Logic (2016)
Lecture 27: The Four Senses of End and the Four Species of Quality

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syllables are longer for some reason, and I just see that it's too long, right? And so they hit upon the idea of five feet, right? So not only are Shakespeare's songs written in iambic pentameter, right? But what they call blank verse, a lot of his plays, you know, blank verse, you have iambic pentameter, right? But some of that fits the English, how fast the syllables move, right? So it's a mistake, you know, to imitate the Greeks, maybe six, you know, that can be done sometimes in English, right? But you can't make the whole thing, you know, with these lines, it's too long, you know? It's just not going to work, you know? I was telling you what the linguists told me, you know, that the Latin grammarians, you know, tried to imitate the Greek grammar, and the Greeks understood their language. They were smarter than their language. And so they're trying to apply to Latin the grammar of the Greek, what, language, and it doesn't quite fit, right? And I guess the English grammarians try to imitate the Latin grammarians. So, which you have to admire, the Greeks know what they're doing, right? You know? And logic, you know, when you get to the logic of reasoning, you talk about induction and, what, syllogism, right? Well, the Latin's had their own word for induction, right? But they didn't have their own word for syllogism. It's too far beyond them. The Latin's are too dumb, you know? So they just borrowed the Greek word and made a kind of Latin word out of it, syllogismos or something, you know? Kind of realizing that we have, right? Of course, that's when they started these protests, right, in college, right, huh? Western SIDS got to go, you know? You're talking into all these steps. But we're really dependent upon these guys, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said, let's look at the reply to the objection there, let's look at the second objection. To the first, it should be said that disposition implies a certain, what, order, huh? This has been said. Whence is not, one is not said to be disposed by a quality except in order to something. And if one adds bene vi male, which pertains to the notion of habit, it's necessary that one attend an order to nature, which is the end, huh? A second objection here. Moreover, the philosopher in the predicamentis says that cliditatum hotness, I guess, huh? Frigitatum, that's the other ones we've got today here. Yeah. To be dispositions or habits as sickness and what health. Color, calor, and frigos, refrigerator. Sunt intertia spitiae qualitatis, huh? Therefore, habit or disposition are not distinguished from the other species of quality, huh? Okay? The fact that there's objection coming in at all is kind of showing the priority of disposition, right, huh? And they sometimes speak of quality as what? The disposition of substance, right? Quantity is the size of substance or something, you know? The measure of substance, right? Whence according to figure, I'm going to the second paragraph that replied to the first objection. Whence according to figure or according to heat or cold, right? One is not said to be disposed well or badly except according to order to the nature of the thing, right? According as it is suitable or not suitable, right? You hit a man up too much or cool him down too much, you kill him, right? Okay? So there can be a certain temperature that is suitable to your nature, right? Whence also figures and what? Undergoing qualities. According as they are considered as suitable or not suitable to the nature of the thing, pertain to habit or disposition, right? For figure, insofar as it is suitable to the nature of the thing and color, pertain to what? Beauty. So beauty is not what? The fourth species of quality, it's going to be put up with habit or disposition, right? Color, hot and cold, according as they are suitable to the nature of the thing, pertain to what? Health. And in this way, hot and cold, right, are placed by the philosopher and the first species of quality, you know? It's very subtle, right? Whence is clear the solution to the second objection. Although it's solved some ways, sometimes otherwise. As Simplicius says, it's commentary in the predicaments. I can bring in Simplicius, but he's subject to Simplicius. But he has great commentaries too. These are very difficult things, right? We exhaust the categories here, huh? We can compare here the four senses of limit or end with the four senses of quality and wisdom with the four species of quality and the categories. But first we give Thomas' exposition of Aristotle's text and wisdom on the word, what? Limbit. That's interesting, huh? Aristotle, in the fifth book there, what's the first word he takes up, do you know? You should know. Hmm? Beginning. Yeah, beginning, yeah. See, he begins with the word beginning. Let's begin. Yeah. Yeah. But then later on he takes up the word, what? Terminus or end, right? Huh? He lays down the ratio of termini or end, right? What's the name of that station there in Rome there? What do they call it? Ratio terminus. Yeah. End of the road. In