Logic (2016)
Lecture 25: Quality and Its Four Species in Aristotle

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The first property is to have a contrary, which Aristotle exemplifies in the first and third species of what? Quality. This is significant because the second and fourth species do not seem to have what? Contraries. But not every species under the first and the third have a contrary either. A connection between the first and third species is seen in the fifth book of Wisdom, the fifth book after the books of Natural Philosophy, where these two senses are joined. Simplicius says that contrariety is found in other genera as there is something of quality in them. Recall the question in Lectio 11 of the first book of Natural Hearing, whether there is contrariety in substance or not. Aristotle reasoning from both the affirmative and the negative. But on the side of the differences is found in the contrariety. And difference is said, as Boethius says, in quality quid, right? It's translated how it is, what it is. You know, it's an essential difference, huh? Or how it is, what it is. Likewise in quantity. And there's the relative secundum dici that works in quality, right? Secundum dici, huh? I don't know too much about that. The second property, which is related to the first one, is to be said more and less. Again, Aristotle exemplifies this in the first and third species. But the fourth species, he says, does not admit of more or less. One circle is not more or less a circle than another, right? Maybe there are a circle. That's a very definite thing, right? So sometimes we say something is more circular than another, right? The wheels of my car are more circular than the wheels of your car. They're flatting out there. But stupidly speaking, the flattened tire is not the circle at all, right? Somebody told me, I forget, a cartoon, and somebody drew a circle. And he said, now suppose that's a perfect circle. And Lucy said, every circle is a perfect circle. Some truth to that, yeah. The third property is more a strict property, right? By its quality, a thing is like or unlike another thing, right? By its quantity, it's equal or unequal, right? Now the third chief part of the chapter returns to the connection of quality towards something, right? Some qualities are said to be towards another by their genus. Each science is knowledge of something, right? Nothing prevents these from being put in too high as generic. You know, the relation in one place and the quality in another. Although fundamentally in quality, the relation falling upon them is in towards something. We can now try to penetrate more of these points at the help of some texts from Thomas. Now this is a very interesting word, this word how, right? Quality is defined by how, right? How are you today? The word how seems to signify the limit or determination of a thing. This can be seen when the word is used in combination as in quantity, being called what? Or how many, yeah. So that's a kind of a what? How much or how many? That's kind of the concrete way of speaking of quantity, right? And we talked about that before how in Greek I guess you have one word, right? That can cover both discrete and continuous quantity. Warren Murray tells me that you can do that in French too. But you can't do it in English, right? But you can use a word like size, right? It seems to me that the word size signifies what? A quantity, not a quality, right? And we can speak of the size of a room, which would be a continuous quantity. Maybe we can speak of the size of a crowd, right? Or the size of a family. But that's a what? That's probably why he got that on the cover there because he had nine kids, right? And that's a discrete quantity, right? Okay. But that's not a what? Same figure, part of speech is how. It's kind of interesting how that quality seems to be tied up with the word how. How are you today, right? But if you add how many or how much, you're asking about what? Quantity. I'm not sure I understand fully the word how, right? But if you're having a dinner, you know, and say, Who's coming to dinner? Many. Many are coming to dinner. How many? You know, wine and beer tasting at the parish there, huh? And they want people to sign up beforehand, right? Now why? You know, to pay. Yeah, I mean, to buy their ticket ahead of time, right? So I know how many are coming, right? Limit. Yeah. You want an olive beer. I don't know why you know. What does it say here, huh? How seems to signify the limit or determination of the thing, right? How much did you have to drink? How much did you have to drink, right? Much? How much? You want it right up to the limit, right? I don't know. Strange word, huh? If I say many friends are coming for dinner, or many students are coming to the party, and you have to prepare the food and drink for them, ask, how many are coming? You want me to limit them to some, what? Number. Number, right? Of course, how many people came to the pro-life march right there? Nobody seems to know. Likewise, when the difference is defined, huh? Going back to porphyry, right? It's signifying how something is what it is, right? It is limiting the