Logic (2016)
Lecture 24: Relations of Reason and Five Kinds of Defective Relations

Transcript
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here can happen right so the first distinction is of two or three it's two here right now okay this is a very subtle what thomas says here and you realize the power here of this text in one way according as this order is what discovered or introduced you might say even by the understanding and attributed to that which is said relatively and of this sort are the relations which are attributed by the understanding to things understood right insofar as he understood just as a relation of genus and what species so when i understand a tabitha to be a animal i'm not understanding tabitha as much as when i understand tablet to be a cat right but the relation of animal to cat there is something that's in my what yeah and it belongs to things understood insofar as he understood right now these relations reason finds by considering the order of what is in the understanding to things which are outside right i get something in my mind it's called man right okay and i compare man to you guys i say oh yeah man is what i said to each of you guys right see so i'm considering that order right but now if i consider man and animal right then i've got the order of things understood to each other right yeah because um universals exist things are universal only in the mind right so they're a genus or a species species i get away from you guys to the species man right that's something universal and even more universal the what animal right and then i compare this to and i see the order of them right and that's important right to see that that's one kind of relation of reason right okay now the other one is more subtle right the other way is according as these relations follow upon the what yeah to it that we understand something in order to another although that order was not introduced by the mind right but more from a certain necessity it follows the way of what understanding and this is the time when when the relation is real and one towards the other right but not the reverse but our mind can't really understand this to relate to that without turning around and relating it back to us right now but now another very important consequence of this well let's finish the sentence first but it follows from a certain necessity the way of understanding right now in relations of this sort the understanding does not attribute to that which is in the understanding but to that which is in the what thing right and this happens according as some things not having in themselves an order are understood orderly okay although the understanding does not understand them to have an order because thus it would be what false okay that's why do you call it the first world war and the second world war right some people say the second world war is a continuation of the first world war a consequence of it right i gotta kind of you know understand them in order in an orderly way right can't do my history without can't be my historian without doing that right it's a very subtle thing right now he's getting closer to a what distinction of the what second kind right and what he says next huh in order that some things have an order it is necessary first that both be a what being right and secondly that both be what yeah because of the same thing to itself there is no order right like i was insisting that what if reason looks before and after it's got to look for distinction right there can't be a before and after without what a distinction between what is before and what is after huh not so and i go back to my axiom of before and after that nothing is before or after itself so there must be some distinction between what is before what's after so if you don't see a distinction first you can't see what order yeah sometimes thomas says distinction is the first thing involved in order or between presupposed order as he says you know okay now the third thing is no more hard to understand um and both able to be ordered to the other right now he starts to talk about how one of these things is missing right now and one of these three sometimes the understanding takes some two things as being of whom either one only or neither is a being right as when it takes two future things right so i'm going to plant these vegetables right before i plant those ones right yeah but now that's two things in the future right one of which i'm saying is before the other but it's that real relation don't even exist the day when i plant these these things i hate to have to explain this to the farmer right now my father's company you know they they made farm wagons and other farm things and so on because their house isn't that business even before he started his own company right but he was still uh when he was uh dating my mother he um he was kept uh sometimes that a farmer had a problem with the machine right my father go out to the farm and get the machine so it was working properly right and uh he'd take my mother with him right and my mother would uh would sit and talk to the farmer's wife my father would go out in the field with the the farmer right so it's kind of a no that's the old-fashioned family planning yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah that ain't trying to explain to a farmer this this is this is about this big only relation of uh reason you know the