Logic (2016)
Lecture 21: Relations: Secundum Esse, Secundum Dici, and Real Relations

Transcript
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keep on going from one thing to another right now got all these cds and mozart i gotta listen to another one now you know because it's kind of funny you know i'll be driving in the car there for the classical music station there in boston you know peace i haven't heard for a while you know hey that's a real nice piece of music you know and i think the bigtovans pastor symphony and then listening to uh you know schubert's trout content to head on we'll see you and then uh the uh you know i haven't heard this for a while so it's nice you know but uh my life is kind of going you know it's a discourse you know even the life of my mind right one thing to another right of course i mean augustine says that in the pete vision you partake of eternity right frozen in in an hour right it's very hard for us to understand that right now our life is uh is measured by time and it seems to be what in time right huh you see we spread out in time right but in the now time i have practically no life at all yeah i can't i can't eat one piece of candy in the now time can i can't listen to one melody of mozart i can't read one paragraph of thomas in the in my now right but god all at once sees everything right very very very unique you know so i mean when thomas takes up um you know he'll see that the relation of the creature to god is real right but the relation of a god to the creature is not real right it's a relation of what reason right and when our mind is seeing the creatures related to god then it tries to you know create a relation of god back towards us right and there ain't such a relation reality right that's a real profound distinction right and so the two main distinctions of what relations right now are between relations they couldn't the medicine they couldn't teach you the one that we meet in the category here and then the other relation between real relations and relation to reason which Aristotle talks about in metaphysics you know let's say the relation of genus to species right is relation of reason right it doesn't exist in things out there so even that science and logic or rigorous science right it's about relations of reason right sometimes you hear them called seven intentions you know but but they are relations of reason right and syllogism might be a middle term or a minor term every man has reason duane is a man therefore duane has reason while duane there is a what minor term this is kind of getting going beyond the categories the categories just consider the distinction though between the relative secundum esse and secundum what dicci right now okay but it's interesting that thomas comes back to that at the other end of our knowledge which is when you're talking about the trinity right and he's talking about the uh ability to generate the sun right is that something relative or something absolute right yeah yeah with a relative yeah a little tight tight on there right thomas is always speaking there sometimes um the divine nature is something one right and the father and the divine nature he says are what the same thing and the son and the divine nature are the same thing and the holy spirit and the divine nature the same thing but then again he'll say you know that the the divine nature is in the father and in the son differently because he says the divine nature is in the father not from anyone but the divine nature is in the son from the father the son is god he's god he's god from god light from light true god for true god right and of course it's amazing that he's he's not just what the one in kind he's numeric to say god that the father is right and yet the divine nature is in the father not from another but in the son from another that's really really profound you know how i understand that but certainly not like human no no and the holy spirit is even harder to understand you know because thomas would say you know we don't even have names really for you know the holy spirit you know the way we have for the son or for his way he's generated right and so we kind of uh you know even the holy spirit i mean the uh holy ghost right holy spirit is uh kind of strange we have naming him right because it isn't uh the father and the son is spirit and holy right and also they have to explain you know why we have to invent this you know it's like when i was talking in the nicomachean ethics uh about moral virtue and moral virtue is between two vices one of which is in excess and the other in defect right so courage is between uh cowardice right and foolhardiness right and you do find people who are foolhardy although it's more common to find people who are cowards right but then he gets to temperance right you know there are people who enjoy sense pleasure too much or pursue it too much right now there are all kinds of examples of that right now and if you say it was in temperature you mean he's going too far eating and drinking or whatever it is um but you say what about not enjoying the sense pleasure as much as you should whereas i said we don't have any name for that because it's it doesn't seem