Logic (2016)
Lecture 23: God's Immutability and Real Relations in the Incarnation

Transcript
================================================================================

You know, when we study the substance of God, we realize that he's unchanging, right? In the Summa Theologiae, I think that's the fourth thing that Aristotle or Thomas shows about God, right? But in the Summa Congenitia, it's the first thing he shows, right? Hence, in one, therefore, secundum rem, and the other, secundum rationum only. Since, therefore, in the incarnation, there is not any change made in the divine nature. But in the human, which is drawn to unity in the divine person. This relation, the union there, secundum rem, is in the natura humana. He really is united to the second person, right? But in the divine, it's according to reason only, right? According to what the philosopher says, some things are relative not because they themselves are referred, but because others are referred to them. When unity, secundum rem, is a creature, right? To the third, it should be said that the union, which is said of God, is neither the creator nor the creature. Because insofar as it is in him, is at anything secundum rem, but according to reason only. But the ratio is not, what, false, because it's founded upon the relation of the creature to the, what, creator. And, of course, Aristotle, he talks about being a reason there. He talks about it as being something, what, being is true. God is truly our creator, because we truly, yeah. But our being his creature, we mean the creatures of God, we depend upon God, and so on. That's something very real in us. But there's no change in God when he created us. So he has no, kind of, no relation with him. Yeah. He says, so, that's a one-way street. But notice he says, none time and ratio is false, all right, which he gives it to be true. Because it's founded upon the relation of the creature to, to creator. Just as about the other relatives, which extemporary, to deal with the clinton, right? In Dormis Vyus Modi, right? So they'll talk about the relations that are said of God, extemporary, right? Which are all relations of reason, right? But the relations that are eternal, right? Like the Father, the Son, and so on. They are real. Kind of a texture. Like God's De Potencia again. Okay, it's necessary that in things themselves there be a certain, what, order, right? And this order is relation, right? Now, Thomas will often speak of relations being in order, right? And you realize how much tied up with reason, right? To understand these relations. Whence is necessary in things themselves to be certain relations according to which, or by which, one is ordered to, what, another. But one is, one thing is ordered to another, either according to quantity, or according to an active power or passive, right? And from these two only are attended something in one with respect to something extrinsic, right? Now, what convinced me that this is real, this being taller or shorter, right? Now, I used to watch this cat there, my daughter's cat, Tabitha, right? And sometimes they'd play with a mouse that they'd catch, you know? And I said, what would she be doing to me if I was the size of one of these mice or a toy soldier, right? Yeah, playing with me. Playing with me. They'd try to run away from me. So, the fact that I'm quite a bit taller than the cat, this is something very real. She might be thinking about it, though. She could ask her to come up. That's important, but that really convinced me. I mean, I'm even emotional. You've seen my reason, you know, and moved my reason along, but. So, you're going to be a torrent argument to the reality of this kind of a relation, huh? Being taller and bigger than that cat. Now, the thing is measured not only by intrinsic quantity, but also by an extrinsic quantity, huh? Through the act of power, each thing acts in another, right? And by the passive, it undergoes from, what? Another, huh? But by substance and quality, something is ordered to itself only, not to another, except for accidents, huh? According either asubstantial or matter, huh? Insofar as they have the ratio of an active or a passive, what? Power, right, huh? And according as in them is considered some ratio quantity, right? Insofar as one in substance makes the same and one in quality, like. And number or multitude, huh? Dissimile and diversum in the same. Dissimile and unlike according to something more or less considered in the other. Lest something is said to be, what? To another, other, I guess, huh? An account of this, the philosopher in the fifth book of wisdom, assign the species of relation, right? Some he speaks of as, he lays down, as being caused from quantity, and some from acting upon and undergoing, huh? Now in this text from the fifth book of wisdom, huh? Fifth book after the books of natural philosophy. The ratio of these modes is this, huh? Since relation, which the relation which is in things, consists in the order, a certain order of one thing to another, right, huh? It's necessary that in as many ways there are relations of this sort as in many ways it happens one thing to the order to another, right, huh? One thing is order to another, either according to being, as the being of one thing depends upon another, and thus it is the third mode, or according to an active and passive power, according as one thing we see to another, or confers something upon another, right? This is the second mode. Or according as the quantity of one thing is able to be measured by another, and thus it is the, what? First mode, huh? So one could think a lot about the connection between the word order and the word, what? Relation, right? Now, one more