Logic (2016)
Lecture 3: Equivocal Names and the Five Predicables

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Now, notice then, you have an use of words where equivocal is used just for this here, and not for this. You have an example of a word equivocal by reason. The word equivocal becomes equivocal by reason. Now, what way of being equivocal is that, right? Well, sometimes when a word is said univocally, right? Sometimes when a name is said univocally, of two things, right? It is kept by one of them as its own name, and a new name is given to the other, right? What's an example of that, Em? Yeah, you say, what's a kitten? The kitten's a cat, and the puppy's a dog, right? You shouldn't call the kitten a puppy, because the puppy's a dog. So, dog can be said a puppy, and then the mature one, right? But sometimes he keeps the name dog, it's its own name, and you say it's only a puppy's not a dog yet. Because the fully grown dog has got the full, what? Nature of a dog, right? Okay. We say a boy is a man, and a girl is a woman, right? But then sometimes we distinguish the man against the boy. So, there's all kinds of examples of that, huh? And one way it takes place is that when one of the two has the common meaning of the two, perfectly, right? And the other has it imperfectly, right? In other cases, the one that keeps the name is the one that has nothing noteworthy. So, sometimes we speak of wisdom and knowledge, and we distinguish the two, right? But wisdom is a kind of knowledge, too. So, but wisdom is an excellence in knowledge, it's a knowledge of God, and therefore it gets a new name, right? And the rest of knowledge keeps the name, right? The urinary name, huh? So, that's the aptly word equivocal, right? The word equivocal, by what? Chance. Oh, it is, it is what? Mini-mini, right? Nothing, nothing in addition. But the word equivocal, by reason, right? Has something extremely important, right? Namely, an order, a connection among the meanings, right? So, it gets a new name sometimes of analogous, right? And equivocal, by chance, keeps the name equivocal, right? But I like to be careful about that, because I think the word analogous is like the Latin word proportional, right? And that's one way, but the word before, for example, right? There, the connection is one of what? Proportion, right? So, if you go from, like, say, the second meaning to the third meaning of before. This can be without that, but that cannot be without that. So, this is before that, and being, right? This can be known before that, but that can't be known without knowing this. It's a real proportion, right? This can be without that, but not vice versa. This can be known without that, but not vice versa, okay? Well, there are the words being carried over by a, what? Proportion. Proportion is very important in philosophy and in science, right? They say most scientific theories are what result from seeing a proportion. It's very important in philosophy, you know? One time a senior thesis there, a senior philosophy course of making them, poor guy, you know, take his, but Aristotle's used to proportion, right, you know? Aristotle says we have to know the first matter by, what? A proportion. The first matter is to man and dog, you know? You and Habiba, right? Like clay, like clay is the sphere and cube. It's got to be known by proportion, Aristotle says in the first book, right? Because first matter is nothing actual, so you can't know it by itself, right? Yeah, yeah. It's a proportion that is very important, huh? So, that's why, you know, although now this is kind of a word even Thomas uses, right? I kind of hesitate sometimes and I like to speak the name equivocal, by the way. And it runs through philosophy, right? For example, it will say, the angel's mind is called an intellective samatha, right? An understanding. Now, our reason could be called an understanding, too. Well, we don't understand very much and very well. Very slow. We have to, what? Have a discourse in order to arrive at a little bit of, you know, sheer understanding. So, you know, we have understanding of the whole sense, so we'll call the, what? An angelic mind, understanding, intellectus. And we'll call us, who'll call us a reason, right? A darkened understanding, that's what they call a reason, right? A darkened understanding. Most of what we understand, we have to reason out in some way or think out, right? So, we're really in a bad situation, right? The surgeon said, you know, he was the wisest man at the College of St. Thomas there. It's just, he said, compared to Aristotle, he says, I have to bring an angle. Well, compared to an angel, right, and Aristotle got the brain of an angel, right? It's a home to help me, that's why. I pray to him to help me, right? And understand the more that I do, right? Anticipate a bit. The first two books in magic are the book of the five names, right? Called the Ace of Goget by Porphyry. And he actually gets the five names from Aristotle and the definitions of them and