Logic (2016)
Lecture 14: Order, Beauty, and the Distinction of Being

Transcript
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Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's why you have a hierarchy, which comes, I guess, from the angels, right? But, you know, you have kind of an imitation of the hierarchy of the angels, you know, in the church, huh? So you realize what a beautiful thing the order is, right? I was talking earlier about how Thomas, he takes up the names of the Holy Spirit and the names of the Son, right? Why does he have Imago, image last, and gift last, right? He's looking before and after, Thomas, he does that, right? It's a question of order, right? He's seeing two orders, right? He's seeing that love has a notion of the first gift, right? Everything else you give somebody, you give because you love them. So the first gift has to be love. But that's why love is given as a name to the Holy Spirit before he takes up the name. Yeah, beautiful, huh? And then I was thinking about my first, yeah? I wanted to ask you, with regard to essentially this gift, a lot of participation in God's causality by different levels of it, for example for material creatures procreation and, but were there the other senses in addition to the procreation such as the higher angels teaching the lower angels? Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's ordered all the way down, right? From highest angels, right? And the angel illumines the angel right below him, right? Because he's more proportional to him, right? You know, gravity is the sole width. So the wiser the angel is, the more he knows the fewer thoughts, but you have to divide them for the dummies below you, right? Yeah. It's marvelous things, huh? But then I was thinking of what my friend William Shakespeare was saying, right? The culmination of his definition of reason is that it looks before and after, right? Now, if you're looking before and after you're looking for order, right? And if you find order, then your mind is going to be, what? Pleased, right? That you're looking for order. You see some kind of an order, right? Pleases the mind when seeing it. See, all the things tied up, right? You know, I was reading the text of Aristotle in the 13th book of physics where he gives orders the first form of beautiful. And then Thomas where he's talking about something else, but he talked about God wanted there to be the beauty of the order causes, right? Which there couldn't be unless you shared causality with them, right? And then, I mean, Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? They all fit together, right? That's the culmination of the definition that reason looks before and after, right? That's what he wants, right? I mean, you can, you know, divide it up for you, you know, and say, doesn't reason want to know why? But it's looking for the order of cause and effect, right? Who really is better, Correlli or Vivaldi, right? Well, finally, Warren admitted that Correlli's concertos are better than Vivaldi's. In a qualified sense, at least. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But he had a reading in front, right? That he, you know, he, you know, for all his glory on so many of the mass, the beautiful things, you know? But you tend to look and see which is the best, right? People are always asking me, what is Shakespeare's best play, you know? I don't mean presumptuous, right? I used to kid Warren Murray, you know. He was saying that Shakespeare is greater than Homer, you know, and I said, that's awful. Presumptuous, isn't it, right? So he qualified it, he said, Well, you know, huh? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So we're going to look at quality today, huh? It was a Tuesday night there. I was looking with my students at the beginning of the second book on the soul, right? Aristotle has the brevity of wisdom, right? He's starting to approach the definition of soul. He says, substance is one genus of being. He goes on. Thomas, he says, Aristotle is going to define the soul. He makes a beautiful comparison between the definition of the soul and the definition of an accident. What is he doing, you know? Why is he making this comparison? Well, an accident has to be defined in reference to something other than itself. It's something of another, right? So sometimes they kind of define quantity as the size of substance, right? Well, quantity is not the same thing as substance, is it? But something of substance, right? It's the size, huh? The measure of substance, right? Sometimes they say quality is what? The disposition of substance, right? So you have to define an accident by what it is of, right? If you're going to define what is health, right? Daddy, what's health, you know? Well, it's a good condition of the body. Okay? Kind of a, to define it. But you're defining it as something of the body, right? And it's not a body. Yeah. Well now, why is the definition of soul going to be like the definition of an accident? Because the soul is not in the genus of what? Quantity or quality or any other accident. Why is that? The form of something. Yeah. Yeah. And Aristotle will say, you know, that the soul seems to be in the genus of substance, right? But