Tertia Pars
Lecture 55: Christ's Will: Unity and Distinction in the Incarnation

Transcript
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Yeah, this is going to be a good meal tonight. Once you come around the table there, I'm going to give you little tidbits, you know, it's spoiling you. But now the pleasures of understanding, right? Pleasures of understanding God, these are pleasures that we share with the angels. Pleasures of understanding geometry and so on, right? Okay. But now the pleasures of the fine arts are what? Yeah. And as Austin Lee said, and I thought he said it very well, the pleasures of the fine arts, you know, that's saying music and painting and, you know, literature and so on, they're too high for the, what, beasts and too low for the angels, right? So my grand angel probably said, what's he listening to Mozart for again? Or what's he reading Simbeline? I was just reading Simbeline. I finished it up this morning. And, but now, the reason for that is that the pleasures of the fine arts involve reason and, what, the emotions and the senses, right? At least reading Shakespeare and Mozart do. So they involve the whole man. So they're, they're the ones, as Austin Lee said, that are most pleasingly proportioned to us, right? By the pleasures of understanding, we share with the angels, but we partake of those pleasures in a way inferior to the way in which the, what, animals do, right? I mean, I mean, I mean, the angels do, but now the pleasures that we share with the animals, we have them in a more refined way. So we cook our food and season it, and maybe have some wine with it, I don't know, maybe you guys don't. But I mean, you know, and, and, you know, sit on our table and like a fork and so on, right? A little bit so fast. So, we have, you know, the French involved in all those sauces and so on, right? And, and, so you have those, those three groups, right? Okay. The one thing the animals don't share is that, the fact that their emotions partake of, what? The will, yeah. Except in so far as the man trains them in some way, right? Well, it's kind of marvelous to see, you know, you know, the way a dog in particular is attached to its master. And, and they seem to have, to even fight and, and sacrifice themselves, the master or someone. So, it's not some praiseworthy there, right? Man's best friend. It's similar to the horse, too, because I, I know my sister, I wrote always when I was very young, you know, my sister continued. I just wrote for a short while when I was young, and she continued because she got married. And, and although I knew the pony she had, you know, for years and years, and he sort of recognized me, I guess I'd come over once in a while. But I didn't used to ride him that much, and so I remember once, after many years, like, I said, I want to ride him today. She said, okay. He wouldn't do anything I want. Because he knows, and not only that, but the horse can tell if you're nervous if you're on top, because they can, they can sense your senses. You can sense your muscle tone or anything else. As so as I said, I'm not going to do anything that you want, because they know you're not the boss. There's nothing. Some horses are better than others, like that. Okay, look, he applies you now, right? Mm-hmm. So, the first objection was based upon what Aristotle says, that the will is in the rational part, right? He's talking about what is a will by participation, right? And I suppose that way of speaking is a little time unusual for Thomas, although it's like Aristotle's way of speaking of the part that's reasonable, right? By participation, right? But I suppose he wants to introduce that expression in talking about Christ, right? Because very much Christ's emotions were partaking of, what? The will and the reason, right? So, the first should be said that that reason proceeds from the will essentially said, right? Which is not except in the, what? Understanding part. But the will participative, huh? By participation said, can also be in the sensitive part insofar as it obeys reason, right? To the second, it should be said that sensuality is signified by the serpent, not as regards the, what? Nature of sensuality which Christ took on, but as regards the corruption of the fulmitis, right? See, Thomas calls that the lex fulmitis, you know, when St. Paul says, I find another law on my members, right? That's rebelling against. It's called the lex fulmitis, right? And then they'll have the corruption, therefore, due to original sin. Wayne, Christ took on an fulmitis, huh? So, you know, when Thomas talks about the sin of Adam and Eve, he says that before they sinned, their emotions were fully obedient and under their, what? Reason and will, right? And so the original sin of Adam and Eve could not have been a sin of the flesh, right? That they ate too much one day or something like that. It had to be a spiritual sin, right? It would be like God, right? Good and evil and so on. So the angel's kind of appealing to their spiritual nature, huh? And, but then after the sin, then they're embarrassed by their nakedness, right? And they want to cover themselves, right? And that's a sign that