Tertia Pars
Lecture 65: Christ's Predestination and Its Exemplarity

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to the predestination of Christ. Then we ought to consider about the predestination of Christ. And about this, four things are asked. First of all, whether he was predestined. And secondly, whether he was predestined according as he was a man. And third, whether his predestination is an exemplar of our predestination. That's an interesting thing. Average guy wouldn't think about. And four, whether it is a cause of our predestination. I wonder if that's going to add something to three. Because exemplar is one kind of cause that Aristotle talks about in the second book of natural hearing and the fifth book of wisdom. So he says, to the first one goes for it thus. It seems that to Christ it does not belong to be predestined. For the limit, there's the word terminus, right? So we get the three terms in the soldiers. The term or limit of each predestination would seem to be adoption of what? Sons. According to that of Ephesians chapter 1 verse 5. He predestined us for the adoption of what? Sons. St. John talks a little bit like that in the epistle, right? That we are the sons of God and so on. And he goes on to talk about it. Now you appear what we'll be, right? But we'll be like him when he appears. We shall see him as he is. In his text. But to Christ it does not belong to be an adopted son. Therefore to Christ it does not belong to be what? Predestined, huh? That's a good argument. Moreover, in Christ two things are to be considered. Predestined, the human nature and the person. But it cannot be said that Christ is predestined by reason of human nature. Because this is false. The human nature is the son of God. Likewise, neither by reason of the person. Because that person does not have from grace that it is the son of God. But it has this from nature. The predestination is of those things which are from grace. As has been said in the first part. Therefore Christ was not predestined the son of God. Moreover, just as that which is made not always was, right? So also that which was predestined. In the predestination implies a certain antecedent. Antecedents. But Christ was always the son of God. Because Christ was always the son of God. Oh, excuse me, yeah. Because Christ was always God and the son of God. Not properly as it said that that man was made the what? Son of God. Therefore, for a like reason, it ought not to be said that Christ was predestined the son of God. But how do you get into this kind of strange question, you know? Well, look at the said counter here. Said counter asked what Apostles teach it, what St. Paul himself says. By Antoinette Messiah, he's called the Apostle. John the 23rd, and Paul the 2nd would call him, Peter, the Princess of the Apostles, right? But Thomas points out how in the New Testament, they are spoken of as the Apostle, right? These two guys. So, but against this is what the Apostle says. Romans 1.4, speaking of Christ, who is predestined the son of God in virtue. I answer it should be said that as is clear from those things which were said in the first part, predestination, taken properly, is a certain divine preordering from eternity about those things which are going to come to be in time through the grace of God. You got that? Stop and say, okay. It's a preordering, right? From eternity, those things which are going to come about in time through the grace of God. So he's going to knock Paul off his horse, right? Give him some grace. Well, it doesn't say he's not God. So I'm sure he says he fell down. There's nothing about a horse. There's nothing about a horse. He was unnoticed. This solver in time was made through the grace of union, right? By God. That man was God and God was what? Nor it can't be said that God from eternity did not preorder this to come about in time. Because it would follow that something happened newly to the divine mind. And it's necessary, therefore, to say that the union of natures in the person of Christ comes under the eternal predestination of God. And by reason of this, Christ is said to be, what, predestined, huh? The grace of union, huh? What can take place by the grace of union that God is man and man is, what, God? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the apostle speaks there about the predestination by which we are predestined that we might be the adopted sons of God. But just as Christ, in a singular way, before all others, is the natural son of God, so in a certain, what, unique way, right, singular way, is, what, predestined, huh? Now, the second objection requires a longer reply, right? And the third, oh my God, it's really long. Okay? You've got to feel these in the potency. The potency, you know, goes, Christ. Apply to the objection, so. A whole little treatise there, you know, and apply. So this second objection was saying that there are two things in Christ to consider, and by reason of neither of them can he be said to be predestined, right? Human nature is not him, and the Son of God and his divine generation is not predestined, so. To