Logic (2016)
Lecture 5: Categories Chapter 2: Being Said Of and In a Subject

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being said about something and another at first you might see him you know well how can you do that you know because burquist is not geometry see burquist is not justice right but maybe he what has some justice right maybe he has some knowledge right so we'll call him a what denominatively right not geometry but a geometry right we'll call him healthy and not health itself house health itself i could never be sick yeah yeah i know she used the word have there right if you wanted to make it you know a speech right i have health right i have knowledge right grandchild her name is grace i call her the graceful one but graceful means what it's a denominator from grace right holy from holiness right now the word have will be one of the post predicaments huh it's kind of interesting how much the word have appears in logic right you might say that a thing has a name sometimes sometimes a thing doesn't have a name right let me give it a name right you give me a book i have a book you give a thing a name it has a name right sometimes the thing has a definition right does the genus have species and does the species have a genus what would you say a genus has a species when you say a species has a genus does have mean the same thing now in the fifth book of wisdom aristotle says that have seems to have as many meanings as the word in so we go back to those eight senses of in right you could distinguish senses of have corresponding to them right and that'd be the beginning right the substance have accidents things that are not substance itself but exist in substance in some way i have you in my power so you see how the connection there between having them they're very very important words so you see a genus has species and a species has a genus right that corresponds to two different senses of in right the what was the uh third sense of in yeah now what's the fourth sense of in first sense of in is in a room in a place right second one is part in a whole right my teeth are in my mouth right okay it's a bit like being in a place right except my teeth are really you know they don't come out at night then then yeah so really a part of my mouth right okay um that's the second sense of in right third sense of in is the genus in the what species and the fourth sense is reversed the species in the genus and then form and matter and so on right okay so um there's many senses of have right now so corresponding to a genus in the species is what the species has a genus corresponding to species in genus would be that the what the genus has species that's amazing you see these words right um if i say the wood has a shape and the pie toss the marble has a shape right it corresponds to the fifth sense of in form in matter right six sense of whole and part is what the holes in it's what parts right like that then you get into the other kind of ability active ability i have you in my power right now notice that right you're in my power i have you now please catch up with you right we have you now it's over but i also have what i have a house i have books and so on i have some money is that the same sense of have when they say that i have some knowledge i have some health so this word have runs all around logic and every other science of that matter right but it's first up in the post predicaments right you know just like the word before right genus comes before the species right but substance another sense comes before accident right maybe the thought comes before the word signifies it right in definition the genus comes before the difference see here you got some understanding what i'm saying okay it's kind of marvelous the the the brevity of aristotle right but how perfectly more it is right starting above and then the genera and then sideways right denomination okay now you see there's some distinction on between the haver and the hat right if something said to have something there's some distinction right the genus has species there's some distinction between the species and species has a genus there's some distinction between them if i have a house there's some distinction between the house even if i have health there's some distinction between me and what health yeah the opposition right now sometimes god has said to have something right take god has mercy on us right god has mercy as a virtue mercy but is the haver and the i had there two different things so in one sense everything they say is what my way of expressing is inadequate to god right if someone says to me does god have knowledge of me i'd say yes right i won't deny that but then it's a real distinction between god and his what that's only in our way of speaking because we have the way of speaking that's appropriate to creatures right so sometimes we say about god that god that god is whatever he has that's not me i am not my house i'm not my car i'm not even my health not even my knowledge of logic am i christ says you know i am the way that says man right and then is god the truth and the life right there's no difference between god and his what life right and god and truth you know in the summa kind of gentiles and in both summers in fact it takes up god's being good right first thing you show is that god is good right and the second thing is that god is goodness itself right you