text here from the question is quadlibitalis, which is what you will. You can see, do all kinds of things. This I do, I read these for my life reading, you know. I know the variety in your life, you know, because they jump around, you know, kind of, you know, whatever, without people's minds at the time, you know. Like, now I would rush into the caeric's office there with my questions, you know, this and that, and so on. I'm going up to one time to see him on CD on, and I just kind of gather some questions, you know, from different things I was doing, you know, and, of course, he didn't see any connection among the questions, so, it was kind of, but, I wasn't, you know, presenting an elaborate thing, you know, I was, you know, making sure that I could answer this question in this area properly, and then this thing in some other course I was teaching, you know. I had something there, you know, so I was asking a number, you know, kind of ad hoc questions, you know, and I didn't, I didn't know where I was going. A great man out there. Relations, bottom of page 10 here, right, relations differ in this from all other genera, because those things which are of the other genera, from the very ratio of the genus, have that they are res naturae, right, just as quantities, that's as opposed to res rationes, right, just as quantities from the ratio quantity and qualities from the ratio quality. This is something he said before, but in a different way he said it. But relations do not have that they are res naturae from the fact that they are, what, for another. Because there are found certain respects towards another, which in a different way not real, but rationale is tantum, oh my goodness. And an example of Aristotle, first point out, as the shibulae, right, the nobles referred to science. Not by a real relation, right, existing in the noble, but more because the science referred to it, according to the philosophy in the fifth book of the Middle Physics. That's a smart guy, that, huh? You see why Kasurik said, compared to Aristotle, he had the brain of an angle, what he said. I'd say, you know, since that's a relation, I don't know. But relation has, as he said before, in these other texts we looked at, it's a res litura ex sua causa, right, through which one thing has a natural order to another. Which natural order and real one is in these things, the relation itself, right? Whence right and left in the animal are real relations because they fall upon certain natural, what, powers. But in the column, right, that famous example, they are to respect to reason only, according to the order of the animal to it, right? Now, from the same thing, one has that something is a being, and then it'd be one. This is the one that's converted with being. And thus it happens, that there is one real relation only, on account of the unity of the cause. This is clear about equality. For that is what? On account of one quantity, there is in one body one equality only. Although there are many respects, according as there are diverse bodies, to which one is, what, equal. But do you have, you know, really, if I'm the same height as two different men, do I have really two, really two different relations to these two men? Yeah, but I mean, I'm equally tall to this man, or tall, I'd say, I'm taller than both these men, right? Because of the same thing in me, right? My size, right? My height, right? So do I have two real relations here or one? But Thomas says, now, if I teach you geometry and I teach you logic, then I get two real relations to you. But if I'm taller than both you guys, it's not very two different sizes that I have. That means you're one, everybody shorter than you. It seems so. Everybody in the world shorter than you. Maybe so, yeah. Real relations, yeah. But you can speak of more relations, you know? Reason can multiply them, right? I'm taller than him, I'm taller than him, I'm taller than him, I'm taller than you. Yeah, you know? But that's kind of a, what? That empty multiplication that we still can do, right? Maybe she's stuck now, but okay. From the same something has that is being that is one, right? And therefore it happens that there is one real relation only on account of the unity of the cause, as is clear in equality, as is the example. For account of one quantity, there is one body, one equality only. Although you can distinguish many respects, right, huh? According to it is being equal to diverse, what? Bodies, right, huh? If, however, according to all those respects and being multiplied, there really are relations in one body, if followed in one, there would be infinite accidents, right? And determine, remember, then, right? And similarly, the master is, by one relation, the master of all those that he teaches the same thing. Although there are many respects, right, huh? Thus also one man, according to one real, what? Is the son of his father and of his mother, right? I didn't know that, but that's good to know. Because one nativity, he receives one nature from both, right, huh? So I have a different sonship of my father and the son of my father and the son of my mother. It's two sonships in me. My mother and father. Can you get two inheritances then? Oh, yeah. name of the Father and the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, move us, God, to know and love you. Help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds. Lord, illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Eleven minutes, where I had left off you. So, am I taller or shorter? What am I? What taller and shorter says nothing about what I am in myself, does it? I'm only taller towards somebody, right? Maybe shorter towards somebody else, right? Strange something, isn't