Logic (2016)
Lecture 9: Being, Predication, and the Ten Categories

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of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment. Help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, snooze in the lights of our minds, order in human images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand all that you are written by the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. I got a letter from a philosopher there, and he asked me, you know, is the soul of a man and soul of a woman differ? And so I give a nice text from the Prima Paras, and then from the Summa Pana Gentiles, right? Where Aristotle saying that just as the soul of a man, right, differs from the soul of a dog or a cat, right? So likewise, my soul differs from your soul, right? And it's because, you know, the soul is, what, it fits the body, right? They're like relatives, you know, they're proportional to each other. So the soul of a man couldn't enter into the body of a dog, right? Because the tools would not be the right ones, and one art can't enter another art for a tool. Let's take the example of my wife and my brother-in-law, right? And my brother-in-law would be a carpenter, right? And so he had a hammer and saw, and my wife would have a thread in the, you know, you don't, and he, she, he can't sew together the wood pieces, you know, and, and she can't use a hammer, you know, to put the dress together, you know, so. And so, since the living body is a body composed of tools, right? One kind of soul fits these tools, another one loose ones, right? Okay. But then it makes a comparison, right, huh? That just as, what, my soul, the human soul is to the man's body, right? As the soul of the dog is to the dog's body. So my soul is to my body as your soul is to your body, right? And so that when God created your soul, he did it to fit that body that your mother and father had begun, right? And so there's some difference between your soul and my soul, right? So I couldn't, my soul couldn't be put in your body now and animate your body and put your soul in my body, you know? And, but the first place for Aristotle was attacking, you know, Pythagoras and those who said that, you know, stop being a dog, you know, I recognize so-and-so that my friend who has left his body, this body was now in the body of the dog, right? Aristotle said, that's impossible. Just as you were talking about the soul of the dog and the soul of the human brother-dog came right over. Yeah, oh yeah, he's, yeah. He must be interested in it, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So I, so I said to him, in the letter, I said that the body of the man and the body of the woman differ, right, huh? So the soul of one doesn't fit the soul of the other, right? I mean, the body of the other. And the, now there aren't as much differences as there is between the soul of the man and the dog because the soul of the man has got powers that the dog doesn't have, right? Understanding and reason and will and so on, huh? And that's not the difference between the soul of a man and the soul of a woman. They all have the same powers, right, huh? But there's some difference there, right, huh? He needs to be more individual, right, huh? And I just gave two things, like the woman is by nature more merciful than the man, right? Or the man is by nature more just, huh? And so Mary, who's the, you know, chief woman, at the, she's called the mother of mercy, but not the mother of what? Justice, right? It's her nature, huh? And then I gave the example, I used to always talk about what's the difference between a man and woman with regard to the children, right? Well, the woman sees the children as a kind of, what, fulfillment of herself, right? While the man sees the children as a continuation of himself, huh? Okay? And therefore, the man makes more of the, the so-called selfish mistake, he wants a boy, you know, or something, right? I remember when I went to the, to the hospital, you know, and when our second child was being born, right? And so I was an experienced man, you know, and this kind of young guy was there, you know, where his wife was from the first child, right? And so he, I could, he's a little bit nervous and so on. And so I said, this is my second, they said, what was your first, you know? He said, and I said, this is a boy, huh? You got what you want? And I said, yeah. But you didn't have to have a conversation between girls, right? You know, you know, you know, you know, you know, what was your first, you know, it was a girl. They wouldn't say, you got what you wanted, no. Because she sees it as, as a fulfillment of herself, right? And, uh, while the man sees it more as a continuation of himself, so he can get somebody like Henry the eighth, you know, trying to get a, you know, boy, uh, Offenberg, you know, so he can have a continuation of himself. I know, and I'd be working in my father's factory down there in the summer, and, uh, sometimes my father would come through with a business friend, you know, and so on, and they stop and say, talk a few words to me, now they're