explanation of the Aristotle. But he brings it together, right? We sometimes bring things together, they're not, you know, they belong side of each other, you know, to help us. But there he's talking about five names that are said of many things, but said what? Individually, right? When you get to the categories, right? Each category would be said indivably of what is below it. But what's above the categories, right, are said, well, equivocally of my reason. It's necessary to understand as we get into those schools a little bit. It's interesting now, people now refer to Newton's great work, they call it the Principia, but that's not really the title of the book. It's Principia Mathematica, Naturalis de Sofie. Everybody's referring to it over and over again. In fact, the great physicists of the 20th century, they call the physics of the 20th century, modern physics. The physics of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, they call it either classical physics or Newtonian physics. So he's the big shot, right? So rather than say Principia Mathematica, Naturalis de Sofie, that's what's called Principia. And this is the first word, right? Well, the title of Porphy's book is the Isogogate of Categories, right? Because it responds to the question, or the request, you might say, of Prysaurus, right? Yeah, yeah. And the Greek with Reduction is Isogogate, right? Same etymology as the Reduction. And so it's just come down to us now is the name Icycogli, right? But these Greek philosophers, they are aware of Antonia Messia, right? And Thomas says, well, you've got to learn logic before the other parts of philosophy because it shows the way reason or reason for all the parts of philosophy. So the introduction to logic, which is the Icycogli, is THE introduction, right? That's the introduction to the beginning of science, right? So it is by Antonia, THE Icycogli. But that's going to happen after the thing that contracted up in Cheepia. I mentioned how the Greek philosophers called the Icycogli the Book of the Five Names, right? And that's because he talks about five names, right? And these five names, to use kind of the English words now for them, are GENIS, right? Which is kind of a Latin name, but in Greek itself it's the same thing, GENASA. The looks like a GV. And GENISA, DIFFERENCE, which again comes from the Latin, right? But the Greek word is very similar. The word DIAPHORA, which is the word DIFFERENCE, huh? Then the word SPECIES, which is the Latin word. But the Greek word would be IDEAS, I forget the word IDEAS. But IDEAS keeps quite the same meaning, but IDEAS does. And then the word PROPERTY, and then the word ACCIDENT, huh? Now the word ACCIDENT could be used in the book called The Categories 2, but it doesn't have the same meaning. It's not purely equivocal, but it doesn't have the same meaning. But Father Dulac there, in the college, he said he had to spare it the same meaning of every day of the students to recognize. The difference between ACCIDENT as one of the five, and they call them Predictables in Latin, right? And ACCIDENT as opposed to SUBSTANCE, right? In the treatise on the predicaments or the categories. I don't know why I should just bear, you know, before you come down. Who is the GENIS, right? The first meaning of the word GENIS would be ME. Because from me there proceeds Paul, and Maria, and Marcus, and so on. And then from Paul, and Elizabeth, there proceeds about the ten, nine names. From Maria, and Matt, there's ten that proceed. You know, like Christmas tea going out, right? In the Christmas party, they used to give, you know, what they call the tree of porphyry, you know, to the magician. Hey, top logic. But in the Greeks like that, you know, Christmas tea like that. Because it's a descendant, isn't it? So, the first meaning of GENIS, you know, the language might be, one man from whom many have, what? Descended. Now, consider the word GENERATION, right? GENEALOGY. Yeah, yeah. GENEALOGY, yeah. Okay. When you go to GENEALOGY, you start with one man, maybe, and you go down and, you know, tell us. And sometimes... But then, another meaning of GENEALOGY, is that multitude of people that descended from me, who were my plan, huh? Good thing, isn't it? That's kind of interesting. Because you have one and many, both called a GENEALOGY, right? And it's something like the universal, because it's something one, sedated, not something one from whom many have, what? Descended, right? Maybe in Hegel, or whatever. We're not ready to do this yet. Hegel takes the most universal thought of our mind, the thought of being, right? He tries to induce the whole universe from our most vague thought. And it actually came from the one who said, I am whoever. It came from him, right? It didn't come from the general idea of being, right? So, GENEALOGY is going to be a name, right? Said with one meaning, right? Of many things. It's going to be common to all of these, right? Specific. Said with one meaning. Many things. Other in kind. In Latin, they're