to be foul and since you have to almost you know make a name right huh you know and uh so uh this is a little the problem with the holy spirit right now you know it's hard to understand in some ways even in the father and the son right i was struck by this this one text there in the deep potencia where he seemed to be saying you know that the the love of the father and the son for each other is the beginning of the what holy spirit right proceeding from that but that the love of the father and the son that gives rise the holy spirit must be a love not only in the goodness of god and knowing the goodness of god and each other but but in being like each other i said i said i wonder you know you know and i said i remember it's it makes it so struck me they said you know he struck me something you know that i read before but i didn't think but maybe when i get to the parts that we goes into the twinity more you know you'll see that right now i know he always kind of insists upon that though that the that the love which is the holy spirit is like charity which is like we have a friendship right between two persons right so maybe you have to understand the love of the father and the son is not just a love based on knowing their goodness but on being what like each other right let's go It's like, I said, Thomas, I want more light to know this, but kind of, he's not to that point yet in the dispute questions, you know, just the marvelous work that is, you know. It's funny, you know, I feel like I should reread this book, you know, this book, you know, and I think it was my guardian angel, you know, telling me to do this, I don't know. I think when your guardian angel suggests things to you, he doesn't kind of get in the way, you know, like denunciation, you know. You know, pick up the thing again, you know. You know, my son, Marcus, sent me an email, you know, and he's got some friend there, a guy who's, I think, a Korean or something, you know, but anyway, he wants, he's taken up with the problem of evil, right, I suppose, in the world, right? And my son, Marcus, is saying, well, can you suggest something written to read? Well, I don't really know any, you know, semi-popular works on the subject, you know, and the things I can refer to in Thomas and so on. I'm probably not ready for these things at all, you know. So, I think, what should I do? And I said, well, maybe I'll, maybe I'll give a little discourse myself, right, huh? Some things I know from Thomas. And it's, you know, but I was thinking about this thing that struck me so much that in the last part of the Prima Pars, when I was reading it, huh? And he says that he had unusual, hard places. He said, with the effect of divine providence or divine governance is one. And I said, that's kind of strange. And Thomas says, well, you could say it's one insofar as it's always to, what, make the creature in some way like God, right? See? So, but then, before you go to all the ways that God, you know, governs the world that cannot be enumerated, because there's too many things, right? Thomas does one stop in between, right? And that he says that God wants us to be like himself in two ways. Now he's starting to divide, right? Okay. And as if there's only two ways that God wants us to be like him. Those two. Oh, you missed the thing here, right? There's two ways that God wants us to be like him. Yeah. Those are the two, right? I said, that's the two. So I was really struck with this text, right, huh? I was mentioning, in fact, that my son Marcus sends me a little letter, right? And he's got a friend there, a Vietnamese guy, right? And that this guy is concerned with the problem of evil, right? I said, and Mary's son wanted me to recommend something to read, right? Well, I know what to recommend because, you know… They're horrible, why not? Yeah, I mean, they're profound things in Thomas, you know, but I don't know any popular things would be good, you know? So I was thinking, what, you know, what can I say besides just rejecting the idea I was suggesting to him? And I said, well, this thing that I found in, you know, human parts, this is where the problem begins, really, right? That God wants us to partake in his, what, causality of the good in others, right, huh? And that's where you can, what, what, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And unless, you know, he allows them to fail, right, huh? In perfect partaking of his causality of good in others, you wouldn't have evil in the world, would you? And so, he has to allow evil, right, in order for us to partake in his, what, so far as we can, right? In his being a cause of good in others, right? So he has to, in a sense, allow that evil, right, huh? Even in the sense that we can imitate him in the sense that… Yeah. One other thing is just thank God for sinners. Yeah. Because then I can forgive. Yeah, yeah. Well, I was thinking, you know, of this thing here. I'd say, why didn't God make all of us like he made Adam, right? That seems like a simple way of doing it all, right, huh? He makes everything. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. But instead, he made everybody descending, you know, his children of Adam, and then children of children, and children of children. I don't know about some grandfather, and I'm not a great-grandfather yet. But now, you wanted us to, what? Share in his… It's good to make another human being, right? To make a human being is good, right? So it's good for God to make Adam, right? And then for Adam to make somebody else, right? And then to partake in being a cause of good to others, right? It's good to get someone else's existence, isn't it? Even to prepare their body for the… Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And yet, given what human beings are and so on, especially after the fall, parents can make many mistakes and all kinds of, you know, some parents are bad in some way and so on. So I thought I'd approach it to this way right now, that there has to be evil in the world if creatures are going to partake in various degrees of what God's ability to cause… They're going to be like God in some way, right, huh? Yeah. Yeah. Spit and nail. Yeah. So he's dying and… He went back to the sacraments and I said, well, why not say something more healthy? Like, he told his father, and his father talked to his brother, he said, can we call the priest? Yeah, why don't you do this? Because when you're dying, your mind changes. You realize, I want to be God. So they called the priest and the priest came and gave him the sacraments. He was happy. He said, he only does it for another week. But before that week was over, he told the priest, I don't want to see a community. Yeah. And Mark was thinking. Yeah. Because you think of, you know, if he's been good all those years, that'd be great. One sooner. I mean, it's like, Mark was ecstatic on it. He just couldn't believe it. It's like Mike Fullerton, the fellow that's here now, his birthday's tomorrow. Mike's… Yeah, we'll have the birthday. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. share in his, and he wants to be like him in teaching others, right, huh? Which is a good thing, but given that our, what, we don't partake too well, the teacher that God is, then we're going to even make mistakes, right, huh? And error is an evil, right, huh? It's time to say, you know, that error is a magna pars miseria. God wanted us to partake of those two things in him, though, unequally, right? Unfortunately. You know? I think it would push me that way, you know, huh? It is, because I don't know if any book, you know, they want to say, you know. Is there a passage in Augustine or something, maybe? I don't know. I mean, with Thomas' commentary on the, I have the Leonine edition of Thomas' commentary on the joke, right, huh? And this is kind of the main thing, you know, the way Thomas explains the order of the books in the Old Testament. The chief argument against God is evil, right? Evil, right? And so Job is about that, right, huh? I mean, Job, you know, makes clear, you know, that you're not going to understand in particular why he allows. I should say that, you know, in my experience as a college professor, right, huh? You've got these students coming into college and sometimes even the same subject or the same courses, right, are taught to another one professor, right? So you get the right professor, you're going to make progress and learn some truth, you know. If you get the wrong professor, you're going to get screwy ideas and professors are, you know, crazy things going on in universities, as you know. But you don't see in particular, you know, the way in Job there, you know, it's kind of presumptuous, you know, to see why God allowed this bad thing to happen to this person, but not to that person, you know. Yeah, when you wonder why not to that one, because that's when human's mouth. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I guess when you say that, yeah, I don't want to be mistaken, you know, I don't judge these things, right, huh? But, you know, I actually did a picture of Kiseric, you know, and Brother Richard made sure that Kiseric was my advisor, you know, and he had me meet Kiseric in the summer, me and Warren, the two of us meet Kiseric for a, you know, follow the talk, you know. And, well, I mean, I think he didn't have the advantage that I did, you know. And Kiseric had given up philosophy because of the bad teaching, you know, he'd had and so on. And then he heard about or met Deconic some way and decided to give him a chance with Deconic because he read about himself. And he was a tough, he was older at the time, he told Deconic, you know, if you teach them how to tell them in the States, I get up in legal class right away. He told Deconic, he's the great Deconic, and the guy's just fine, you know. And then you could see how devoted he was to Deconic, you know. Deconic would come down. And I remember Deconic would speak, you know, he'd speak at the college, and he'd speak at the consortium of the colleges, and he'd speak at the St. Paul Seminary, you know. I remember at the St. Paul Seminary one time because there's something, you know, some problem with the speaker. I mean, the thing, and Kiseric jumps out of the land and runs up like a slave boy, you know, and adjust the thing for Deconic and a little bit, you know, to make sure that the speaker's okay, something like that. You could say respect to the man, you know, Kiseric's a tough guy. I mean, I realized that, and there were some questions that he couldn't answer with mine. He'd say, you know, when Deconic comes down, ask Deconic, you know. Deconic would be very clearly, you know. You see Deconic's excellence there, you know. But why has God got all these bad teachers, you know, all these crazy things, you know. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, move us, God, to know and love you. Help us, God, to know and love you. Guarding angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our bridges, and arouse us to be more correct. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand what you were to know. Okay, we were on page, what, five, I guess? A couple of texts here where Thomas is explaining a little distinction. Distinction of relatives, secundum est, secundum what? Dici, right? Now there's another distinction between real and what? Relations of reason, right? And Thomas says don't confuse these two, right? Okay. Okay. But we've talked here about, already, I think, the distinction of, relative to either secundum est and secundum dici. But what is that distinction? You know? You know, Latin is such an abstract language, you know? My two, two of my great teachers at Laval there, whose native language was French, right? Father Yasmin Boulet, and Monsieur Dion, they both thought that English was better for poetry than French's, right? And they both thought that English was better for philosophy than French. You know? So Perkis said that, you say, we didn't know French that well. You know? These guys, their native language is French, right? You know? And Monsignor used to compare, you know, English is to French a bit, but Greek is to Latin. Latin is kind of more abstract than Greek. Better, huh? But anyway. Relatira secundum est and secundum dici, right? What's the difference, huh? And what's it got to do with this chapter on relation? In an essay, we have something that is not a relationship, but it's some implied relationship. Yeah, yeah. The relative secundum est is one whose whole nature, right? It's being in the sense of nature, right? A human being, right? You dump the nature of the thing. Something whose whole nature is to be towards something, right? It's nothing in itself. So I'm going to give you a double, right? Yeah, yeah. In itself, it's nothing, is it? How much is a double? You know? It could be something very, very small, right? You know? These things could be divided, right? I'm going to give you a double helping of pie, right? A double what? Maybe it's the half of a half of a half of a half of a half. Because you've got to double it all the way down, right? You know? Respond to those things, huh? So that's what the genus, the highest genus of towards something, right? Which is something called relation, but towards something is more the real nature, right? It's nothing in itself, but only towards, say what? A double and half, right? Why a relation secundum dichi is kind of what Plato was saying, right? Whatever is said to be of another, right? But it's something that is said to be of another, but fundamentally it's something other than a relation, huh? Or it has relation following upon it, right? Now, the example of knowledges was the kind of one that often is given there, right? Because knowledge is knowledge of something, right? So it seems to be relative to something else, right? But is knowledge fundamentally a relation, nothing in itself? Now it's, I'm able to teach because I have students. Well, I guess students are supposed to do some teaching, right? But it's fundamentally because you have students that you can teach? Or is it fundamentally you can teach because you know something? It's really a quality, right, huh? But it has a student-like relation to something that you know, right, huh? Okay? Now, this is the reason why Aristotle apparently changes the order, right? Of talking about these things, right? Because when he first enumerates the highest genera of being, right? That's what the categories are, right? The genera that are only genera, not species, right? When he first distinguishes them, he gives substance first, then quantity or how much, size, then quality, and then relation, right? Well, he takes them up in particular now, first substance like he did, and then chapter six, he'd take up quantity. I'd expect quality and Aristotle obviously got mixed up there and he gave relation next, right? Yeah, yeah. And why did he do that, see? Well, because there was a very much accepted definition of relation, right? It had some truth to it, right? But it's mixing up, right? Something that is fundamentally equality and has only a relative as a consequence of what it is, right? And so they're mixing up, to use the Latin term, the relative secundum dici, with the… Yeah, he was defining Plato in a sense, the relative secundum dici. Well, we want the genera of being, right? What kind of a being is, you know, a relation that's unique, right? Well, it's just towards another, right? Nothing in itself, right? And it's important to know later on when you talk about whether the relation is real or not. That's another distinction