working down the factory, you know, and the business friend, my father would say, running it from the ground up, you know? But you kind of assume that the son's going to kind of, you know, succeed the, the, the father, you know, in his occupation, you know, but the woman would be looking for that same sort of thing, you know? But, okay. So you got your page five here, we're going to look at the other text where Thomas divides it, huh? It's, uh, page four. Oh my goodness, huh? Yeah. Yeah. Just so you're not reading the quang, uh, left, right to left. Okay. It's in the fifth book of the metaphysics. Now in the fifth book of the metaphysics, or the fifth book of first philosophy, as Aristotle calls it, huh? The fifth book of wisdom is entirely devoted to what? Names, right? That are equivocal by reason, huh? And names that are used most of all in first philosophy or wisdom, but are also used in the, what, axioms, huh? Like the whole is more than the part, right? The whole and part of words are in the fifth book, right? Something cannot both be and not be at the same time, and so on. Well, but words like being, they have many meanings, huh? But they're equivocal by what? By reason, there's an order among the meanings. Um, so the whole fifth book is taken up with that, huh? Okay. So that's a nice analytical question, you know. Whether it's necessary to understand words equivocal by reason? I was talking to Warren Murray on the phone the other day, and I say, Warren, in reading the modern philosophers, did you ever run across a guy stopping on a word and saying this word is equivocal by reason, and then distinguishing the senses in the order? No. So they don't understand the words they use every day, huh? Because to some extent they're used every day, because they're uncommon. I said, I couldn't find them myself. I couldn't find anything if I missed something. I said, did you ever find one? He says, no. I told you the story when I was in graduate school there. We'd sometimes go to the library and read a doctoral thesis, you know, that there's copies of a doctoral thesis. There's a copy of mine someplace in the library, right? And at that time we were interested in Marxism because of the Cold War and so on. And some guy written a doctoral thesis on Karl Marx, right? Well, the name of Marxism as a philosophy is dialectical materialism. That matter is the beginning of everything, but things develop through the, what, conflict of opposites, right? So opposite is at the very center of Marxist thought, huh? And, but they don't distinguish, Marx never distinguishes the senses of the word opposite. And so this guy, we're having a section there, you know, it's touched upon, you know, distinctions you'll meet here in the post predicaments, right? I mean, this is the key thing. This is not just any word. This is the center thing. Yeah. But they'll use the word contradiction or, you know, is it for, you know, any kind of opposition, right? They never distinguish the senses of word opposite, which is equivocal by reason. And Aristotle will distinguish it here in the fifth book and you'll be here in the post predicaments too, huh? That's kind of a fundamental thing, you know, that they seem to, uh, to miss, right, huh? Yeah. So I say that's a nice thing. Whether it is necessary to understand words equivocal by reason, huh? Well, the axioms are these statements to which, you know, all other statements because they're known to themselves, right? But they're all expressed with words that are equivocal by reason. So you can fail to understand these, huh? Even the axioms. So it's necessary, right? But even the word necessary is what? Equivocal by reason, huh? So you know how I used to... I'll imitate my master there, Aristotle, and say, is it necessary to understand the word necessary? If you say it is, you better understand it, right? If you say it's not necessary, you're going to have to explain why it's not necessary, right? In which case, you're going to have to understand the word necessary, right? So, we find out in the earlier books of the wisdom there that the subject of wisdom is being in one, right? And so, you get to one place there in book five there where he's going to distinguish the, what? He's got the Latin text, the modes of being per se, right? As opposed to, what? Accidental being, right? Like, for example, an example of accidental being is I am a, what? Christian geometer. Is there such a thing as Christian geometry? No. And does Christianity and geometry come together and make something? No. But it's because to be a Christian belongs to me and to be a geometer belongs to me, right? That you can say, for Archidens, right? That I am a Christian geometer. That now you can say I'm a white geometer too, right? That's accidental being, right? So, Aristotle distinguishes accidental being from being per se. And now in this text, of course, Thomas is laying out what Aristotle says here, right? So, he distinguishes the modes of being per se. And about this he does three things. First, he distinguishes being, which is outside the soul, through the datum predicamenta. That's the