see for us goodness signifies not what is good but that by which is good we want to say both about god that he's good but he is goodness itself he's also that by which he is what good and that's not the same thing right if i'm good it's because i got some virtue i got grace or something right so my goodness is something i have not what i am god is goodness itself right so nothing can be good unless it's like god in some way right because he's goodness itself unless it partakes right some way of god's goodness but you realize kind of you know our minds kind of some of the church fathers said stuttering you know the mind stutters it speaks of god right huh so thomas says a chapter that shows that god is good and a chapter that shows that he's goodness itself because of his simplicity right and then from that he concludes there could be nothing bad in god my friend one where he says breakfast he says people put up with you because of your mind because there are other things they wouldn't put up with i'm not goodness itself right there's something good and something bad in there yes and he's hitting there yeah yeah yeah but if god is goodness itself there can't be anything bad in him right so that's the third chapter thomas has huh god is good god is goodness itself because of the simplicity therefore the third chapter there can't be anything bad in god and then he has this beautiful thing that he took from augustine that god is the good of every god that he's the summa both of them right you have only four of those in the uh summa theologiae right but all five in the summa country gentiles you know i left out that thing god's the good of every good but you may say another place in some other ways but kind of beautiful my favorite book the summa country gentiles it's a big printing that's why i brought the this one has got a bigger print you know the oxford got that at home too but it's kind of small print this near has got the english that you get lost or something but now we come to what they call the second chapter here It's not a bad division here. Second chapter of the predicaments, right? So the first chapter is about three ways about names, right? Some names are said equivocally of many things, right? Some are said univocally, right? And some things are named denominatively, right? And how does this got to do with the categories, right? Well, as they said, overarching M, right, is something said equivocally, but equivocally by reason. Then within each genus, each highest genus, and going straight down, it said univocally, but from one genus to another, it said, what, denominatively, right? So virtue and vice are a species of habit, which is a species of quality, right? But if you're going to say this of a man, we'd say he's virtuous, or he's vicious, right? We'd be saying something denominatively, right? So it's a very complete thing. He's doing that, right? He's distinguishing three ways that things are named, but in a way that's very relevant, huh? Perfectly ordered, yeah? Now, in the second chapter, you're going to have two, what, divisions, huh? And following the Greek, the first one is ton legomeno, which we translate sometimes in English, you know, of things said, or just of the said, okay? Then you have the division tonanto, of beings, huh? Tonanto. An is a Greek word for being, right? But the first division is ton legomeno, okay? Yeah. Of those said, you know, the Greek doesn't have the word thing in there, right? Of those said, right? Some are said with, what, sumplokene, huh? Intertwined, right, huh? Okay. Some, without sumplokene, without sumplokene, without being intertwined. And he gives the fundamental sumplokene, huh? That you have in a statement, right? Some are said, what? According to sumplokene, as man, what? Runs. Anthropos trachea. Or man wins, as we translate here, huh? His victory. Anthropos vika. Nika, huh? Now, what are these? Yeah, nika. These, like, yeah, yeah, yeah. Same myself here. Like, this is a cause of deception. Okay. So, these are really, what, statements, right? Okay? And it pertains to the, what? Second act, right? I emphasize the statement because you want to separate the second act from the, what? First. Yeah. Yeah. Because if things are in the categories, will they be statements? No. There'll be things like virtue and vice. Man, dog, cat, horse, right? These are said without any intertwining things, huh? But man runs. Well, the man and his running are not the same thing, are they, right? So, it's kind of a, what? Mixture there, right? You can see how he's leading up to the categories, right? Because you're going to be putting things in there without, sumploke is the Greek word says, right? There's no intertwining of things there, right? But in the statement, there can be an intertwining of things. But even something like a white man. Can white man be put in some category? Yeah. Man would be in the category of substance. White would be quality. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Can whitey or negro be put in a category? No. There's a sumploke, an intertwining of two natures, right? Color and an animal, right? So, you see what Aristotle's doing, right? So, it's not only a statement that can't be put in a category, right? But, you know, something like white man or short man or just man, right? Tall man, short man. Because the one is his size, his quantity, how much of them there is. I first went up to Laval there, Chris, the rector up there, he was a monsignor, you know, at the university, right? He was kind of a short man, you know? They say Napoleon was short, right, huh? But he re-authority, right? Well, this guy did, you know. I remember first going up to the social event there at Laval, and he was a kind of reception for students who are not in the province of Quebec itself, right? That's foreigners. And I'd never met the dean, right? I mean, the rector, rector at the university. He says, you're a burqvist, he said. It was the rest of the burqvist coming up there, you know. They recognize some likeness in the days, but, you know. I remember when during the Second Vatican Council, doing some break in the Second Vatican Council, Cardinal Wright, I know he was a cardinal at that time, but he came back, you know, and he spoke, you know, at the Assumption College there, right? And he gave a talk to the students, he gave a talk to the faculty, right? And I remember afterwards, we kind of shake his hands as we were, you know, after his talk. He says to one of my colleagues, so, you're from Notre Dame, huh? How's your life? It was just some joke he'd made. He picked up the guy's reaction to it, you know, like that. He, he, he, let's get to Notre Dame, huh? And the guy comes to him and he says, how do you know I'm from Notre Dame, you know? How do you know I'm from Notre Dame, you know? We never met him before, you know, or he didn't have any list of us, you know. He's got to, he's got to be a sharp, you know. I told you the story he told, huh? You know, I guess during one of the breaks in the thing, Paul VI went down to India, and he got off Europe, and it was just a tremendous crowd there, right? He burst into tears at the idea of evangelizing this huge crowd, you know. Newspapers reported it, you know. They saw how much populations have increased due to his... He spoke into tears, oh, what have I done, you know? It showed you how the press, you know, I mean, you see this political campaign, you know, but I mean, the way they twist things, right, is, you know, I mean, he's just such a warm reception he got, you know, you know, he's spoken to tears, I mean, just, you know, going to a foreign country like that, in a country like India, being met with this enthusiastic charity. That's what they said of John Paul when he went to Denver in 93. All the missions were dead set against, they thought it was going to be a total failure. Yeah. And when John Paul got there and all the crowds and all these young people, and they were so busy, they said John Paul was in tears. So, joy, joy for them. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah, that's what happened in India there, I mean, to Paul VI, you know, and as he's talking about, I remember him talking about your own habit there, right? And he went to see him in Rome, remember, and he encouraged him, you know, right away. Right away, yeah. And my wife knew him, you know, when he was a bishop here at Worcester, you know. So, you see the significance of this thing here. The things you're going to put in the categories, the categories themselves, will be said without simploques, right, a new simploques, huh? I mean, it's kind of twisted together, right, intertwined, you know. It's not a bring together different things, right? Whether you say it together, like white man, or whether you have a name whitey or something, you know, to name such a thing. That's a distinction of two, right? But now we're going to get undertone legomenon. I mean, excuse me, to an untoum of beings, you get a distinction of what? Four. But crisscrossing, yeah, yeah. Because there's two distinctions of two, right? And what are the two distinctions of two that he has? Yeah, you could say exists in another subject or does not exist in another subject, right? And then set of another, or not set of another, set of another, distinction between universal and singular, right? So sometimes you talk about distinction into universal substance and singular substance, universal accident and singular accident, right? So geometry would be said of what knowledge is found in the minds of a number of men, right? It's a number of women, too, I guess. And I think you can speak of the geometries in my head, right? And that would be my unique mess, right? The knowledge of geometry that's in my mind is something singular, right? I don't mean a pun on singular, but it's all those who've been taught by Euclid, right, huh? They have some individual knowledge of geometry, right? Not equal to Euclid's, of course. And that's the way Aristotle proceeds, right? I see him do this in one division he gives. He's using two things, right? Affirmed and denied, right, huh? So what does he begin with? Something where one of them is affirmed and the other is denied. Because then you kind of, what? Right away you see that they're not the same thing. Of beings, some are said of a subject, right? Okay. Now the Greek word, in the genitive there, that's just like the word subject, right? So it means more placed under, I suppose, right? Subject means what's thrown under, you know. Those Latins are kind of sloppy, you know. Okay. Of being, some are said of a subject, right? Now I mentioned before, you have two senses. The main senses of whole and part. You have the universal whole, but the first meaning of whole is the composed whole, right? So the composed whole is put