their emotions now are not subject to their reason and they're embarrassed by this disorder in them, huh? Which is a punishment, right? So long as their reason and will are subject to God, then what is below the reason and will is subject to them, right? But when they revolted, right? Then the lower, you're punished by having the lower revolt, right? A little bit like, going back to the analogy of the father and the son, like the reason the emotions, well, he has his son revolt against him, huh? Deep and he suffers, right? When his son is killed and everything, right? And the third thing he's saying, well, the will follows nature, right? But in Christ, there is not except one nature apart from the divine. Therefore, in Christ, there is not except one human will. He says, to the third, it should be said that where there is one on account of another, there, there seems to be only, what? One. And this, the reference here is to Aristotle's topics, huh? Lots of work, yeah. Just as surface, which is visible through color, is one visible with the, what? Color. And likewise, because sensuality is not said to be will except because it partakes of the will of reason, just as there is one nature, human nature in Christ, so also there is placed one, what? Human will in Christ, because of their conformity, right? Mm-hmm. In case we have to stop there. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Thank you, God. Thank you, my guardian angel, our guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas, deo gratias. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, think of the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and allows us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Praise to you, God. Help us to understand how it's your written. Thank God for your guardian angel, best friend you have. Okay, to the third one goes forward thus. It seems that in Christ there are two wills as regards reason. For Damascene says in the second book that two-fold is the will of man. This is kind of a strange way of sticking it. He raised in this article. The natural, which is called philesis, and the rational, which is called what? Philesis, huh? Grace. But Christ in human nature had whatever detains the perfection of human nature. Therefore, both of the four said wills was in Christ. Moreover, the desiring power is diversified in man, according to the diversity of the grasping or knowing power. And therefore, by the difference of sense and understanding, there is diversified in man sense desire and the intellectual desire. And likewise, as regards the apprehension of man, there is posited a difference of reason and of understanding, both of whom were in Christ. Therefore, in him, there is a two-fold will. One intellectual or understandable, and the other rational. So is the ability to understand and the ability to reason two different abilities in us? Yeah. We make some distinctions, though, right? Just to understand and to reason is not the same thing. Moreover, by some, there is placed in Christ. And here's my namesake there, Hugo of St. Victor, right? Because I was actually, what, Christian Hugo was my first name, Hugo. And my confirmation name is Victor, so. My father's name, we know Victor, so I thought I should take the name Victor. Oh, he's got some closeness to Hugo of St. Victor, because of his son. Yeah, I were if I said first. And the work that he referred to is, it looks like the, about the four wills in Christ, huh? So, by some is placed in Christ the will of piety, which cannot be placed in him except on the side of reason. Therefore, in Christ, on the side of reason, there are many, what, wills. But against all this is that in any order, there is one first mover. But the will is the first mover in the genus of human acts. Therefore, in one man, there is not except one will, properly speaking, which is the will of reason. But Christ is one man. Therefore, in Christ, there is only one human, what, will. I have enough problems with my will without having two or four wills, if you don't have to continue it. Enough internal conflict between my will and my emotions without having a conflict of wills. Well, Thomas says, I answer. It should be said, as has been said, that the word will, voluntas, sometimes is taken for the power and sometimes for the, what, act, huh? You can see that in the term, you know, like intellectus, huh? As Thomas used, he used intellectus sometimes for the power of understanding, right? And then for the act of understanding. And sometimes also, in a third way, for the habit. Aristotle, you know, calls the power of understanding nous there in Greek. But then one of the virtues of reason is called nous, too, huh? So these words are connected, but they're equivocal by reason, huh? If therefore will is taken for act, then it's necessary in Christ on the side of reason to place, what, two wills, right? That is to say, two species of acts of the will. For the will, as has been said in the second part, is both, what, of the end and of those things which are for the end. And in a different way, it is, what, carried towards both of these, then. For it is carried towards the