Latin word for the categories, which is, ends what? Perfectum, right? Secondly, he lays down another way of being, according as it is only in the mind. Well, now, as my dear teacher there, Kasurik said, you know, philosophy is the only subject we can get paid for talking about nothing, he said. And, uh, is nothing something? You can say nothing is nothing, huh? And what does is mean there? Because nothing isn't, is it? So, how can you say nothing? You can say nothing is nothing. Nothing is more true than to say, what? That something is itself, right? So, you can say nothing is nothing, right? What is that is? It's only in the mind, huh? Outside the mind, there's no, what? Being corresponding to nothing, right? When I was a little boy, you know, thinking about that nothing, I said, that's strange, you know? What if there was nothing, you know? Of course, nobody would know that there was nothing. Would nothing be in some way, you know? A little boy had never, you know, had an excited idea, but a sense of being. But it is a strange sense of being, right? Right, to say that nothing isn't. That would be correct, too. But you can't say that nothing is not nothing. If it's not nothing, then it's something, right? And then you'd be in a contradiction, right, huh? That's an odd kind of being, right, huh? That's why my teacher, because he would say, you get paid for talking about nothing, you see? Philosophy is the only subject to get paid for talking about nothing. But suppose I say, you know, the man that the Lord later on cured, right? He's blind, right, huh? Is that a kind of being, to be blind? It's an unbeing of something, right, huh? But yet we speak as if, you know, he's white and he's blind, right, huh? He's young, he's healthy, or whatever he may be, right? But you can say he's blind. It's true, isn't it? The true and falsity are in the mind, huh? It's true to say he's blind. Otherwise, Christ didn't. Strange. Strange kind of being, right? Here's how it's written. He talks about accidental being, and this being that is only in the mind, right, huh? And third, he divides being by, and I usually translate that in English, by potency and act, but I translate it by ability and act, huh? And notice what he says about this division of being into ability and act. And being thus divided, huh? His communiosa, more common than ends perfectum, the division by deitium praedicamenta. So, in every predicament, there's act and ability, huh? And then there are things that aren't in the predicamenta, like God, who's pure act, right? So, it's kind of curious now that in the later books of wisdom, he takes up being, he takes up being according to the figures of predication before he takes up act and ability, going from the less universal up to the more universal, right? It's the opposite of the way natural philosophy goes, from the general to the particular, huh? Strange, huh? Natural philosophy goes from the general to the particular and towards the matter. And wisdom goes from the less universal to the more universal and towards the immaterial. It's just the opposite of these two ways, huh? Proceeding. So, Thomas is really laying out the text, huh? You know, they call Thomas' work sometimes commentary, right? That's what they call it. That doesn't mean, you know, it's like making comments on, right? The technical word they use is exposition, right? But how would you translate exposition? It's the laying out, right? He's laying out the work, right? He's really making it plain, huh? Laying it out, so you can see clearly, right? And plainly what the Aristotle's doing, huh? Okay? Okay, but now I just give you the part where he's going to talk about that first division, right? Which is probably into our study of the categories, huh? He says first, therefore, that those things are said to be secundum se, whatever signifies, signify the figures of, what? Predication, huh? Now, he doesn't elaborate too much upon the Aristotle, he uses the term figure predication, but the word figure, of course, is equivocal by reason, right? And where do you find figure first, in what science? Yeah, geometry, yeah, yeah. And figure is what is contained by a limit, or what? Limits, huh? So remember in the anti-predicaments, you know, we talked about how the higher genus can be set of the one below it, and everything all the way down, right? There's a whole order there, right? And it turns out to be a highest, what, genus here, and a lowest, what, species? It's like a figure, right? But it's contained by a limit or limits, in this case, by limits, right? Very precisely there, as Dada does, huh? Okay. I told you how at the Christmas time, at Laval there, when they'd have a little Christmas party, right? And this one guy, a friend of my brother Marcus's, he was very good at impersonating the professors with, every professor got a little oasis speaking, you know, they're kind of quirked, you know? So, and so he'd come and he'd start, you know, and everybody recognized what professor he is, right? But they would, you know, do little funny things, and they would give the logic professor, you know, a tree of