together from its parts, but it's not said of its parts, right? The universal whole is not put together from its parts, but it's said of them, right? So animals not put together from dog, cat, horse, and elephant. Because then to say a dog is an animal would be to say a dog is a mixture of dog, cat, horse, elephant, and everything else, right? But animals said of its parts, right? Dog, cat, and horse, and so on. But knife is that said of the blade is a knife, and the hand goes a knife, and the seat of the chair is a chair, and the legs are chairs. You know, there'll be how many chairs in this chair. Yeah. But it's put together from these, right? So when I used to contrast those two holes, I'd say, I used both things. I'd say the universal whole is said of its parts, but not put together from them. The composed whole is just the reverse. It's put together from its parts, but not what's said of them. So you see that? Well, here you're affirming one thing and denying something, right? Of beings, some, oh, excuse me. Yeah, sometimes they call those parts that make up a, that the universal whole is said of, the subject parts, right? Because they are said of something which is imagined to be under what's being said of it, right? Why, usually you have parts, you think of the composing parts, right? But, you know, this is the name. You could call them composing parts, and parts put together. So some of beings now, right now, some are said of a subject, but they don't exist in any, what, subject. As man, anthropos, is said as a subject of this man, right? Or some man, right? But it exists in no, what, subject, right? Now that's what we would call, what, universal accident, right? This example he's giving, right? Man is universal. I mean, she's using universal substance. Universal substance, huh? So man is being said of, what, this man and that man, right? But it doesn't exist in a subject. Some are in a subject, right? Like my knowledge of geometry is in the subject which is my mind, it's in my reason, my knowledge of the before and after, right? Yeah, yeah, it's in my, I think. But the knowledge that's in my mind is not said of anything, is it? It's said of no subject, right? Now, he says, I call that in a subject, huh? Not what is in something as a, what? Part belongs, right? But something belonging to something and impossible to be, right? Apart from that which it is. So, want some of my knowledge? Now can I take some of my knowledge out of my head and put it in your head? You know, the computer, but you can't do it. So you can't take my knowledge and put it over here, right? In the table, right? Or even in somebody else's head, can I? I can maybe generate a knowledge in your head, something like the knowledge in my head, but it won't be the knowledge in my head. Well, my teacher, Eseric or Deconic, you know, he was producing a knowledge like his own in my head, right, in his lectures, right? But I don't know if I understood the thing as well as he understood it, at least then, right? He'd been teaching that since the 1930s and always seeing more as he did it each time. I was just starting to read some of those things, right? So the knowledge in Deconic's head, right, is the example of the second thing, right? The knowledge in my head, right? Not said of something else. Nobody else has knowledge, right? Notice the difference between these first two things, right? The one is said to not be in a subject, right? And this is said to be in a subject. The one is said to be said of something, and the other has not said anything. So he takes the extremes, you might say, right? Okay? So you realize that to be said of something and to be in a subject means something different, right? If something, the first can be said to be of a subject but not in a subject. They can't be the same thing, can they? And the second thing is in a subject but it's not said of a subject. Again, those two same things, right? Cannot be the same thing, right? But what is affirmed in one is denied in the other and vice versa, right? It's like if I said, you know, some human beings are male and young and some are female and old. Did that, Mr. Berkowitz? That's sexist. But what am I doing, right? You know? You know what's... It's going to be affirmed in one. It's going to be in that and the other, right? So, now, what's the third thing that he talks about? Well, he takes the example of the second thing there. As a certain, what, grammaticae, a certain knowledge of grammar is in a subject to wit in the soul, right? We mentioned that part there where he says what it means to be in a subject, right? What is in something, not as a part, right, which is the second sense of in, right? Huh? But it's impossible for it to be apart from that which it is. A part that maybe exists, right? You can pull the tooth out of my mouth. I do that sometimes. As a certain, what, knowledge of grammar is in a subject namely the soul, right? Not being too precise there, but it's in the mind, right? But it's not said of any subject, right? The knowledge which is in my head is not said of anything else, is it? And then he takes an example from what? Sensible example, right? And there's something that is white, is in a subject, the body in which it is, right? For every color is in a, what? Body, right? The white in my body is not said of anything else, right? Okay? None. It is said, right? It's said of none of them. Now he