genus to one or some of its species, right? So, I say, what's a square? It's a, what? Quadrilateral, right, huh? Well, how is it a quadrilateral? Well, the four sides are all equal, and they all meet a red angles, huh? That's how it is a quadrilateral, right? That's how it is what it is. It's quadrilateral, it says what it is in general, right? But this, you want to determine exactly how it is what it is, huh? What's an isosceles triangle? Well, triangle is a three-sided, you know, contained by three straight lines, huh? But in isosceles, you've got two equal legs, the Greek word means isosceles, right? Okay. So, when you stand like that, you're making a... Isosceles. Yeah, yeah. Now, if you made the distance between the two feet there, you'd have an equal to these, then you'd have a, what? You'd have an ikerado, yeah, yeah. But, you know, that kind of gives you the idea that how is kind of looking for some kind of determination, some kind of a limit, isn't it? Or what do you think? So, if I ask you, how are you today, huh? You know, I want some... Well, definitely how you are. I wasn't patient, huh? I wasn't patient, huh? I wasn't patient, huh? I wasn't patient. I was patient. the connection between how and limit can also be seen by the correspondence of the four meanings of how in the fifth book of wisdom or first philosophy and the four meanings of limit there oh my goodness limit can also be connected with the species of quality through the senses of how you can write your doctoral thesis in philosophy on the word how how's your dissertation going and the reduction of the senses of how to to in the fifth book of the metaphysics also points to the distinction of the first and third and perhaps the second species of quality for the last we'd have to check the physics there to realize what this is all about by quality or howness how something is is said but this is how simplicity there not how much or how many is by quantity or how towards another by relation or how something is what it is in a species making difference Cajetan is commentary in the categories you know it's Dominican is he venerable or blessed or anything there is a St. Cajetan but I don't think this one is canonized he's the one they sent to argue with Luther yeah yeah but what's his name is the same on his blog St. Cajetan pray for us yeah I don't think it's a different Cajetan though I think it's a different I don't think it's the same I don't think this guy was ever canonized but you know in this in the theonandition right of the Summa Theologiae they got his commentary yeah you know Sylvester Ferrara I think he's got the one in the leonandition of the Summa Contra Gentiles because I like him better than Cajetan but anyways Vell et in Aedim Redit it returns the same licit determinans potentiam substantias acunum essi accidentale qualitas es quia tamen qualitatis ratio attenditur penes determination in potentia re and sold in genus so consists in the it's a determinatis subiecti my goodness in distinguintir secundum quia diversi modi subiecti potentiam determinat idio qualitatis cibiat rationum et nomen vindicavet ita tamen u tiktam es omni ali dachidens u determinat potentia subiecti qualitatis rationum sapiat taste that right and nomen kodimodo haben hega popi ratio nomenis qualitatis fut causa quia qualitas descriptor esper qualitas descriptor why don't they help me too much can you tell me commentators are rightly puzzled by aristotle's second statement in this chapter that quality is among those things said in many ways in the fifth book of wisdom metaphysics he distinguishes four senses how can three species of quality be three meanings of how the species of quality seem distinguished more like the senses of a word than by opposites is an indivision of a genus this seems contrary to species which have one meaning in their genus there seems more real diversity among the species or genre of quality quality seems to be less one genus than quantity did right in his commentary on the senses of quality and wisdom right thomas compares them with the species of quality in the categories and notice the word the word substance you know is sometimes it has one meaning right because substance can mean you know what it is of anything that has a what it is right and then it can mean you know the first genus right so I can say what is an even number right with the substance of it that's a different sense of the word right and you call substance the first genus right so the mere fact that a word could be equivocal right doesn't mean it couldn't be used minimically right well it's the size right quantity I mean quality quality yeah well according to me you're all said to be how right aren't you by all of them you said to be how in some way aren't you by all four of them right it's just kind of you know it's not too distinct the notion of a highest genus anyway right because you can't define the highest genus nobody's speaking Thomas says you know that when you define quadrilateral let's say are you defining a genus or a species well quadrilateral is both a genus and a species right it's a species of rectilineal plane figure and a genus of square