end, simply and absolutely, as in what is by itself or as such good, right? But in that which is towards the end, it is, what, carried with a certain, what, comparison. According to me, I said, it has goodness from the order to another, right? So should you get that new fuge shot, you know? People are disagreeing about this, right? I heard one of the commentators there on the TV there saying, you know, he got a shot and he got, you know, really sick, you know? So, it's, uh... Take Obama's advice, just take a pain pill. And therefore, of a different reason, or for a different reason, is the act of the will, according as it is carried towards something that by itself, or as such, is willed as health, right? Which, by Damascene, is called the laces, right? That is simple will. So, sometimes the word de volontos, right, is taken, you know, even sometimes by itself, just as the act of the will that has the end as its object, huh? But here it's a little more involved, simple will. And by the masters, it's called the will as a, what, nature. And we make the same distinction there of reason, right? Reason as a nature naturally knows some things. Like the axioms, huh? And then reason as reason, right? Or reason knows things by what? Yeah, by discourse, right? So, sometimes they say that Shakespeare's definition of reason, as the ability for discourse, right? To take the beginning of the definition. It's a definition of reason as, what? Reason, right? Okay. And in a way, you could say that logic, that art, right, is directing, what? Reason as reason, huh? You don't need logic for the things you naturally know or naturally come to know, right? But these things that you have to reason your way to or think out, then you need logic, huh? So, this is the way he's explaining or understanding the distinction of Damascene, right? John Damascene. So, one is called, in Latin there, simplex voluntas, or voluntasus matura, right? And sometimes it's called something, and of another reason is the act of the will, according as it is carried towards something that is willed only from its order to another thing, such as the taking of medicine, huh? Which act of the will, which act of the will, Damascene calls, what? Ulesi, huh? Ulesis. And that is the will that is the result of taking counsel, huh? But, by the masters, it is called the will as, what? Rocks in? No, more and more the will as will. That's what this one says, too, though. Yeah, yeah. Maybe it means the reasonable desire. Well, because the reason is taken there as a condition. It's a discrepancy of power, right? Now, this diversity of act does not diversify the power because both acts are noted or pertain to one common notion of an object, which is the good. So you can say the object of the will is the good as known by what reason, right? And therefore, it should be said that if we speak about the power of the will, right, in Christ there is only one human will essentially and not said, what, by participation like this in Sabbath day. If, however, we speak of the will which is an act, thus one distinguishes in Christ the will which is as a nature, which is called philasis, and the will as ratio, right, strange, which is called philasis. I mean, when you make a distinction, a sort of distinction with regard to reason, you'll say reason as a nature, right? And then reason as reason, right? And sometimes you have that same way of speaking the will, but there's another little way of speaking here. I was going to say will as nature, isn't that will as its order to one? Yeah. As opposed to will that can be ordered to one? Yeah. So isn't will as an order to one, well as an order to happiness? Yeah. But sometimes they'll put in there little things like life and so on that seem to be naturally desired, right? Oh, okay. So that's what he uses it. Yeah. I just was confused. Because seemingly you can choose not to get out, you know, I want to avoid the draft or something, so I don't want to be healthy. Yeah. And then I kind of choose not to get out. Yeah. But you want some help. You want some. Yeah. Basically, it's in the leg, you know, not in the head, you know. Yeah. It's not simply, say, okay. Qualifying. Okay. It sounds like to me, when we first read this, it was like almost a long-term goal versus the things that are the substantial things that get you to that goal. Is it the distinction? Then probably you said something about things in a broad way. Now that, I don't understand how that works. My understanding of will and nature is that our will is ordered to one thing by its nature. which is happiness. Okay. We can't not in a lot to be happy. So that's impossible. So our will has a nature, and that is nature, it's ordered to one thing. I mean, chiefly of happiness, see, but if something was obviously committed to happiness, it would have to be alive to be happy, right? Okay. You know, in a sense, in the Declaration of Independence, life, liberty, and the suit of happiness was kind of in the order of being, right? You can have life without liberty, but you can't have liberty without having life, and you can have liberty without, what? Happiness. Happiness. You can't really be happy if