Aristotle touches upon, but not here in the categories, right? So that's why he takes up relation before quality, right? He wants to clear that up, right? And in the chapter in quality, after he distinguishes, you know, makes known in some way what quality is and distinguishes four different kinds of qualities, right? And at the end of the chapter, he comes back to this thing, right? You know, about things that have kind of relative aspect, right? Now, another example we use at is of power or ability, right? Because we sometimes define power ability as the source of what? Doing something, right? So it's the source or the beginning of something other than itself, right? So I have the ability to see, right? Is my ability to see my seeing? No. But it's a source of the activity of seeing, right? I have the ability to make French fries, right? But is that ability making French fries? No. But it's a source, a beginning, right? It wasn't a beginning, kind of a relative thing, right? But is power or ability basically something of another or is it something in itself? It's like in my muscles, in my mind or something, right? And so ability would be relative secundum dici in that Latin lingo, right? But it'd be put fundamentally in quality. It would be the second species of what? Quality, right? Yeah. So I think I mentioned before tonight how Thomas, you know, when he talks about God, he sometimes quotes what the great Boethius says, right? There are two of the ten categories that we find in God. There's something like them, you know? And that, strictly speaking, God is not in the genus, right? And what two categories are they? Substance and creation, right? When you get into the Trinity, right? The Father and the Son, and so on. And so, I was mentioning last time, wasn't I? How when you get into the Father is generating the Son, right? God from God, light from light, true God from true God. Begottes, not me! Like, what was the Father able to generate the Son? Was it by his substance, or was it by his fatherhood, huh? Well, if you say it was by his fatherhood, right, they generate the Son, which makes some sense. The Father generates the Son, right? You get into a certain problem, right, huh? Because every agent makes something like itself, right? It just rises up like itself. And so, does the Father communicate his fatherhood, or his fatherliness, to the Son? It sounds kind of heretical to me, huh? We have two fathers in the Trinity, yeah. It's as bad as having two sons, right? Yeah, probably. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But now, if you say that, um, what does the Son have in common with the Father? Well, he's God, right? So, it must be by his divine nature that he generated the Son, huh? That could arise to a problem. So, you might say, well, if the Father generated the Son by his divine nature, and the Son has that same divine nature, numerically the same, in fact, then can't he generate a Son, too? Well, maybe it's not a complete statement of what the Father generated the Son, but it's fundamentally by the divine nature, as it is in the, what, Father, as it's the same as the Father, right? And that's why the Son can't generate, right? So, but fundamentally, his ability to generate the Son is the divine nature, and not his, what, fatherhood, right? It's by that, right? And, of course, Thomas refers to what Aristotle does, right? He puts power in quality, right? But not in, what, relation, right? It's fundamentally something absolute, right? Rather than towards another, right? Kind of very subtle, right? But it's kind of amazing, you know, kind of the study of God is kind of the last thing we know, really, especially in philosophy, it's the last thing we know. And maybe the last thing is really the Trinity, right? Because Thomas takes up the unity of God, right? His divine nature and his operations and so on, before it takes up the Trinity, right? And here, you're going back to the categories, right? Which is kind of the beginning of logic, which is the beginning of philosophy, right? The order of learning, right? You realize the importance of the categories, right? And what's this other distinction now? But it's touched upon here, but Aristotle doesn't go into it in this particular chapter, right? He just considers that distinction between what the Latins call relativus secundum dici and secundum esse, right? But some relativus are, what, secundum esse, right, huh? Which are not real. So what was that, right? And some are relativus secundum dici, which nevertheless imply real relations. Yes, it's clear about sense and sense, science and sense. So he says, things are said to be relativus secundum esse, when the names are placed upon them to signify the relations themselves, right? But relativus secundum dici, when the names are placed upon them to signify in qualities, or something of this sort, principally or chiefly, right, huh? To which nevertheless there follow certain, what, relations, right, huh? It's a little different there in the case of the father generating the son, right? You're talking about a relation that falls upon having the divine nature, right, huh? And what you are talking about, it's chiefly by his divine nature