it? A relation or towards something? I brought some, I copied out some documents, you know, arranged them in all the traditions of reason, right? So, I know that you can put in your thing and we can, you know, do that if you want to get into that, huh? But we'll see what he says here in this dark, anyway. Okay. Not so much to concern here, not about Christ so much here, that problem. But the second paragraph here in this one on the bottom of the page. And this ad-aliquid, huh, differs from other genera, right? Because the other genera, from their own ratio or their own meaning, have that they are something, right? Just as quantity from this that is quantity places something in us, my size or something like that. And likewise about the other ones. But ad-aliquid, from the meaning of its own genus, its own meaning, does not have that it lays down something, huh? A very strange thing, huh? But it says something ad-aliquid, right? Okay. I'm not something, but I'm towards something. Okay. Whence there are found some ad-aliquid, right? Which are nothing in the nature of things, right? But even the things that are in the nature of things are, barely are, right? Whence there are found some things which are ad-aliquid, which are nothing in the nature of things, but in reason only, right? Which doesn't happen in the other genera. And although ad-aliquid, by reason of its genus, does not have that it lays down something, right? Or places something in it. Nevertheless, huh? Does it have from its Ratzikov's genus that it does lay down nothing, right? Okay. It doesn't do one or the other, right? Because in that case, no relation would be something in the nature of what? Things, huh? Whence ad-aliquid would not be one of the ten genera, right? Now, Thomas often refers to the text of Aristotle in the fifth book of Wisdom, where he distinguishes being, distinguished according to the ten genera, right, from beings of reason, huh? Some of which are relations, some are, you know, negations and so on, huh? And so, um, there wouldn't be a one of the ten genera ad-aliquid if there was no ad-aliquid that was in things, right? They'd all be in beings of reason, right, huh? So Thomas is pulling authority of Aristotle, right, huh? Aristotle saw this distinction, huh? But, you know, Thomas often quotes the various two, you know, where he's talking about, uh, the weakness of, uh, relation, and some people thought that all of these are just something of reason, you know, comparing things and kind of, you know, but that's a mistake, huh? It's very hard to see what makes a relation be real, right? It goes back to what it causes. Relation has that it be something real from that which causes the relation, huh? For when there is in something found something real through which it depends upon another or is compared to another, right, then we say that it is really, what, compared or dependent upon something or referred to it. Just as the relation of equality is real, right, and it's laid down to be real from the virtue of, what, quantity, which is its, what, cause, huh? Now, in the case of God, the relations in God don't have any cause, but they are the same as the divine substance, huh? That's what makes them real, huh? That's a very hard thing to, you know, got to go to the potencia to see this, okay? Now, because from the same thing, a thing has being and unity, huh? Being in one are convertible. Therefore, the real unity of relation should be weighed from its, what, foundation, right, or the cause of it. And because one is quantity in which something might might be equal to, what, many things, huh? This is a little thing. If I am, what, equal to two different things, is that two relations in me? Or just one, right? Which is, you go back to the cause of it, it's just one, right? It's my size, or my height in this case, right, that is the cause of my being equal to these two others. So we have one relation, huh? Okay? And because one is the quantity through which one is equal, I am equal to many, in me it is not except one, what, relation, right? A real quality having a respect nevertheless to what? Many, right? Similarly, right? Because by one nativity from one's father and mother, one was, what, begotten, yeah. By one real sonship, right, I am said to be the son of both, huh? Although the respects can be multiplied, huh? That's really basically one thing. Those seem very hard things, huh? No, it's really hard. Now, the next text here from the scriptum on the third books of sentences, again, he's going to touch upon the fact that Aristotle has to point out that real relations in us have as their cause either, what, quantity, right, or acting upon and, what, undergoing. That's the source of the two kinds, huh? I was reading Thomas there a little bit about the Trinity today and God, right? Thomas says, there's an article there on whether the relations here are real, right, and so on, God, which they are. But, he says, it can be based upon quantity or upon something like acting upon undergoing. There's no quantity of God, so it can't be based on that. Therefore, it's got to be based upon generation, those sort of things, right? Because you have a real, a real relationship, father and son, right? But, you know, it's Aristotle when we saw this, right? This kind of amazing guy, you know? Compared to Aristotle. I can repeat the words of my professor, I got the brain of an Engelberg. So, in this next passage, you'll talk about that, huh? Relation does not have, from the fact that it is said to be to another, that it be something in Verum Natura, right? From that alone. But, it has this from that which causes the relation, which is in the thing which is said to be to another. And, from