porphyry, right? Because that's the way it is, right? It has a kind of a shape, right? Because you divide the genus into species, and then those species, they have species below them into more, so it spreads out like a Christmas tree does, you know, rather than some other kind of tree, right? So they'd give up the tree of porphyry, but they used to call it, you know, even, you know, in the Latin, they had lines drawn, you know, like that, they call it the tree of porphyry, you know, because it looks like a tree a little bit, so. It's very concrete that Aristotle used the word figure as a predication. Now he says, it ought to be known, huh? That being, what ends, that's the word for being, is not able to be contracted, huh? To something more, what? Determined, huh? More particular. In the way that a genus is contracted to a species by differences, huh? Why can't you say that, you know, being is a genus, and then you have some differences, and you get some species of it, right? Everything's under one big genus, and so on, right? Well. Well. Well. Well. What is there about genus and species and differences that doesn't allow you to do that with being, right? Well, he points out something from what we know from Porphyry and from Aristotle. For a difference does not partake of the genus. It is outside the essence of the genus. So if you define man, say, as a two-footed animal or something like that, is animal in the definition of two-footed? To have two feet is to be an animal? That's a two-footed animal. Or is animal in the definition of reason? Man is a rational animal. But can you divide being by something that is not a being? Can you divide it by nothing? So being is said of everything that is in any way whatsoever, right? So it's impossible to contract being like a genus is contracted by its differences to its species. You can say the same thing about others said of all, as I call them, right? Take the word something, right? Well, everything is something, right? So if you know the difference between something and nothing, you know everything, I told them, right? Oh, God, go home and tell my father that. But could you divide something by nothing? You have to divide something by something, right? And that's not what a genus and a difference do, right? The difference is something else, right? The genus signifies what a thing is, and the difference signifies how it is what it is, right? But not what it is. So Thomas is stopping there and laying out the text there, that being cannot be contracted to something more particular or determined in the way that a genus is contracted, right? For a genus, for a difference, does not partake of the genus. It's outside the essence of the genus. But nothing can be outside the essence of what? Being, huh? Nothing can be outside of something, right? For what is outside of being is what? Nothing, right? And is not able to be a, what? Difference, huh? Once in the third book of wisdom, third book of the metaphysics of this book, the philosopher, now who the hell is that? Yeah. Well, I see, Latin is a defective language. It doesn't have the article, right? So they can't say the philosopher, right? But at least they capitalized it, right? Okay. So this is an example of what figure of speech. And that's the one that the Bible is very fond of, right? So the Bible and Gospel and Christ are all named by, what? Yeah, yeah. Whence the philosopher proves in the third book of this thing that being is not able to be a, what? Genus, huh? Marvelous man that he figured that out, huh? Okay. Plato called him the mind of the school. Whence is necessary that being be contracted to diverse genera, right? To diverse, highest genera, we can say. According to a diverse way of being, what? Set up, huh? Which signify, which follows a diverse way of being, right? Because as Aristotle says, Quotzias, in many ways as being is said, right? That is, in as many ways as something is said of something, right? Totsias, in so many ways, is being, what? Signified, huh? So it's something proportional, right? Between the ways that beings are, or kinds of beings are, and the way something can be said of something, right? In account of this, those things into which being is divided first are said to be, in Latin, predicamenta, right? Or categories in Greek, huh? Because they are distinguished by a diverse way of, what? Being said of, right? Okay. Now, from our profound study of the anti-predicaments, right? You remember Aristotle distinguishing between, what? Universal substance and individual substance? And universal accident, in particular, a singular accident, huh? And there's more than one reason why he makes that distinction, right? Because one highest genus will be substance, and then the other nine will be accidents, right? But it's also necessary before you see this here, right? Because these ten highest genera will be distinguished by the diverse ways that something can be said of one of those four, namely the individual substance, right? So we'll take an individual substance, like you or you or me, huh? And see the different ways something can be said of you or me, okay? Thomas