farmer probably caught me over the head or something try to try to get me back to reality as he would say so sometimes intellect takes two things as beings and one of them or even both of them are not a being right so he takes two future things in that case neither one would be right or one thing present which might be somewhat real as you said and another future right and it understands one right in order to the other right saying that the one is before the other right now once these relations are reason only as falling upon the way of what understanding now i should try to explain this to an historian right open to this i doubt it though the first world war really didn't come before the second world war forced to understand the thing that way are we but i wonder you know when i was talking this is the first sense of before and after the before and after in motion right one part of motion doesn't exist with the other part right and yesterday and tomorrow don't exist so how can you know this be more than a relation of what reason right between today and tomorrow right We'll do that tomorrow. There's some prophecies, I know, where the future things have passed. Like you're looking in the future of that future. Funny, because there used to be a program on the radio in the old days when I was young. You know, they'd be re-enacting some historical event, right? I think the program was called You Are There or something, right? You even had Socrates' trial, you know, and you're in Athens, you know, and the guy's on the radio. It's kind of fun to watch, you know. It's sort of just a joke, you know, but that's what eternity's like, right? You are there, right? You know, because the past, present, and future are all present to God and is eternal now, right? And so then you are there, you will be there, you know. Eternity, we share an eternity. That doesn't have the first thing, right, that both exist, right, no? Sometimes it takes something one as two and understands it with some order, right? Well, this is going against the reason of being distinct, right? That's when it says something is the, what? Same as itself, right? And such a relation is a reason only, right? So I'm the same as myself. That's not a real relation, right? Yeah. Sometimes it takes two things as order to each other, right, huh? Between which there is not a middle order, right? But rather one of them is essentially an order or relation. As when it says a relation happens to its, what? Subject, huh? When such a relation of relation to something other of reason is of reason only, right? Yeah. And it just comes up when they take up the fact that the relation, what is creation in the creature, right? What's relation to God, right? Who's produced it, huh? Well, of course, one of the objections to saying that this is a real relation of the creature to God is, well, then you'd have to say that that relation was created and therefore there's relation for relation. And this will go on forever, right, huh? Well, that's going against this third thing, right, huh? If something's essentially relation is not related to you by something else, right? Like they're saying like, like all the time, right? Now, notice those are three different things, aren't they, right? Now, sometimes it takes something with an order to another insofar as it is the, what, limit of the order of the other to it, although it is not ordered to the other. And this is the example that Aristotle pointed out. As it is by taking the shibile, right, as the limit of the order of knowledge to it. The name shibiris is signifying relatively, right? But it's a relation of reason, what, only. But if knowledge is towards the thing known, but it isn't the thing known by the knowledge, you know, your mind automatically thinks of it in an orderly way, right? It's kind of interesting, you know, when Shakespeare says, reason looks before and after you think of what? The fact that it's looking for before and after in things, right, huh? But not realizing that sometimes it has to think of things as what? Before and after you think about them at all, right, huh? Historian's got to do this, right, huh? And he's kind of, what, thinking orderly, but the order really isn't there. Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha And this one, Aristotle points out this example, you know, of a relative sequindum reason, right? And have a center pointing out this one, right? You know, and so on, right? So I mean, it's kind of, in the text that Thomas is aware of, he's learned something from more than one guy, right? Pointing out, not that Aristotle didn't maybe know them all, but I mean, you know, we have a text where he's saying that the relation of the knowable to knowledge, right, is a relation of reason. The relation of knowledge to the knowable is real, right? But the relation of the knowable to the knowledge is of reason, right? And Aristotle points that out, right? But they have a center and he takes another one, right? And shows another kind. But this is the most complete text I know. So you can realize some of the power of the disputed questions on power, huh? Most powerful, the ones that I think I know. Okay, this is an objection, you know, the objections in the reply to it, right? Number, where it says three down there? Yeah, that's just one of the objections, right? Yeah, yeah. I mean, some of these ones have got, you know, 17, 18 objections, right? And