the second, it should be said that as the gloss says, right, on Romans 1, 4, some say that the predestination ought to be, that predestination ought to be understood about the nature, not about the person. Because, because, to human nature, it was made or done, right, that this grace, right, would be united to the Son of God and the unity of the person. But according to this, the speech of the apostle is improper on account of two things. First, for a common notion, for we do not say that the nature of someone is predestined, but the, what, person. Because to be predestined is to be directed to salvation, which belongs to the suppositum acting on account of the end of, what, the attitude, huh? Secondly, for a special reason, because to be the Son of God does not belong to the, what, human nature. For this is false, that the human nature is the Son of God. Unless one wishes to expound it by this extorted, this strained accusation, right? Who has predestined the Son of God in virtue, that is, has predestined that human nature would be united to the Son of God in his person, huh? It remains, therefore, that predestination is attributed to the person of Christ, huh? Not in itself, right? Or according as it subsists in the divine nature, but according as it subsists in, what, human nature. Whence, when the apostle said before, who was made to him from the seed of David, according to the flesh, he adds, who was predestined the Son of God in power. So one might understand that according as he was made from the seed of David, according to the flesh, he's predestined the Son of God in what? Power. Because although it is natural to that person, considered by himself that he be the Son of God in power, it was not ever natural to him according to its human nature, according to which it belonged to him through grace. The grace of union, that is to say. That's a little thing to chew on a little bit, huh? Close up the machine, and then tomorrow I'll get out of canvases. But I can't, I can't see that. The predestination is a difficult thing, you know. I first got into predestination with those treatises of Augustine, the predestination of saints. And my cousin Donald had, you know, these two volumes, the Augustine there that they have in English, you know. And I'd go over to my aunt's, and I'd go up into Donald's room there and get the Winds of Augustine and start to read these things. You know, and that's quite a introduction to the subject. You know, where did he get the time? I mean, he must have bilocated most of his active ministry as a bishop, because he writes out these letters where he's expounding, you know, huge stuff. Very profiled, very subtle. So he's writing on and on and on and on and on. It's just one letter he wrote to this guy over here. A third objection, right? He can't be said properly to be made the Son of God, right? Therefore he can't be said to be predestined the Son of God. To the third, it should be said that Origen, upon the epistle to the Romans, says that this letter of the apostle, who is destined, predestined some texts have, the Son of God in virtue. Oh, okay, they drop out the predestinatus, right? Okay. So that there's not designated any antecedents, and thus it has nothing of difficulty. Others, the antecedents, which is designated in this participle, predestinatus refers to, not to that which is to be the Son of God, but to his manifestation, according to that accustomed mode, customary mode of speaking scripture, that a thing is said to come about when it are made known. That the sense might be that Christ was predestined to be made known as the Son of God, but thus not properly is predestination taken. For someone is said properly to be predestined, according as he's directed to the end of what? The attitude. So predestination is a part of divine providence, right? And by divine providence, all things are directed towards their what? End, right? So Thomas takes up divine providence in the third book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, after he shows what is the end of creation, and so on. Predestination is something for the rational preacher, right? But for his end, that's properly the meaning of it. For thus, not properly, says predestination, is taken. For someone is said properly to be predestined, according as he's directed to the end of beatitude. That's a part of providence for rational creatures. But the beatitude, and for those who may be saved, but the beatitude of Christ does not depend upon what? Our knowledge, huh? And therefore, it is better said, in Edis Echendo Medicine, that that antecession, which is implied in the particle, predestinatus, does not refer to the person in himself, but by reason of what? Human nature. Because that person, although from eternity he was the Son of God, nevertheless, this was not always so, that he was subsisting in the what? That what subsists in human nature was the what? Son of God. When Augustine says in the book on the predestination of saints, and I'm trying to get out of that when I first read it, that Jesus was predestined, that who in the future was to