doesn't spell it out there, but it's clear from the text, right? As Aristotle points out, everything else is said of or exists in individual substances, right? Philosophy is said of this kind of philosophy and that kind of philosophy and exists in individual minds, right? Yeah, not too much that, but I mean, there's some minds around, you know? Socrates and Plato and Aristotle, at least, huh? Because therefore of those things which are said, some signify what an individual substance is, right? They signify what it is. Aristotle, I mentioned, sometimes calls its category lucia, which we translate by substance, and sometimes he calls it tiesti, huh? What it is, huh? Quedest. Some signify quali, that's what? Concrete word for qualities. Quedem, quantum, right? Okay? And sictialis, right, huh? Okay? Where, when, and so on, right? It's necessary, therefore, that what? To each way of, what? Being said, there signified some kind of being, right? There's something proportional here, right? It's a likeness, huh? Likeness of proportions. As when man is said to be an animal, it signifies substance, huh? And when man is said to be white, it signifies quality, or quali, right? To be, kind of, as Aristotle is, et sictialis, huh? So, now in the next sentence, standing by itself, I love standing by itself, right? Thomas is going to begin to point out the, what? Distinction in the way something can be said of you or me. It should be known, then, that a predicate is able to have itself in three ways to the subject of which it is said, huh? In one way, when it is that which the subject is, right? As when I say Socrates, as an example of the individual substance, huh? When I say Socrates is an animal, right? For Socrates is that which an animal is, right? And this predicate is said to signify first substance, which is a, what? Particular substance about which or of which all things are, what? Said, huh? Okay. I notice those two ways of speaking there. First substance and, what? Yeah. We met the term particular there when we talked about universal substance and particular substance and universal accident and particular accident. But in the chapter on substance, we'll meet the term first substance and, what? Second substance. See you next time. See you next time. See you next time. See you next time. See you next time. See you next time. See you next time. See you next time. See you next time. See you next time. But first substance will signify the same thing as the individual substance, right? And then second substance will signify the species or the genus in which first substance is, right? So these are the same thing, but a little different in the way they're named, right? You say first, you're talking about order, right? Uno, and I was going to point out when you get to the chapter on substance, that first substance is what is primarily substance, right? And most of all substance, right? Substance, it stands under, right? He's going to argue that the species in which a substance, individual substance is, is more substance than the genus, right? Because it's closer to you or me, right? So man is more substance than animal, yeah. And man kind of stands under animal, right? But under man is what? And closer to man than animal. Is man, and then he's closer to you or me, right? Now, what's the second way that it can be said, right? Well, not signifying now what it is, right? But something in it, right? Either which will be subdivided into absolutely right or towards another, right? And the second way that the predicate is taken according as it is in the subject, right? Which predicate is either in it per se and absolutely, as following upon matter, and thus it is quantity, everything material has got quantity, or as following upon form, and thus it is equality, right? So, maybe you won't have quantity in the sense of size in an angel, right, huh? Where my guardian angel is right now, right? Does he have any size? Does he have to worry about getting overweight? But does my guardian angel have certain qualities? Yeah. Yeah. Much wiser than I am, I bet. More a lover than I am. He's my guide, huh? Remember the sisters of St. Joseph, now, leave room for your angel, you know, on the bench. Because we've got to be kind of seriously, you know, leave a little room for the angel to sit, too, you know. And the sisters had ways of, you know, implicating things in you, right, huh? I still remember, you know, the sister talking about that the priest in this one parish had a drinking problem, right? People were talking about it and making a scam about it. And he came over to the church and put kind of a curse on them. And he said, I was talking to somebody from that place. And they said, you see, it's surprising how people are dying now, you know. Wow. That gives me respect for a priest. You don't gossip out of a priest. It's just a little ways. It wouldn't be the most orthodox ways. What? Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's when the old pastor says, Dwayne, he says, how did you get baptized? That's not a saint's name. Well, I was actually baptized Hugo, Dwayne, and there is a saint you, but there's no saint Dwayne, you know. And the name's got, you know, it happens a lot of times to people, you know. And, you know, how did I get baptized? I could get baptized without a poor little kid. But, you know, he was a good pastor, though. He would come sometime, you know, we'd have a, you know, a mass for the whole school, right? And then he'd get up with a pulpit afterwards and declare a holiday for the day, right? Yay! Of course, the nuns would pretend to be, you know, like, they had twice as much fun for us, you know, that they were disturbed. They probably need a day off more than we did, you know. So those are the two ways they're absolute, or in respect to another, right? And notice the ad-ollywood, right, huh? And Aristotle's word, as I mentioned before, was prosti, huh? Towards something, right, huh? Okay? So four is double towards what? Two, right? And four is half towards what? Eight. Eight. But in itself, is it double or half? Four. It's neither, right? It can only be double or half towards something, right? I'm not a father or a son. I'm a father towards this. I'm a son towards Reno-Victor-Brickquist from Parkers-Prairie, Minnesota. They had some nicknames for the Swedes in Worcester, but I forgot what it was now. There was some names they had for them. Some kind of, you know. Dirac. Well, yeah, different nationalists had each had their direct right name. So they taught me like I forgot what it was now. So am I a teacher or a husband? I'm a teacher towards you, right? But I'm a husband towards Rosalie, right? I'm a grandfather towards Lady Wisdom and the other ones, yes. But what am I a man of myself? What am I a man of myself? I'm taller than some people. I'm shorter than some people, right? Is that my size? Taller or shorter? Which is my size? Taller or shorter? That's what I am towards. Towards a basketball player, I'm maybe shorter, right? Towards some, yeah. I'm taller, right? My student comes on Tuesday night there. I'm shorter than him, right? I had my class on 7 to 9. I figured the results wouldn't be in until after 9. So we're up frozen there until 3 o'clock. But notice he calls towards something, something in us, nevertheless, right? But something in us towards another, right? I am something in me towards another, right? To be a son, to be a teacher, to be a husband, to be a father, and so on, right? To be taller than. So now we've got four highest genres so far, right? Notice Thomas there, he's using the abstract word quantity and quality. But before he used the term quale and quantum, right? Which is like what the Greek has, okay? And not alio there, right? He doesn't use that abstract word relation. Not alone the terrible word relationship, right? That is absolutely. And the third way that the predicate is taken from that which is outside the, what? Subject, right? And this in two ways, huh? This is a little different from what he said in the other part, huh? He makes a little conviction here. In one way, they'd be entirely outside the subject, right? And then he distinguishes that into, what? Four, but he distinguishes one against the other three, right? In one way, they'd be altogether outside the subject, which if it is not to measure the subject, is said of something by way of, what? Habitus, right? That's what they use. The Greek word Aristotle has this echain to have, right? Has when Socrates is said to be, what? Calciatus, huh? So what are they? Discalced, huh? Okay. Or vestitus, right? Clothed, right? Vested, huh? That's man. That's man. categories, which you kind of need to get a lecture on. If already be the measure, since the extrinsic measure is either, when he says extrinsic measure, that's as opposed to quantity, right, where you have an intrinsic measure. Which extrinsic measure is either time or place, right? If it's taken from time, it will be not time, but when, right? Because time, we'll see, is put in the category of quantity, right? But this category is what? When, right? Or from place. He subdivides that into two. Either ubi, which means where in English, where one doesn't consider the order of parts and place, but if one considers the order of parts in place, then it's, what, situs or position, right? So where am I? I'm in this room, right? That says nothing about how my parts are arranged. Am I laying down or am I sitting or am I standing, right? My parts are arranged a little bit differently, right? In place. But time already has the idea of order, right? That's the first sense of order before and after, right? So you get just one, right? I hope you're keeping track of how many distinctions of two and three there are here, right? So that gives you all together four more, right? Okay. Another way that that from which the predicamentum or category is taken according to something is in the subject, right? He doesn't want to put that back in the second part of the main division, right? But there's a beginning of it, right? Okay. If I kick you, right? You hold me responsible for kicking you, right? Because the source of this activity of kicking you was in me, right? So it's practically in me, right? That's