that he generates another one who has a divine nature, right? But it's that divine nature insofar as it's in the, what, father, right? So I was talking there before class there a little bit about how Thomas says, you know, that the father is the same as the divine nature. There's no distinction between the father and the son, no real distinction. There's a distinction of reason, right? There's no real distinction. It's the same thing. And the father and the divine nature of the son, same thing. There's no real, what, distinction, not two different things. There's a distinction of reason, right? There's no real distinction. And then between them and the Holy Spirit, right, huh? He says, is the way of the divine nature being in the father and in the son and in the Holy Spirit the same? Well, they have the same divine nature, numerically, right? It's not just that you and I have the same, you know, in species, right, human nature. But they have the same nature, numerically one, right? And they're all equally God. One is not more God than another. So, um, do they all have the divine nature in the same way then? Once those relations are going to make it a little bit different in the way they have it. So he says, the father has the divine nature, not from another. The son has the divine nature from the father. That's what we say in the Creed, don't we? God from God, light from light, true God from God. You've got the, not me again. It's not an effect, right? What was it, is it Bezos scandalized when he spoke of the father as being the, the idea, you know, the son? Yeah, yeah, yeah, he didn't mean that, but it's, you know, Thomas is very clear to distinguish between what? You can call the father the beginning of the son because the son proceeds from it, right? God from God, light from light. But not really, what, cause, because then we wouldn't have the same being, we wouldn't have the same nature. And so that's kind of like, you know, you should have stood there a little bit more there, Bezos, you know? It's kind of scary for us to tell you, you know, can you realize that Bezos is a really great mind, right? But then how is the Holy, how is God's divine nature in the Holy Spirit differently than in the Father and the Son, right? Well, I think if you said that he's in the Holy Spirit from the Father too, period, I think you're going to get in trouble, right? Then there'd be no distinction between the, what? Between the Son and the Holy Spirit. Between the Son. Yeah. And therefore, you have to say that the divine nature is in the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, right? It recedes in their mutual love, right? That's kind of interesting distinction, you know? A little indice, you know? The Church Father says, and they stutter when they speak of the eternity, right? It's a beautiful, beautiful use of the word stutter, isn't it? Because it's the mind stuttering, right? Unnecessarily the words, I suppose you could stutter with the words, you know, too, but it takes a long time to state these things correctly, right? Now, what is the second distinction, you know, which is not in the category, so it's kind of a bonitatum doctrinae, right, huh? But because of the words, you might say, you know, real distinction, distinction of reasons, and real distinction the same as secundum esse. No, see? For a relation to be a real relation, it's got to have something besides the relation. And in the case of God, that other thing is the divine substance, which is the same as these relations. But in order for relations that we creatures have, right, then we have to have, what, something else that's the cause of this, right? So I'm a father because I generated a son, right? Or I'm a teacher because I taught a student or something, right? You know, but I say, you know, this is the right side of the glass and this is the left side of the glass. Why do I say that? Yeah, because there's really something in the glass. Does the glass really have a right side and a left side? I drink tea a lot, but the mug, the handle is on the right side of the mug, right? Confusing. That's not a real right or left, right? But I'm right-handed. There's no basis for right to left to me, you know. So, some relations are only of a reason, and Aristotle was the first man to point this out. He speaks of knowledge that's really related to the known, but the known is not really what it is. If I have a window peeker, I'm looking at my neighbor's house. If they don't know I'm looking at him, right? I didn't think really, is there any real relation of them to me? See, the real relation of me to them, right? But, you know, to me, to the known, right? There's really a relation the other way. But our mind can't really think of one thing being towards the other without, you know, turn around, it's fair game, and so on. But then you have a relation of reason, right? What about that first sense of before and after, right? Which is time, right, huh? Is today before tomorrow? Well, yeah, I'd say that, right? That's pretty smart. I'd say today is after yesterday, if my grandchildren ask me. And it's before tomorrow, right, huh? Is that a real relation? Yeah? Tomorrow doesn't exist either, right? So