and oblong and rhombus and rhomboid and trapezium and so on but Thomas says you define it as a species because you define it by its genus and what difference right okay just like you would say that can a son generate yeah now you might be both a father and a son right huh but I did I generate my children as a son or as a father and I was generated as a son right so you have to even though I'm both a father and a son right so you could say sometimes the son sometimes generates right but not a son a son is generated right so sometimes a genus is defined but it's defined as what a species by its genus and what difference right what is a genus is a species right well you want to say the genus is such as a species fogmire because a genus as such was a what species then the highest genera would be species right if a species is such a genus then the lowest species would be a genus right so you gotta distinguish right we better stop now Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand what you have written. Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. I finished my current rereading of the Questiones Disputate de Potencia, you know. Powerful. So, in the last question, you know, you have a question that divided into articles, right? The last question, you know, is getting into the processions in the Trinity, right? But the last one was, would the Son be distinct from the Holy Spirit if the Holy Spirit didn't proceed from him, right? So, that's a beautiful text. It's about 24 objections, you know. So, but Thomas says, you know, nine arguments to prove that, right? You know, and divided into three groups of three, you know. It's a bit different. So, I was thinking, you know, of how do those off-side docs, how do they, you know, hold on to their position, right? You know, they almost regard us as heretics, don't they, for the Pope adding that. And then, so when I started looking at the other work of Thomas, they're the contrarors, the Krikorn, right? But he's going through and giving quotes, you know, from the greatest of the Greek doctors. And they certainly do accept that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, right? It's in their own text, right? They said, you know. I think Thomas was going to that council when he, you know, when he died at that time. Yeah. But I mean, I mean, even from their own Greek doctors, right? And we'd go to the Greek festival there in Worcester, you know? And you could get a nice tour of the Greek church there, which it wasn't always going, you know? But the guy was talking there a little bit about the... The Billy Oakway? What? About the Billy Oakway? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So, again, I was going to engage him in an argument here, but I said, no, it's not time to do it on Sunday there, you know? Yeah, I've never heard it anyway, you know? His scandal, you know, but the Billy Oakway is that, you know? It's, uh... Well, one of our... They reject, they can't be united with us because... Yeah, it's funny. Funny. Well, should we belabor the relations of reason, or should we go into the quality, huh? How is this? I sent you the text, right? I sent you the text. Maybe we should continue with quality now, huh? And then if you want to sometime, you know? Go back to somebody who, you know, wants to really do it, you know? But, uh... Yeah. I was mentioning before some of you came in there that, um... Thomas was distinguishing... Actually, I was looking at another text there in the... In the... In the... The Veritati, right? We distinguish these same four relations, but... In other texts, he will say that, um... Two of the ways are found in the words of Aristotle, and the other two in the words of, what? Avicenna. So, Aristotle doesn't have a complete thing on the, you know, the different kinds of relations of, uh, reason, huh? And, uh... Avicenna doesn't either, but... Aristotle, um... Takes the example of, um... Socrates is the same as Socrates, right? That's one example of the relation of reason. And... Why is the relation of reason? Well, because there aren't two Socrates, right? To be related to each other, right? To have a relation, you have to have two things that are really, what? Distinct, right? So it's only, you know, in our mind, huh? That there are two Socrates, right? One is a subject, one is a predicate, but... They're not real, really. Okay? That's one kind of example that Aristotle touches upon the fact that this is a relation of reason, it's not a real relation. And the other one is the case where there's a real relation on the side of one term but not the other, right? And the example is that of what? Knowledge and the known, right? So though knowledge is said to be knowledge of the known and the known is known by knowledge, right? The relation of the knowledge to the known is real, huh? Real dependence is upon the known. But the known, right, doesn't share in the act of knowing and so on, right? And it doesn't really have a real relation back to it, right? And then the Avicenna brings out these other two forms, right? One where we say, say, tomorrow, today is before tomorrow, right? And, well, then if one or both of the