Logic (2016)
Lecture 22: The Category of Relation and Its Foundations

Transcript
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I count the church's money on Monday evening now, and there's somebody in the parish and his name is Euclid, right? I'm dying to meet this person, you know, see if they've ever read Euclid, you know. And I was a boy downtown in my hometown, St. Paul, there was a Euclid Hotel, and I don't know how he got that name, you know, but maybe he had some contact with Euclid, I don't know. So Aristotle makes that distinction, right? To be a Christian or to be, you know, a logician is being per se, right? But I speak of a Christian logician because to be a Christian, to be a logician happens to the same man, right? But they don't come together and make something, right? Logic or something, right? Okay, but then when he gets to being per se, right, he divides that into what? Two ways, according to the ten genera of being and according to act and ability, right? And then he says, when you consider being according to the distinction of the categories, it's chiefly about substance, right? And so in books seven and eight, he talks about substance, right? But he leads you into it from logic in book seven and from natural philosophy in book eight, right? And then book nine, he talks about the division of being and quite active ability. But then he gives this other sense of being, right? Which is the being of reason, right? Which is kind of what? There's no man's land there between being per se and being prejudice, right? It's not accidental being, right? Because in that case, there could be no what? Science, no episteme, about what? Logic, right? So it's got to be, it can't be accidental, right? But it's not as real, shall we say, or as fundamental as the ten categories are. Why is it in the category of quality? Because knowledge is it? Well, knowledge is in the category of quality, yeah? Right. See? But let me take a simple example of this one. A living man, right, is being in a fuller sense than sitting is being, right? So, if I was going to be assassinated when I leave here tonight, you could say, you will cease to be, Mr. Berquist, if you leave this room, right? Or you wouldn't say that about my not being in a room anymore when I left it, right? That's being in a much lesser sense, right? Accident doesn't have being by itself, right? It's that by which substance is in some way, right? Now, you have substance and then accident, right? And then what comes even lower than accident, huh? Well, that could be motion, right? So, is growing as much being as the size you now have? Motion is kind of... The imperfect being. Yeah. It's defined in the third book as the act of what is able to be insofar as it's able to be, right? So, it's learning the same thing as knowing. It's growing the same thing. Growing to be five foot ten. It's the same thing as being five foot ten. Well, it has something of the size, but not, you know? My grandchildren are growing, right? But they haven't reached their full thing, right? Sometimes people say something's going to shoot up suddenly, you know? They went to the military academy there, and they used to march with the M1s, right? You get these little shrimps sometimes, and they give them a car guy, you know, to march with, you know, and maybe it wouldn't be until their sophomore year or something like that that they would start marching with the M1, right? And it's kind of funny the way people shoot up, you know, just between a couple, you know? Yeah. So, growing is the third, right? But now, can some people be said to be ignorant? Or somebody can be blind, right? Somebody can be deaf, right? Well, what kind of being is that? So, now you're starting to get done. You could be dead. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And here you seem to be saying that non-being is a kind of being, right? Which shows how equivocal the word being is, right? So, it's substance first, then accident, then motion. Motion will come up in the most predicaments, right? And then you have non-being, right? Like being ignorant, or being blind, or being deaf, or impotent, or something, right? But it's a kind of non-being, these things, right? Now, if you want to get really into non-being, let's talk about nothing, right? What would you say about nothing? Is nothing something? Or would you say that nothing is nothing? Yeah, my friend Boethius, right, the great mind, Boethius, he said, nothing, no statement is more true than when something is said to be itself, right? A dog is a dog, a cat is a cat, a rose is a rose, right? So, you can say nothing is nothing, right, huh? What kind of is is that? That's really a being of what? Reason, right, huh? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So, nothing is something in the mind only, right? So, we can talk about nothing, right? And if you're an actual philosopher, you might have met these guys who said, you know, you can't get something out of nothing. Shakespeare teaches us this, King Leary, you know, he says to Cordelia, nothing will get you nothing, right? So, you won't flatter him, you know, and stop what she loves him, right? It's like the two elder sisters in the home. Yeah. Terrible people, really. But nothing seems to be a being of reason. You can make a true statement about it, right? That nothing is nothing, right, huh? Or I can even say that something is not nothing, right? So, it can be a true statement, right? And here, that kind of shows maybe that nothing is, in some way, a being of reason that's closer, right, to real being, because it's kind of in this descending order, right? You know, it's kind of the bottom thing. I always quote my teacher, because his joke was that philosophy is the only subject where you can get paid for talking about nothing. That's true, right, huh? You see? And he comes back with, what, our friend Hegel there, right, huh? And Hegel kind of gets things confused, but, you know, he thinks of becoming as kind of a union of being and unbeing, right, huh? You see? So, people do think about these things, right? You know? But, so you might say that nothing is being only in the mind, right? Therefore, it's something like this, what, genus and species, right? But, there seems to be two kinds of, what, beings of reason, one which is a relation, right? A relation of reason, right? Does that mean the relation arises from knowing something? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Or, there's a little more cases than that too, but that's when you talk about genus and what species, right, huh? And so, you know, when we define genus, we sometimes say, it's a name, said with one meaning, of many things, other and kind or species, signifying what it is. And what's a species, and what's the name of a particular kind of thing, placed under a genus in which the genus has said, and answers the question, what is it? And so, they kind of seem as being, what, relative to each other, right? And that's the reason we gave, why Porphyry takes up species right after genus rather than difference, right? And what, I guess, why wouldn't you do that? And what, I guess, why wouldn't you do that? That relation, so genus is relative to species, species is relative to genus, right? Why isn't that relation a real relation? Genus and species? Yeah. Well. I mean, aren't those really things in your mind? I mean, don't you have animals in your mind? You could say that they're relative a secundum what? Essay, right? They are. Yeah. But they're not real relations. Relations. It's not in things outside the mind. That's why they're not real. Yeah. It's a relation of universal to the singular, right? Universal is a set of the singulars, but things are universal only when they're separated in the mind, right? Okay. So it's the active understanding that separates the universal. It's common to many things, right? So the distinction between logical relations and real relations has to do with what's in the mind and what's outside the mind? That's one of them, yeah, see? But those ones might be based upon what? Some kind of relation of reason, right? Why nothing is more of a negation, right? So it's a little different kind, yeah? Okay. Some are based upon negations, yeah. And deafness or blindness, right? That's not quite as much nothing as nothing is. But when you get to the post predicament, you'll come back to this, because you'll talk about the kinds of opposites, right? And you'll distinguish between contradictories and lack, right? So we can say that this class doesn't see, right? But you wouldn't speak to this class as being what? Blind, right? Because blind is a non-being of the ability to see and something that is able to see by nature and should be able to see by nature, right? And so it's being deprived. But in the case of this, it's a mirror of what? Negation, right? And again, you know, every time I study the substance of God, right? Thomas divides his consideration, the substance of God, in both the summas, right? Which kind of key works into five, right? The order's a little different, but the five are right there, right? And one of the five is that God is infinite, right? And the first thing Tom wants to point out is this is not a, what? Prevasion, you see? Like a limitless line or something, you know, infinite line. But it's a, what? Negation instead of God, right? Yeah. And so he's going back to the categories and distinction between having and lacking something, right? And then being and not being, right? Yeah. So is the relation of the category of the nation? No, no. Because the categories are, you know, ones of being in the sense of even outside the mind, right? There's a good, you've got to be the de potentia. But one distinction there is between ones that are like, what, nothing and like, you know, if I say, you're known to me because I know you. See? Well, that's kind of the relative thing, right? Why negation is a different kind of thing, right? But, you know, Thomas and I guess Aristotle too, but they'll speak of, you know, as the reason kind of makes nothing to be like a, what? Something, right? What are you doing? What are you doing? What's that? Okay, another little text here in the middle of page five here. Sometimes a name is