is both set of another and exists in another and then he takes finally individual substance which is neither set of another nor exists in another right he doesn't very far as though he doesn't right dummies like me and i say universal substance particular substance and universal accident well you can see that too but aristotle does something unique he does right and by putting universal substance and a particular accident first right what is affirmed and one is denied and the other you realize that set of another exist another are not synonymous right but you might kind of think you know seven other exist another right but they're what quite different right because one of these one is affirmed and the other is denied and they don't see verse so not the same thing right so he makes you very clear about these things right well this obviously now tells you to distinguish between substance and the other nine what genera right because universal substance in particular substance will be in the order of substance and then universal accident in particular accident will be in each of the nine genera of it right okay and what does he do next what's the fourth one yeah this is really this is really a rule about the order within each category right so if uh substance is said of body or material substance right and body is said of animal right then substance will be said of animal right the higher one is always said of the one below it right now so you see that's something of the predicamental order right now okay and that the differences will be not the same in every genus right now they're dividing and then the fifth one is to benumerate the what 10 things said without intertwining right either substance or quantity he just exemplifies them right okay then in the predicaments the middle part right he takes them up one by one these ten genera but mainly the first four right that's surprising disorder there yeah yeah now what are the post-pregaments right well i think people say more than one thing but they seem to be for the most part you know things that are critical by reason you right? But they're found maybe in more than one, what, category, right? So the first thing you'll be talking about will be, what, opposites, right? You're talking about before and after, right? Well, these are found in what? If I was going to divide substance, I'd probably divide it into material and immaterial. You want to divide by opposites, right? You divide quantity into, what, discrete and continuous. That's by opposites, right? The quality is no more difficult, right? But you divide by opposites very often. And then there's a certain order, right? Because the genus is before the species and the species' genus is then below it and so on. You get the order, right? So the first things you talk about are, what, opposites in about, what? Order, yeah. And then some things are together in division, right? So when I divide quantity into discrete and continuous, they are on the same level, right? And I divide, you know, so line and place and time aren't on the same line with discrete quantity, right? But discrete and continuous are on the same line. They're together, right? Together, right? Okay. And then you could say that maybe line, length, width, and so on, you know, that these are in the same line, right? Okay. And the same way, you know, if you divide, what, substance into material and immaterial substance, right? And then, say, material substance we'll call body, or body, right, huh? Well, body means equivalently, of course, with the genus of quantity. But then bodies are divided into, what, plant and animal, right? I mean, living and non-living. Yeah. And they'd be on the same, they'd be ama, living and non-living, and then living into animal and plant, which would be on the same division, right? And then you start to subdivide those, right? Okay. So you have those three things, right? But you say, substance comes before body, body before living body, living body before animal, before man. We're way down there in the order, right? We're in the mental order, right? But all those things are said to me, right? If I'm a man, I'm an animal. If I'm an animal, I'm a, what, living body from living body, my body from the body, my material substance, my substance, right? All these things are said to me, right? Way down, all these things are said to me, okay? So that's just one thing you see, though, right, huh? Okay? In those first three, right? But at the same time, you might say, you know, when you go into another science, right, you might, like Thomas does, you know, recall, what? Oh, yeah, there was a category called, what? Quality, right? And I bet that's where these virtues and vices belong, right, huh? You go back and recall the 4G, right? But eventually you're going to be going beyond the text of the categories, right? Because you'll be distinguishing the virtues of, the moral virtues from the, what? Yeah, from the virtues of reason, right? And then, you know, just, you know, infuse virtues maybe later on, right, from these, right, and so on. And so those first three post-pregnaments, right? Not only go back and illuminate what's gone before in the categories, right? But it's kind of a starting point for what you're going further, subdividing these things by opposites, right, and putting them in order, huh? Okay. Now, you can stand back even further and say, yeah, but this is of universal importance, these things too, right, huh? Because both Plato and Aristotle say that there's the same knowledge of what? Well, it's kind of interesting. And so the medical art is about health and sickness. Ethics is about virtue and vice, not equally, but logic is about fallacious reasoning as well as demonstration and so on, right? And so opposites is the way we distinguish things, right? That's what the mind is always doing, distinguishing things, right? And order, of course, is the definition of reason, right? You know, Shakespeare said that reason looks before and after, but now if you look before, before and after you see there's a distinction you have to see before, because nothing is before or after itself, so there must be some distinction. So reason looks for distinctions as well as for what? Before and after, and it looks for distinctions before it looks for before and after, right? Okay. It's a kind of universal importance for the mind, right, huh? Kind of, you know, richness of Aristotle's text there, right? But that's at least three things, right, you can say, those first three things, right? There are things that are found in more than one category, right, huh? But then we're going on subdividing these categories, right? And if I'm going to be talking, if I'm studying the soul there, I'm going to distinguish the second species of quality, right? Aristotle divides them into five groups of abilities, huh? This involves opposites and so on. So to understand the categories better, right, to go forward, you know, subdividing, right, in particular, right? And, but then for the universal, that's about the reason, huh? A lot of times the commentators just say, you know, well, you know, these have many meanings, and