terms doesn't exist, it can't have a real relation, right, between being and non-being, huh? That's one relation of reason that the great Avicenna pointed out, right? And then the other one was where you can't have a relation of relation, right? So how is your fatherhood or your sonship, whatever it is, related to you? Well, relation is essentially, right, already relation, right? If you had a relation of relation, then you have to have a relation of relation and a relation of relation forever, right? But it's kind of interesting, huh, that Thomas takes in these four that he distinguishes, right, in a number of texts. I just saw it in the day 20, I mean, the day 30, looking at that again, you know, today. And he has those same four that he gives in the potency and so on. And he acknowledges in some places, you know, a couple of these are mentioned by Aristotle and a couple of these are mentioned by Avicenna. So bringing these great minds together. How is the genus in relation of reason? Well, that was another category that was not said of the thing, right? It's not said of the things in themselves. It's said of things only in the mind, right? There's no one. Yeah. But the relation of the relation of reason that you just, before that you just did, Yeah. He distinguishes those kind also from the relations of reason that are said of the thing, right? Things themselves. Oh, okay. So he, he, Aristotle makes that distinction. Well, I'm not as explicitly as Thomas does, no. No. But I'm talking about this distinction of, of relations that are said of things, right? Socrates really is Socrates, right? He really is the same as Socrates. You know? Okay. But it's not by real relation that he's the same as himself, right? We see that the known is, is what? Is known, right? By knowledge, right? But it's not a real relation that it has towards that, huh? So genus is instead of things. Is that true? Well, the genus is, and species and so on, are universals, right? And things are universal only in the mind, not in themselves, right? So the relation of genus to species or species to genus, which was kind of the reason why Porphyry took those up together, right? Before difference. and so there's a relation of things understood to things understood, right? You know? Relation belongs to things in the state of being known, right? Not in themselves, right? You wouldn't be tempted to say it about the things in themselves, huh? Much appreciated. Yeah. So that's really, you know, difficult stuff there, you know? But I was mentioning before when I was looking at the examples of Aristotle when he talks about towards something in our relation in the post-particuments, right? We haven't got the text yet there, but he gives the example of double, right? First, in double and half, it's real relation in both sides, right? We're taller and shorter, right? In terms of your quantity and my quantity, right? If one of us is taller and we're shorter. And then the second example he gives is that knowledge is said to be knowledge of the known and the known is said to be known by knowledge, right? I said, why does he give both of those two examples in that order, right? Well, in the second example, you have a real relation on the one side but not the other side, right? And so he carries that second, right? And like he said, he's hinting at the idea that there can be a real relation here on one side but not the other side, right? So his choice of examples is significant, right? I always quoted my teacher, a certain undergraduate, he says, you can tell a man's intelligence by the examples he chooses, right? You know, they're always contrasting when Aristotle takes some very plain, ordinary, you know, thing in life, you know? It's an example that's clear to everybody, right? And the modern philosophy takes some kind of extruse example that then appeals to the imagination some way, you know? And it's a clear way of exemplifying something, right? And then my teacher DeConnick, you know, I remember one time, you know, the Texan class there, and Thomas was giving some examples. And he stopped to explain the order in which Thomas was giving the examples, right? And he made kind of an aside that it was a modern Thomist, he wouldn't bother, you know, to try to find any order among the examples, right? You know, you realize how close these things are, right? Well, there's an order among these two examples of Aristotle, I think, that he gives them. And it's striking, you know, striking. So we'll let that lay fallow for a while, you know, and pick it up again, right? When I finish the last page, you know, the Christiane, it'll just be Tate di Potensi, say, no, I have to read this again. But I'll let it, you know, lay for maybe a year or something, and I'll pick it up again, you know, and go and read the Trinitate, I mean, something, you know, the Trinitate, and so on. I was noticing in my setup of the De Ferritate, the way I divided it, you know, and you see, it's kind of called the De Ferritate, because the first question is about De Ferritate. But then things are tied up with the mind, right? But then down about, I don't know, question 20, it's about the