placed upon something to signify the, what, relation itself, right? Habitudinum. I suppose, you know, the word habitunum, I guess the nearest thing would be how you have yourself towards another, right? But kind of a strange one. Just as this name, what, nominus, right, huh? The dominus is the dominus of the slave or this. And ones of this sort, which are relativa secundum esse, right, huh? And other things said of God are relative, which signify from their first, what, understanding, a relation which is by reason in God, right, huh? And consequently, they make an understanding of the essence. According as such a relation is founded in something essential. And what does that mean, huh? If you say God is a, what, creator, right? Is that a real relation that God has to us? Well, Thomas would argue, you know, that the creature is really related to God. He really depends upon God, right? But God is in no way changed by creating us, right? It's a foundation in God for him being our creator, right? Yeah, yeah. Sometimes a name is placed upon something to signify that upon which is founded the habitudo, right? Has this name science. That's always a common example. Equality, right? That's in the genus, fundamentally, equality, which there follows, upon which there follows a respect to the noble, right, huh? Okay. When such things are not relative, secundum esse, but only, what? It's secundum dicci, right, huh? Now, whence these principally, huh, are given to understand something of another predicament, right? Named equality, right, in this example. And ex consequente, they imply a sinumulation. So that's the way Aristotle, you know, seems to have interfered with the order, right? In the following text, Thomas explains why power or ability, as well as science, right, should be placed in the category of quality, even though they have a relation, right, huh? So he says, although to power belongs the notion of, what, being a beginning, right, huh? Which is in the genus of relation, right? Nevertheless, that which is a beginning of a acting upon or undergoing is not a relation, right, but something absolute, right, in absolute form. And this is the essence of power. And hence it is that the philosopher places potency, not in the genus of relation, but in equality, to be the second species of quality that he gets. Just as he places science, right, in the first species of quality, although, what, to both some relation, what happens, right, huh? You see how subtle Aristotle was to see this, right? So Thomas has great respect for Aristotle. Deconic said, Aristotle is somebody, he said. Now, this also seems to confirm the necessity of the second definition, right? Now, the first definition of relation is something that is said to be of another, right? But that's kind of a tonic definition. But Aristotle is one whose whole being or nature is to be, what, towards another. Right? So this seems to confirm the necessity of the second definition to exclude the relativa secundum dici that the first definition quite admits, right? We do not mean that the distinction between the two definitions is that between the relativa secundum dici and secundum esse. For under the first definition come both relativa. They're both said to be of something, right? This is double of that, you know? This is now of... that, right? So they're both relative and they're said to be of another, right? But one is just that, right? And the other one, which is really after in that category, a different kind of being, is something whose whole nature, right? Is to be towards another, right? But the second definition excludes relative secundum dici from being placed chiefly in this genus, things that are just that. The first definition of towards something is not a definition of relative secundum dici but it includes them. But the second definition is a relative secundum esse and this excludes relative secundum dici, right? Now it's the same text here. There's another universal distinction of relations which should not be confused with the distinction between relative secundum dici and relative secundum esse. This is the distinction between what? Real relations and relations of what? Thomas points out this possible confusion replying to an objection and he gives examples showing how a relation secundum dici can be real and the relation secundum esse of reason, yeah. Yes, so language, yeah. Moreover, those relative eva in which there is not a relation secundum right, that's a relation by that way of speaking, secundum we can find there to be a not adequate secundum dici tantum as the noble about which the philosopher that's Aristotle, somebody in the fifth book of metaphysics that's related because something else is referred to it, right? So reason, you can't really grasp that very well unless it makes the other thing relative to the original one. But about God, I said, some relatives which are what? Adaliquid, right? And according to their being as Lord, King, and so on. Therefore also, these, yeah, these signify some re-relation in God. Thomas says this is all nonsense, right? You can see how difficult about this thing it