you don't have liberty, right? And so, that's an order there, right? So if you see that connection, right, then you naturally will, not only happiness, but liberty, and even life itself. just like with reason as nature, the fundamental thing is the axiom about being and unbeing, right? So you can't both be and not be, same time, the same way. But it also extends to things like the whole is more in the park, where you obviously see that in Ivis, it's to kind of make something, right? Okay. So he applies the first objection from Damascene, from what we see already in the text there. To the first, therefore, it should be said that those wills are not diversified according to, what, powers, as if there's two powers there, but only according to the difference of act, as has been said. To the second, it should be said that also, intellectus et ratio are not diverse powers, as has been said in the first part. And notice, if you really define something, intellectus as a power, you'd say, well, it's the ability to, what, understand, right? But when Shakespeare defines reason, he says, the ability for large discourse, looking. And looking means, what, not necessarily understanding, but trying to see, right? And that's kind of, you know, reason as, what, reason, okay? And when you define discourse, if you recall, discourse is coming to know what you don't know, what you do know. So, but we speak of, sometimes, of the, angelic understanding, the human understanding, right? But to both, you could say, man has to some extent, an ability to understand. So you say, intellectus and latin, and understanding now, as the name of an ability. and you say, okay, now this can be said of the, angelic understanding, and the human understanding, right? But then sometimes, they will say, that, we keep the name, what, understanding, for, as if it was the angel's own name, I mean, the name of his, his, of his ability to understand. And we give this a new one, we call it reason, right? Because man doesn't, understand much, without, what, reason, right? And so, it's kind of a, Thomas Lewis quoting, this, I guess he must have been a Jewish thinker, Isaac, you know, but it's an, intellectus, Abubrahto say, intellect, under the shadow, right? Under the, you know? So, man barely understands a few things, you know, and, and most of it, he understands he has to try to, think out, you know, and so on. So, he gets the new name, right? We've talked about that way, of names becoming equivocal by reason. Just like if you might say, you know, someone asks you, what's the difference between a dog, I mean, a kitten and a, and a puppy? You'd say, well, a kitten is a little cat, and a puppy is a little dog, right? And then you call a kitten a cat, and a puppy a, what? Dog. But then sometimes we divide dog against puppy, because only a puppy is not a dog yet. It's a kitten, not a cat, or it's just a boy, he's not a man, right? Okay. But then, this distinction here, though, is in regard just to the human understanding, right? So someone might say this power called human understanding, or human reason, right? It's called understanding insofar as you know some things, what? Naturally, right? It's called reason insofar as you, must have some kind of discourse, huh? That comes up when you talk about the Trinity, too, huh? You could say God the Father is God the thinker, right? And God the Son is the thought of God the thinker, right? But is that a thinker in the sense of what? Understanding? The way we do it? Yeah, no. No. I mean, you're in danger if you don't think this out, you don't have any second person. No, it's, it's, it's, it's inactive to understand himself, right? So it naturally follows this, what? Thought of himself, huh? And then when you talk about the Holy Spirit, it's in a way of love, well, it's a natural, a natural love that God has of himself. So, and he says in the second objection there, and this is something we saw maybe earlier, if you studied that part of the soul, intellectus and ratio are not diverse, what? Powers, right? I noticed Aristotle there in the, in the, in the three books of the soul, you know, he'll sometimes call his power in nous, right? Which is like calling it intellectus in Latin, right? But then I was noticing in the second book there in the Greek, he sometimes calls it the dunamis, which means power, right? Theoretique, which is the power of what? Looking at things, right? And that's like Shakespeare saying, that it's the ability to look before and after, right? And then, A lot of times he'll say it's the ability of the Deutomis Dea Noeticae, and he uses the word Dea Noeticae there in the beginning of the Posture Analytics, when he's talking about all Dea Noetic knowledge is from pre-existent knowledge, right? So that corresponds to the other thing that Shakespeare says, the ability for what? It's a discourse, right? And then Aristotle uses another word there, along with Dea Noia sometimes, which is logizmos, right? Now logizmos in Greek can mean calculation and what? Reasoning, right? Well, those are the two main kinds of discourse. When you add, subtract, multiply, or divide the verse from two numbers, at least if