called species, right? In Greek, ados, right? The aden. Species is one of those weird words that has its name as fun. It's sort of a singular and a plural, right? I had somebody to make this thing other in kind, right? It's not just different individuals, right? It's a name said with one meaning of many things other in kind. Like the word quadrilateral, right? Instead of the square, and then the oblong, right? And then the rhombus, which is like a jerked square, right? And then the rhomboid, which is like a jerked oblong, right? And they're all really parallel again, as you find out. Or a tripeza, which is a regular, you know, the four-sided, where the opposite side is an angle of an equal, right? Okay. Here, other in time, right? Okay. Or number instead of what? Odd number and what? Even number, right? What kind of number, right? But now, I think it has to signify something, right? Signifying what it is. Instead of each, right? Definition to understand, right? It's saying of each of these species, right? What it is. But now, can it state completely what it is? If it has only one meaning? Now, take the example I was giving there. Quadrilateral is a genus said of square, oblong, rhombus, right? Rhomboid, right? You know what these things are, right? This is more or less a square. This is an oblong. This is a, what? Rhombus. And this is a, what? Rhomboid, right? It's like a jerk. And this is a, you know what you call it anyway. These four, later on, you see, are all parallel graphs. Because the opposite sides and the opposite angles are all equal. Even here. These two, these two five segments. But this, they don't mean anything, you know. So, in a way, it divides into two, right? Palograms and trapezia, right? Trapezian is a singular. So, when you say the name quadrilateral, which of these, you say, what is this? In general, it's a quadrilateral. It's a plane figure contained by four straight lines. What is this? Why do you call this a quadrata? It's a plane figure contained by four straight lines. It's exactly the same, right? Why do you call this a quadrata? It's a plane figure contained by four straight lines, right? Okay. Now, no, it doesn't answer the question completely, what is a square, does it? It answers in general. In general are connected there, right? You have the same two senses that you have in the Greek word gemis, right? Where can you also one man from whom we need a descendant? Or one man who commands many men, right? General Douglas MacArthur, right? He's not said of all his soldiers, right? But he's commanding them, right? He's a general cause, right? But the genius is something that is said of many, right? So soldier would be what? More like that, more like the genius. It's a name said with one meaning of many men, right? Not a one man who commands many, right? It's a name said with one meaning of many things other in kind, signifying what it is, but not particularly what it is, right? But in general. And that's seen because it's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? Of many things other in kind, signifying what it is. It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It's said with one meaning, right? It means a multitude composed of units, right? It means a multitude composed of units, right? Or a multitude measured by one, right? And that's two of an odd number and an even number. It doesn't tell you in particular what distinguishes the odd number from the even number, but it tells you in general what it is. But the odd number and even number differ in kind, right? Habit is said with what? Public ethics now, for example. We tell our mathematics happens because mathematics is what? More proportionate for our mind, right? My brother Marcus one time with a class he had, he was supposed to teach them some geometry and some logic. So what's the thing he did first? It's geometry, right? He used the geometry to exemplify definition and other things to talk about in syllabus and so on, right? But I did, right? So that's how I begin with the math and math examples, right? Now you go to see the ethics, right? Virtue is a genius. I mean, excuse me. Habit is a genius set of what? Virtue and advice. Now they're other in time. You don't know that. You should know that. No. So it's a name set with one meaning, right? Which is firm disposition, right? A firm, stable disposition, right? And a virtue is that and a vice is that, right? Vice isn't as stable as the virtue, right? So just as quadrilateral is the genus of these four kinds, right? Or of the parallelogram and the tripensium, right? So Habit is the genus of what? You can begin to see how logic can be useful for ethics, right? And for geometry and for what? With Medicaid, right? Government, right? I still divide government into about, what is it? We'll use the rule of two or three, right? Because there are three kinds of government and then what? Multiplied with two kinds of government. There's good and bad government. And it's ruled by one man, by a few, or by