that, the thing has unity and multitude from which it has being. Therefore, according to that in which the relation is founded, one should judge. whether secundum rem, it is one, or what, many. Now, there are some relations which are founded upon what quantity? Jeff says equality, which is founded upon one in quantity. And since the unity of quantity is not except one in one thing, hence it is that through one equality, a thing is equal to all things, to which it is what, said to be equal. That's kind of a subtle thing, right? Now, the other relations are founded upon what? Yeah, Aristotle points it on more explicitly in the metaphysics than he does here in the chapter on relation, right? But some are based upon quantity, some real relations, and some are based upon action and passion. And in these it should be considered that one undergoing corresponds to two acting upons when neither agent suffices per se to complete the action, right? Just as in the one who, by what? One nativity is born from the, what? Father and the mother, right? Whence in the father and the mother there are two relations, secundum rem. So my father and my mother are not to be in the same relation, right? Okay? But in the one born, there is one relation, secundum rem, according to which is referred to the father and the mother. Do you want to explain that to couples? That's why I say, you know, the difficulty of understanding relation, you know, either it's the, because of the sublimity of the object and the weakness of our mind, like in the Trinity, or else it's because of the weakness of the thing itself, right? It hardly is. But it's the notion of what it is, towards something, right? It's not something in me, but it's towards something, not something in me. It's very hard to see how you can get a real relation, right? But you've got to go back to the cause of it, right? Yeah, I want it to. Well, it is an accident, right? And therefore, it's got to be in us, but it's in us, not by, from the notion of what it, what's private to it, right? And it's in me because of some, of its cause. So, you know, you're in the bar there and you had a few drinks and you get to argue with the guy next to you, you know, and then finally you're, you know, getting into the fight, you stand up and you realize he's towering over you. This is very real, you know, as he's looking down, and you're looking up at him, you know, and you wish you had not risen from your seat because he was slouching in his seat and you realize what a big guy he was, right? For example, I used the cat there, you know. The cat was, you know, bigger size. He'd be playing with me rather than the mouse, you know. And our relation would be quite different, right? Something real about this, right? How would parents take care of the baby, right, if they were much bigger, you know, than the baby, right? If the baby had to carry them in their arms rather than the tall carry the baby in their arms. There's a picture there of Paul there with the little one. It's one of the most difficult things in the world, right? Relation. And then you go to the relations of the Trinity. Then it's a weakness of our mind, right? They can't fully grasp that, you know. It's kind of amazing that there are styles of this, that they could be based upon quantity or upon action and passion. They're not based upon qualities unless they take on the aspect of something quantitative or take up the aspect of being, you know, the ability to act upon something or undergo. So. It's harder than that thing. Yeah, yeah. It's like you're, what, quantifying it in a sense, right? Even though he's a body. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's how much he. Yeah, yeah. Or they say, you know, when you take these relations like same and equal or like, you know, it's one, huh? Just something, kind of quantity in a sense, huh? We have one quality or we have one, you know, size or something. This is wider than that. Yeah. I think this is wider. And that sounds qualitative, but this is wider than this one. Yeah, but wider goes back to quantity, really wider. No, but if you just talk about color itself, this is whiter than this. Oh, whiter, whiter, whiter. White, yeah. White or, you know, redder. This is, you know. Isn't that a relation? That this has a relation of being more red? Well, you know, that's a question of, you know, you're kind of quantifying the quality, right? That's a very complicated thing. Philosophers always argue about those things, right? I mean, it is really a very difficult thing, right? Very difficult. In the De Potencia, they're right, you know, they'll talk the question of whether there is, you know, relation in God, whether it's the real relation or, you know, and they're really, you know, 10, 15 projections, you know? And, you know, it's amazing, huh? It's an amazingly difficult thing, huh? And further, it should be considered that some relations do not arise from actions according as they are an act, but more according as they, what, were. She says, someone has said a father after the action which the effect is falling from, right? And such relations are founded upon that which in the action from the agent is left, right? Whether it be a disposition or a habit or some right or power or something of the sort. The one has over one's offspring, right? Because I generated you. Yeah, yeah. But they're always quoting, you know, Cicero, you know, the son is always in debt to his father, right? Your mother, too, you could say that. Okay, again, he goes back to the example there. And because this is left from the actions of one kind, it cannot be except one. Hence it is that such relations also, secundum rem, are not multiplied