Rome, that's... Which the term is said. Which the first is according as in any species of magnitude. Now that's continuous, what? Quantity, right, huh? The end of the magnitude or the thing having magnitude is said to be the terminus, right? Just as the point is said to be the terminus of the line. Now I'd rather use the word end, right, huh? The point is the end of the line, right, huh? Okay. That's one sense of end, right? Okay. And the surface is the end of the body, right? And also of the, what? Stone having quantity, right, huh? So when I leave Shrewsbury, I come to the end of Shrewsbury. Yeah. Now another meaning of end would be destruction, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But it's not that end of Shrewsbury. You get a soldier to me, I'd say, you know, happiness is the end of life, the end of life is death, never happiness is death. The most common mistake in thinking is mixing up the senses of words, right? Okay. The second mode is like the first, right? According as one limit of what motion or of action is said to be the end, right, huh? This to which there is motion, and not that from which is motion, right? So I made a journey today, right? And this is my end here. That was the end of my motion. It's a little different, but it's similar to the end of magnitude, right? That's the end of my motion. To be here with the end. Is that in the sense of purpose to be here? Did I come up here to be here? Did I come up here to teach or something, right? That's more of my purpose, right? Runs a mile and then stops, you know, it's enough today. Exercise, right? It's the end of his motion, right? He's no longer what? His running has come to an end. What's the third meaning here, huh? Second word, okay? Now, sometimes he says both extremes of the motion is said to be the term largo modo, right, huh? Okay? That from which and that to which, right? As we say that every motion is between two, what, terms. Now, the third mode of which term is said is kuyus causa fida li quid, huh? That's for the sake of which something comes to be. And this now is the last of intention as a term. Well, the second mode was the last of the motion or operation, right? But see, you know, if I run for a, what, mile and then I stop, right, huh? Is my stopping there my purpose? I ran to the purpose of stopping. I probably ran for the sake of exercise or something, right? Or the health of my body or something, right? So health was my, you know, in the sense of purpose, right, huh? But stopping was the end of my motion in the second sense, right? So it's a different sense there, right, huh? My death is the end of my, in the second sense, right? My death, right? The fifth, the future of the fifth is waiting for him to the fourth to die, right? It's a very, very fatherly scene, very, very, very Shakespeare, right? Okay? So we've got three meanings so far of end, right, huh? The end of the line, right? The end of the table. It is the end of the table right there, okay? It's the end of me right here. I'm extending the iron map. Right here, that's the end of me. That's the first sense of end, right? And then the second sense of end is where I, what's my stock? And the third sense is that for the sake of which, right? And that's one of the four kinds of causes, right? That for the sake of which, right? Now, what's the fifth, the fourth sense, huh? Obviously. Fourth sense is according as the substance of thing, which is its essence and definition, is said to be, what? Terminous, right? Okay? Now, notice the word definition, right? Yeah. And Christali, you know, even he's trying to first know what a thing is. He speaks of perigraphic, right? So it's a little bit like drawing a line around, right? So you're going back to that first sense, right? But you're using a different sense now, right, huh? You're kind of, what? You know, description, you know, drawing a line around or something, right, huh? Okay? So definition. And that's what Thomas says here. It's beautiful, but he does here. For it is determinous cognitiones, right? For knowledge of a thing begins from some exterior signs, but which one arrives eventually at knowing the definition of the thing, huh? When one has arrived there, right? And it's a perfect knowledge of the thing, right, huh? Or it is said to be the end of the knowledge of the definition because within it are contained those things in which the thing is known. So once I had, you know, quadrilateral, equilateral, and right-angled, I got the square, you know? Fenced it in, right, huh? Okay? And that's why, you know, Plato compares it to hunting, you know, and forcing the animal, you know, in Maryland. And finally they get the animal, right? The way they catch you the lions there in India, you know? Boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom. And the lion keeps on, you know, kind of running away from all the sound. And they got it. So defining something is like hunting, right? Hunting. Plato says, don't let it escape you, you know? The thing you're trying to define, you know? Like, you know, hunt, you don't want the animal to escape you, you know? Okay, so if one changes one difference, or adds it, or subtracts it, it would not be the