you know, you come to know another number you didn't know. And in the syllogizing, you know, from two statements you do know, you come to know a third statement you didn't know before, right? So Aristotle uses that word logizmos, which is related to the word logos, reason. Now as we mentioned before, the name of the art of calculating is in Greek like logistike, right? And then the art of reasoning, logike, right? So there we did it, right? So it's interesting that Aristotle, he sometimes refers to reason as the ability to look, and sometimes as the ability for what? Discourse, I mean the word discourse, but he uses the word logizmos, right? Or dea Noia. So it's very close to what Shakespeare has in his definition, except that Shakespeare combines the two, right? It's the ability for a large discourse, looking before and after. So you have to admire that, huh? I had a student there at the house last night there, and we were doing prior analytics, all the easy, very dedicated guy to this. But he's mentioning, you know, one of his aunts had died recently, and she had some Shakespeare volumes that he inherited, huh? And some of these New Hudson Shakespeare's I always talk about, huh? Oh, really? And actually, the introduction to New Hudson Shakespeare for As You Like It, that was one of the best short eulogy of Shakespeare I've ever seen. And so I pulled out and read it to him, and so on. He's got it as you like it, so. So, the reply to the third objection. There's a question of what the word meant here. To the third it should be said that this voluntas pietatis, right? Does not seem to be other than the will, which is considered as, what? Nature. Insofar as it, what? Flees. An alien evil. Absolutely, what? Considered, huh? So this is a mod language there, maybe. Or a familiar language, anyway, right? so let's look at article 4 now whether in Christ there was what we'd say free will but the Latin says what free judgment they should free judgment you wouldn't have free will kind of interesting the way they speak to the Latin to the fourth one proceeds thus it seems that in Christ there was no free will no free judgment about these things for Damascene says in the third book gnomina that is a what position or mind or thinking and pro-aeresis that is choice in God to say it is impossible if we speak what properly most of all those things that pertain to faith we're not to speak what properly I was looking at this text on the Trinity this morning and Aries had this quote I think before from St. Anselm right and St. Anselm says that the no only does the Father say himself but the Son says himself and the Holy Spirit says himself right therefore there's more words besides and Thomas says well he's using say loosely for understand say but never even proper use well see it's a danger that yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah you know I gave you my little poem you know God the Father said it all in one word but he's the only one yeah it has a word proceeding from it the Son has no words and the Holy Spirit proceeding from them so therefore in Christ there was not what choice and consequently neither Libra or Vitria right whose act is what choice it's kind of interesting the way Aristotle speaks in the ethics there when he takes up choice in the third book you know it kind of you know leaves it up in the air a bit whether it's an act of reason or an act of the will because it involves what both you know and here's the way he speaks here Libra or Vitria Vitria seems to name something of reason right a judgment and then he says whose act is choice okay so it proceeds from that right more of the philosopher says in the third book of the ethics that choice is desire or the thing that one's taken counsel for so in the in the second book of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle works out the definition of moral virtue and the definition is that it's a habit with choice existing in the middle towards us that determine the right reason but then it's not until the third book beginning the third book that it takes up then what is this choice that's involved because that's kind of the chief thing in the moral what virtuous choice do you choose to drink moderately or do you choose to drink excessively and so on but does not seem to have been what counsel in Christ right because we take counsel about those things then we do not we do not take counsel about those things of which we are what certain right but Christ had certitude about all things therefore in Christ there was no choice and therefore no free what judgment moreover free will has itself to both right but the will of Christ was determined to the good because he was not able to sin it says and said above therefore in Christ there was no free judgment right it's the same thing they say about God and his divine nature right you know they say well he couldn't choose the bad so he didn't have free will right more free than he is yeah not true but against this is what is said in Isaiah chapter 7 he will eat what's it butyere butter what butter butter oh is it kind of like curd usually it's kind of like butter I got a dictionary it's the land