they have a way of concentrating your mind, you know, willy-nilly, but kind of, I've got to take a break. Or, I'm going to read that again tomorrow, you know, or, I'm going to read that again tomorrow, you know. Yeah, yeah. Now, moreover, this name Dominus, right, signifies a, what, relation, right? Since it is a relativum secundum esse, now you've got to be careful of that way of speaking, huh? Well, what that means. But God is the Dominus, not according to reason only. And I noticed that when I taught at Assumption, you know, I was going to, you know, quote Christ, right? I'd always say, you know, notice our Lord says, I always call him Lord, right? Okay? This is the word Dominus, right, huh? One of my son's sons is the Dominic, right? I call him the Lord's man. But God is the Lord, not according to reason only. Therefore, neither are these relations in God according to reason only, huh? See, does God have a real relation to us, right? Well, then this would be something added to God, right, huh? Could something be added to God? To a third, it should be said, just as someone is really the same as himself, right? You can say that, right, huh? Even though it's not by a real relation that he's the same as himself, right? And not only according to reason, right? It's not just according to reason that I am the same as Dwayne Berquist. But it's that real relation that I have to myself. Well, no, I'm not two, right? You've got to have two things, right? It takes two to play. Relation, huh? Okay. Although relation is to be according to reason only. An account of this, that the cause of relation is real, namely the unity of the substance, Dwayne Berquist. request, right? Which the understanding understands, right? Under a what? Relation, right? Thus the power of coercing who's subject to him, right? Is in God really, right? Which the understanding understands in order to the subjects, right? Why? Because an account of the order of the subjects to what? Him. Okay? Just as we understand the order of what? The knowable, right? To knowledge, which is not real, but because the real order of knowledge to what? The knowable, right? An account of this, we say that he's the Lord really, although the relation is one of reason only, right? Now we say the same thing about the knowable, wouldn't we? The knowable is really known by knowledge, but is it a real relation that it has, you know? A real relation it has, but it's really known by knowledge. You see how people get very mixed up in that, huh? Very subtle, you know? See, you know, when you talk about creation, his creator, we say God is the creator, right? Is that a real relation that he has to the creature? So we say, but isn't he really the creator? You see what I mean? You know? Yeah. But he's not, what? The creator of our real relation to the creature. That's very subtle, right, huh? It's a problem he would have, right, huh? So there's no easy business here, right, huh? Yeah, yeah, yeah, I know. I have a professor who had a real problem with this because he talked to God, not really related to us, but, you know, he's kind of cold and distant. Well, he says that's the kind of, you know, it's very awkward now that he says that God really is cruel. I know, I know, but that's true. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, God does have emotions in his event. In your heart, it's true. I was talking to students, you know, about marriage and I'd say, now, what does the priest ask you? Do you have wonderful feeling about this woman? Well, presumably you do. Is that what makes you married? And I said, no. He says, do you take so-and-so? He's asking you to, what, express your choice of this woman for your wife, right? Or vice versa, you know, take, you know, take you as my husband, huh? And, uh, um, it's that which really marries you, right? And I say, if a man leaves his wife, is he being true to himself? He's getting an expression of what it means to be true to yourself, right? And, uh, well, I'm being true to my emotions. Well, is the emotion more you than your choice? So I said, now, suppose you're a member of the jury, right? And a person in a fit of anger, you know, strikes somebody and kills them, right? Would you regard this as seriously as you would a man who's plotted a murder or, you know, see? Because it's more of what? Him, right, huh? So a, a, uh, planned murder, right, would seem to be what? Yeah, yeah. I used to say, you know, that, um, people are breaking up a little bit and somebody says, I don't want to see you again, you know? And, uh, but you can walk that back better than if you write them a note, you know? Because that means you thought about it and you, you really wanted to have nothing more to do with them, right? See, why, it might be just a sudden emotion, you know, that you, you know? You know, that people go through those things. So, um, when are you being false to yourself, right, huh? Or you're being more false to yourself than when you go against your choice than when you go against your, what, emotional change, right? Because the choice is more you, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. So you can see that problem that you have there. Let's stick that in through there, right? But anyway, in the above text, Thomas would seem to distinguish about five kinds of relations of reason, right? That's there's a note to a thing. But you distinguish them first into