takes up the two of the four that are, what? Two affirmatives and the one that's two, what? Negatives, right? Some are said of a subject, right? Something universal. And they are in a, what? Subject. As reasoned out knowledge, I translate it. It'd be statement, right? Science. Science is in a subject to it in the soul, right? But it is said as a subject of grammar or logic or geometry or something, right? You see that? It's time for the universal knowledge now, right? Or if you take the word science, if you want to use the word science. Science is in a subject, right? It's in the soul, right? More precisely in the mind of the soul, right? But it's, what? Said of this science and that science and so on, right? So both being said of a subject and being in a subject is found in this third thing he's talking about, right? And that's universal what? Accident, right? Okay. So he first talked about universal substance and he talked about individual what? Accident, right? Now he's talking about what? Yeah. Which is both said of something, right? And it exists in some subject. He gives an example of episteme, right? Or you might say virtue, right? Virtue is in the soul, right? It's in something, right? And it's said of something, right? Courage and temperance and find the one that has both of these negated, right? Some are neither in a subject like Dwayne Berkwist or Father Michael, right? Patrick and so on. Nor is it what's said of something, right? So you don't exist in something that's in a subject to you. You might exist in something that's in a room, right? But not as knowledge exists in the mind or health in the body, right? And notice the examples he gives. As this man or this what? Horse, right? For neither of these of these such things are neither in a what? Subject nor are they said of a subject, right? And he says it's kind of summing up this distinction that's underlying these things. Haplos, right? Ta Atoma So you get the word atom, right? Atoma The individuals, right? But Atoma and individual etymologically the same thing, right? Individual means not what? Divided, right? As universal is divided in particular, right? So Socrates is not divided and individuals, right? He is an individual undivided, right? And the Greek word is optoma which comes from the negative prefixed a and poma, right? So you get the word anatomy, right? Anatomy means cut up ana is up and but atom means what? Undivided, right? What they called atoms in Democritus I guess first used the word, right? The atoms were what? Indivisible, right? The ultimate building blocks therefore parts of things that could not be divided, right? So what we called the atom was really a misuse of the name, right? But it was called an atom because by ordinary chemical means you could divide it, right? It's kind of a now it stays there as a sign of our ignorance at that stage of our understanding, right? Now the proton turns out to be made out of something that is not proton at first is it? Sign of ignorance right? So he says simply speaking generally they say it's not too bad individuals and what are one in number right? It's another expression Aristotle uses, right? For individuals one in number are said of no what? Subject, right? But nothing prevents them from being in some subject right? For this grammatical knowledge might your particular knowledge of grammar is among the things that are in a subject right? But it's not said of anything right? So he's distinguishing here now among four things right? Universal substance substance universal accident individual accident right? But he first took up universal substance and what? Yeah because what is affirmed in one is denied in the other right? And he took up the one where the two were affirmed or the last the two there now there's a couple of reasons why Aristotle made these divisions right? These divisions tone on totally one way is going to be preparing us for an understanding of the ten categories because the first category will be about those things that don't exist in another is in a subject right? Either universal substance or individual substance and the rest of them will be what? Accidents right? Things that exist in another whether they're universal or singular right? My knowledge of geometry or geometry in general right? Okay So it's going to prepare the way in some ways for the categories right? And the distinction between the one genus of substance and the nine genus right? That are accidents right? Things existing in another I mentioned how my teacher in logic there in undergraduate Father Dulac he said he despaired of students seeing the distinction between accident here as opposed to substance and accident as opposed to property there because accident here as opposed to substance could be a property of something right? know know don't So action doesn't mean the same thing here and there. It says, you've given up his spirit after his experience of teaching, right? But can you see the difference between the two? You've got to think about that, right? Aaron Stahl says in the book on sophistical reputations, right, that the most common mistake in thinking is because of the equivocation of the word, right? Suppose someone says to you, do you know that or do you think that's so? He's making a distinction between what? Well, not necessarily that, huh? Because I could know that something is so, right? Wouldn't that be the same thing as thinking