same, what, definition, right, huh? Nature's of things are like numbers, right, huh? If it is the term of the knowledge, it's also the term of the thing, right? Because knowledge takes place through being likened to the thing, right, huh? He concludes, then, the comparison of terminus to beginning saying that, right, that as many ways as a beginning is said, right, so many ways as in said, and then even more, right? Because every beginning is in some way an end, right? But not every, what, end is a beginning, right? For that to which motion is, is an end, and in no way a beginning, right? But that from which there is a motion is, can be called both a beginning and an end, right? So someday I take a line, I say, okay, I'm going to start here. So this point here is the beginning of the line, and the point down here is the end of the line, right? But someday I say the two end points, right? Two ends of the line, right? I wouldn't say the two beginnings of the line, but now you're probably not, you see, you know? So in some way, end seems to be even harder, right, huh? So it's beautiful, right, huh, the way Aristotle brings out these things, right? Four senses of end, right? That's a pretty fundamental word, right? It's a respectable word, right? It's equivocal by reason, right, huh? It's got these four basic senses, huh, sweetie? I really find that impressive, you know? Because I read this book called The Revelation, I guess they called it, and I noticed the way God really kind of plays with me a little bit. He says, I am the Alpha and the Omega, right? And then he says, I am the first and the last. Then he says, I am the beginning and the end, right? And you have to see the words that Aristotle has, huh? Because in Greek, archaic and telos, right? Both beginning and end have got many meanings, right? So one sentence has got a, what, beginning, right? You see, beginning, like the point is the beginning of the line. When Aristotle begins with beginning, he takes, what, a beginning that is in the thing in which it is a beginning, right? And then he comes to the sense of beginning that is, like, the, what, the father or the maker, right, who's outside the thing, right? And what sense has got a beginning? Do you like the point? Or Aristotle gives us, like, the second sense there, there, the foundation of the house is the beginning of the house. He has the, yeah, yeah. It's like the first part of the thing, right, huh? The ace of gogi is the beginning of logic in the tradition, great tradition, going back to the Greeks, right? Okay, the category is the beginning for Aristotle has his books. Is that what God is, the fundamental part of it? In that beginning, in either of those... Oh, honor me. But then Aristotle comes to the beginning that is not in the thing which is the beginning, right? And it's not for the sense of which God is the beginning, like he's a mover, right, huh? But then he's finally the alpha and the omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end. What sense of these senses of God, the end? Of those four senses of end? What sense is the end? What sense is the end? What sense is the end? What sense is the end? What sense is the end? What sense is the end? What sense is the end? Yeah, yeah, yeah. So God is a beginning, right? He's an efficient cause, right? The mover or the maker, right? Beginning, it says God made heaven and earth, I guess, didn't he do that? And then, but he's also what? The end of the whole, right? Unusual, God is both, right? How can the beginning be the end, huh? So they talk about the perfection of the circle, right? Where the beginning is the end. But that's different senses in the sense that God is the beginning and the end, right? But you keep on coming back, you know? So I always say to the students, you know, is reality more like a straight line or like a circle? Well, if it's like a straight line, the beginning would not be the end. So the evolutionist thinks it kind of, you know, straight line, you know? Uncomplicated, complicated, right? But then the beginning and the end would be something different, right? But if God is the beginning of all things and the end of all things, then reality is like a what? A circle, right, huh? That's true, right, huh? Your style speaks of a circle in the dianima there, right, huh? Because the candy or the, you know, walking in the bakery, you know, and it moves your senses, right, huh? And your senses move your hunger, your desire, and then that, what, brings you back to the thing that was in the bakery there. It's kind of an interest, it's a circle, right, huh? The importance of it, huh? Oh, we'd better stop here now, okay? Because we obviously need some help. In the name of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, move us, God, to know and love you. Help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. I think we'll pass over this little passage here in 10 and 11 there, where he's talking about the senses of how, because we'll have that text here, and we'll have to refresh our minds on it. But look at the bottom of page 11 there, right? We mentioned before about the reason why Aristotle had altered the consideration of them, the order, right? He