be according to the flesh, the Son of David, right, would also be in power the Son of God. And it should be considered that although this participle predestinatus implies antecedents, just as this participle factus made, right, nevertheless, in a different way. For fieri, coming to be, pertains to the thing according as it is in itself. But to be predestined belongs to something, to someone, according as they are in the knowledge or the apprehension, the grasping of someone for ordering. but that which is, what, under some form or nature, secundum rem, can be apprehended either insofar as it's under that form or also absolutely. And because absolutely it does not belong to the person of Christ that he began to be the Son of God, right, it belongs, however, to him according as he's understood or grasped as existing in, what, human nature. Because this at some time began to be that, what, that something, yeah, for this at some time began to be that what was existing in human nature was the Son of God. and therefore this is more true that Christ was predestined the Son of God than Christ was made the Son of God, right? Because Christ is more the name of him as, what, subsisting as human nature, right? So he was predestined to be, what, the Son of God. But he's not made the Son of God because the Son of God was not made. He's not going to drop the subject entirely, he's going to go on. Does Thomas pray for her? You know how he sees prayer after communion, he prays, you know, had vices removed and then virtue, right? What virtues does he mention, right? Charity. Humility, obedience, charity, and patience. You know, to go through these things, you know, with all this detail, right? You know, it says, Aristotle in the second book of wisdom there, he says that some people don't like this precision, right? Because it seems you're being stingy, right? And that guy who's tight with money and counts every penny, right? And can't say keep the change or something, you know? He can't bring himself. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He's got it. Well, they say, you know, during the 1952 campaign there, you know, Senator Taffy's a very strict man, you know, and he only left somebody a dime tip. And the person got so mad only getting a dime tip from the security for the Republican nomination for presidency that he calls in the reporters, or the woman, I guess it was, complaining about this dime tip, and it's all this thing gets out about. It's funny things that happen, though. I guess when Dewey was running for office, right? And they're hanging, and he said, well, stop, train stops, right? And so he's kind of, you know, at the end of the train, he gives his speech, you know. Well, some guy makes a mistake up in front of the train, and the car, you know, and he lets out some kind of a swear. So he's browbeat the poor guy, you know. So Shakespeare, in the, you've got to watch the word here now, but he speaks of niggard truth, and I'm not talking about our black brothers. But if you use the word niggard, you're a toponaut, because people wouldn't understand. But what niggard means, when you're niggard, you're stingy, right? So he calls truth as being what? Niggard. Yeah, yeah. As opposed to, you know, flattering, right? You see? And most of the time, we, you know, flatter somebody, you know, and say how wonderful they are, you know, and how wonderful the meal was, what it was, you know, that they've done, you know, and it's a wonderful paper, you know, and so on. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And if we are, you know, Shakespeare says a flattery, you know, kind of smooths things over, you know. But if you just were truthful about what someone has done or not done, you know, you'd make a lot of enemies. So, just talking about truth, it seems to be something kind of stingy, right? You know? So you could see Thomas, you know, you know, right down to the little, you know, the last penny, you know. The president isn't stingy, that's for sure. He makes so many speeches. You're talking about things, some of the money there, that big money that they passed, you know, the recovery bill, where it was. And usually you have to pay off the debt. This is the most fascinating thing. Many might pay off the debt. Rush Limbaugh would say, why not just, you know, pay off the whole debt, you know. That'd be crazy. You guys are protective of some of the madness out of the world there, you know. We're here for a reason, I swear. Yeah, yeah, yeah. At least one. Some of us are many. It's tottering out there, huh? Okay. To the second one proceeds thus, it seemed that this is false. Christ, according as he is, what, man, is predestined to be the, what? Son of God, huh? For this is, what, each one according to some time that he was predestined to be. In that the predestination of God does not, what? Yeah, fail. If therefore Christ, according as he is man, was predestined to be the Son of God, it would seem to follow that, what? He is the Son of God, according as he is, what? Man. But this is false. Therefore the first, huh? So Christ is saying, as man is not