is, right? And so we don't normally in logic in the beginning. To the fourth, it should be said that that doesn't make anything for the thing proposed, right? Because about both relatives, there's found something which implies a re-relation and which implies a relation of reason. For item, the same, implies a relation of what? Reason. Although it is what? Relative secundum esse. So I'm the same as myself, right? Is that a real relation, huh? Because I'm only one. It's like saying I'm like myself, right? What's a relation of reason? Well, yeah. But it's still a, what? Relative secundum esse. It's whole definition, right? It's to be towards another. And science implies a real relation, although it's a relative secundum what? Dicci, huh? Relations of reason would not be put in the category of towards something since the categories pertain to a division of real being, right? This is clear from the distinction of being in the fifth book of wisdom. But is Aristotle's second definition of towards something meant to exclude relations of reason as well as relative secundum dicci? Perhaps the use of to be in the second definition for nature indicates that one is thinking of being in things and not just in reason. When Hammond says to be or not to be, there is a question. He is speaking of being in things and not in what? Reason. Now, some have thought that all relations is something of reason. If there arise from our mind comparing things, right? And not in things. But this is a mistake. But the reason for this mistake is the weakness in being of relations. Thomas speaks of this weakness, huh? Those things which are ad aliquid, huh? Toward something. Seem to be, what? More remote, right? From substance and other genera. From this, that they are a weaker, what? Being. Whence they exist or inherit in substance by means of other genera. So double and half are in substance by reason of, what? Quantity. So quantity is closer to substance than double or half, right? Okay? Such as equal and unequal. Double and half by means of quantity, right? Now, father and son, right? Implies, what? Some kind of quality and some kind of acting upon, right? Generating, huh? Moving, the mover and the mood. Father and son. The commanding lord and the slave, huh? By means of action and what? Action, huh? And this because substance is existence in itself, right? But quantity and quality are beings and other, right? But relativas are not only in another but towards another, right? I think you meant I'm talking about the war at the south there, right? Master and slaves, right? Oh, it's just only, uh... It's hardly anything. The reality or existence in things of some relations is from there being accidents or having a cause in their subject, right? Relation is something real and creatures is having a cause in its subject, right? So am I really your teacher? I'm teaching you I'm a teacher by reason there's something real in me, right? Some knowledge, I hope, yeah. The following text of Thomas is useful for understanding what is responsible for relation being real, huh? That's what he says here in this beautiful text and guess where it's from? Ah, being ground down by the depotentia that's powerful stuff that's really, really impressive Relation according to the, what? Ratio of its genus, huh? In so far as its relation does not have that it is something it's not something in itself, right? Yeah But only that it is towards something, right? It's nothing in itself It was double in itself, right? That it be something, what? Secundum Ram, right? It has from that side by which it is in something, right? Now, either and this is the thing in the Trinity there either as being the same Secundum Ram within Divinis, right? So is the fatherhood of the father, right? Something other than the divine substance two different things that the father is composed of his divine substance and his fatherhood and he's all together what? Simple God, huh? So the fatherhood of the father and his divine substance are the same thing, right? So that's very much a real thing then is what? Fatherhood, right? It's being a father, right? It's the same as his substance, right? Okay Now that's not true for us, right? It's our accidents and our substance, right? Let alone our relation are a substance by God, right? You know because double and half and taller and shorter is even more remote from being my substance than quantity is, right? Even that's not the same thing, right? People sometimes confuse the size of the thing with its substantial being, right? Because it's closer so he says it's real either because it's the same thing as the substance secundum rem as in divinis, right? That's a very profound statement, Thomas you can see how powerful this is or as having a cause in its subject, right? as in creatures, right? So there is a cause in me of my being taller or shorter than you and it's my size my height you know my quantity right? And so that's a real relation, right? I'm taller or shorter than you, right? Or equal to you if I am, right? So we have to beg by reality, in a sense, right? From that quantity that I have, that size I have, right? If