of milk and honey what's wrong with butter I think I've seen that elsewhere in scripture you know where someone eats a honey and he's wise honey has that sense butter no no there's no curds in it curds curds are a corruption modern trickle so you might yogurt know to eject evil right and to choose good right which is an act of free will therefore in Christ there is free will so Thomas says I answer it should be said as has been said above in Christ there is a twofold act of the will one by which his will was carried towards something that was willed as such which pertains to the notion of the end in another another act according to which his will was carried towards something by the order that it has to another thing which pertains to the notion of that which is towards an end now as the philosopher says in the third book in the ethics electio or choice differs from the will in this that the will speaking as such is of the what end I know volintas there is taking means the act right it's called volintas right but choice is of those things which are towards an end and thus simplex volintas is the same as volintas as nature and choice is the same as will as what reason strangely speak that way and is what and its own act and it's the own act of what free judgment right as has been said in the first part and therefore since in Christ one lays down will as what ratio is necessary there to place choice and consequently free judgment whose act is what as has been had in the first part now what about this text from Damascene to the first therefore it should be said that Damascene excludes from Christ's choice according as he understands the name of choice to be implied what doubt but nevertheless doubt is not a necessity of choice because because even to God it belongs to truth right according to the famous words of St. Paul Ephesians 1 4 he chose us in himself he chose he chose he chose he chose he chose he chose he chose before the constitution of the world. That's why I say you should thank God for choosing you to, what? Be. And for choosing to make a universe in which you could be a part of our humble. Did God make the best possible universe? Thank you, brother. We were all thinking on the same way. It's kind of funny, the objection of saying that God made the best possible universe, and they kind of quote, Plato, you know, that the better the craftsman is, the better the thing he makes, right? So God being the infinitely good, infinitely wise, and so on, the infinitely powerful, supreme craftsman, must have made the best possible universe, right? But can God, in fact, make the best possible universe? He could always do better. Yeah, yeah. Not in terms of his power, but in terms of the material. But see, any universe he made would always be, what? In fact, infinitely less than himself, so he could make always a better universe. So you could say, I think, that God could not make the best possible universe, but that involves a, what? Contradiction, right? Just like the question they raised, you know, could God make something that doesn't depend upon him for its existence, huh? But it involves a contradiction, right? Because what he makes depends upon him for its existence. So you're saying, could he make something that depends upon him for its existence, not depend upon him for its existence, so it involved a contradiction. So God can't make us that, you know? You know, the old idea of God in the universe and then kind of forgot about it, and the universe goes, it doesn't make any sense, you know? But likewise, you know, you can see how people would think. Thomas says there that those who think that God made the best possible universe, either they think he made the universe not by choice, he was naturally, what, determined to make the universe, and nature determined to want, so this is the only universe he could make, and like, raise the nose with a thing, or people like that, or likeness to somebody, or else he did make it by will, but he had to choose the best one possible, right? But then he couldn't choose the best one because there is no best one to be chosen, right? So he's right. Hey! So he could have chosen the universe of which you and I would not be a part, right? So you should thank him for having chosen this universe and for choosing us to be, right? I mean, could I have been a part of the universe of which my mother and father were not a part? I don't know, maybe he could have made me without my mother and father, but... Anyway, I doubt very much if I would be a part of the universe of which they were not a part. So he chose us in himself before the constitution of the world, huh? Nevertheless, in God, there is no, what? Doubt him. For doubt happens to choice insofar as it's in a ignorant nature, a nature that doesn't know, huh? And therefore it ought to be said about others of which there is made mention in the forest head of authority, right? See how he's kind of correcting Dan the scene, right? But sometimes they understand it this way, right? If by choice you understand something that implies doubt, right? Then Christ, he wouldn't have choice, right? Or God wouldn't have choice, huh? Let's doubt