takes up the genera in particular. He takes up, what, substance first, then quantity, then what quality he says, right? But he first enumerates them, and then relation, then the other six. But here he takes up substance first, then quantity, and then he takes relation third. Well, it's because of the fact that, what? There was this big accepted definition of relation, huh, in Plato, and where everything that's said to be of something else, right? Seems to be relative, right? And Aristotle said, well, there are some things which are really not basically relations, but they have a relation following upon them, right? And, of course, the famous example where Aristotle pointed this out was knowledge, right? But the bottom here of page 11, huh, Aristotle, or Thomas, rather, makes the same point about what? Potencia, right? Power, right, no? Notice what Thomas says here. Although the ratio of principia, the notion of a beginning, right, belongs to potency, right, huh? And that ratio of beginning is in the genus of what? Relation. Nevertheless, that which is this beginning of action, passion, is not a relation, huh? But some form absoluta, as opposed to the relative, huh? Towards another, right? And that is the essence of potency, right? And hence it is that the philosopher places power not in the genus of what? Relation, but equality, right? Because it's fundamentally equality, but it has a relation following upon it. Just as science, which is the example where Aristotle happens to point out that this sort of thing, that knowledge is what? Basically equality, but it has a relation to the known following upon it. Although to both, some relation happens, right? That gives you the more richer two examples, right, of things that are basically qualities, power and knowledge, but they both have following upon the relation to something else, right? So you place them fundamentally in quality. If you want to say the relation belongs, relation, okay, but power or knowledge are fundamentally qualities, right? Now, I point out that the, Aristotle calls that second species of quality, what? Natural ability or inability, right? And it's good to have in mind the word natural because the first species of quality, if you have these positions, these are acquired abilities, right? Now, Thomas clearly places the powers of the soul in the second species of quality. So he talks about the virtues in the ethics, right, or in the prima secunde, right, he goes to the genus of quality and then goes to the first, what, species, right, huh? But in the, what, study of the soul, he goes to talk about the powers of the soul, and Aristotle was talking about them last night, they're the five genus of powers, right? They're found in souls, right? And, but he goes to the, what, category of quality, but to the, what, second species, huh? Now, if you see a few texts there on the page, 12 there, huh? The first one is from the Summa Theologiae, where he's taking up the soul, right, and his powers. Since the power of the soul is not its essence, huh? Thomas will often have articles on that. Just like you'll argue in the angel, his powers are not his, what? I mean, his, yeah, his powers are not his essence, his nature, right? It is necessary that it be an accident, and it is in the second species of quality, right? Okay? But it's not an accident in the sense of porphyry, right? The Asegogia, right? But an accident is defined in the Antipredicaments, right? Exists in another, huh? Take another one from the, the spiritual olibos creaturis, and I guess that's one of your disputed questions, right? That's delicious reading. These things consume them again. There's nothing like that in the modern philosophers. Nothing like that at all. Thomas has 24 objections against the truth, you know, and what he's going to maintain in the body of the article, you know? And sometimes he has armies on both sides, you know? That's marvelous, huh? Concentrate your mind upon these things. If the powers of the soul are not its, the very essence of the soul, and its manifests that they're not other substances, right? It falls that there are accidents in one of the, what, nine genera, that are genera of accidents, right? But they are in the second species of quality, which is called potentia, the impotentia naturalis, huh? Natural power, huh? Okay? So, if you, by upbringing, you know, are able to acquire a certain habit, you get a certain ability, right? But it's not really, what? Yeah. It's an acquired ability, right? You see? So, it distinguishes two things, right, huh? What do you do when your little boy comes home from the store with something that was not paid for? Yeah. We make him go back and, and, and, uh... Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so, after a while, he gets, you know, you know, avoid these things, huh? Oh, yeah. That guy, that guy was... Natural ability? Yeah, something, yeah. Many times I said I wish that, that Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas had known Mozart's music, right? They would have been, I think, very much impressed with it, right? And if they had known Shakespeare, they would have been very impressed with his plays, right? But at least my, my great teachers, like Monsignor and Viconic and so on, were very much taken up with these things, right? And I remember, I remember, I guess, DeConnick was out at St. Mary's College. That's where I first taught, you know, the graduate doctorate. And, uh, DeConnick had been out there one time, I guess, in the summer. And, of course, he had spoken so, so, you know, well of Shakespeare right now. You know, one of the, uh, clerks out there was telling me about it, and he felt almost impersonal that I would be, you know, shocked or, or something, you know, but that respect that he had for Shakespeare, right, you know? It was kind of, kind of striking. Of course, I fully agreed with it, you know, but, uh, I would say, you know, you know, you know. Aristotle, you know, in the eighth book of the politics there, he talks about the music and how some music is suitable for kids. And I'm sure you'd see that rock and roll is not suitable for kids. And so, my favorite example was that my cousin Donald went into the Navy, right? He was down in the Navy place there on the East Coast, huh? And, uh, there were planks of that wild stuff, you know? People were taking these fold-up metal chairs, you know, and, whoosh! Those things flying through the room like that. It's like, you know? It's so cool. You know, which is just quite crazy. It's just music, you know? Now, the next text is a little one on, what, alteration, right, huh? This is in regard, right? Where I still say, Omnis alteratio, huh? Fit secundum qualitatem sensibilea. Right? They use the word sensible, right, huh? Which is the third speech. of quality. According to these things, bodies are altered, huh? By which first bodies differ from each other, right? Because they distinguish earth, air, fire, and water by hot and cold and wet and dry, which are sensible qualities as gravitas and levitas, deritzias and molillas, which are perceived by touch, right? Okay. And these are certain passions under the, what, genus of quality contained. And they're called passiones because they, what, engender a passion in the senses or because from some passions they are caused, as Aristotle says in the predicament. So my face may turn red in embarrassment as I'm shown to be the scoundrel that I am, right? Okay. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Now, in the very fifth book of physics there at the bottom of page 12. To this genus he alludes this common name, which is alteration. For alterum, it's a custom to be said, what differs secundum what? Qualitatum, right, huh? We speak now about quality not according as quali is found in the genus of substance. According as a, what, substantial difference is said to be predicated in eoquad quali, right, huh? So when they defined, you know, even difference they'd say it signifies how something is, what it is, right? Quali quid, right? And de quali passivo, which is contained in the third species of quality, huh? But you can call those sensible qualities too, like down the scenes to do here. Quali desider aliquid pati and cold, white and black and so on, right? So they're like per se sensibles, but private sensibles, right? And the fourth species is, of course, that, huh? The philosopher in the seventh book of the physics, at the top of page 13, he proves that in the first and fourth species of quality, there is not the motion of alteration, but only in the third, which is called the undergoing or undergoing quality. An account of this, he significantly, as it says, alteration in the transmutation in the passions, right? Okay. That's kind of interesting, you know, in the first species of quality, though, there seems to be something like alteration, right? Can a man go from being vicious to virtuous or vice versa? But how do you go? How do you acquire these moral virtues, huh? Well, Aristotle says, it's by doing courageous things, it would become courageous. And then people say, well, how can you say this by doing courageous things that you become courageous? Because if you're doing courageous things, you are courageous. Well, you don't do it with the, what? Yeah. So you kind of force yourself into a kind of violence to yourself, right? Huh? I remember this guy in college there, he wanted to, you know, be active in some organizations, but he had a fear of talking in public, right? So he signed up for this course for a professor, you know, speech course, right? And for, you know, you're forced to get up and talk in front of the class, and the professor, you know, will tell you what's wrong with the way you're addressing the class and so on. So, but he's, what, doing kind of violence to himself, right, huh? But he's starting to build up this thing, right? So eventually he can, he can speak without, what, fear, right? Rose and I were at the Elite 3D Mass there, you know, in the local parish. And, well, today they have the, you know, once in a while they have the, all the kids come in from the grade school, St. Mary's grade school there, you know. And, of course, they get them up, you know, at the time when they have to say the prayer of the faithful and so on. And each kid gets, you know, has a little petition, right, and they climb up there and so on. None of them