I didn't have any size, I couldn't be double you or taller than you or shorter than you, right? Are you taller than your guardian angel? Oh, I'm shorter than him. Yeah, I was thinking metaphorically, right? The relation, notice the English translation there, the relation by reason of its generic nature as such is a thing, but it is purely relative, a liquid, right? That it is something real is due to the fact that it is in a subject, right? Which is its cause, which is either identical with it as in God, right? Or as its cause, as in what? Creatures. That's really profound what he's saying, right? Relation, as Thomas explains, is not an accident from its being alone towards something, right? Because an accident is something that exists in another, right? Well, my relation is only towards another and has no foundation in me. That's not an accident in me, right? So he says, this is very profound. That which is said towards something does not have the ratio, the notion of an accident, something exists in another, right? From the fact that it is adequate, right? Towards something, but only from the fact that it is, what? Inest. And hence it is that relation alone, according to the ratio of his genus remains with substance and divine things. But there it is not a, what? Accident, huh? But it's real because it's the same as the substance of God, right? You can see how Thomas is influenced by his master there. What? Well, who said that? Who said that in God you have just two categories, substance and relation. Boethius, yeah. I sometimes suggest that Boethius is the greatest mind in the church between Augustine and Thomas, who were kind of probably the greatest minds we had, huh? But Boethius is really something that comes in between, right? You know, Thomas learned a lot from him. He was very influential, right? Boethius started out to make known the whole Greek philosophy to the Lactans, right? So he started translating Aristotle and so on, right? So Thomas would refer to his translations sometimes and so on. But he wrote, you know, works, you know, great works in theology, right? Great works in philosophy, right? Great mind, Boethius. I guess there's been a little bit of a, you know, tradition of him being a saint too, you know? He's not, he's not, he's never in Canada, I don't think formally, but there was some, you know, local worship of him as a saint, right? When some relations are a reason only because they have no foundation in the thing in which they are said, right? Now another little text here from the sentences, huh? In relation, there are two things. One is the respect of the relation by which it is referred to what? Another. In which consists the ratio of relation, right? Towards something, right? And again, the being of the relation, which it has according as it is what? Founded in something, right? Either quantity as in us, right? Say, you know, or say the essence like in God, right? Or something of this sort, huh? A man who considers relations according to the respect in which the gratio relation exists, from which it does not have that it's what? Implies something in herring, right? Whence they also find such relations placing nothing really in the thing, right? On account of this, they say they are assisting or exterior fixes, getting mixed to the heresies about the Trinity too, okay? Those relations are said to be affixed or assisting, which properly do not have a foundation of the thing, but only from the, what, relation to another, to the thing about which they are said, as right in the column, huh? Which is said of it to the fact that man is on its left or something, right? Are you there on my right? Are you there on my left? See, I'm the center of things here, huh? And you're on the right and you're on the left. In the distinction of the ten highest gender, the one we had from Thomas, you know, before, Thomas separated quantity and quality from towards something because the former, he said, or said, what? Absolutely, right? What are said, absolutely, place something in that in which they are, and what is private of what they are. But a relation does not have to do this, huh? Now, another little text here from Thomas in the sentences, huh? I told you much in the end, you know, I've forgotten text in you, in the sentences. We're all waiting, what the hell is this text? He's going to give us the text, you know? So, those things which are said absolute, right, huh? That's the Latin there. According to their, what? Own reasons or notions. Place in that, right? In which they are said to be, right? As quantity or quality, right? So the size of my body, right? The condition of my body, how am I today, right? Healthy or I'm sick, whatever it is. Hence, neither of these are found, right? That they're not really, what, in God, huh? Of which they are said truly and properly. On account of this, we cannot say about something that is said from time, except that it changes through the, what, reception of that which before it did not have. But the relation, according to his ratio, does not have that it places something in that of which it is said. But it places