what you're going to hold me responsible for. Kicking you, right? For the beginning of the action or the acting upon, like I like to call it in English, is in the subject. But if you're on the receiving end, it would be according to the term of this action of kicking, right? Then it's what? Undergoing, right? Or being acted upon, right? Or being kicked. For undergoing, right, is terminated in the subject undergoing. Now the word is where you get the word passion and so on, right? And when you speak of the passion of our Lord or something like that, right? You're being acted upon in a way that is what? Harmful, yeah, yeah. So actually the word in English would be suffering, right? But the word suffering has not, you know, been moved much, you know, to a later meaning. So I like to use the word undergoing, huh? Because undergoing can have a little bit of the sense of something bad, right? If we say about somebody, he's undergone a lot, that's probably not good what you're talking about, right? You know? But I mean, later on, Aristotle will even use the word undergoing, you know, saying the senses undergo, right, huh? They're being perfected when they undergo, right? It's a word that can be moved more. But I like that, acting upon and undergoing, right? You can imagine the cause to be above the effect, huh? Even though when I hammer something into the ceiling, it's not so easy to do that. You get very tired of doing it. You're doing that kind of a job, you know? Well, that's the last two, right, huh? Okay, okay. And he says, because some things are predicated in which, the last paragraph, in which manifestly is not added this word, what? Est, right, huh? See? Some verb to be, right? You say, in most of these, I am a man, right, huh? I am five foot ten. I am healthy. I am a father, right, huh? I am clothed, right? I am sitting, right? But you might say, what? When a man walks or something like that, right? You're not saying yes, huh? And some of you might say, well, then does it pertain to the predication of being? And consequently, he moves the saying that in all of these predications, to be is in some way signified, right? For the word, the verb, any verb can be resolved into this verb est and the, what, participium, right? So instead of saying he walks, I can say he is walking, right? And so we can say that in the statement there, sometimes Aristotle will divide it into two, the noun and the verb, which you've got to have for this statement, right? But sometimes he divides into three, huh? The subject and the verb is or is not, the cocktail, as they call it, and then the predicate, right? So, that's the rule. Rule two or three or both, right? Okay? Okay, so he gives us an example of that. Once he says it is clear, I should maybe separate the line, huh? In as many ways as predication comes about in so many ways being is said, right? So a lot of things in philosophy have to be understood by seeing something that is proportional, right? The proportion is first seen maybe in math, you know? I used to say to students, two is to three as four is to, and they'll say five. But two is to three really as four is to what? Six. You don't see the proportion, right? So you have to see the likeness there, huh? In Aristotle, in the book on dialectic, huh? The book of places there. That's one of the tools of dialectic, right? To consider the likeness of things, huh? And especially, you know, not just the likeness of things that are in the same species or genus, but the likeness of things that are far apart, right? Aristotle is taking up act there in the ninth book of wisdom. He says, you can't define act. It's too universal, right? But how do you know act? By seeing a proportion in the ninth book of wisdom. That's a book on ability and act, huh? A favorite book in there, right? Did I tell you I was thinking about God again? Really? Yeah. Yeah. And Thomas, you know, when he begins to talk about the substance of God, huh? He says that we know more what God is not than what he is, right? Now, when he takes up the five attributes of the substance of God, in some of them right away you can see there's a negation there, right? So God is said to be unchanging, huh? Unmoving, right? Obviously negation of motion, change, right? He's the unmoved mover, right? Or he says God is infinite, right? When infinite is the negation of what? A limit, right? So you're knowing God negatively, right? Even you say God is one, huh? That means he's not, what? Divided in dominion. And then you say God is simple though, but what he actually does is to show that God is not composed. God is not put together in any way, right? And in the Summa Theologiae, which is for you beginners, right? He goes through all the forms of composition and creatures, right? Eliminates all of them from God. And then, that's his inductive argument. And then he shows universally that God in no way can be put together, right? About perfect. That's the fifth one, right? Doesn't seem to be a negation, does it, huh? And it'd be stupid to say he's negating imperfection. That's it. That's it. That's it. That's it. That's it. That's it.