two, right? All relations of reason are either attributable to things only as they are in the understanding, right? That's the first one he spoke about, right? What they call second intentions magic. Or to them as they are outside the reason. Some relations of reason, such as genus and species, are said of things only insofar as they are in reason, where they are universal. Relations of reason that are said of things in themselves are four kinds whereby they depart in some way from what is required for relation. And the first way was when one or both of the things between them and there's relation does not exist outside the mind. It's the days before tomorrow, right? To use Thomas' example. Before it's already, we have two future things. Two when things are not distinct outside the soul. As Socrates is the same as what? Socrates. That's very true that Socrates is Socrates, right? But is this being the same as Socrates? Is that really? And when one is not orderable to the other because it is itself a relation or order as relation to its what? Subject. And four when the foundation of the relation is found only in one, which is really towards the other, right? But not vice versa as the known to the knowledge or knower, right? Perhaps in the first three there is relation of reason in both relatives, but in the last only in one, right? And that's the other distinction Thomas has of the three, right? There seems to be two most universal divisions or distinctions or relations that we find in Thomas. Every relation is either a real relation or a relation of reason. And then there's the other distinction. Every relative is either a relative secundum dicha or relative secundum esse. But some people confuse relative secundum esse means the same thing as a real relation. It doesn't, right? But the word, the language could confuse you, right? But there's a lot of mistakes from language, huh? First I'll say the most common mistake is equivocation. There is a danger in understanding Dicci and Esse in the second distinction and confusing them with the first two. I'm going to crisscross the two divisions, but it's all a little stuff in relation, huh? It's a question. I got a qualky here. In this case, there's a qualky here. Thank you. Okay, this chapter can be divided into three parts. That happens a lot. In the first part, Aristotle defines quality. It puts that in quotes there, right? Because, strictly speaking, a definition is of a species, right? And a genus, highest genus, cannot be defined in a strict sense, maybe. But it's kind of a notification of what quality is. And he distinguished its species, right? Right, and there's going to be four species, huh? It's not as easy to distinguish these as it was the species of quantity. Aristotle sometimes calls these species genera. Well, of course, it's certainly going to be both a genus and a species, right? But maybe it's a little bit because it's not so what? It seems as much unity there, right? Let's not push that too far, huh? Yeah, yeah. In the second, he considers the properties of quality, right, huh? Some of them have, really. But in the third, he returns to the connection of some qualities towards something, right? Which we talked about before, the reason why he seems to get out of order, right? It should be a serious thing for the philosopher. In the first part, Aristotle defines the Greek word for quality by its concrete correspondent, just as Latins could define qualities as that by which you are qualities, right? This is difficult to imitate in English. It's as if we use the word howness for quality, right? And define howness as that by which we are said to be how we are. Sounds a little strange in English words, right? Then Aristotle distinguishes four species or forms of quality. Finally, returning to the original definition, he points out that how we are is said denominatively from the above, what, species, right? That was in the first anti-pregnant, wasn't it? Some things are named equivocally, some are named genetically, some are named by denomination, right, huh? Because you're not keeping the same word, are you? But I am denominated healthy from health, right? Or a geometer from geometry or something, right? You don't keep the same word, right? But you do in the equivocal. Now, the first species or form of quality, Aristotle, is habit and what? Disposition, right, huh? Now, sometimes Aristotle will distinguish and divide habit against disposition. Sometimes he'll say that habit is a disposition. No, he can't get away and do that, can he? He can't. You don't realize how often we do this, right, huh? So I used to say to the students, if the biologist says that you're an animal, right, he's probably not insulting you, right? But if your girlfriend says you're an animal, she is. So sometimes we divide man against the, what, animals, and then man is not an animal, right? But sometimes we say that an animal can be man or a beast, right, huh? They're both animals, right? But beast sometimes keeps the name animal as its own name, and man is called a man and not an animal, right? Now, what's the reason for that? And that takes place in more than one way, right? But what's the reason for that? The man gets a name. Yeah, why would man get a new animal, right, huh? A new name? Well, because he has something very noteworthy, right, huh? Now, there's a famous example of this in Aristotle there when he's talking about