seem to be afraid, you know. See, at that age I would be afraid to get up in front of the church, you know, and see all these people out there, you know. But they seem to be, you know. But it's probably good for them though, you know, huh, to get up there and speak in front of a crowd like that and not panic, you know. That man, I do a high school class for this big, big room. You're in the front, you're talking, the professor's in the back, and he has a big metal bucket and a handful of nails. And every time you stutter or say something, you drop a nail in the bucket, bang! You know, you stutter again, you said the you know again, or something like that. Boy, that's the way to connect. I'm glad to do that for a preaching class. I thought, uh, uh, uh, you know, you know. Like, like, like. Now, in the appendix here, going to some things in theology right now, okay. What about grace? What is grace, huh? Is there a place for, for grace in the category of what? Quality, huh? More of a grace is a certain, what, quality, huh? But it is manifested is not in the fourth species of quality, which is a form and a figure, right, around something. Because grace doesn't pertain to the, what, body, right, huh? Nor is it in the third species, because it's not a passio, an undergoing, right, or undergoing quality, huh? Which is in the sensitive part of the soul, right? This is proven in the seventh book of the physics, huh? For grace is chiefly in the mente, in the immaterial part, yeah. Mente doesn't mean just, you know, mind as opposed to will or something, but in the, uh, nor again is it in the second species, which is potency of impotentia naturalis. I was emphasizing the word naturalis, right? Because grace is super natura, huh? Above it, huh? And does not have itself to good and bad as a natural power. Therefore, it remains that is in the first species, which is habitus, habit, or disposition, huh? For the habits of the mind are, what, virtues, huh? Because even knowledge itself, scientia, is in some way a, what, virtue, huh? Virtue is what makes its however good and is, what, doing, doing good, right? Said and said above. Therefore, grace is the same thing as virtue, it seems, right, huh? You're kind of taking those four species that Aristotle gives, right, huh, as if they are, what, exhausting all the species. And Aristotle himself says they made the other ones, right? I'll tell you that, Father Henri Dulac, Father Henri Dulac, there was my logic teacher in college there, huh? He thought that there might be some other species that didn't bring anyone out, okay? Notice what Thomas says in his reply to this objection argument. To the third it should be said, top of page 14 here, to the third it should be said that grace is reduced, that's, that's simply there, right, but led back there, to the first species of what? Quality, huh? But it is not over the same thing as virtue, but a certain what? Habitudo, huh? Way of having yourself, which presupposes, which is presupposed, huh? More fundamental in that sense to the infused virtues, right? As if it's the beginning and the root, huh? I like those words, the chief human radix, huh? And in another text where Thomas does the same, he notes that grace is a quality not known by the, what, philosophers, huh? So grace is reduced to the genus of quality, but that reducita doesn't mean it's put there simply, right? Okay? And to the first species of quality, right? But does not properly have the name, the nature of a what? Habit. Because it's not immediately ordered to what? Act. In the way that you could say that faith and hope and charity are, right? Faith is what? Immediately, huh? Not to anything else, immediately ordered to what? Believing, right? And hope to hoping, right? And charity to what? Loving your God and your neighbor. But it's a certain way of having yourself, right? Just as health has itself to the, what? Body, huh? And therefore, Chrysostom says that grace is the sanitas mentis the health of the mind right yeah whence it is not numbered neither among the sciences nor among the virtues right nor among the other qualities which the philosophers number of whom it did not belong to what? to eat except natural habits and acquiring ones right now this fiction one goes further along in a third text where Thomas also notes the difference of this quality which is grace from those known by the philosophers and this is maybe more clear now grace is in the first species of quality right although it's not properly said to be what cannot properly be said to be a habit I think it's the same reason he gave the other argument because it is not immediately ordered to what? act but to a quaddam esse spirituale right see a kind of spiritual what? being right huh? which therefore is in the soul right which it makes in the soul rather than in the what? powers of the soul right so grace is like a habitudo as he calls it in the soul itself right giving it a kind of spiritual existence right and a spiritual being right and it's as a disposition which with respect which is with respect to glory which is they call this gratia consummata gloria you've heard that before I'm sure but nothing like grace in the accidents of the