then he has a second division. He divides material substance into what? Matter and form. And then the what? Composition of the two, right? So the soul is going to be the form of a body, right? So Aristotle has three divisions on the side of the soul itself. And then some divisions on the side of the what? Body, which it is the form, right? Beautiful comparison, right? But the first division, he says, Aristotle, is talking about the what? Distinction of what? What is being distinguished mainly in the book called Categories? What are you distinguishing? Yeah. I usually call it the highest genre, right? But Thomas says, like following Aristotle there in the text, where he says substance is one genus of being, right? So what are you distinguishing here in these ten? See, being is not a genus, right? Because a genus is said with one meaning, of any things other than kind, signifying what it is. But being is not said of these things with one meaning, right? But you are distinguishing the what? Genera of being, right? That's the way Thomas describes it, huh? He says, Stink, you don't have my friends come? He's excited to hear about something. He didn't know he was a substance. He considers himself a dog of substance. Well, this is a very, you want to talk about order, right? This distinction is, where does it belong in the order of distinctions? Seems almost, doesn't it? Very high. It's very high, right? And if you're interested in going into what's under these genera, you can go to all the different parts of what? Philosophy, right? Like for example, under quantity, you're going to see the distinction between what? Discrete quantity, right? And what? Continuous quantity, right? And then under discrete quantity, you'll get what? Number and speech, right? And then, where do you study number? Well, in mathematical philosophy, but in particular in arithmetic, right? Arithmetic, huh? Reasoned out knowledge of numbers, huh? But continuous quantity, you'll get that over in what? Geometry, right? But you put place and time with line and angle and surface and solid, right? And where do you take up place and time? Natural hearing, fourth book of the physics, right? When I was at Laval there, they kind of would give a course on the first or the second book of natural hearing, the physics, as we call it. It was so clear, you know, we used to call it the physics, but the actual title is natural hearing, right? He gave a course on the first or the second book for the first-year students, right? So if you were there for another one year, you'd sit in and get the first two books, right? But then he'd give a more advanced course for the older students, one of the later books. When he got to the fourth book there, he would give one course, a whole semester in place. And then another, you know, course, another year, another semester, a whole course on what? Time, yeah? At the end of time, there is definitely eternity, right? You have to go to arithmetic and geometry, right? And natural philosophy, take up those particular, what, species or discrete quantity or continuous quantity. Maybe you can go to the book on the poetic art to hear about meter and so on, right, and poetry, huh? I told you my mnemonic device, right, huh? Add it in the most common forms. But if you want to know about substance, right, where would you go? Well, if you want to know about material substances, you'd go to, what, natural philosophy, right, huh? But if you want to know substances in general, right, even in material substances, you've got to go to, what, first philosophy, right? To wisdom, huh? To wisdom, huh? Well, these are all different sciences, different parts of philosophy, right? And you can't, you can realize how universal this is, right, huh? Now, later on, we'll get into, what, qualities, right, huh? And one kind of quality would be habit or disposition, right? And the place where I meet habits the most is in ethics. I was asking my students last night. And, but where do you find the abilities or powers, huh? The animal, yeah, the powers of the soul, right, huh? And where do you get shape and those things, huh? Go back to geometry, right? So you see how, how this is higher, right, huh? You know? So I was saying to myself, is this the first division or not? The first distinction, I mean? The distinction of the, the genera of being or the genera of what if, what is? It means what is there, right? This is something very universal, right? It's funny, you know, when Aristotle was going to define the soul, he says, we're going to first define the koinitapitas, the most common definition, right? That covers the plant soul and the animal soul and the human soul, right? And then you take up each kinds of powers and you'll realize what's peculiar to the plant soul, where it stops, you might say. And then what the animal soul has in addition to that, and then what the human soul has, more, right? There's two of them in that order, right? So, let me see, is this the most universal? The most universal? The most universal? Is this the first distinction? What do you think? Our mind starts off with being confused as Aristotle. It brings out in the premium to the eight books of natural hearing, huh? And