the virtues of reason, right? And he distinguishes the virtues of looking reason, a noose, or natural understanding, as I call it, episteme, right, huh? Reasoned out knowledge. And then wisdom, right? And then the virtues of practical reason, which are art and foresight or prudence, right? So he distinguishes between episteme and what? Sophia. But then in the book, the 14 books of wisdom there, he calls what? An episteme. Oh, he's obviously mixed up, right? No, he's like, we shouldn't be, let's say the hell. Yeah, yeah, we just, no, he's not. I remember the clinical scientist at the Assumption, I mean, at the College of St. Thomas, you know, he said, Thomas used the words in so many senses, you know, you don't know what he'd say. He'd given up trying to, you know, he's a guy who's fairly well known, he had his own textbook, you know, he was kind of a pretty good seller, but how can Aristotle divide Sophia against episteme, right, in the discussion of the virtues and the ethics, and then make the mistake of calling Sophia an episteme in the metaphysics? Excellent. Yeah. He gets a new name. Yeah, yeah. See, episteme is a reason of knowledge of causes, but wisdom's about the very first cause, right, huh? I think, you know, the first cause of God, really, you know, that excellent this is, right, huh? So if you ask Lady Sophia there, my godchild, I mean, my grandchild, what is wisdom, you should say it's a knowledge of God, right, huh? Okay. So, that's impressive, right, huh? He does it with God. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So sometimes he says disposition can be easily lost, like what we in English sometimes call mood, right? You can change your mood in the course of the day, right? Or, you know, they have these coutures they call attitude adjustment. You know, people get through with me and say, I need a drink, you know? You change the attitude, then they're laughing, you know, and they're enjoying themselves, something like that. So mood is an easily lost disposition, right, huh? But a habit is a, what, stable, firm disposition, right, huh? But because it adds something noteworthy over just any kind of disposition, right, it's firmness or stability, right? It might even define your character, right? We give it a new name, we call it a, what, habit, right? So you find Aristotle sometimes saying habit is a disposition, a firm one, and sometimes you divide habit against disposition as a, you know, is a, unstable, yeah. Habits are more stable and longer lasting than dispositions, huh? Reasoned out knowledge and moral virtues are habits, but health and sickness are more, what, dispositions, huh? But a habit can also be called a disposition in the broad sense, for by habit we are disposed in some way, right? Thus the word disposition could be used in general for this species or genus of quality, and then be kept in particular that is easily movable. What other species, adding something noteworthy is the ability and longlessness gets the name of, what, habitant. The second species or genus of quality is natural ability or inability. Thomas puts the powers of the soul in this, what, species. And so I define the reason they're following my teacher there, Shakespeare, as the ability for a large discourse, right? Looking before and after. Now, why do you think he gives habit or disposition before natural ability or inability? Isn't that more fundamental, a natural ability? So I have this ability called reason before I have geometry, right? Which is the perfection of it. So what is he, you know, he's obviously mixed up there in the order, isn't he? Well, he had put. discrete quantity, didn't he, before continuous quantity? And that's because discrete quantity is more perfect measurement, right? You measure every number by one. It's a real fixed, you know, thing. You measure every length by what? There's no smallest line to use, right? It's a perfect thing, right? But perhaps the reason is that by habit we are well or ill-disposed towards our, what, nature. The nature is what's most fundamental in the thing, right? And by habit we are well or ill-disposed towards that. It might be more known, too, in some way, right? Because sometimes when they talk about quantity and quality, they say quantity is the measure of substance, quality is the disposition of substance, right? See, that's used to cover the whole thing, right? Especially used for the first species, right? I like this other one in terms of its connection with our, what, nature, right? I mean, a habit is either virtue or vice, right? It's either well-disposed towards your nature or… Yeah. When the mayor of Worcester called these guys last night morons. He was well-disposed. He knew. He said I'm walking back now, you know, because he said something for himself. There's one guy in that thing wants him to, you know, are we a, you know, what do you call these cities that accept people? Oh, a safe haven or whatever. Yeah, yeah, what is it? Sanctuary city, I guess. Whatever it is, yeah. And he wants to avoid the word, right? But he wants it to be a sanctuary city of the mayor, you know? This one guy is a Republican who's trying to push the thing, you know? And so they're all down there, you know, demonstrating in favor of us being the accepting city, you know, and so on. Sanctuary city for what? What? Illegals. Illegals. Oh, illegals. Yeah, yeah. Trump wants to get rid of any threatening, you