what? Dominic, right? Okay. So you have, you know, monarchy and tyranny. You've got aristocracy and oligarchy. And you have republic and democracy. So majority are rooting for our forefathers, right? I was reading a beautiful thing of this book. It was recently in the bookstore there. And it's got the constitution in it at the end of the book, right? But it's got all the things being up to it, right? All the main things. And he had one thing here from Benjamin Franklin there talking about. If you want to come to America, that's what to expect, right? And he's destroying it with false images that they have of what America's going to be like, right? What's good about America and what you can do to get ahead and so on, right? Okay. And then there's, yeah, I just mean another thing today there. Something like that. The Congress was giving open letter to the American people, right? Beautiful thing, you know, right? They had to finish the war, you know? And finish up the British army and so on. And it made me beautiful. Beautiful. You know. I say democracy is even a Georgian word in some ways. You know, Alexander Hamilton, people serve as a beast. So, government there is a genius, right? It means that it would be bad government and ruled by the one, the few, and the many, yeah. So it runs into all the sciences, right? And you say, hey, that's going to be useful for all the sciences, right? Logic will meet syllogism. Logic will meet syllogism. Is a genius said of the, what? Demonstration. Necessary syllogism. I mean, the one that makes you know with certitude. And then dialectical syllogism, right? Okay. Two different species of syllogism. Or stated is said of what? Affirmation and negation, right? They're both a statement, right? So it runs through all the sciences, right? And you say, hey, that's going to be useful for all the sciences, right? So the name called a genus, you could say beginnings, tell you what something is, right? But because it's a name said with one meaning of many things other in kind, it can't say completely what those things are. So those things other in kind, which is said, have something in addition to the genus. And this is one definition they sometimes give the difference. And difference signifies what the species has in addition to the genus, right? What is the square? Well, the genus of square we saw was what? Quadrilateral, right? But in addition to being a quadrilateral, the square has all of its sides what? And in addition to being to that, it has its sides being at right angles, right? You see what I mean? So the difference is what the species has in addition to the genus, right? Okay. Okay. Okay. Sometimes they say the difference is what separates species under the same what? Genies, right? That's another way they kind of define or make no difference, right? So equilateral separates the square from the oblong, right? Right angle doesn't mean. But right angle separates it from the rhomboids and the rhomboids. Because they have two say angles, right? They are acute angles, right? By the square and the oblong you've got all right angles, right? So the difference, right? Separates it from what? Separates species under the same genus. I pointed those two things out and then Corpio won't say that. Those two descriptions of the difference, right? Point to the role of difference in both defining species, right? Because you've only begun to state what the species is in the genus, right? And the difference is like equilateral say for square and right angle, right? We'll complete the definition, right? But the other description of difference is what separates the species under the same genus from each other, right? Points to the role of difference in dividing the genus into its what? Now the godlike porphyry, right? He says chrysaurus to know what genus is, what difference is, what species is, what properties, what accident is not only useful to understand the categories that you asked me about, right? But it's also useful to understand definition. This description of the difference is what the species has in addition to the genus points to its role in completing a definition, which is begun by the genus, right? But not completed, right? And it's also useful, he says, for division, right? Because one of the most important divisions that are made in the science is that of a genus into its what? Species. So, quadrivata is divided by all these species in geometry, right? Have is divided into virtue and vice, right? And the person is divided into its species and so on, right? Now, the word difference, though, right? The Greek word is dia and phora. They're both in the same etymology. Carry, carry apart, carry apart. Pharaoh, phora, very similar in Greek and Latin. The word to carry and dif and dia, apart. So, if you carry things apart, you're separated, right? And that agrees with what the difference does as far as what? Separating species under the same genus, right? It doesn't express the connection of what the species has in addition to the genus. And