those things in a confused way, right? I know I had this painting of Canaletto, painting of Canales there in Venice, right? And I put it up on my wall there and I was a bachelor, you know, blank wall. So I have a little bit of... One day I'd gone from one side of the room to the other side of the room and I said, Hey, just notice something, you know? You're way over here, looking over there, and you're looking straight down the canal, and you can go over that side, and you're looking that way towards the painting, and you're still looking straight down the canal. That's interesting. What kind of ouch did I have in the painting before I saw that? I confused ouch, right, huh? You sting the parts, right, huh? Okay. So sometimes you see somebody in the art museum there, you know, and you walk through there, and you've got these kind of chairs or benches or whatever you call them, and see somebody just standing there, sitting there, you know, looking, you know, at the painting, you know? But you start to see more as you go on, right, huh? I told you that thing about Mozart's Jupiter Symphony. My friend warned me, I said, What do you... I said, How much I like the Jupiter Symphony? He says, You know what he does there in the last movement? And I said, Kind of. It combines all five melodies together. He does? What kind of ouch did I have in the Jupiter Symphony? Yeah. But Saristow gives that kind of example, right, huh? I like your salad dressing, huh? What do you use in your salad dressing, you know? I told you that story of my brother Mark going into the wine place there in California, and it used to be, Paul said, to have these names like Burgundy, you know, not to mean Burgundy wine, but just a combination of red wines, right? And everybody had their own, what, ratios and so on, their own combination of what they had and what they thought tasted good together. And my brother Mark was tasting one of them and said, What do you use in this? And the guy said, I think I'm stupid. I'm telling you what we use in this, you know? So my brother was tasting one of them, and he started telling the guy I wanted to know what he had in there. The guy says, Come out in the back room here and taste these combinations, he'll show you what he's the best. He said, this guy knows what he's doing, you know? But maybe Mark couldn't do it when he first went out to California, right? And I couldn't do it now, because I did wine quite frankly. And what kind of ouch do you have of the wine then? Yeah. Yeah. I'm putting out a lot of these wines here from Italy now that are, you know, the famous Chiantis. But San Gervais, maybe 90%, and there's 10% carboné sauvignon thrown in. And that's as if I can . I think I'm confused still, right? I'm not sure if I hear everything . Buy another bottle to try it. Yeah. Yeah. So, he gives the example of the child calling all men father and all women mother. They distinguish, right? And I told you I was watching my children one day. They were watching some woman go into a house across the street and they say, Oh, look at that mother! Well, it may or may not have been a mother, right? But they don't have a distinct knowledge of what a mother is yet, right? Confused knowledge, you know? Sometimes you find a child calling a cat a dog or something, you know? A little man with these. So, we go from the confused to the distinct, right? What's the first distinction we meet? Is it the distinction of the genera of being? I mean, being is pretty universal, isn't it? Everything that is in any way whatsoever is a being, right? You know? So, here you're distinguishing the genera of being. It's a very universal distinction. Is it the first one? Yeah. Now, you see, when Aristotle takes up being as such, right? In wisdom, he distinguishes it to an accidental being, right? In a different sense now than accident here. If you say that I am a, what? Christian geometer, right? That's an example of what? Yeah. And Aristotle would say, Is there any way of becoming a Christian geometer? Well, he would if he was here, right? There's a way of becoming a geometer, right? Which is to buy Euclid's elements and read them carefully, right? Think about them. There's a way of becoming a Christian, which is to get baptized and so on, right? Believing and so on. Is there any way to become a Christian geometer? Is that anything? You could say in some way that, you know, I really am a Christian geometer, aren't I? Or, I am a philosophical grandfather. Is there any way to become a philosophical grandfather? Is there any way to become a philosopher, right? Is there any way to become a grandfather, right? Is there any way to become a philosophical grandfather? So here seems to be a distinction before, what? This distinction, right? Distinction between being per se and being, what? Per accident. And then he gives two distinctions of being, what? Per se. One is according to the figures of predication is the way we distinguish these things. But you could also say it's a distinction of the, what? The genera of being, right? And then the other distinction he gives is into being an ability and being an act, right? Now, is that a distinction of the genera of being? Or what is it a distinction