the Son of God, right? So how can he predestined to be the Son of Man? We puzzled here. More of that which belongs to Christ, according as he is man, man, belongs to every man, huh? In that he is of one species, of one kind, with other men, huh? If therefore Christ, according as he is man, is predestined to be the Son of God, it would follow that to each man this belongs. But this is false, huh? Therefore the first, huh? Something unique about this man, I don't know. More that this from eternity is predestined, that at some time will come about in time, huh? But more is this true, the Son of God was made man, and the Word was made flesh. That's what it says in John, right? Then that man was made the Son of God. So someone said to you, would you say that, that, would you rather say that God became man in the Incarnation, rather than man became God? Yeah. Therefore more is this true, that Christ, according as he is the Son of God, is predestined to be a man. And then the reverse, that Christ, according as he is man, is predestined to be the Son of God, right? Especially given he was the Son of God before he was man. Now Thomas, you don't mean to be that you want to take that by the side, Thomas. You can't possibly mean that, can you? But against this this is what Augustine says in the book on the predestination of the saints. High school reading for me. Yeah. You mastered it. It's such a tender age. It mastered me. The Lord of glory, right? Insofar as he was, what? A man was made the, what? Son of God. You say him to be, what? Predestined, huh? He's pretty much an authority, this Augustine's son. Well, let's see what Thomas says, huh? Like Houdini, getting himself in one tie-up, you know, another, and he's got to find a way out. He's never going to untie this one. You know, I told you how there's a likeness there between fiction there where the plot Aristotle says you have, what? Tying of the knot and then tying the knot. And something like that in philosophy, you know, you tie the knot and then you untie it. And, uh, but Aristotle has another saying in the book on the poetic art that the, the young or inexperienced poets or the inferior poets are better at tying the knot than untieing it, huh? And I think you've all seen, you know, maybe a movie or a story or something like that and it's kind of interesting the way the complication developed than the way it did. You didn't know how to untie it to pull it, huh? And, uh, so I say, well, that's the same is true of philosophers, right? They're much better at tying themselves and others into a knot than they are to untie the knot, right? And that's what separates the men from the boys, so to speak. So let's see how it does to untie this knot. I answer, it should be said that in predestination two things are able to be considered. one from the side of the, what, the internal predestination itself, huh? And, again, okay. According to this, it implies a certain antecedence with respect to that which comes under predestination. So the word pray there, the preface there, I mean, prefix there. In another way, it can be considered according to the temporal effect, which is some gratuitous, some graceful gift of God, right? It should be said, therefore, according to both of these, predestination is attributed to Christ by reason of human nature, what? Alone. For human nature was not always, what? United to the world. And to it also, through grace was this bestowed, that it might be united to the Son of God in person. And therefore, only by reason of human nature does predestination belong to Christ. When Augustine says in the book on the predestination of the saints, that the predestined was what? This so much and so high and what? And the highest, right? Subjection, right? That something could not be what? Higher, yeah. In other words, you couldn't be predestined to something higher, human nature, than to be united to what? God in person. But that, we say, belongs to someone according as his man, that belongs to it by reason of what? Human nature. And therefore, it should be said that Christ, according as he is man, is predestined to be the, what? Son of God, huh? And the first objection was saying that he can't be the Son of God, according as he is man. So, how can he be predestined to be the Son of God, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that when it is said that Christ, according as he is man, is predestined to be the Son of God, this determination, according as, right, man, can refer to the act signified by the participle in two ways. In one way, on the side of that which, in a material way, comes under predestination. And in this way, it is false. For it is the sense that be predestined that Christ, according as he is man, be the Son of, what? God. And in this sense, the objection, what? Goes forward, yeah. Another way, it can refer to, what? The very notion of the act itself, right? Insofar as predestination implies in its definition, both, what? Antecedents and a gratuitous, what? Effect. And in this way, it belongs to Christ's predestination by reason of human nature, as has been said. And