according to diverse actions, but the more are one according to that from which the action is, what, left. And in account of this, they are not diverse relations, secundum rem, now, right? In patre uno, qui generat pluris filiosa. So am I, you know, do I have two relations of fatherhood to my, you know, secundum rem, to my two sons, or what? Yeah, but that's very hard to judge those things, right? Nor in the magistral, right? One teacher who teaches many, what? Yeah. So does he have a, you know, three different relations, right? Teacher three titles. Yeah, yeah. These are very difficult things. I know this is text here from the Summa Theologiae, about the same sort of thing here. The unity of a relation or its plurality is not to be observed according to its, what, terms, but according to the cause or the, what, subject. Because that just makes it, what, real, right, huh? Okay. For if it be observed according to the terms, it would be necessary that each man in himself has, what, two sonships. One but which is referred to his father, and one but which is referred to his, what, mother. But to the one, right? They consider it. That's what we pray for, right? To the angels, huh? It appears by the same relation to be referred each one to his own father and mother on account of the unity of the, what, cause, right? For by the same birth, a man is born from his father and his mother. When... by the same relation he's referred to what? Both. Now I'm wondering about that in the Trinity there when you say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from what? Yeah, so does he have two relations, one to the Father and one to the Son? Then we have quaternity, right? It's a little bit like this, isn't it? It's very difficult. Yeah, but you know, I mean, does the, you know, you have to understand how the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, right, and their, maybe their, what, mutual love, right, huh, from their being like each other. The Holy Spirit's way of proceeding from the Father and the Son is so unlike what's found in creatures, right? They don't even have a name for it, so we use a common name, procession, right, but it doesn't have a name like for the Sunday of Generation or Begetting or something like that. This other one is, the same reason is about the teacher, right, who teaches many students by the same, what, science, right, the doctrine, and the Lord who governs his diverse subjects by the same power, huh? So with, with, uh, Trump do we have, yeah, but that's what, uh, so if you taught us philosophy or logic today, yeah, yeah, yeah, he goes on to talk about the next paragraph here, right? But if there are diverse causes differing in species, ex-consequente, right, they seem to differ in what species, right? Whence nihil prohibit, nothing prevents, there being many such relations in the same one, right? Just as if someone is a teacher of some in grammar and of others in logic, right, huh? Other is the ratio of magisterium in both, right? And therefore, uh, what, diverse relations, huh? One and the same man, right, can be the teacher either of diverse ones or the same according to diverse doctrines or diverse sciences, huh? It happens however sometimes that someone has relation to many according to diverse causes of the same species, just as someone is a father of diverse sons according to diverse, what, acts of generation. Whence of eternity cannot differ in what species, since the acts of generation are the same in what species. But because many forms of the same species cannot be at the same time in the same subject, it is not possible that there be many fatherhoods in the one who is a father of many sons by natural generation. It would be however other, if he was a father of one by natural generation, and of another by, well, adoption, then you'd have a different... That's why you have, you have, you may have by generation, that's what you're talking about. Yeah, but if I'm the father of this man by generation and this man by adoption, then that's what you're talking about. And I think that's a very, you know, this stuff would drive you crazy, you know, you can see, trying to understand the relationship. That's a different difference that the father of God can understand by those words, fatherhood in general, of all creation. Mm-hmm. It's not a special father, more so than the rest of creation, but then the fatherhood is in heaven by the eternal generation, which is kind of eternity there. Now, the distinction between real relations and relations of reason is not made much in the categories, right? I mean, Thomas points out, you know, that the category of relation is about real relations. And he points to the text of Aristotle in the fifth book of wisdom, where he divides the senses of what being, right? And there's one division of being according to act and ability, right? And another division of being according to the figures of predication, which is the ten categories. And they're divided against this other sense of being, which is a being of what? Of reason, right? As well as divide against accidental being too, but accidental being divided against all these other kinds. So Thomas would say, you know, there wouldn't be any, what, relation among the genre of being, right? If all relations were of reason and not real, right? That's a division of being and things, right? But, you know, when I was talking about the reason why we, why Porphyry considers species before difference, right? And I gave the reason, you know, that there's the same knowledge of opposites, right? And genus and species are what? Kind of relative to each other, right? So they're kind of defined with reference to each other, right? And so on. But