only, what, in relation to another. Whence there is found some relation not really existing in that of which it is said. And therefore, in such things, these relations are said newly, not through their change, but of the change of that to which they are said, huh? Yeah, the relations, they are said temporarily in God, right, huh? Like he's a creator. He wasn't always a creator, right, huh? Well, that's because of the change that took place in us. You can call that change. The following text of Thomas brings out, well, what relation has in common with the other accidents, and what is proper or, what, private to it, huh? Incidentally, when they talk sometimes about the common good and the proper good, you know, opium. I usually translate opium now as proper, but it is, what, private, huh? It gives more sense that you want to give, huh? Now, this is from the Summa Theologiae, huh? In each of the nine genera of accident, huh? There are ten highest genera. The first one is substance, and then the other nine are, what, accidents, huh? In each of the nine genera of accident, there are two things to consider, one of which is what belongs to each of them according as it is a, what, accident, huh? And this commonly in all is that it is in esse subecto, it's in a subject. And that's what you had in the early chapter, right, in the anti-predicaments, right? You had universal substance and particular substance, universal accidents and other substance. Well, some things are said of another, and other things are not said of another. Well, some things are said of another. Well, some things are said of another. right? Some exist in another and some do not exist in another, right? So what's common with all the accidents is they exist in another, right? Another that can be considered in each of them is the proper ratio of each of these genera, right? So sometimes we say quantity is the measure of substance and quality is the disposition of substance, something like that, the proper ratio of each of these genera. And in the other genera, this is a very subtle distinction between the two, right? As in quantity and quality, even the proper ratio, the notion of the genus, is also taken according to a comparison to the what? Subject, right? For quantity is said to be the measure of substance, right? The size of substance, right? Quality, the disposition of substance, right? But the ratio, the proper ratio of relation is not taken according to a what? Comparison to that which it is, but according to comparison to something outside. How great is the difference between those first two accidents of quantity and quality and then relation, right? In some sense, they're all in the subject, right? But the notion of quantity in particular and quality in particular has a different what? Connection with the subject, right? One is the measure of the subject, the size of it, and the other is how it is, right? But what does relation say? Yeah, just a strange thing, right? Very strange thing, yeah? From what, then, does relation have existence in things, right? It's a strange thing, right? And I often say to students, they say, you know, that relation is really a difficult thing to understand. And Aristotle says the difficulty in understanding can be in the thing itself you're trying to understand, because it hardly is, or it can be in you because of the weakness of your mind. In relation, you get hit at both ends. Because relations of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, right? They're the difficulties in us, right? Because your mind is not adequate to understanding those things. But in the regular relations, right? Preacher things, the difficulty is what? In the thing itself, it hardly is, right? Right. Aristotle talks about, in the three looking sciences, huh? He says that natural philosophy is more difficult to know than geometry, huh? Or with Medicaid. And wisdom is more difficult to know, right? And he says the cause of difficulty. Why is it more difficult than geometry, right? Yeah, natural philosophy? Yeah. Because it's mainly about motion and matter, right? And matter is considered by itself as not actually anything. It's only something in ability. Very hard thing to know, right? And motion is what the act of what is able to be in so far as it's able to be. And, you know, Descartes says, what do those words mean? You know, he can't understand what he's saying, right? I remember when I was first doing the definition there, I was still in high school. And I said, I think I understand it. You better be careful about what he's saying, you know? You understand that, right? And so the cause of difficulty is there, right? But wisdom, or first philosophy, is more difficult than geometry and arithmetic because of the, what, weakness of our mind, huh? That's kind of distinction you can make in other things. You can make it in love, right? So I say it's difficult to love the common good. It's difficult to love God, huh? But because the difficulty there is in you. The common good is a very great good, and therefore very lovable, right? So if you have a hard time loving the common good, right? The