good, and all the rest are about the good. So if you want to give what the work is a little bit more fully, say, it's questionis disputate, de veritate, and bonitate, right? And I had actually divided in my text there, you know, the two groups of questions, you know, I said, yeah, let's see. So I've got to be careful right now. The object, and then it's the object, and then it's the subject, blah, blah, blah. But this one, he starts off, and he asks, then I realize, well, all these questions are about the object, about the truth. That's right, he's already talked about it. He's just concerned about the action. Now, what about the, what are the four species of quality that Aristotle distinguishes? Have we seen that already? Now, are you bothered as a man who's been propagandized with the rule of, what, two or three or both, right? Which is scandalized by, Aristotle does, in the category of quality is distinguished from the category of quantity, huh? The category of quantity, huh? All quantity is divided into what? Two or three. Yeah. Yeah. And, although it's not as clear in the case of the category of towards something, right, huh? Nevertheless, Aristotle will point out that some relations are based upon quantity, like double and half, and some are based upon, what, acting upon undergoing, right, like father and son, right, huh, okay? Teacher and student, right, huh, okay? Over and moved and so on, right? So, you could say, okay, we could divide real relations in creatures, right, on that basis, right, huh? Okay. Well, here we've got four species of, what, quality, right, huh? That's not two or three, right? So, you laugh at Perkwis for trying to bring in two or three, you know? I always defend myself by saying, you know, that Plato always divided into two in the dialogues on division, right? Like in the sophistry, everything's being divided into two, so I think it's the animal you're looking for. And Aristotle criticizes this in the biological works and says, sometimes it makes more sense to divide it into three than two. And when he's arguing in the book on the universe that there's only three lines that can all be in right angles to each other, right, he makes a famous statement that three is what? Enough. Three is the first number about which we say all, okay? And we use the number three in praising God, he says. People get excited, oh, we move out to Trinity. But he did it. But he saw the perfection of the number three, right, huh? What is the beginning, middle, and end, huh? So I said, now, you put these two great minds together, right? So you should always divide by two because you divide by opposites, right? But maybe it makes sense to divide into three and say that that's the first number about which you say all. So you don't have all unless you have three. Quite often true. So I put the two masters, you know, both, what's his name, Thomas says that Plato and Aristotle are the philosophies per kipui, the chief philosophers, and Albert the Great said, to be a complete philosopher, you have to know Plato and Aristotle. So I said, put them together, right? And he came out with the rule of two or three, or as they point out sometimes, you should use what? Lope, huh? So Aristotle, my favorite example is Aristotle when he takes a plot, right? He praises the great Homer for teaching all the other Greeks how to make a good plot. That the unity of a plot doesn't consist about being what happened to you or me or some other man, right? But it's about a course of action that has a beginning, a middle, and an end. What's a division and two, what? Three. But then another place in the book, in the poetic art, he says, the plot can be divided into two parts. The tying of the knots and the untying of the knots. So she would divide the plot into two or three parts, or both. Now sometimes I see Thomas and Aristotle divide a name set of many things into a name set of many things, magnifically and equivocally, right? And that's a division into what? Two. And sometimes they'll subdivide set equivocally by reason and by what? By chance, right? So that's all by twos, right? And sometimes I see Thomas saying, well, when a name is set of many things, sometimes you have entirely the same meaning in each case, sometimes entirely different, and sometimes, what? Kind of in between, partly the same but partly different. And so you have what? A division to three. Univocal, equivocal, or purely equivocal, what they call it. And then the analogous or the equivocal by what? Reason, yeah. So if you divide it into two or into three, what would you say? Or both, you know? I wouldn't say that one is correct and one is incorrect. In this case, I'd say, some of you said we're both, right? And one brings out something, the other one doesn't bring out so much, right? How should you divide the family, huh? To two or three? Yeah, it's a division to two. But sometimes I think it makes sense to divide it into father and mother and what? Yeah. Especially when I talk about the father being the head of the family, right? In my argument, you know, lex orandi, lex credendi, right? While saying that the litany of St. Joseph and he's called the head