they're found in the one category. Well, that's something to do with it, you know, but not the whole, I don't think of it, huh? So I go to this text on before and after for understanding Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? So that's a kind of universal use of reason, huh? Looking before and after. Now, what's the fifth post-pregnant, or excuse me, the fourth one, huh? Well, this is the one of what? The last two are a little different, right? They're motion and what? Having, right, huh? He distinguishes motion because they're found in more than one, what? Genus, right? But not at all, right? So generation and corruption are found in substance, huh? Growth, right? And shrinking, maybe I'm shrinking now, is found in quantity, right, huh? But something imperfect or incomplete, right? Growing to be some height, right? It's not the same as having that height, right? Having seems to be something more perfect, right? So if you're growing to be six feet tall, you know? I was looking with one kid here in the great school area. He's kind of towering above the other ones, you know, something, you know? And if he's going to be a basketball player, right, he has to maybe grow to be six feet tall at least, I guess. But it's something imperfect, right? See? But when he has six feet, or what, six feet four, right? He's doing, you know, I say, you should be playing basketball rather than coming to my house. Yeah, yeah. The word have there, you know, also seems to be found in one category, right? Because use the word habit is created to having, right? And then have in the case of what? Of that category, right? Have, right, huh? But when you start to take up the senses that Aristotle gets a have there, you know, I mean, he'll talk about when it's said to have a quality, right? When it's said to have a size, right? Distinguishing these things. The last sense he talks about is to have a wife, right? It's kind of an alien sense almost. So the most common thing you say about the post-pregments are they're talking about things that can't be placed in just one category, right? They're found in more than one, right? So if you say to me, you know, Berquist, I heard you say ad nauseum that things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stir is, you know? So motion is what my life is. Yeah. Where does that belong in this division, right? That's a pretty important thing, motion, right? And in the movie, they were talking about before, and natural philosophy precedes per modem motus, right? The way of motion, Thomas says. Where does motion belong in this thing? I mean, you claim to have ton on ton, you know, it covers everything in some way. And I say, well, motion is found in some categories and other ones, right? And substance is found in quantity, and it's found in quality, and it's found in where. See? So maybe there has to be a kind of a consideration of things and not let them escape, right? But I don't think that's the only reason, you know, but the post-pregments are there, right? What do you do with the categories now? Well, I'm going to go forward from the first species of quality when I get to ethics, right? I'm going to go forward from the second species of what? Of quality when I study the powers of the soul, right? And I go to my friend Euclid of Alexandria, right? And I say, well, those first six books are dealing with continuous quantity, geometry, right? But the seventh and the eighth and the ninth is very illuminating, right? So I'm going to go forward from it. And if I go to natural philosophy, we'll be talking about, well, in book five, the distinction of the kinds of what? Motion, right? It has a qualitative, you might say, division of motion and then a quantitative division, right? Because they're continuous, right? And they're divisible forever, right? Half the way to the door before you go to the door. They'll never get there. Yeah, paradoxes, as you know, right? It's amazing how many senses in the word has has, right? But just in terms of the categories, you can say that things have a name and a genus has species. In another sense of have, the species has a genus and a what? And differences. And then substance has accidents, right? You know, all kinds of sense. You've got to tie those things up, doesn't it? You know, let them escape, right? Weithius, you know, I mean, all kinds of things. Thomas is always quoting him, right? Thing is singular when sensed, universal understood, all kinds of quotes that appear again and again in Thomas, right? Weithius, huh? Definition of eternal. Yeah, you'd greatly admire the category. So next time we'll maybe start to dig up the post-prediments, right, huh? And the first one is opposites, right, huh? I told you about the writing the doctoral thesis and Karl Marx's philosophy. Tell you about that. Well, it was at the LaValle there. You could go to the library and there would be bound copies. Probably bound copies of my thesis there in the LaValle library there. And if you're interested in a particular topic, you'd maybe go read a thesis on this topic, right, huh? And if you want to see the, you know, the itty-bitty stuff about it, talk to pieces, but don't. This guy was writing about the Marxist philosophy. Well, the official name of Marxist philosophy in Marx himself is dialectical materialism, right? Materialism says that matter is the beginning of reality, but dialectic is how things develop from matter and it's probably the clash of opposites. It's dialectic, you know, it's borrowed from logic because you can argue on both sides of a question, right, huh? Like in the disputed question, you know, we have ten objects on one side and some on the other side, right? And so on. Well, but nowhere does Marx really distinguish the kinds of opposites, right? But that's fundamental to his whole philosophy, right? You know? And they'll speak of contradiction, you know, and they'll be talking about contrariety, you know, the rich and the poor or something, you know? Well, they're not contradictories. I mean, they're different. There's four different senses. I never see a modern philosopher, you know? Even in senses, it's crucial to their thinking, right? That's the name, right? I mean, they apply it to, when they get to human society, they take what's most material, which is the economic mode of production, right? And then the opposites that are involved in the economic mode of production, you know, so it gives rise to the, you know, capitalism and its contradictions that give rise to communism and so on, right? But they never distinguish the senses of what? Opposites. And of course, Hegel comes before Kant, and Hegel was dealing with the opposites, right? And accepting contradictions, you know? But distinguish these words that are equivocal by reason, and then they're all around the place, you know? You don't see the distinction, and I refuse. Yeah. Aristotle speaks of the, you know, fallacy of equivocation, a mistake from, makes you have to sense of the words as the most common source of... Was Trump's thing there, he bannin' Muslims or not? Or is it a bannin' terrorists, right? So, look at the opposites next time, okay? All right.