it follows upon that, right? But now, difference is also a name said with one meaning. Usually, of many, what? Things other in kind. But not as many, right? Although it is possible, you know, that you have a difference maybe that fits only one species, right? Like reason, right? Instead of man. But in the logic books, they don't use one difference for man, right? Man is defined as a mortal rational animal. And their animals are immortal. They are rational, too. Or they thought so, right? But it's interesting the example they choose, right? Because in modern logic books, they take the example of rational animal, right? For man. And rational seems to be the only, what? Belong to man alone, right? But usually, differences apply to one species and you need a combination of differences. And so, in the ancient books, right? The scientific idea that they are a mortal rational animal, right? You have to define man as the mortal rational animal, right? But look at the definition of square, right? And equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral, right? Equilateral is said of what? Square and crombus. So it's said of many, right? Meaning is only more than one, right? It's said of square and crombus, right? Right-angled is said of square, not one. But both right-angled and equilateral is said of square, not one. So you need a combination of differences, huh? And usually you need more than one, what? This is here. One kind of thing. So it's a name said with one meaning of many things other in time. But what does it signify? Not what it is, but how it is. How it is what it is. Signifying how it is what it is. I'm not to admit. We'll say it signifies quality, quint. An essential how. Not how you today, you know? Because that's not essential, right? Not feeling today. How you today. But this is how you are, what you are, right? A quadrilateral is four sides, right? But how are those four sides? Are they equal or unequal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? Are they equal? 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So I am the father of a son, and I am the son of another man, son of a father, right? And knowledge is what? Knowledge of the known. Well, it's knowledge of relation. In words, I speak the same way, right? I am the son of Reno Victor Burquist from Puppets Prairie, Minnesota. I am the son of Reno Victor Burquist. I am the son of Reno Victor Burquist. I am the son of Reno Victor Burquist. I am the son of Reno Victor Burquist. I am the son of Reno Victor Burquist. I am the son of Reno Victor Burquist. I am the son of Reno Victor Burquist. I am the son of Reno Victor Burquist. So knowledge is said to be the knowledge of something, right? So it seems to be relative to something, right? The same way love, right? But is knowledge really a relation or is it a quality of us? Quality. Yeah, yeah. So he has to clear up this relative secundum dici, they call it in Latin, right? What is said to be of another from one whose whole being, whose whole nature is to be towards another, right? So take the relation like half. How much is half? Is it two or is it three or four? You can't say absolutely what two is, but what half is. How much is a half? I'll give you half of my money. Half of my money. Half of my money. How much is that, Mr. Burquist? Half of my money. Half of my money. Half of my money. Half of my money. Half of my money. The judge says, Hey, half of my money. You see, the whole being of half is to be towards another, right? It's nothing in itself. But the whole being of knowledge is to be towards another. So Esther has to clear that up. And that's the way he takes up towards something before, you know. You can see how he's tied to the words, right? You know, Esther likes to proceed from the senses, right? Well, when he first enumerates the ten categories, he does in their proper order, right? Order of being, right? Because quantity, substance underlies all the categories, and quantity is before quality, because some qualities are color, presuppose surface, and so on, right? And quantity and quality come before relations, because relations are based upon quantities or upon qualities, right? Okay. So he enumerates them. Substance, quantity, quality, relation, but he takes them up in substance, quantity, relation, and quality, you see? There's a reason he gets it, right? Now, it's premium, right? Chrysaurus, to know what genus is, what difference is, what species is, what properties and what accident is, is not only necessary to understand Aristotle's categories, what to understand definition, and division, and demonstration, right? Like, give us something. That's what important this must be, okay? But, in what order does porphyry take them up? He takes them up in the protection itself. That was the premium, right? He takes up genus first, then species. That'd be mistaken because he's doing something like Aristotle. Is there a reason why he thinks of genus and species first? In the definition, you might say, of genus. The guy