know, to cut off funds, federal funds, you know. Oh, there are sanctuary cities? Yeah. Oh, Chicago has announced in the Arctic, San Francisco… Maybe New York. Yeah, there are 50 cities that call themselves sanctuary cities. Illegals are there, you can't support them? They're not to cooperate with the federal. And so now Trump's threatening to cut off federal aid in those cities. He's threatening to do it, I don't think he's done it, but he's done it. Yeah, yeah. No hint, no hint to this, you know. I mean… We think it's always people in office, you know, they can really, really plow forward, you know. Now the second species or genus of quality is natural ability or inability, huh? And as I say, Thomas puts the powers of the soul in the species, right, huh? So the ability to grow, right? The ability to feed yourself, huh? The ability to reproduce. The sense powers, you know? The ability to see or hear, and the ability to just reason, and so on, right? And the ability to choose, and so on, right? These are all in the second species of quality. Now the third species or genus, huh? It should have been or. Our genus of quality is what Aristotle calls undergoing qualities and undergoings, huh? Now when I was first studying these things, he used to always call these the sense qualities, right, huh? So hard and soft and hot and wet and dry. These things that easily change, right? Blush, you know, something weird, you know. Undergoing qualities, right, huh? Things of that sort. Might be useful to call them the sense qualities, but Aristotle calls them this one. Now the undergoings, of course, are more transitory, and this is something imperfect in the genus of quality. They are called undergoing qualities because the senses undergo them, right? And some call these sensible qualities. But some are called undergoing because they're the result of those having them undergoing something. Blush! Thomas alludes to the distinction here of undergoing quality, undergoings in this text. Nulla potentia passiva can go into act unless it be, what? Completed by the form of what is active upon which it comes to be an act. Because nothing operates except according as an act. But the impressions of active things are able to be in the passive things in two ways. In one way, by way of a, what, action undergoing. Passive powers in a kind of state of change. Another way, by way of, what, quality and form when the, what, impression of the active is already now made kind of, what, connatural to the thing, huh? People have been on the sun too long, right? And they've got their, they've permanently died by the sun. Just as the philosopher in the Predicamentes, right, distinguishes passion and passibile amquilitat. Now the four species, the fourth species of quality is figure and, what, form. And you can imagine how much more difficult it is to talk about quality here than quantity, right? Because quantity is divided into what? Two, right? Then you subdivide it into two or three and all the way down to the ones. I can divide it into four. This is horrible. This is horrible. I think the four. Aristar even says, maybe there's some other one too, you know, we don't know about. Yeah, but Thomas says, you know, nobody's ever going to find the other one, so. I remember my logic teacher there, Father Delac, that he thought there might be another one, but he, no one can come up with them, you know. It's kind of amazing that Aristotle can distinguish these four, right, huh? So when Aristotle has finished distinguishing these four species, he says there may be others, but these are the ones many spoken of, right? Now can you divide these four into two or three? Well, sometimes I notice that the first three ones, right, seem to be in some way a source of what you do in some way, huh? You do something because you're a habit of disposition, right? You do something because of your inborn abilities or inabilities, and even because of your, what, undergoing qualities, right, huh? But the fourth species is the one around quantity, right? The shape of something, right? Is that a source of someone doing something? And when Aristotle's investigating, you know, the virtues, you know, he's saying, well, what is in the soul, right, huh? That's the source of what you do. And then he distinguishes these first three, right? So maybe you could distinguish the first three against the fourth, right? And the fact that Aristotle gives those first three together, right, and then the fourth one maybe is a sign that he sees a little difference, huh? So they point out that you have in geometry figure and form, but you don't have any motion. The, you know, even the sphere doesn't go rolling off, right, or something like that, or the circle going rolling off, you know? And the sphere has a hard time bumping along, you know? It doesn't seem to be any more than quantity itself as a source of change, right? That's kind of interesting geometry, right? There's no change, right? The triangles melt and still apply. So now in the third part of the first part, right, Aristotle states how one is, is said denominatively from the, what, above, huh? Now in the second and chief part of the chapter, Aristotle considers three properties of quality. The first two fitting only some species of quality, right? And the latter being a property in a stricter sense, huh? The first one. The second one. The second one. The second one. The second one.