of? Or would you say it's a distinction of? It's a distinction of. You brought it up, father. That's good that you did. But what is the distinction of? Well, that's, they'd say different senses of being, too. Okay. Kind of together with that. You have a confused knowledge of senses of being. The senses mean like meanings, right? They probably say in Latin how modes of being, right? But I think in English we'd say two ways of being, right? Being an act and being in what? Ability. In some way this seems to be more universal even than this. Because in any genus you can speak of ability and what? An act, yeah. Ammanus kind of struck how Aristotle in the 14 books of wisdom there, the metaphysics so-called, he takes up the distinction of being according to the figures of predication and mainly a consideration of substance because that's being in the fullest sense before he takes up the, what, distinction of being by being an ability and an act, right? So in books 7 and 8, right, of the 14 books of wisdom, he singles out the consideration of substance, right? But in the 7th book he leads you from, what, logic, right, into it, right? And then in the 9th, 8th book he leads you in from, what, natural philosophy. So you talk about matter and form and that sort of thing, right? And then in the 9th book, which comes after his 7 and 8, of course, he talks about ability and act, right? That seems to be more, what, universal. And even a God, right, huh? Who's a being, huh? He said, I am who I am, right? I think he qualifies as a being. He's more real than we are, right? Sometimes the scriptures speak as if we're nothing compared to God. But when we think of the simplicity of God, one thing we showed is that God is not a unique. He's more real. but yet he comes under act. I was talking about my great excitement in following this middle term of God being pure act, right? You can show from him being pure act that he's infinite, that he's altogether perfect, that he's altogether simple, right? Bang, bang, with this one middle term. But you can speak of act, right? You can even speak of ability if you take act of ability, right? In God, huh? Father is said to be almighty, right? God is almighty, all powerful. So I mean this seems to be even taking God in some way, right? Getting taken God? You can't put God in one of these genera, huh? Gena. So is that the first distinction? Why does Aristotle take up this one here before that, huh? We should leave that question until I study the first philosophy. And even the consideration of substance in 7 and 8, he takes it out from logic first and then from what? Philosophy, huh? Of course this distinction here is by the figures of predication, right? It's from something logical, right? Nice subtle guy like Aristotle, right, huh? The teacher De Connick said he'd been teaching the books of natural hearing from the 1930s, right? He never went through them again to lecture on them, and that he didn't see something he didn't see before, right? And we heard that when he and the Prima Pars now, and I said, gee whiz. Did I really see that the last time? Am I just reviewing what I already know, or am I seeing something I didn't see, huh? But, you know, as my teacher Caseric said, you know, compared to Aristotle, I've got the brain of an angleworm, right? And these guys, wise men, they say more in a, what, few words, huh? We dummies there, we say, not very much in a lot of words, huh? Amazing things, huh? So what's the first distinction? Is it being an act and being an ability? I mean, if you get that by dividing, let's say, substance into matter and form and things like that, right? Even though things in a confused way before I know them distinctly, you may be puzzling, right, huh? But then there's another thing that comes up, you know, I'm kind of amazed with these guys, Plato and Aristotle. One of my teachers was Albert the Great, and he said, to be a complete philosopher, you've got no Plato and Aristotle. And Thomas says, Plato and Aristotle are the chief philosophers, the philosophie particularly, you know, the chief one, you know. That's it. And both Plato and Aristotle said that there's the same knowledge of what? Yeah. What's the opposite of being? Yeah. And that's one main way of distinguishing things, right, is by opposites, right? He's going to distinguish discrete and continuous quantity by what kind of opposition. He's going to say that in a continuous quantity, the parts meet at a common boundary, like parts of a line meet at a what? Point. Point. And like in a circle, if you divide into two semicircles, right, they meet at a what? Line. The parts of a body at a surface, right? And the past and the future meet at the now, and so on. Why discrete quantity is one that what? Yeah. Yeah. It's an opposition of contradiction, right? Yeah. Parts have a common boundary, parts do not have a common boundary. So the number seven, does the two and the five meet, or the three and the four meet? No. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So being, what's the contradiction of being? None being, right? Yeah. Yeah. That's why Shakespeare says it, right, huh? To be or not to be, right? But when Aristotle takes up, what is the first statement, right? Something cannot both be and not be at the same time in the same way, right? It's in terms of being and none being, right, huh? Does that distinction come before the distinction of being, you know? Isn't the distinction between being and none being before the distinction of the genera of being? That's why the principle contradiction, right? Even God can't, he can't make some of this contradictory, can he? Can God make the, when I was a little boy, you know, used to be the, the, you know, the Catholics would say, God is all powerful, right? And then the enemies would say, you know, well, can God make a stone so big he couldn't lift it? You know, and then you seem to be caught, right? He said, yes or no, right, huh? He'd say, yes, and then somebody can't do it, Kenneth, that's no. You say no, then somebody can't do it, Kenneth, that's no. You say no, then somebody can't do it, Kenneth, that's no. You know how to answer that, I assume? It's contradiction. Can God make a square circle? There's no such thing. He wouldn't be making anything in a square. Can God make, can God make nothing? Or the distinction between something and what? Nothing, right? And since corresponds almost to the distinction of being, being and non-being, right? And you can see that these are the ten genera of what? The most general kinds of things, right, that can be, right? So, no wonder Boethius, you know, he's really impressed with Aristotle, right? You can see these ten things there. This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, Aristotle distinguishes the species of quantity and then separates quantities by happening or branched ends, right? From those that are quantities as such, right? Or quantities per se, which are in fact the species of quantity. In the second part, he gives three, what, properties of what? Quantity, right? Aristotle distinguishes the species of quantity in two ways. He does so in both by looking at their parts, right? And seeing something they have or do not have, right? Either parts have a common boundary or they do not have a common boundary, right? Either parts have a, what, position with respect, right, to each other or not, huh? He then unfolds each of these ways, huh? Now I raise a little question here. The understanding of quantity in its species is properly done by looking at its parts. Why is that so, huh? For every quantity consists in some multiplication of what? Parts. Now you don't want to take my word for that, right? So let's see what Thomas says here, right? And this is from my favorite book, huh? The Summa Contra Gentiles. Every quantity consists in some multiplication of what? Parts. And an account to this, number is the first of quantities, huh? It doesn't unfold that fully yet, does it, huh? The Summa Contra Gentiles. The Summa Contra Gentiles. The Summa Contra Gentiles. The Summa Contra Gentiles. The Summa Contra Gentiles. The Summa Contra Gentiles. The Summa Contra Gentiles. The Summa Contra Gentiles. The Summa Contra Gentiles. right works no difference neither is there anything right that follows some difference does that make sense to you that every quantity consists in a certain multiplication of parts yeah now in the Greek here Aristotle uses what not the abstract word quantity right but the word what yeah posas right how much how many right and that seems to type of parts doesn't it how much but what else besides parts does it touch upon the words how much how many they're the more concrete more proportion to us than the word quantity right what is it how much well I'll meet this later on some texts here that Aristotle's distinguishing these species of quantities by their measure right what measures them right doesn't how much and how many imply not just a multiplicity of parts but what yeah yeah I mean if I said to you how many chairs are in this room there's a plurality of chairs would I consider my question a good answer right and measure in some ways right yeah you gotta count these chairs right then okay count them by one how many times one is repeated right okay this is how big this this table is right now how big is this table right my wife asked me how big is the table you sit at I can't I can't stretch my arms to the end of it I mentioned how many my first great teacher there Roman concert there you know kind of beat into my mind on the idea that Aristotle's using the concrete terms right now he doesn't use the word relation he uses the words towards something right now and for quantity and for quantity he uses things like how it is right or how much it is or how many and I point out here morbid the first sense of whole and part is is in what quantity and since it's a composed tool so it is natural to distinguish the kinds of quantity by their parts in the fifth book of wisdom Aristotle distinguishes quantity in general from other holes by the parts into which it can be divided it is divided into parts that are in it somewhat in act not fully in act is it not divided in each of which is apt to be something one one and this something right now compare that to the other kind of hole like a universal hole right when I divide animal into dog and cat and horse and elephant are they all actually