the way. The second thing, huh? The second that should be said, this is the one for the text from Aristotle. Aristotle's talking about choice in us, right? He says it's the epititus, pre conciliati, right? To the second, it should be said that choice presupposes what? Consul. But it does not follow from consul until that's been determined through what? Judgment, huh? For that which has been, what? Judged to be done, right? After the inquiry of consul, we choose, right? As is said in the third book of ethics. Sometimes they would, you know, speak of prudence, foresight as having three acts, right? Consul, and then judgment, and then what? Command, right? Your brother Mark, you know, used to joke about these two guys he hanged out with in Quebec. He says, one of us could think of all kinds of things to do, but he had to go to judgment as to which one should be done. My brother Mark had the judgment for which to be done, but the third guy's history to get the boy. So they divide the three acts of force and one's own themselves. It makes it more clear, right, that there are these three things, that to really be a complete matter of force that you'd have to have all three of these. And therefore, if something is judged to be done without doubt and a preceding, what? Investigation or inquiry. To get a word, inquisition, right? This would suffice for what? A short sum. And thus it is clear that doubt or inquisition, which is when you're in doubt, something you do, does not per se pertain to what choice, right? But only according as it is in a, what? Ignorant nature. I don't know. So Aristotle is talking about an ignorant, ignorant nature there. That's how I'm a God's choice. Now the third objection is in terms of the good and the bad, right? To the third, it should be said that the will of Christ, although it is determined to the good, is not nevertheless determined to this or that, what? Good. And therefore, it pertains to Christ to choose through free judgment, confirming the good, just as it pertains to the, what? Blessed, yeah. So the use of these words between free judgment and free choice, it is talking about the same thing but just using a different aspect? Well, no, but Librium Arbitrium points out that a reason could judge this or that to be good, right? And sometimes in us, you know, we judge something bad even to be good, right? And unless reason had the ability to judge this or that to be good, right? You wouldn't have any, what? Choice. There's only one thing you could judge to be good to do, right? So when I go home now, should I read Shakespeare? Or should I read Thomas on the Gospel of St. John? Yeah. Well, I could maybe, you know, one's distracted with the other. But should I read Thomas on the Gospel of St. John? Or should I read Thomas on the Dianima? Or should I read this delicious questionis disputati de potencia? They're all good, right? Should I go back to my favorite book, the Summa Conte Gentiles? Maybe I should spread out a little bit and read the delicious de potencia, right? Well, I have to have in some way free judgment. In fact, in fact, in fact, in fact, in fact, in fact, I can only judge that the, and I can say, you know, well, the Gospel of St. John is the greatest book ever written, right? And Thomas brings in, you know, the Church Fathers, Augustine, and God's, really, that's the way to understand the Gospel of St. John, that's the best book to read, therefore I should read the Gospel of St. John tonight, huh? Yeah, but there's all those things in the first chapter about the Trinity, you know, and the Word, and so on, right? And the question is just to be taught, they, they didn't see, they got beautiful things on the Trinity, maybe I should study that first, and then I'll be prepared to really understand what I'm reading, so maybe I should read that instead, huh? See? I, I, I, I, I'm a crafty fellow, you see? And they say, well, maybe I, you know, I wore myself out with those monks today, I says, maybe I should relax a bit of Shakespeare, you know, and, you know, and, you know, it was Thomas, he was talking about the virtue of Eutropole, and so, and he quotes something, yeah, he goes there about St. John, because, and, and John, you know, talk about, you know, Yeah, breaks, you know, you know, so, you got to relax a bit, right, huh, you see, once in a while, see, so, I can, I can find a reason to read Shakespeare tonight, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah Now, whether the human will in Christ wanted or willed something other than what God willed, right? To the fifth one proceeds thus, it seems that the human will in Christ did not will something other than what God willed. And take the other side. For it is said in Psalm 39 from the person of Christ, that I might do your will, my God, I will, right? But he who wills to do the will of another wills what that one wills. Therefore, it seems that the human will of Christ will of nothing other than the will of the divine will. It's got to be that way, isn't it? What's he going to maintain here? Moreover, the soul of Christ had the most perfect, what, charity. Perfect love. Which also exceeds the comprehension of