soul which the philosophers known can be found right huh? because the philosophers did not know except those what accidents of the soul which are ordered to the acts that are proportioned to human what nature right huh? so I think that's what he says there right huh? quaddam esse spirituale right I sometimes tied up with you know doesn't St. Peter talk about partaking in the divine nature right huh? and you're partaking in the divine nature it seems in your very soul right huh? and therefore it's kind of a spiritual being right huh? and therefore this is a beginning and a what root as he says right of faith, hope and charity which are not in the soul but in the powers of the soul huh? faith being and reason and hope and charity being in the will and if you go back to nature and just talk with nature you say what is the connection between the nature of the soul and these abilities of the soul like reason for example and will and so on right well they're like what properties huh? in the sense of the predicables right they're they're something what accidental right but they follow upon the what nature right so you might say that from the nature of the soul there proceeds these what abilities of understanding and will right huh? and therefore from the elevation of the what soul to a kind of spiritual being or a kind of partaking of the divine nature that proceeds from the soul right as a beginning and a root of what faith hope and what charity right which are in the powers of the soul rather than the soul itself right huh? it's kind of interesting I mean to see that connection between grace and distinction nevertheless in grace and the theological virtues right we talk about those things huh? they speak of sanctifying grace right huh? it's giving the soul kind of a more elevated existence than it has by nature right huh? that's kind of interesting huh? but it's a little bit like you know if you had to lead it back to one of the four species you'd lead it back to the first one as kind of a disposition of the soul right? so that it has a kind of spiritual yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah even habituro and habituro have certain affinity right huh? this is talking about character right? a character in some sacraments is what pressed upon us right huh? no and all the modern not modern confess right? none of them confesses now yeah yeah but in the way of placing it in the soul they partly differ and partly come together right huh? they come together and if they say that the character is implied a three four relation right huh? for it's a character is a sign that is what? distinguishing and configurative but they differ in this that some lay these relations not to be what? it's not underneath them some absolute accident right huh? as opposed to what relation right? okay don't be too absolute about the absolute as we use it nowadays you know is that absolutely true? you know that's a thing saying you know but absolute there is opposed to towards another right huh? so you're saying these characters maybe are not just relations just like we saw this point about you know power and knowledge that they're not fundamentally a relation right but they're a quality that has relation following upon it right okay but this could not be huh? because the sign right through the form which it impresses upon the senses or the understanding makes something come into our knowledge huh? likewise nothing is distinguished from another except through some form for likeness is a relation founded upon unity of what? quality huh? as is said in the fifth book of the metaphysics that's what he stated those relations of likeness and equality and so on are based upon unity which is the beginning of number right so that's why they kind of say their relations are based upon quantity right it's not this kind of extension of the thing right once it is clear that of those relations which character implies there's required some what form lying neath you know stretch out anything and since it's not a substantial form right because a substantial form is not given the sacraments right it remains that the form undergoing this is a certain quality whose what unity of meaning right makes for what likeness and there's some people say therefore that it's not in one of the four species of quality which aristotle distinguished right and nevertheless it's in the genus of quality resting upon the word of the philosopher himself in the predicaments right where aristotle said they're quoting aristotle now in latin for tossing right perhaps there were pure other modes of quality than these four that he's but notice Thomas is kind of tough about this but this is a certain fuga flight because although there are other modes of quality nevertheless all in some way are led back to these what species which he says is clear from this that no other species is able to be found right I didn't have this text to quote it to Father DeLac you know I'm a little suspicious of Father DeLac though he went in and helped started raising money for the college you know yeah I don't know there's a good side of a philosophy he knows how to raise money for college he's quite sophisticated in some ways