inside animal yeah yeah they're an animal in what abilities you would say yeah an animal can be a dog or a cat or a horse we could say right but is it any one of these actually color can be red or white or blue or yellow green but yeah are these all in color in general are the pieces of a pie right are they already in some way actually in the pie see one thing they do to a poor guy this first year at west point right he's in a table with upperclassmen right and he's got a you know there's a pie there for dessert and he's got to cut the pie into even pieces right well if it's divided into four pieces it's not too hard to do it right well if you gotta divide it into five pieces even though you might eat the whole pie even for the health and how do you divide pie into five pieces and the other guy was just you know cut the pie yeah but you know the writer you know they're looking for anything they can do to you you know I told you my son followed his first inspection of course he knew he had his hair cut short and he had the bar to do it you know but the guy looked there and he said what are you a hippie or something he wasn't closing out for them you know plus I never solved my life you know you get some guys at west point you know were kind of amused by this uh this uh you know way of finding something wrong with you no matter what when I was in the military academy it wasn't like west point but but uh you know shined my shoes right before inspection right right cause when I looked down he says didn't like my shoes right how many times you sh- you shined them I said three times sir try a dozen if you really know you could find funny you know but most of the time you're kind of you know so scared you know but you know is the universal whole defined by its parts what was the definition of a genius huh if we mean species right so you'll find what it is you know what it is potency right but in the case of the mathematical one it's they're actually in there right in seven aren't there seven ones and actually seven ones in seven and five there's five ones and so on remember the orders of the word in right the first meaning of in was in place huh and the second one was part and whole right and the third was genus in what in species right huh and those were all where the thing was actually in it right and then the fourth sentence was what species in genus and that's ability and then the fifth one was what form in matter right okay originates in matter and ability right and it's like species in genus right so genus is like matter and so on sometimes you get into natural philosophy they'll say really genus in natural philosophy it's got to be the same matter right so if they have any bodies don't have the same matter as the bodies down here they wouldn't be in the same genus huh it's based upon it right species is kind of named from form in uh witness text in the metaphysics here this is for the bonitatum doctrinae right huh you guys are going to be super super wise right when you get down here huh first he lays down the ratio of quantity saying that quantum is said that's a concrete thing what is divisible in those things which are in it right huh you Which he says to the difference of mixed things, right? Because they found in a mixed body, right? Things are existing, what? The elements only in ability, right? Which are not an act in the mixed, but in virtue of what? Only, huh? That's in modern science there, you know, and they get down to the element of the particles and sometimes they'd bombard them, right? See what happens. And you get some particles as a result of that, right? Now, were they actually in there composing that thing before you broke it up, right? Well, you might say that when you got hydrogen and oxygen, right, from water, hydrogen and oxygen seemed to be smaller than water, right? So maybe the water was composed of hydrogen and oxygen, right? What they found in these experiments was that sometimes the particles you got have more mass than the original than the other one. So how can that original particle have been actually composed to ones that have, what, more mass? They must have been there only in, what? I took that conversation now that my friend Warren Murray had with Heisenberg, right, huh? And Warren could speak German now, so that was, I thought Heisenberg could speak English too. I mean, he studied English, but he went to Scotland, but... Warren said, are you a Patonist or Aristotelian? And he was trying to force Heisenberg to say he's more Patonist because Plato was more into the mathematical science of nature, right? And he had to admit that in that way, he was more Patonist, right? But he had this great respect for Aristotle, his understanding of ability, right, potency, right? And so if you look at his Gifford Lectures, right, they put out the title Physics and Philosophy, and it was the Gifford Lectures that he gave in Scotland, right? And see how much he admires Aristotle there, you know? And now Warren would refer to some fragment in the Greek philosophers, and Heisenberg says, Oh, yeah, and he'd give it to him in Greek. So he's no W, Heisenberg, you know. He's a kid, man, really. You see, you'd think that if you get some particles