of the holy family, right? I say, if anybody had a distinguished wife and a distinguished son and a wife and a son, you might say they were superior to him in many ways, it was him, right? We get, we're asked to pray in, this is one of the six psalms singled out, right? It's of special importance in the history of the church to pray to him as the head of the holy family, right? Well, the head ought to be distinguished from the other parts, right? So it makes sense to say father, mother, and what? Children, yeah. It makes sense. But not that it's wrong. It doesn't make sense to divide the parents and children. That makes sense, too, yeah? I always tell them, I say, you know, that marriage is two-in-one flesh, right? And I say that the husband and the wife are more two-in-one flesh in the child than they are in the marital act. Because the marital act is temporary and they separate them. But in the child, the husband and the wife are joined. And I say, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know flesh of the child forever right and that's really profound when you stop and think about it right so it's like a common good right the child it should it should fortify the way the marriage right you know how can you separate from this person when you're joined in this inseparable way right and she's altering her own activity right but in this child right something of both right now i often think you know that um i think a bit like my father and i have emotions like my mother so i got some of my father's flesh and some of my mother's flesh you know but it's kind of funny the way you you you know you say you philosophize like a businessman they tell me my mother my mother had a had it had a tremendous hatred of dirty jokes as we call right you know and i just can't laugh at a dirty joke no i mean just just i mean emotional reaction to the thing i don't like these things you know i think that's kind of interesting huh you probably are influenced more by your your mother right emotionally uh than your father right but your way of thinking is more influenced by your your father right so coming back to the category of quality right now here we got a division of what four right now but could you divide it into two or into three it makes some sense maybe just a little bit of uh more understandable if you divide it into two you can divide four either into three and one or two and two right sometimes you can do both so could you divide these four into three and one and into two and two but they're different principles well again the order which is the four is interesting right because here's a way to divide the first three against the what the fourth one he puts the first three together doesn't he puts the fourth one last right okay he doesn't put the fourth one i think is distinct from the first three right second place or third place right okay here's a way of dividing the first three against the what fourth one right now there's a second way dividing the first two against the last two so it follows the order which he what enumerates them right you know what is this what is the way of dividing it into three and one let's take that as one way huh what do the first three in some way have in common that separates them then from the fourth one yeah yeah all right i i'm you know the red artist tells nick of mocking ethics right and when he's investigating you know what the virtues are right he knows the virtues are responsible in some way or a source of what you do or don't do right okay so a courageous man and a coward aren't gonna do the same thing are they a just man i'm just man i'm not gonna do exactly the same thing right when you count the church's funds there on monday night we joke you know for ten dollar bill records all falls in the floor what's that doing down there it's just a joke among us you know first i was saying that um virtue seems to be you know a source of doing something not doing something right source of emotional change right what is in the soul that is a source of moisture change well it's habits or things you know it's also the abilities that are inborn right the ability to do this or do that right that's a source right and then even these what uh undergoing qualities aristotle calls them right even things like emotions right are a source in some way of doing something right so then there's also what are the virtues are they habits or are they natural abilities that we have or are they what emotions right and he's going to eventually conclude that they must be what habits right now it's not my ability to feel anger that is a virtue is it right it's being habituated you know to moderate my anger and so on right right but listening to him on the way up you know he's very angry with the uh so if i have to control my angry he says huh now it seems like i should show my angry people like to see me showing my anger about these things but i think i you might not speak as clear as i would if i control what he says so um yeah yeah and because uh you get angry is that virtue or vice well no it depends upon how you're habituated to get angry right now when you should and as much as you should and