according to this, it is said to be predestined according as he is, what? Man, huh? That's a little thing, chew on that a little bit, huh? What? This whole question. Yeah. Now, the second objection, what belongs to Christ as he is man, belongs to every man. Well, I'm not even careful about that. To the second, it should be said that something can belong to some man by reason of human nature in two ways. In one way, thus, that human nature is a cause of that, right? Just as to be visible, capable of laughter and so on, belongs to Socrates by reason of human nature, from whose principles this has caused, right? And in this way, predestination does not belong either to Christ nor to any other man, right? By reason of human nature. And in this sense, the objection, what, precedes, huh? Another way, that is said to belong to someone by reason of human nature, of which human nature is, what? Susceptible, right? And thus, we say that Christ is predestined by reason of human nature, because predestination refers to the exalting, huh? The rising up of human nature in him, right? As has been said, huh? You know, if you think of Mary there, you could say, Mary was predestined to be the mother of God, right? But not every woman is predestined to be the mother of God, huh? To have that same exaltation, you know? I mean, it's a similar exaltation in some sense. Because the human, the divine nature of Christ was not exalted by this human, huh? In fact, Philippians says he kind of, what? Emptied himself, right? And the third objection, that is predestined from eternity, that will come about sometime in time, right? But more is this true that the Son of God was made man, and that man was made the Son of God. Therefore, more is this true that Christ, according as his Son of God, is predestined to be man, and that Christ, according as he is man, is predestined to be the Son of God. That's an interesting objection, huh? Very interesting. The third, therefore, it should be said, that as Augustine says in the book on the predestination of the saints, that is what? In an inexpressible way, right? Made that what? Unique, receiving of man by the Word of God, huh? That the Son of man, at the same time, on account of the, what? Man received, right? Yeah. I got a footnote here about the, should have said more on account of the received humanity, right? Because I'm not speaking the way he should altogether. Um, and the Son of God, yeah, and the Son of God, on account of the, what? Only begotten God, receiving, we're taking it on, is truly and properly said, right? But the Son of God, the Son of man is said to be the Son of God, and vice versa, I guess, huh? And therefore, because that receiving, under predestination, is something gratuitous, both can be said, that the Son of God was predestined to be man, and the Son of man predestined to be the Son of God. Because, however, um, grace was not made for the Son of God, that he'd be a man, but more human nature, that he united to the Son of God, more properly, it can be said that Christ, according as man, is predestined to be the Son of God, than that Christ, according as he is the Son of God, is predestined to be man, right? So if you're just saying, you know, did man become God, or God become man, I think you could say both, but maybe you'd say more that God became man, right? But in terms of predestination, if you have the definition of predestination, there's something gratuitous, right? Well, then, it's by the grace that the human nature there receives, right, that it's appropriately taken on by the Son of God, right? Well, it's not by grace that the Son of God is appropriately able to take on human nature, right? God has no grace, but the human nature does. God has no grace, but the human nature does. God has no grace. God has no grace. God has no grace. Time for another one here? Okay. To this. To theory, one proceeds thus. It seems that the predestination of Christ is not the exemplar of our predestination, right? It's the thing that Augustine says, I'm going to quote it here. God became man so that man might become God. For the exemplar pre-exists to the exemplato, the exemplar. But nothing pre-exists to the eternal. Since, therefore, our predestination is eternal, it seems that the predestination of Christ is not the exemplar of our predestination. Moreover, the exemplar leads into a knowledge of the exemplard, but it's not necessary that Christ, that God be led into what? A knowledge of our predestination from something else. Because, as is said in Romans 8, those whom he foreknew, these he also, what? Predestined. Therefore, the predestination of Christ is not the exemplar of our predestination. If he needed that to know about ours. Moreover, the exemplar is conformed to the exemplard, but of a different reason seems to be the predestination of Christ than our predestination. Because we are predestined to be adoptive sons. But Christ is predestined to be the Son of God in power, as is said in Romans 1.4. Therefore, his predestination is not the exemplar of our predestination. But against all this is what Augustine