that something is so? I mean, suppose I said this, I know that no square is a circle. Who's going to win the election? I probably would not say, I know so-and-so is going to win the election. I would probably say, I think that so-and-so is going to win, you know? Now, what's the distinction between knowing and thinking? In those words of mine. Why do I say, I don't just think that a square is not a circle. I know that a square is not a circle. But I don't really know who's going to win the election. But I think that so-and-so is going to win. What's the distinction between thinking and knowing? Yeah. You see? I'm sure that a square is not a circle, right? I'm not sure that so-and-so is going to win the election. I think he or she is going to win, right? I don't really know, right? I'm going to live to be 90. I think so. My mother lived to be 90. I've got the same genes or something on it. Yeah, but your father died at 65. I don't think I'd say, I know I will live to be 90. Unless God reveals it to you. Yeah, yeah. See? So, knowing there involves being certain or sure, right? Thinking there, in those examples, right, means not being sure or certain, right? It's an opinion, right, huh? Now, if you ask me this, Mr. Berquist, do you think that a square can be a circle? Or do you think that a square cannot be a circle? What do you think, Mr. Berquist? What would I answer? I think that a square cannot be a circle. Well, then you're not sure, Mr. Berquist, of what you're saying, right? I mean, don't I think that a square cannot be a circle? I think that. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Now, what kind of equivocation is this? Is it by chance or by reason? Yeah, yeah. Now, remember how I gave an explanation of one kind of, several kinds of names equivocal by reason, right? And sometimes a name becomes equivocal by reason when it's kept by one of the things that you'd have said, right? And then the one that had something noteworthy gets a new name, right? This is an example of that, right? So if you think something but you're not sure of it, right? That kind of thinking keeps the name thinking as its own name sometimes. And when you're sure of what you think, well, that's noteworthy to give a name, you know? Yeah. So I remember my daughter Maria saying, you know, I don't like this food or whatever it was. I love it. So she's denying that she likes this food. But doesn't she like the soup? You say to the girl, I like you. Oh. Yeah, yeah. You better say to your wife, you love her, right? Okay, but loving is a kind of liking too, right? So liking can be common, you know, to liking a lot and liking a little or something, right? But if you have a really intense liking, right, you might say, I love you, right? But it's a philosopher. Doesn't take justice to him, right? He's a lover of wisdom, right? You guys trying to like that or love that? Well, I like that, he's a nice guy. No, but you can say that loving is a kind of liking, right? But it's a strong liking, right? You know, if I say, I like, you know, my grandmother's cookies, you know, I need to like them. She's kind of the standard, which I judge all, you know, commercial cookies, you know, and so on, and cookies that people make, you know. You know, my grandmother's motto, maternal grandmother was, I aim to please those her motto in life. It's really pleasing those cookies, you know. So, you know, first of all, I think the beverage farm makes the best, you know, but the measure, the criteria, you know, which I judge them, is by, that's because my grandmother's, obviously, but, you know, approaches more closely to them than most of these other kinds of cookies, you know. Okay, so, um, can be easily deceived by words, right, huh, that are equivocal. And especially if it wasn't equivocal by reason, huh, because they're closer, right? Who was it? Some artist that it was, rock band or something, I don't know. But just one student at the college had the same name as the guy, right? Someone said, so-and-so died or something, you know, and they were talking about, you know, and they thought it was a friend of theirs, right, you know. But I remember I'd heard that, you know, I was interested in Winston Churchill, you know, that Churchill had written a novel, right, you know. So you go to the library and there are novels by Winston Churchill, but it's not the same Winston Churchill. He does have one novel, you know. But anyway. So anyway, going back to Father Dulac's despair, right, huh, there's a difference in meaning between accident as distinguished from substance, right? Universal accident and individual accident as distinguished from universal substance and individual substance. An accident is distinguished from property in the predicables, right? Say property in the sense of the five predicables, right, is not an accident, right, in the sense of the five predicables. But it is an accident, it could be an accident in this sense here, right? But he said that, he's disparate. It shows you how easily we are, what, deceived by equivocation, right? So anyway, this distinction, then, is useful for a distinction of the, what, highest january, because only one of them is the genus of, what, substance, right? And the other ones are, what, january of accidents, huh, of things that exist in another. So your size exists. in you, right? But is your size you? If your size was you, you never grew up, right? You