so on right now you know i always the example stories in class was if you're walking down the hall somebody bumps into you should you get angry and you know well if he just happens to hit you in a little bit you know you should get angry at all right he goes down the hall like that you know he gets a little bit like that you know but now somebody's using your kid for target practice should you get angry with him yeah because prudence you know we'll look at the situation right now remember this uh one guy i knew i just said the neighbor's kid come over you know and they're back a little porch there and there's a potted plant right and he's looking at my friend and he shoved the thing down and throw it off and smash you know and he give a whack you know you know you go over and you know what are you going to be my kid you know next door i wasn't there to see it but i mean he told me about it you know it's just a little justified i think you're giving a little whack in the seat there but that kind of nonsense yeah but you're saying how the the fourth one is tied up with quantity right and quantity is not a source as such of what motion right now okay so shape and so on right now there's not a source of motion in the soul right yeah so you can divide the first three against the fourth one right and so aristotle's order of putting those three that have that in common first and then the fourth one right that makes some sense doesn't it i can see the distinction of that now another way to divide them into two and two right sometimes that third species instead of calling it undergoing qualities which is kind of hard to explain you know when i was first studying the categories used to call them sensible qualities right but when you study the senses um aristotle would distinguish between the private sensible and the what common sensible right and the private sensible is known by only one sense like color is known only by the eye right it sounds only by the ear right and the common sensibles are known by more than one sense right so i could know the shape of this class here by looking at it but also if i you know was blind i could feel the the shape right now so the shape is a what common sensible right but the inborn abilities that we have right are they sensible i really kind of know that i have the ability to see through my seeing right it's not like i know the you know the senses of the ability to see directly immediately do it i'm not sensible except maybe a sensible project right okay and that's not a proper i mean a sensible as such right the last two are sensible as such right and the first two are not huh i don't sense my justice or my you know even my virtue or courage if i have it you know okay the difference and justice so again the first two kind of could be divided against the last two, right? Or the first E against the fourth, right? So I'm my fanatic adherence to the rule of two or three, right? I can see it through some way of making use of it, but I think it helps to help you a little bit now. Now, one thing that puzzles me is, why does he give the habit or disposition before the natural ability or inability, right? Because isn't that more basic and more fundamental? And when people ask, you know, why does he give quantity before quality, right? And forget about the reason why he took up the towards something before quality, right? Because when he first enumerated the 10 categories, he gave what? Substance, quantity, quality, relation, right? Okay. So why did he put quantity before what? Quality. Quality. Well, the usual reason given is that quantity in some ways is more basic than some of the qualities at least, right? So quantity is more basic than shape, right? And it seems more basic than the sensible qualities. So the color green here is spread over a what? Surface, right? You know? And so quantity seems to be more fundamental, right? And quantity is tied up very much with the distinction of individual substances of the same kind, huh? And just like you can have many tables here, which is somewhere or less of the same kind here, right? It's because you have enough wood, right? So quantity seems to be tied up with wood and the distinction of many individuals, right? You have many men here sitting around this table because there's enough flesh and blood and bone to go around for all of us. Isn't that wonderful? You know? Aristotle thought that the sun was made out of all the material that could be a sun, right? And therefore couldn't have any more than one sun. The moon was made out of all of its trees. Yeah. But we can keep on getting more flesh and blood and bones, right? And keep on getting more human beings, right? And so on. So it's very much tied up with the fact that you can have many individual substances and material ones, right? You can't have that in angels, right? But in material substances you can, right? So it seems more fundamental, right? Well, now I would say, what about the first and the second species of quality? Isn't the second species of quality more fundamental? Because that's the natural or inborn, right? I use the Greek English word for natural. Inborn ability or