our, what? Yeah. According to that of Ephesians chapter 3 verse 19, the, what, charity of Christ super eminentum, going above science, but it pertains to charity that man will the same thing that God does, right? Whence the philosopher himself says in the ninth book of the Ethics, which is one of the two books on, what, friendship, right? That one of the things about friends or friendly things is to will and choose the same things. Therefore, since he was, when we take up charity, it's a kind of friendship, as Thomas argues in the treatise on charity. Therefore, they should will the same thing, right? Therefore, the human will in Christ will of nothing other than what the divine will. Moreover, Christ was a true, what, comprehensor, right? On the side of his, what, soul, but not his body until. But the saints who are, what, comprehenders in the homeland, yeah, fatherland, will nothing other than what God wills. Otherwise, they would not be blessed because they would not have whatever they will. For the blessed man is the one who has whatever he wants and wishes nothing bad, as Augustine says in the book of the Trinity. Therefore, Christ willed nothing according to his human will, that he did not, that the divine will did not, what? Thomas doesn't go against all that. But against this is what Augustine says, against Maximino. In this that Christ, what, said, not what I will, but what you will, right? He shows himself to, what, will, something other than the Father. Well, there he's quoting Christ himself now. Augustine, and Augustine's quoting Christ. But what more could you ask for, for a sin conqueror, huh? What, except by a, what, human heart, he was not a boy. Right? Since our infirmity, in his own right, not the divine, but the, what, human affection, transfigured. Well, there's got to be some distinction. There's got to be some of this. It's really tight, right? The objections are pretty good, don't you? And, uh, I think it's a pretty good set conference, pretty good, too. So, my mind is tied in a knot, isn't yours? And again, I'll tie it in my high will, but you will. We saw, you know, a number of emails, I know, right? I answer it should be said, that it has been said, that in Christ, according to its human nature, there is laid down a, what, multiple will, right? Okay? We had a whole bunch of distinctions here in one of the articles. And this is kind of a strange way of speaking here. To wit, the will of what? The sense appetite, right? Sensuality. Which is called the will by, what, participation. That's kind of interesting, huh? Because in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says, reason is one of the parts of the soul. And then there's another part of the soul that can, uh, obey reason, or be trained to, uh, habituated to obey reason, right? To listen to reason. And that's reasonable, not in the sense of having reason, essentially, but by partaking of it, right? That's the reason why Austerlis said the music of the 18th century was superior to the music of the Romantic period, huh? Because it represents the emotions in harmony with reason, huh? In a way that, uh, the Romantics would not, uh, seek, right, huh? So when you listen to the music of the 18th century, Mozart and Handel and so on, your emotions are moved in a way that, uh, if it doesn't make them virtuous, it disposes for what? For virtue, right, huh? I remember when rock and roll was first coming out, and, uh, and I was reading a report of a riot down there in Newport there, where they were showing, the sailors were listening to rock and roll, and they were throwing these, uh, share the claps, you know? Came back, and one of those things flying through the air, right? Those, you know, those kind of old chairs. But that was the effect of this kind of wild, but music, right, huh? So Aristotle, in the 8th book of the Politics, talks about listening to the right kind of music. Because the right kind of music, your emotions move in harmony with the music, and so if it represents the emotions in harmony with reason, then your emotions are being disposed for what? For, uh, virtue. It's not enough to make your emotions in virtue. If I go home tonight and listen to Mozart, will I be virtuous in the morning, you know? Maybe. Well, not necessarily, but I'm being disposed in that way, right, huh? Okay. If I listen to the wrong kind of music, you know, most of what's being put out today on the radio and so on, it's, um... Six o'clock news isn't a surprise. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So, it distinguishes, first of all, between the, what, the Voluntas Sensualitatis, right? Which is called will by, what, participation by partaking of it, huh? And the, what, rational will, right, huh? And then we distinguish whether it be considered by way of nature or by way of, what, reason, huh? Now, it has been said above that from a certain, what, dispensation of God, right? The Son of God, right, before His Passion, right? And therefore, before His glorification of His body there, He allowed His, what, flesh, right? To act and to undergo those things which were, what, proper to Him. So, He became hungry and thirsty and so on.