problem is in you. It's not in the common good. In 843, if you have difficulty loving God, well, God is not only good, but his goodness itself. He's good or very good. It should be easy for you to love God. So if you have difficulty loving God, the problem must be in you. But they say, now, if you have a hard time, though, loving cancer, I say, huh? Is the problem in you? No, the problem is in cancer. It's not a very horrible thing, right? I have a hard time loving rock and rolls. That's not your problem. Yeah, yeah, that's in the thing, right? So that's a nice distinction, huh? And so you're making love, but you can make it annoying, right? So you hit with both difficulties in knowing relation, right? Because relations down here, right, are difficult to know because they hardly are. So it's like the devotee having knowing ability or, I mean, matter or motion. The difficulty in knowing the divine, the trinity, right? The cause of difficulty isn't us, right? Our mind is just too weak, right? So our style in the beginning of the eight books of natural hearing, he says that what is more known to us is what? Less known simply, yeah. Less known by nature, he says, or he says less known simply, right? So we have to go from what is more known to us to what is more known by nature, he says, huh? That's true, right? Well, there he manifests it by three kinds of examples, right? And he's showing that we know things what? In a confused way more than we know them what? Distinctly, right? I was saying to my student there, Richard at the house, they said, no. I gave her a glass of dry red wine to drink, right? He'd be more what? Sure, you're drinking your dry red wine, then you're drinking carbonée sauvignon, which he agreed. But the wine is less known when it's known to be a dry red wine, and there's no one to be a carbonée sauvignon. He could fool me too, I'm sure. But he couldn't fool my brother Marcus. He was a, you know. He told you that story, you know, where Ron McCarthy, you know, the first president of Thomas Aquinas College there, he gave a tenure for the faculty where he put other wine in bottles that get saved, you know. Everybody was fooled, except my brother Mark said, this is not that. You know, that's what they want, you know. I mean, it's kind of amazing. Mark said, it would catch him, you know. But I probably wouldn't be fooled like anybody else, you know. But we had, when he had a partner together, Mark and I, you know, with this little wine left over from the body, he'd save the little container, and then at the end of the week, we'd have a little test, you know. And I'd test him, and he'd test me, right? Well, I'd get maybe what thing right, maybe 50 percent of the time. He was always right. Yes. So he was the great authority, you know. I always tell you, my first lesson he gave me was, the two greatest red grapes in the world are Caminé Sauvignon and Pinot Noir. The two greatest white grapes are Pinot Chardonnay and Johannesburg Riesling, you know. I've always repeated it to everybody, you know. I teach up the grandchildren, you know. So notice what he says in this page, in the middle of page eight here. It is the nature of relation that it has a cause in other genera of things, right? Because it has a minimum of the nature of what? Being. As a commentator now, this is the variables, right? Whence although relation, per se, does not, what? In the motion you don't have a relation to trying to become double, you know, trying to become taller. Because in ad-aliquid there's no motion, as is proven in the fifth book of natural hearing, so-called physics. Nevertheless, from this, that motion ends per se, at some being, of necessity, there follows some relation, right? So you see the grandchildren, sometimes they're growing taller, some of them, than the parents, right? At least the shorter periods, anyway. For from this, that the motion of alteration, which is in the genus of what quality, that it turns to Albany, that it follows relation of likeness to all things that are what? Yeah. But did I really become white? I may assume that I become like others, or did I become white? What is the real becoming in me? Yeah, I became white, right? It's in quality, right? It's not really relation, but there's a relation following upon my becoming white, right? Unlike other things that are white, eh? Okay. So for from this, that the motion of alteration ends in whiteness, there follows consecutor, right, eh? Consequitor, or sequitur means to follow, I guess, eh? The relation of likeness to all things that are white. Similarly from this, that the motion of generation terminates at form, it follows this relation according to which matter is said to be under what form, eh? Although how much, how, and towards something are said as substance by reason of something in it, there is an important difference in the ratio of towards something and the ratio of quantity and quality and understanding what they are, eh? Another text here from, oh my goodness, the De Potencia. Yes, I could shiver my fear, you know? My fear is aroused, and I see that title, the De Potencia. I mean, my God. Relation in