by what, shooting something against this one, right, they must have been composing it, right? But if they actually turn out to have more mass than the original ones, then you kind of have to go with the idea of ability, right, huh? And not say that they're actually in there, right, huh? But in quantity, right? The parts of the pie that we'll be eating, they run. Our actions some way in the pie, right, huh? And you've got to be careful with those West Point guys, right, that you divide the pie evenly, right, huh? You guys, huh? There are six of us. Yeah, that'd be easy to do, yeah, because then you just do. In geometry, you know, they, what, you divide a straight line into equal parts, right, huh? Or you divide an angle into two equal parts, right, huh? You bisect a line or your bisecting. And they seem to have been in there already, right, huh? But not separated fully in act, huh? But in the mixed body, it would be like those things that I was talking about with the Thyssenberg there. There's not only a division of quantity, right? It's necessary that there be some, what, alteration, right, huh? In which the mixed is resolved, right, into its elements. And then he adds again, right, that each one, or each one of them, is apt to be what? Yeah. On the Greek there, that's to the tea, to the tea. But in Latin, it's hoc aliquid, right, huh? Hoc est aliquid demonstratum, right? And Aristotle says, many times in the famous article, what is the soul of man? It's a hoc aliquid, right? Because usually a hoc aliquid, in the full sense, has got a complete substance, right, huh? But because our soul can exist by itself, apart from the body, right, is something of the character of a hoc aliquid, huh? It would be hard to demonstrate it, huh? To point it out. And this, he says, to be moving the division into essential parts, which are, what, matter and form. Neither of which is apt to be something one by itself, huh? But even with the accidental form, right? You take the pietas of Michelangelo there, it's in the Vatican, you've seen that, huh? And you take, it's composed of, what, marble and shape, right? Now, can you put the marble over here and the shape over here? It's a division of the pietas into its matter, which is marble, and its shape, which gets all the credit. You divide into two, and that's the matter, and that's the shape. It's a different kind of division, right, huh? Secondly, he lays down the species of quantity, among which first there are two. Multitude or what? Peralty. Sometimes they define a number as a multitude measured by one, right? Sometimes they define it as a multitude composed of ones, right? And both of them have the notion of quantity insofar as what? The one is able to be numbered and the other is able to be what? Measured, right? Okay. For measurement, property pertains to quantity, right? That's what I was saying about the question, how much or how many, right? Which implies not only a multiplicity of parts, but what? Measurement in some way, right? You don't see any word quantity, do you? That there's a multiplication of parts, huh? So is my teacher, Piseric, right? And banging into my head the fact that Aristotle uses these concrete things, huh? You know what he's doing, that guy, Aristotle, right? I was talking to Warren Murray, who's very good at languages, you know, and I was saying, you know, we don't have one word for how much and how many, right? Like the Greek, there is one word, posas, right? But apparently some languages do, and Warren says, combien, in French, I guess, can be used for both, right? There was one in Greek that could be used for both, right? Give me some other examples, you know, this knowledge of languages, you know, I don't know, I think it's all this knowledge, but... And I was thinking in English myself, the word size, right? It's not the, which is not a noun now, but I mean, could you use size for either discrete or continuous in some cases? I mean, my dad's coming with her whole family, and the size of his family... The size of his family is a magnitude. That's what the most... But you speak of, you know, when we have the March in Life there in Rome, I mean, in Washington, D.C., the size of the march, the size of the crowd in something, you know? The size of Trump's crowd, you know? He's going back to... You hear about Indiana? He's going there. He's going on a trumfled tear to think all it was abode for him, yeah. He was going to Indiana because he stopped this one company from going to Mexico. Yeah, it's already... Over here? Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. And they had people, you know, who were very happy, though, working there, you know? I worked there for 24 years, you know, and he's about to lose his job, you know? So he's very happy, you know? Like I said, I was a dude saying about him, I'm going to shake his hands when he comes. He'd be doing these working men, you know? Companies, the expansion. So the stock market is going up to those. So he's settled down there. Okay. It's supposed to probably much crash Yeah, yeah, yeah. But the first day was some hesitation, and you know, because of the excitement of a gentleman and what he expected on. And then as he started to...