inability, right? You know, the abilities, the parts of the soul which are the abilities of the soul, right? They'll put that in the second species of quality, right? That's more fundamental, isn't it? And closer to my substance than my virtues or vices. Maybe not as a manifest. But, you know, Thomas gives a reason in the Prima Pars, right? I noticed, you know, Thomas is just like Aristotle, you know. And I was teaching on Wednesday night there, the Dianima, right? And Aristotle was going to define the soul, right? And he says, there's a genus called substance, he says. He recalls, there's a genus substance. And then he starts to divide substance into matter and form and the composite and so on. And which of these is the soul, right, huh? But he recalls going back to substance, right, huh? Well, if you look at Thomas, when he takes up the virtues there and vices in the Prima Par, Prima Secundae, he recalls there's a chapter on quality, right, huh? And then he kind of, you know, goes back to that distinction of the four species and it comes down to average disposition, right? And he says, how are these two guys working out? Are you where there's a genus called quality? And that's where, that's where, you know, I think virtue and vices are going to belong, right, huh? And so let's go back, you know, to, to that categories and go forward, right, huh? And that's part of the reason for the post predicaments, right? And prepare the way for you to, what, subdivide these things and go further down in each genus, right? So if Perquist was teaching, you know, the elements of Euclid like they do at TAC, right, I'd say, well, now, in these first six books of the Euclid, there is the elements, it's geometry, right, huh? We'll learn about triangles and circles and all these interesting things. But then in books seven, eight, and nine, he's going to be talking about numbers. Well, I recall that there's a genus called, what, quantity, right, and it's divided into discrete and continuous, and number comes under discrete over here, and under continuous comes, what, lines and surfaces and so forth, oh, yeah, well, that's the difference between, you know, the first six books and the, and seven, eight, and nine, right, huh? And it significantly starts with seven, right, huh? Right? It's a symbol of wisdom. It's a symbol of wisdom. Yeah. The seven wise men of Greece, right, huh? The seven angels that stand before God, right, huh? The seven parts of philosophy, as you know, but the seven plays that they should be saved of Sophocles, and seven plays, and it's a great thing, yeah, seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, right? So I could imitate, I could imitate, huh? Aristotle in the second book of the Dianima, I remember, substance is a genus, and Thomas in the Pima Secundae, quality is a genus. That's the starting point, right? Right? Parker says, quantity is a genus, I recall, and I go back, you know, and I recall the distinction between discrete and continuous, you know, oh, it's fun, right, okay? But if I was teaching, you know, Shakespeare's, what, his sonnets, right, huh? And I go back, right? Because that was the second species, right, of discrete quantity, how many feet, right? Okay. Iambic pentameter, five feet, which is an iambic pentameter, right? Five feet, five iams, two syllables with the x on the second one, five of those, yeah, yeah. So I recall Aristotle in quantity, right? Okay. But I think part of the reason here for the post-pregnaments is to, what, get your mind ready, you know, for dividing by opposites, right, and seeing the order, you know, each one going forward, you know, like we do when we take up the virtues, you know? Yeah. Thomas Eichen, the prima secundi from right, he says that the, by the virtues and vices, we are well or ill-disposed towards our nature. In some ways, they're closer to our nature, right, than the abilities, right, in terms of being, what, not just having something because of our nature, but in being, what, well or ill-disposed towards our nature, right? But Shakespeare in one of the comedies, right, the character studying that part of philosophy, he says that treats of happiness by virtue especially to be achieved. And Thomas Aquinas says that virtue is the road to happiness. And guess what the road to misery is? Really? It's vice, right, huh? Okay. That's the chief thing you can learn, you know, anything from the daily newspaper is that someone has ended up in some miserable state because of a vice of some sort of other, right, huh? Maybe he robbed something or he got angry and killed somebody or, you know, he was unfaithful, but he had some vice, right, that led to misery for him and many people around him, too, you know? So maybe there's something extremely important about that first one, right? That's the quality of which you are well-disposed as being a man. That's the, what, of which you're on the road to your end or purpose, which is happiness, or your, what, yeah, yeah, yeah, misery, right? Now, you could also see this in terms maybe of, we're Roman Catholics, right, huh? Now, you could also see this in terms of what you're on the road to your end or maybe of