this differs from quantity and quality because quantity and quality are certain accidents remaining in the subject. My size remains in me. My knowledge remains in me. Relation, however, does not signify, as Boethius says in the book on the Trinity, as in a subject remaining, right, but in transit towards another, right? I'm taller than you, or I'm shorter than you, or I'm equal to you, right, eh? It's a strange thing, this relation. Very, very odd, odd, odd being, eh? Tell me an odd being, I mean. Whatever is attributed to something as from it proceeding to another does not make composition with it, just as neither acting upon with the agent, right? Because you're acting upon something outside of you, right? That's another genus. In account of this also, the philosopher proves in the fifth book of natural hearing, the so-called physics, that in ad aliquid, there cannot be any, what? Motion. Because without some change of that to which it is referred, the relation can cease to be from only imitation of it, right? So I've known parents who are taller than their children, and then all of a sudden, yeah, and they cease to be taller than their children. That's a shocking thing, right? But it's because of the growth, right? Change in quantity, right? The real change was in growth, wasn't it, right? And there followed a relation of being shorter than your children. Okay. Same way about what action, right? I don't think it would bother right now, but an easy metaphoric chain appropriate, yeah? Just as one changing to act from idleness, right? Is it to be changed, right? Which would not be if relation or action acting upon signifies something in the subject remaining, right? When I act upon something, am I, where am I? I mean, the thing I'm acting upon, aren't I? Kind of, right? It seems to be. You know, it's interesting, I was reading Thomas there in the De Potencia there, I think I mentioned this, I think I mentioned it last time, and he's arguing, you know, that God created us by will, by choice, by his wisdom and his will, not by his what? He didn't actually produce us. And one of the arguments he does, he says, well, God's creating us is not something added to a substance, right? His operation is his substance. So the act by which he created us has to be an act that, what, remains in him, right? His substance, because it's his substance. Now what kind of acts remain in the doer? The acts of knowing and willing, yeah. And therefore he must have made us by knowing and willing. It's subtle, I bet you know. And the De Potencia just grinds up my mind, Thomas doesn't, just powerful. He must have been a popular teacher there at the University of Paris, right? Because all these things, you know, the copyology seems off by hand, you know. Kind of thing, yeah? Okay, now, let's look at another text here from the Scriptum Supra. It should be said in regard to the first question, that union is a certain, what? Relation. Now every relation, according to the philosopher in the fifth book of wisdom, the fifth book after the books in the actual philosophy, is founded either upon quantity or what is reduced to the genus of quantity. It's the ideas like what being, yeah, but also one, you know, you know, being the same or like something, huh? One is tied up in quantity. Or it's based upon action and what passion, right? One is reduced to the genus of quantity, as it were, being the beginning of discrete quantity. And upon this is founded identity, right, huh? According to something is one in what? Substance, huh? Equality, according to this, is one in quantity. Likeness, according to this, is one in quality, right, huh? Initio, however, is a certain axio or passio, right? By which for many is made something in some way, what? One, huh? And this action, there falls upon this action, a relation, which is union, right? Could I be applied to marriage? I wonder. So I got into this. One like he said, relations are very hard to understand. Especially the in-laws. Yeah, yeah. From the way, we use the word relation in English, right? You know, we speak of our relations, right, huh? You know, I hate this word relationship, right? My teacher at the cert, you know, he says towards something, right? He didn't say relation, even, you know, or Thomas, you know. I mean Aristotle, but you, you know, we use relation in science of talking about the genus, huh? Now relations, of these relations, both these and others, some arise from the motion of both, right? The change of both. And there's necessary that these relations be really in both of these extremes, just as, what, fraternity and things of this sort, huh? So your father really generated you, right? And you were really generated by your father, right? So you do that. If I'm kicking you, you're really being kicked, right? And so there's something in me and something in you, right? Okay. But some arise from the motion of one without the change of the other, which happens in those things of which one depends of another. And in such the relation, secundum rem, is in that which depends upon the other. And the other is according to reason only, see? So. So. So.