these are relations about reason, huh? Yeah? It's shocking the reason, you know, looks before and after, and the first sense of before and after is in time, right? Like it's, what a weak little son of a guy, right? So that's a very difficult thing to get in, right? But you could say, though, that is it before, kind of, is it something fundamentally, or is it its whole nature, if you want to use that, to be towards another, right? Is before a relation secundum dichi or secundum esse? Yeah, any sense of before, yeah. Well, I would say this part of the table is before this part of the table. Yeah. See, it might, it didn't seem to be something absolute in itself, does it before, I don't know. But this is a very difficult thing, right, huh? And it's not really necessary for understanding the categories, because he's just giving out one distinction, right? In other places, he, Aristotle touches upon this, and Thomas would touch upon this, right? So it's very important when you come to talk about what, the relation of father and son, right, huh? Because the heretic, right, was it Sibelius, right? And he said, well, same, same guy is, is called father, son. He's called father insofar as he created us or something, and he's called son insofar as he became a man or something. And, yeah, yeah, that's another kind of relation of reason, right? What kind of? Yeah, yeah, yeah, but, um... You mean this whole doctrine is about relation and reason, isn't it? About logic? Doesn't it have a lot to do with it? Yeah, yeah, logic is about relation and reason, yeah, yeah. And, uh, so it's interesting, we need those ones, you know, so we try to define something. If I'm going to define a square, you know, say, well, let's get his genus first, right? You know, when I was teaching, uh, Shakespeare's, uh, education to use reason, right, huh? I'd say to the students, you know, that, uh, he's teaching us, among other things, what reason is, right? And you've got to kind of see that you've got to start with the genus of what a something is, right? Which is that it's a, what, an ability, right? Okay. And you can figure out that you've got to define an ability in particular by what it's an ability for, right? And then you say, well, okay, well, he's saying it's an ability for a large discourse, looking before and after, right? But, uh, you know, if you ask somebody, what is a square, they probably could have a little, have to stop to think, you know? The first thing you want to see about a square, maybe, is that it's a plane figure or a rectilineal plane figure, or maybe you could start closer, quadrilateral, right? And then you've got to add these, what, differences, right? So I ask my students, well, it's an odd number, it's an even number, and I think most of them know that. They say, what's a perfect number? It's a number to begin with. A number, you know that. Yeah, yeah. And then you've got to find the differences, right? A number which is equal to everything that measures it. It measures it evenly, so I want to help them a little bit. Yeah, yeah. So four is measured by one and two, but not by, what, three. And one and two don't add up to four, right? But six is measured by one and by two and by three, but not by four or five. And lo and behold, one plus two plus three equals what? Six. Yeah. And the second perfect number, I remember, is 28, right? Just to accept the consideration and perfection of God. So how did you do this? Can you define them generally speaking words? Well, I think it's probably equivocal by reason, right? So, well, you can speak about relation in a sense, right? But the categories are concerned with the highest genre of what? Of being, right? Now, if you look at Aristotle in the book about being, which is metaphysics, right? Metaphysics, the subject of metaphysics is being in one, right? And so when he gets to the fifth book, he's already pointed out that being is equivocal, right? The word being, right? And then he distinguishes being into being, what, per se, and being gratidants, right? And he talks about accidental being, in that sense, not as accidental as to pose a substance, but as opposed to per se, something like a white logician, right? Or a Christian geometer. I'm not a Christian geometer, right? Is that really something, to be a Christian geometer or a Christian logician? And apparently Porphyry attacked the church, I guess, and the Christians, you know? So, and so Augustinean kind of speculates as to why he had this pride, you know? But I'm following Porphy, you know, and I said go gay, and Kajetan has got his commentary on I said go gay, and Thomas is always referring to the I said go gay, even in the, you know, very advanced places. So, you don't have to be a Christian to be a logician, right? And you can be a Christian without being a logician, right? You can be a logician, not being a Christian. But is a Christian logician really some kind of logician? It's a better logician. Not necessarily. I know a lot of... It's not unnecessary. Her style is the father of logic, right? You know, there's no Christian that's the father of logic, right? So don't you think there's a Christian mathematics? As far as I know, Euclid was not a Christian.