those are relations of what? Reason, right? Okay. Now he says, of relatives, there's found a three-fold diversity, right? This is only one of the, it's real text, right, huh? Brian's up here, huh? I was joking with my students last night at the house there. And I said, I was talking about how I told the monks, you know, I had this attachment to number five, right? And since likeness is the cause of love, right? Maybe that's my number, right? But I was saying, how did I get this attachment to number five? Was it because my name, Duane, in five letters? I noticed it sometime. Or because I noticed I had five fingers, or I don't know why, but I was thinking, you know, the categories here, you know, and how many, you know how we divide the text into three, right? But how many anti-predicaments are there? No, no, the categories of Aristotle, there's five. There's five anti-predicaments, right? Okay. And then how many post-predicaments are there? Yeah, yeah, yeah. I was overjoyed. Yeah. And of course, there's 10 categories, but that's five and five, kind of, you know. But I was looking at the nefarious lobe edition, you know, huh? And I notice here where he's beginning the, what we call the post-predicaments, right, huh? Chapter 10 there, right, huh? We've now said enough on the subject of the categories that we proposed, and with opposites, next to must deal, right? That's the beginning of the things. He's got a footnote here, a little A, right? At the bottom of the thing says, the chapters that follow are commonly regarded by scholars as spurious. Well, no, I mean, all the, you know, guys I've read, you know, I mean, all the great, and, you know, Kajetan, and whoever it is, you know, all the Greeks, they all, you know, talk about the post-predicaments, right, huh? And when you stop and consider the post-predicaments, they're extremely, there's nothing accidental there attached on, you know, or something, you know, by chance, huh? We'll talk about that in post-predicaments, but these, uh, gratuitous, uh, Marx scholars, you know. I see, I always wonder, you know, I mean, I guess most of the scriptural scholars don't think that the epistle to the Hebrews is by Paul. Yeah, that's the majority opinion now. Yeah, yeah, but, you know. Tell us what's that in a participle commission. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah Yeah. It wasn't sufficient. Yeah. That's a real problem because God's author, I mean, the scripture, I mean, I still think it was by St. Paul, you know, and I don't know how they conclude these things, huh? Certainly some of the fathers didn't do St. Paul. Yeah. I mean, you do have this. There was doubt among the fathers. Yeah. Something about the style that, you know, it doesn't fit, you know, but he's ready for a different audience. Yeah. Yeah. I don't think it was 100 years ago, but they said that the style was internal evidence that the Holy Spirit said, well, no, I don't think it's sufficient. I forgot. I was reading one of Thomas's, you know. And we use, you know, four styles, you know, a couple of them. You know, it's like you can't change, you know. And I always take the example, you know. I find Thomas's Latin is a very easy Latin, I think, to read, right? Except when he has the dedicatory letter to the Pope or something like that. And then he's kind of a Ciceronian or, you know, even, you know, Augustine's much more difficult, right? These guys are closer to things. And I say, Thomas, I mean, it's obviously not the same guy writing this, right? You know, because the styles are different, right? You know? You know? And a man couldn't write in different styles. He'd have to be a genius to do that, you know? It's like if I write a letter. Yeah. And there's C.S. Lewis talking about that, you know. I mean, addressing God, you know, it's not unheard of that you use an already written prayer, right? You know? Rather than inventing your own, you could do that too sometimes. But, I mean, this is kind of a special guy to talk to, right? And you want to have, you know, something that's kind of adequate, you know? You know? I said the Anima Christi there after the communion, you know? And I said, it's a really marvelous thing, you know? Or I said, Thomas' prayer, you know? The E.S. word, the Eucharist, and so on. Couldn't have said it better. You know? It was like they couldn't, you know, think the guy could, what? You know, write in different styles, huh? And I know Thomas'. I have a hard time reading those. They're dedicatory letters. I don't have much difficulty reading Thomas' ordinary things, huh? Okay. It says, of relatives, there is a three-fold diversity. Oh, that's curious. Some, there are some which are, what? Both imply relation, not existing in the thing, but in reason only. As when being is referred to what? Non-being, huh? Because that's nothing, right? There'll be something towards nothing is nothing real. Okay? Thomas would say, you know, that if you say that today is before tomorrow, right? Well, tomorrow doesn't exist, right? So it's not a real relation. Yeah. Not as one thing, that's one thing. Or if I say, you know, the First World War came before the Second World War. That's a relation of reason, right? Because neither one of those things exists now, right? Yeah. They still exist now. At least their souls do. Yeah. So this is one kind of relation where neither one, what? Yeah. There are some, of which both relations imply a relation, right? Of which both things. As the father and the, what? The son. I don't know if that's referring to the Trinity or even to the, you know, naturally. But there are some, this is the famous example of Aristotle, of which one implies a real relation, and the other relation of