says in the book on the predestination of the saints. For that is a most clear light of predestination and of grace, the Savior himself, right? The mediator of God and men, the man, Christ Jesus. But he is said to be the light of predestination and grace insofar as through his predestination and grace is made known our predestination. It seems to pertain to the notion of exemplar. Therefore, the predestination of Christ is the exemplar of our predestination. Thomas begins with a distinction here. I answer it should be said that predestination can be considered in two ways. In one way, according to the act of the one predestinating him. And thus, the predestination of Christ cannot be said to be the exemplar of our predestination. For in one way, and by one eternal act, God predestined both us and Christ. In another way, predestination can be considered according to that to which someone is predestined. Which is the limit of the predestination and the effect of it. And according to this, the predestination of Christ is the exemplar of our predestination. And this in two ways. First, as regards the good to which we are predestined. For he was predestined to this, that he would be the natural son of God. We are predestined to the sonship of adoption, which is nevertheless a certain, what? Partaken likeness of the divine, the natural sonship. Once it is said in Romans 8, 29, whom he foreknow, these he also predestined, right? To be conformed after the image of his, what? Son. Maybe the image there is taken in the sense of exemplar, right? Rather than the usual sense of image. Another way, as regards the way of, what? Obtaining that good, which is the grace. Which in Christ is most manifest, huh? Because human nature in him, no merits preceding right, was united to the son of God. And from the fullness of his grace, we have all, what? We see, huh? And the first objection proceeds from the, what? The side of the act of the one predestining, huh? The same way for the second objection. And the third says, it is not necessary that the exemplard be conformed to the exemplar in regard to all things, right? But it suffices that in some way the exemplard imitates its exemplar, right? In the last article. What? That was easy. Article 4, where the predestination of Christ is a cause. of our predestination. To the fourth one goes forward thus, it seems that the predestination of Christ is not the cause of our predestination, for the eternal does not have a cause, but our predestination is eternal. Therefore the predestination of Christ is not the cause of our predestination. Moreover, that which depends on the simple will of God does not have any other cause except the will of God. But our predestination depends upon the simple will of God, according to that of Ephesians 1. We are predestined according to his, what, proposal, who does all things by the counsel of his will. Therefore the predestination of Christ is not the cause of our, what, predestination. Moreover, the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But if one takes away the predestination of Christ, there is not taken away our predestination. Because even if the Son of God was not made flesh, there would be another way possible for our salvation, as Augustine says in the book on Trinity. And Thomas had argued before, right, that the incarnation was not, what, absolutely necessary for our redemption, right, but for the well-being of our redemption, right? Therefore the predestination of Christ is not the cause of our predestination. But against this is what is said in Ephesians 1.5. He predestined us in the adoption of sons through Jesus Christ. So he says, I answer it should be said that if predestination is considered according to the very act of predestination, then the predestination of Christ is not the cause of our predestination. Since he said before, by one and the same act, God predestined Christ and us, right? But if predestination be considered according to the term of predestination, then the predestination of Christ is the cause of our predestination. For thus God foreordered our salvation by predestining it from eternity in this way that it be, what, completed through Jesus Christ. For under predestination, eternal predestination, that only falls that which is going to come about in time, but also the way and order according to which it is going to be completed in time. Now he says the first two objections are according to those reasons, they proceed from predestination according to the act of predestination, which is the same act of which he did both, so he admits that. And to the third, it should be said, if Christ was not incarnated, God would have foreordered men to be saved through some other cause. But because he foreordered the incarnation of Christ, the same time with this, he foreordered that he would be the cause of our salvation. So that's in the one section there, but now the next one is about those things which pertain to Christ in comparison to us. First about adoring him, secondly is about his being, what, a mediator, right, to God. That's in each two questions, huh?