being known to get a genus and species. Same now as a relatives, right? Same now as an opposites. That's where he defines species, right? It simply turns around the definition, right? What is placed under a genus and of which the genus is set, right? Now, you gentlemen are taught by the good Shakespeare to look before and after, right? Don't descend to the lovable beast, huh? Before and after. Well, in what sense does difference come before species and genus of that matter? Why does genus come before difference and difference before species when the endocrinium numerates the phi, right? Yeah, being, yeah. Can there be a square if there cannot be a quadrilateral? Can there be a quadrilateral without being a square? It's before and being, right? Can there be an equilateral quadrilateral without there being a square? Because the rhombus is also equilateral, right? It's equilateral and being without a square. Could the square be without equilateral? No. So, in being, genus and even difference are before species, right? And genus before difference. Because you can have a, what? Quadrilateral. They'll probably be equilateral. But they can't be equilateral. Now, properties and accident we'll see are later on because these are outside the nature of the thing, right? Property and accident. Property is a connection to nature and the accident doesn't. That's what properties put before the accident. But the ones that refer to nature of the thing, what it is, are put first, right? Well, fundamental, right? But in the order of knowing, right? Genus and species are closer than what? Yeah. In order of knowing. Because species is the right of the definition. You just turn around, right? What is placed under a genus? And which genus has said? And answer the question, what is, right? Okay. Can you see that? Very subtle, but I really admire Porphyry that he would enumerate the five in this order, right? And then when he takes them up, he does species right after genus. Comes after right away in knowledge, right? And then comes difference. And notice, when he notifies difference, he gives these other two definitions. The difference is what the species has in addition to the genus. Well, then you define it by species and genus, aren't you? Well, the difference is what separates species under the same genus, right? Both of those are making known what the difference is by what? Genus and species. So genus and species come before difference in or not, right? Of course, in defining it's going to be different, right? In defining it, you say, you've got to first find the genus and then add the differences. See, those same cells, right? You've got to look before an actor to understand these things, right? It's subtle, isn't it? It's subtle, isn't it? It's subtle. It's subtle. It's subtle. It's subtle. It's subtle. It's subtle. It's subtle. Why did he become a Christian, you know? Christianity. We like to point out, John, this guy we all read, he won't know if he has a paraphrase, so he's not a Christian, acting as probably anti-Christian. Hold on to the old religion of what it was. Now this definition here could perhaps in some way be understood, right? Without referring to species like he did in those two descriptions, but still you refer back to genus, right? Probably an accident, these differ from the first three, because the first three refer to the nature of the thing, what it is, right? In general what it is, or specifically what it is, and how it is what it is, right? They all refer to what it is in some sense, right? But the property and accident is something outside the nature, right? That's common to both, right? So, what's the difference? Well the property, in some way, follows upon the nature, right? It's coniculate to nature, and the accident has no connection with the nature. So to go back, let's say, to a triangle and you say, well, it's a property of the triangle to have its interior angles equal to what? Two right angles, right? Well if you know the nature of the triangle, and you know some other things, you can see that follows upon being a triangle that you will have angles inside that are equal to what? Two right angles, huh? You all know the demonstration in geometry. Now suppose you have three green triangles, right? Does green say something about the nature of a triangle? Does it say something connected with the nature of a triangle? So, outside the nature, but the property is connected to nature, right? And this other one is not connected with the nature, right? The accident, huh? Now going back to the despair or fellow delight, huh? The accident as opposed to substance can be a property and not an accident, right? The accident is, right? The accident is something that exists in another, right? The accident is something that exists in another, right? The accident in this sense too. How does Porphyry define the property, right? It gives a definition of property in the fullest sense. The property is what belongs to one species, to every member of that species, and