would have ceased to be yourself when you got, what, got tall, right? You know, you're marking on the wall, whatever they do sometimes. You know, I go into the, I go to the doctor, they checked my size. I suppose if I'm shrinking too much, then I'll get concerned. So size with quantity, right? Qualities, right? These exist in me in some way, right? I guess that's one advantage of what he's doing here, right? But I think there's another one that's more, more, even more so than this distinction, right? Because how are the ten highest genre going to be distinguished, you think? Well, as you might expect in logic, they're going to be distinguished by the way something is said of something, right? But is there something that among these four that everything else is said of? Which one of those four do you think everything else is said of? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. You can say of me that I'm a man, right? More generally, I'm an animal and so on, up to scale to substance, right? You can also say of me that I'm, I don't know, five foot ten or something, five foot nine. What? You're white. Yeah, you can say I'm white, I'm just, I have a hard time stealing from people. Something, something draws me back all the time. I'm a geometer, right? And so on. I'm a father, I'm a son, I'm a teacher, I'm a student, gardener, yeah? I'm in this room, I'm sitting, I'm clothed, on the table. So everything else is said of individual what? Yeah, some being said individually of it, right? Others being said denominatively of it, right? So maybe Aristotle is going to distinguish in the ten highest genera, right? By the way something can be said of individual what? Yeah, yeah. Now the text we're looking at last, next time, from Thomas. Thomas will divide, will distinguish, huh? The highest genera by the different ways that something can be said of individual what? Substances, right? And his first distinction will be into what? Three, right? So let's take an individual substance like Dwayne Berkwist, right? Some things can be said of Dwayne Berkwist for reason of what he is. He's a man, he's an animal, he's a living body, he's a substance, right? That's the first category. Other things can be said of Dwayne Berkwist, not by reason of what he is, but by reason of something in him, right? Other than what he is. And one is by how big he is, or how small he is, right? His size, right? Others are these qualities of him. Is he healthy or is he sick, right? Is he just or is he unjust, right? Is he knowledgeable or ignorant? And so on, right? Or is he ignorant of many things, no, some things. And some things can be said of Berkwist for reason of something outside of him. Like, I'm in this room. I'm clothed, huh? The clothing is not in me, as in a subject, is it? Now the second and this third way, you know, will be subdivided by Thomas, right? And we'll see how he does that, right? But just take those three, right, huh? There's examples of the three. Man is said of Berkwist, right? Berkwist is said to be a geometer, and Berkwist is said to be in this room or to be clothed, right? You see, a big distinction between those three? Man is said of Berkwist for reason of what he is. And more generally, animal is said of man, reason of what he is. Geometry is said of my house. My house is not what I am, right? I'm in my house sometimes. My car, I'm in my car sometimes. But I'm not my car. I'm not my house. I'm not this room. Okay? Another example of this third kind is I am clothed, right? Well, my clothing is not what I am. Clothes make the man. Doesn't make the monk. What is it? What do you call it? The wood? The wood, yeah, yeah. What is it? Yeah, I can't remember the exact Latin, but the one that the hood doesn't make the monk. Some of it they call a cow. Yeah, yeah, but the hood doesn't make the monk is what the saying was, right? It was different in English. And so we all have things said of us in these three ways, right? But the second and third way will be distinguished in total. A number of things, right? But notice, what is the purpose? I am an individual substance, right? I can take Father Michael. He's an individual substance, right? He doesn't exist in something else. He's in a subject. He's not said of anybody else. He's unique. Okay? And I can say he's a man, right? Okay? I can say he's in his room, but also he's, I guess, you're healthy, right? Yeah, he's healthy, right? So some things are said of Father Michael by reason of what he is, a man, right? Or more generally an animal, more generally a living body, more generally a body, okay? Other things are said of him by reason of what is in him, right? Is he tall or short or a big man? And he's a son, right? The son that says something in you related to the son of man, right? He's your father. And then there's things said of him by reason of what he's clothed, right? Now his beard, I think that's part of him, right? Yeah. See? But this is outside you, right? These things are not part of you, right? Even if you have contact lenses, it's not really part of you, right? So we distinguish the highest genre, in general, by the way something can be said of individual substances. So you have to distinguish among tone-on-tone of beings, right, individual substance from universal substance and from individual accidents and from universal accidents, right? That's another reason why he's doing this, right? Makes sense.