reason only. As science and the knowable, right? Okay. So, you know, knowing is a kind of a unusual thing, right? And so when I'm knowing a material thing, I'm knowing as what? An immaterial way, right? And that material thing doesn't share that immaterial knowing, does it? So it doesn't have a real relation to me because of my knowing it, huh? But I have a real relation to it. Isn't that unusual, right, huh? Thomas points out distinction in a number of texts, you know, but here's one place where he does it, right? So two things are related. Sometimes the relation is not real on the side of either one, right? For reason. Some, both are real, and some, one is real and the other is not, right? It's interesting. Distinction, right? So Thomas, you know, in the De Potentia, he talks about God being the creator, right? We're the creature, right? He says the creature is really related to God. But is God really related to the creature? Well, that's a relation of what? A reason, right? That's an example of what the Shubilee thing he's talking about. Aristotle saw that, right? He didn't see a Shubilee, right? He said, you know, that's really, really subtle stuff, you know? Even I, when I, when I was interviewing somebody for a job, when the philosophy probably wasn't asking these kind of questions. Now, what's the reason for this diversity, right? We've got to look before here in terms of what's the reason. Because that upon which is found in relation, sometimes is found in one only, and sometimes in what? Both. So, as it's clear that the relation of scientia to the Shubilee, hein? Science to the noble, is founded upon a, what? Grasping, and that is, secundum essee spirituale, right? That's the famous thing that immateriality is the root of knowledge, right? But this essay spirituality, in which is founded, hein? The relation of science is only in, what? The one knowing, and not in the thing being known. Because there is the form of the thing according to natural being, right? But then it's interesting about the difference between these things and the lover and the loved, hein? And this is the famous text from Aristotle in the Sixth Book of the Medaphysic, a magnificent text. It's contrary about the lover and the loved. Because the relation of love is founded upon the desire of the good. But the good is not something existing only in the soul, but also in, what? Things. Whence the philosopher says, in the Sixth Book. Unless he calls him a philosopher by Antoinette de Sion. Whence the philosopher says, in the Sixth Book of Metaphysics, that good and bad are in things. But true and false in the soul. That's one of the most found things that Aristotle ever said, hein? And therefore, Avicenna says, right? In his book, in the Third Book of Metaphysics. That in the loving, lover and the loved, in both of the relatives there is found a disposition, which is referred to the other, right? But not in the one knowing and the knowable. And therefore, in both relation is real, right? Yeah. That's also equality, which is immediately founded upon quantity, which is in both, right? Now, if you read the great Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae, right? When he takes up God, he takes up the unity of God before the Trinity, obviously, right? But then, what does he do with the unity of God, huh? He takes up first, after the existence of God, right? He takes up the substance of God, as he says, right? And then he takes up the operations of God, as understanding and willing, right? Now, where does he take up the goodness of God and the truth of God? Yeah. But the truth is taken up. He takes up the operation of God, understanding. It goes back to Aristotle, right? That's really amazing, you know, to realize how subtle time... this is, right? In the substance of God, in both Summas, right, you have five things, right? And sometimes there's something attached to it, right? So God is said to be unchanging, right? There's no motion God at all, right? And then to that they attach the consideration of God's being in eternity, right? The eternity of God. Or God is infinite, right? And then God being everywhere in some way, right? Okay. Well, but one of the five things he takes up, again, is the perfection of God, right? And then to that he attaches, what? Consideration of the goodness of God, right? That's an amazing thing to know how careful Thomas was, right? He takes up the goodness of God in his, what? Substance, right? But he takes the truth of God, right? And he takes up his understanding of the operation, right? It goes back to Aristotle, right? It's amazing with Thomas, you know, how much he learned from Aristotle. You know, sometimes, I remember here, you know, some people are understanding what Aristotle is saying, and I don't know what Thomas would say, you know. It's an important matter, right? It's so great a mind, it's so great a matter, but I think this is, it doesn't make any sense. I mean, it's hard to explain him, you know. I just noticed today, you know, a couple, somebody's quoting Damascene or somebody's quoting Augustine, you know, and Thomas explains what really Damascene meant to what Augustine meant, you know. So, that's the kind of a guy you need, huh? Yeah. I kind of see the difference because, so you say that when you have a lover and a loved thing, there's a relation, a real relation going in both directions? Yeah, and it makes me a simpler thing to say. Yeah, yeah, that's true. Yeah, yeah. I think because in a loved thing, there's something real there that's the basis of it. Yeah, yeah. Okay, but with the knower and the known thing, the known thing also has something by which it's known. In other words, it doesn't have actuality, it doesn't