always. Let me put down the three things there. There belongs only one species, every member of it, and always. Now some properties, huh? Some properties, we don't have a name for them, right? But we have, we can use the speech in place for the name, right? So, it's a property of two, which is a species of number, right? To be half of four, and a third of six, right? Does that connect with being two? What two is? Because it's half of four? Okay. And it belongs only to two to be half of four. Anything else half of four? You say good mathematicians, huh? Aspiring. It belongs only to two. Is every two half of four, or just some twos half of four? Does a two, you know, as its life goes on, become suddenly half of four? I guess there's a little bit more of it. It's always, huh? Okay. So, those are the three things, right? That porphyry puts in. I was defining property in the strictest sense, right? But now, sometimes we pick up the word property and we apply it to something else by dropping out part of the what? Yeah. Now, is a property of two to be less than ten? Every two is less than ten, right? Is two sometimes less than ten? No. Yeah. But is two only less than ten? But now, is it by chance that we call this still a property? Because it has a connection with the nature, right? A connection between what two is, right? And it's less than ten, not sometimes, but always, right? And every two whatsoever. There's some connection with what a two is, it seems to me, right? Yeah. But now, is every square green? Are squares always green? What's the third thing? Only squares are green? So that's clearly an accident, right? You see? So you could say that half of four is a property of two, right? And in some sense, less than ten is a property too, right? But not as much so, right? Now, this is another way that a name becomes what? Equivocal by reason, right? By dropping out part of its what? Meaning. Yeah. By generalizing in a sense its meaning, right? Now, I have a beautiful example of this in Aristotle in the three books on the soul, right? Where he says that although grammatically, to see and to hear is an active grammatical sense, right? What is really seeing or hearing? Is it the eye acting upon colour? Or as a result of the colour acting upon the eye? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. That's why, you know, you have to look at the sun, sun, the... Cliffs of zero. All right. All right. All right. And I'd look at a light too much, you'd get kind of blinded, right? These kids, they say they're going deaf because the band is too loud or something, right? So Aristotle says that sensing is an undergoing, right? It's not an acting upon, right? It's a being acted upon, right? A result of a being acted upon and not an acting upon another, right? Now the Greek word for undergoing there, of course, is suffering, right? Now, you probably don't think upon the fact that I've been acting upon your ears, right? Maybe it hasn't been too painful, you know? I do. But if the last half hour I'd been sticking a pen in you, you'd be very much aware of the fact that I'm acting upon you, right? And so when you're acting upon in a way that suffers and is harmful to you, you really recognize that. That's very sensible, you know? But you walk around all day, you know, and color is acting upon you and color is acting upon you. You don't think about it, do you? But if you bump into something, you know, oh, oh, you know? We do sooner or later every day, not every day, but we... Then you're very much the fact that you've been acting upon, right? Somebody bumps into you, you know, and knocks your glasses off and tackles you something, you're being acted upon. But you drop off the idea that you're being acted upon in a way that is, what, harmful to you, right? In fact, if you're listening to the music of Mozart, your ear is being perfected by hearing the music of Mozart, right? Because all knowledge is such as good, and knowledge of a better thing is better knowledge, right? So to hear the music of Mozart rather than this rock and roll is a perfection of your, right? So you've gone a long way from the first meaning of undergoing, right? Which is a connotation of something bad, right? If I say about some poor guy, he's undergone a lot in life, it hasn't been for the good, right? But you drop off part of the idea of undergoing, right? That you're being acted upon in a way that is painful or harmful to you, right? And then you would. You're still being acted upon, though, in a somewhat bodily way because the senses are bodily. But he's dropped off part of the meaning of it, right? Being harmful, right? And then finally says that understanding is undergoing, right? And now he drops off the idea that it's even a body, right? But you're still being acted upon, right? And the idea is like in the phantasms of the images. So the word is being carried over by being generalized, right? Or by dropping out part of its meaning, right? I'm very fond of this word, hodas, right? Road, eh? And I talk about the three roads in our mind. The natural road, the common road of reason, and the private road of each reason to acknowledge. And, you know, Thomas says, you know, virtue is the road to happiness, and vice is the road to misery. But what's the first meaning of road, right? Well, and I ask my son Paul, as a little boy, you know, what do you think of the basic road in human knowledge? He says, there are cars and trucks on it. I said, road means the end. It's something that has cars and trucks on it, right? And what do you do? You drop out the idea of what? Yeah. But you drop out the idea of whatever the road is made out of, cement or asphalt or something. And you keep the idea of the before and after that's in the road, right? And now the word road has become, what? Equivocal by reason. So the road in our knowledge is not, you know, cement in our knowledge. Warren Burr used to say, you know, adults are like cement. They're all mixed up and set. I think that's very funny in high school. You know, you kind of had a road. The road in our knowledge is no cement or tar in our knowledge, right? It's a before and after in our knowledge, right? Sensing comes before memory, and memory before experience, and experience before a knowledge of the universal, right? It's a before and after in our knowledge. So we speak analogously, as he says, right? Or equivocally by reason, of a road in our knowledge, right? Aristotle even calls philosophy a methodize, right? It's over a road, yeah? It follows a road, right? It's a before and after, right? I was meeting with the students there on last Tuesday night. They were doing the, looking at the premium to the three books on the soul. And Thomas says that Aristotle renders the student desirous of knowingness, and then he renders him teachable, right? And attentive. Well, how does Aristotle make him teachable? By showing him the distinction and order about proceeding, right? In a sense, you make him teachable by showing him the road to follow, right? Whether you're following the teacher or following the book, right? Which is the teacher, in a way. So the word property, right, can be carried over, right? To things that have only two or maybe even one of those things. So long as there's connection with the nature, right? But you're making the word equivocal by what? By reason, yeah. And not by chance. But he gives it the full definition, right? Of the property in the strictest sense and fullest sense, right? What belongs to only one species, to every member of that species, and always, right? Three. You need three things here to have a property in the fullest sense. So when Aristotle demonstrates that the soul is immortal, right? And that's connected with the nature of what the soul is, what he's shown about the nature of the soul. But is it the only thing that's immortal? The Greeks used to refer to us as the Homer. We're the mortals. And the gods are the immortals, huh? Immortals are the synonym for the gods, right? There's something godlike that our soul is, in fact, immortal. And it's connected with the nature of our soul, right? But it's not the property that belongs only to man, right? You know, they're always saying this, Lithuania is always talking about the immortal one. But Lithuania speaks of God as the immortal one. What I say, can you think of the child of the divine mercy? Yeah, yeah. But God in there is called the immortal one, right? We say it every day. Yeah, yeah. So man is not the only thing that's immortal. Our soul, I mean. Once he resurrected, we're the immortal one. That's what Athanasius means. Athanasius? Yeah. Without death, yeah. Without the Athanasius. Yeah, that's good. I said, you know the Greeks. If you didn't, I said, you know what it means? I said, you're mortals. Hallelujah. Hallelujah. Well, the accident is not connected to nature, right? So green instead of square or triangle, right? Well, notice how useful it would be to know what these five things are, right? The nature, right? It's so green instead of a triangle and a circle and so on, right? It's a set of many things, huh? But notice what the great Porphyry says now, huh? To come back to his premium, right? See, once he's young, he's a little horse and premium, right? He says to Porphyry, to Cresaurus, to understand what a genius is, what a difference is, what a species is, what a property is, what a accident. It is useful not only, Cresaurus, to know the categories of Aristotle, which is what his request was, right? What led to his request, right? And if he met. It's useful for understanding definition and division and demonstration. Now, we've talked a bit about how definition is involved here, huh? What you define is a species, right? You begin the definition by the genus, right? And you complete the definition by the differences. That's useful to know, right? Okay. It's also useful, he says, for division, right? Because one of the most important kinds of division is the division of a genus into its species by differences, right?