mean that it wouldn't be known, it wouldn't be knowable. So, there's something in the known thing as well that is the basis for my being able to know it. I think the best way to approach it, it's kind of easier for us, you know, to approach it, right, is to bring out that loving is something that proceeds from the love to the thing in itself, right? Okay. So, if I love the woman, I want the woman herself. Okay. And so, I'm going out, right? And therefore, love is said to be in the thing love, right? I left my heart in San Francisco, right? I gather treasures up in heaven, right? Because where your treasures are, there your heart shall be, right? So, love is in the thing, what? Love, down here, going out to the thing itself. But knowledge, right, then, in knowledge, the known is in the knower, right? And so that the, even the early Greeks in some ways saw that, right? You had to have the thing known inside your mind to know it, right? And that's why the, in the first act of mind is said to be simple apprehension, simple grasping, right? But when I grasp something, it's contained in my hand, right? Yes. Yeah. Yeah. So, when the mind grasps something, when it knows something, when it grasps this, it's in some way in the mind itself, right? And that's why truth is primarily in the mind, right? Following upon that. And where the good is primarily in the thing, right? In one case, you're, you're coming out to the thing itself, right? Your heart is moving. And so the heart is said to be in, you know, or we have the expression, you know, even saying, my heart's not in it. My heart's not in it. What does that mean? See, the heart is said to be in what you, you love, right, huh? If I love some doing something, right, my heart's in it, right? Enthusiastic about it, right? You know? One of the students last night, I was going to Boston University, say, you said something about Kuhn, you know, huh? I said, I don't like those guys to read them at all. I said, you know, I'd much rather be the, you know, Heisenberg or Einstein even or Max Born, you know, the scientists themselves. They talk about their knowledge, right? And, I mentioned Duhem. I said, well, that Duhem is different, right? Because Duhem was a working physicist, right, and made contributions to physiology and so on, right? And he did a great historical research, too, on the history of science, right? And then he wrote his thing on, you know, what we call the philosophy of science, right, the nature of science, you know? I trust those guys more than some philosophers, you know? I always tell the story, you know, I was at some kind of philosophical meeting there, and we had lunch or something like that, so I got to talk to somebody, and somebody came about talking about hypothesis, so I quoted Einstein, who said that a hypothesis is freely imagined. Oh, that's Einstein's opinion. Here's a guy who, in one year, you know, had three ideas, all which are worthy of the, what, Nobel Prize, right? They didn't give him the Nobel Prize for the Special Theory of Relativity because it was too hard to understand for a while, right? I mean, nobody is so fertile a mind, right? Presumably he knows something about how scientific, you know, theory arises, you know? He used to say, you know, get it from the horse's mouth, right, in the expression. He used to know that expression, but he should know it, you know? The horses know who's going to win, right? That's really, that's really profound, though, you know? But to me, you know, it's easier to see, you know, I'm amazed by Thomas taking up the good where he does, and then the truth where he does, huh? Because these things are all what they call the transcendentals, you know? They're convertible with being, right? Truth and goodness are convertible with being. But, you know, he still sees the differences, right? It goes back to his teacher or style. In knowing, obviously, the existence of the things, but not in the same way, and more precisely, that the grasp of my mind was the cause of my truth. Yeah, there's kind of a being that it has in the mind, which it doesn't have in itself, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. When I love steak, or I love a woman, right? It's the thing itself, right? I don't know what's in the thing that I'm seeking. So I guess there's more than one. Yeah. And, you know, when we say you take charity, right, which is the highest kind of love we have. Well, faith disappears, right, in heaven, but does the charity disappear? And so in sense, God is more proportioned to our, what, will, you might say, or our will is more proportioned to God, I should say, than our mind is proportioned to him, right? I used to use the metaphor, and I say it's easier to jump into the water, the ocean, than to get the ocean inside you. So, you know, it's like that little appearance of the void to Augustine, right, huh? But I mean, it's easier to, when you love God, you love God in himself, right? You're not loving, but in theology, you're knowing more of what God is not than what he is right now. Very perfect way of going in. That's what I know some of the fathers would say about the parable that says, enter into the joy of your Lord. And I say, no, it doesn't say the joy of the Lord can enter into you. You're going to enter into it. Yeah. Yeah. Very subtle. Very subtle. Okay, now we've got the famous text here, which I got to reproduce again in that thing I got, if you want to. But let's look at this one. This is a magnificent text that you were asking about that father. Secret realis relatio consisted in ordinary way ad rem, right, to a thing to a thing. So the relation of reason consists in the order of things understood, which to pitch it.