Tertia Pars
Lecture 54: Christ's Will: Divine and Human in the Incarnation

Transcript
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Okay, next question should be easier, right? Okay. And he's going to be wondering here whether Christ is one will or two wills in the cross. There was a heresy, right, about the one will, but I've often thought about the Trinity, you know, it's kind of strange. Three persons, but only one will. Yeah, yeah. I suppose it means there can be no disagreement up there. No conflict of wills like we have all the time now. And no obedience there. I was thinking, you know, I never remember in all my classes there, or in grade school and so on. But the question is asked, why should we obey God, right? Probably you begin, you know, with the lowest reason and say, well, if you don't, you're going to be in trouble. So Adam and Eve got in trouble, right? They didn't obey God, right? And that's kind of the start of all our troubles, right? So that's a reason for obeying God, right? That you're going to be punished, huh? If you don't, huh? But maybe a better reason for obeying God is that if you obey God, you'll be rewarded with... Yeah. Okay. But is that the best reason for obeying God? Maybe the best reason for obeying God is because you love God, right? And Christ says, you know, if you love me, you keep the commandments, right? And so on. And if you love somebody, you do their will, right? But then you come to question, well, why should you love God? Well, there, I think the best answer is in the Summa Kata Gentila. And you can go through the five chapters there in the goodness of God. But the first chapter shows that God is good. Well, that's the reason to love God, because he's good. The good is what should be loved, right? But then the second chapter in that section shows that God is goodness itself. Now, this is not only good, but he's goodness itself. Nothing else is good except by partaking some way of God. So the very reason why anything whatsoever could be desirable is because of God, right? Well, that's really the reason to love him, right? And then Thomas goes on to show that there can be nothing bad in God, right? And therefore, there can't be reason not to love him. That's right. You have to make a good point, right? There's no reason to love him, right? Now, what is the reason not to love him? What are his bad qualities? Yeah. Of course, some people don't love God because he's opposing what they want to do, right? But there's no reason in God not to love him. Well, do you see how about a nice person? To know them is to love them? But to know him is to love them, right? Okay. And then he goes on to show that God is the what? The good of every good, right? And then he's the sumum bodum, the highest good, right? So you have every reason to love God and no reason not to love him. He's goodness itself. He's the good of every good, right? Those two are kind of the strongest. He adopted sumum bodum, but, you know, they say something marvelous about that. But then I think you can add to that these things like, but he chose me to be. That's a good reason to love him, right? He created my soul, right? He's got good taste. And he gave me my body to my parents, you know? And he gave me my parents and my brothers and my teachers and things go on like this, you know? But it was a little different than the reasons that I gave from this. I mean, there's a different reason to love him, right? That's the best reason, therefore, why you should obey him. Because, you know, the saints would ask him, why should we love him? Why should we obey God, huh? He'd better. They'd probably start there with that. Yeah, yeah. Let's see, in the Act of Confucius, I did it as a child, it says, because I dread the loss of heaven and the pains of hell, right? But most of all, because of heaven, be my God. So you're going from the lesser reasons to the highest reason, you know, for loving God. I mean, for being concerned about your sins and so on. Okay, let's look at the premium here to chapter 18, or question 18, rather. Then we ought to consider about the unity as regards the will, right? And about this, six things are asked. First, within Christ, is other the divine will, and other the, what, human will. Second, within human nature of Christ, other is the will of sensuality, and other of, what, reason. Kind of strange you use the term voluntat sensualitatis, but let's leave that for the time being. And third, within Christ, on the side of reason, there were, what, many wills, right? That kind of arises because, Father, not my will, but thine be done, right? So, he's conforming himself to God's will, but there's something in his will opposed to this suffering, too. So there's a two, some duplicity in Christ there, right? Not in a bad sense, but, okay. Fourth, within Christ, there was, what, free judgment, huh? Free will. So, five, whether the human will of Christ was altogether conformed to the divine will and what was willed, right? And six, whether in Christ there was some contrariety of, what, wills, huh? So, I'm going to throw an investigation here of the will of Christ, huh? Let's look at the first article, which is the fundamental one here. To the first one goes forward thus. It seems that in Christ there are not two wills, one divine and one, what, human, and the other human. For the will is the first mover and commander, right, in each one building. But in Christ, the first mover and the commanding one was the divine will, because all human things in Christ were moved according to the divine will. Therefore, it seems in Christ there was not except one will, namely the divine will, right? And, of course, if his human will is completely conformed to his divine will, the divine will can be the, what, first mover, right? But he still has his, what, second mover, right? Okay. Anyway. Moreover, the instrument or tool is not moved by its own will, but by the will of the mover. But the human nature in Christ was a tool of his, what, divinity. And in my text, it's got the reference to, what, Damascene, okay? Incidentally, I noticed in regard to your use of reintroduction there, that in the footnotes, so they're referring back, you know, to the premia, these were intro, you know, reintroduction, right? I mentioned how that translation of Vatican II, right, they translated in the Latin freemium introduction, right, in the English text. Look, I left the church anyway, so anyway. It was just a sign to confirm his mind on the righteous. Who were you talking about? Yeah. Huh? Who were you talking about? Forget his name, but he got in trouble. Isn't it bound? Yeah, yeah, he got in trouble. Yeah, he did his novitiate at our monastery up in Nova Scotia. We left there, though. Yeah, he had some disorder, I mean, you know, it's a church that he ever was, exactly. Did he go to church? I don't know if you left the old church. I started off the priesthood. I think we left the church. So it shows you that until we get into it, you translate it. A little mistake in the beginning is a great one in the end. Right, right, right. It's kind of a pun, you know, a little mistake in the beginning is a premium, right? It's a great one in the end. Now, does that English translation appear everywhere? Because I wonder if that's the one that we've got here. There's two English translations that I know of, unless the Vatican has another one. There's Gregory Baum, I guess, did one, and Abbott is another one. Yeah, Baum is one of the ones that we have. I didn't know who he was, but I just happened to pick it up when the first came out. And then someone gave me a copy of the official Texan Latin, you know. Because that blue, the two blue ones, the English that's in there, I think, needs to be done. Well, you know, that's, I think, Abbott's translation. I can't remember his name. Oh, Flannery. I'm sorry. Then there's three. I don't know about Abbott, Flannery. But I think none of the translations exist. Okay, so you're saying that the human nature was a tool, like I was mentioning before there, the way Thomas explains the Athanasius. The, of course, when you speak of a minister as being a, what, animated tool, right? It's a different sense of tool, right? Okay, further, that alone is multiplied in Christ that belongs to the nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to nature, because those things which are natural are of necessity. But what is voluntary is, what, not necessary, huh? Therefore, the will is one only in, what, Christ, huh? That's when they distinguish the will and nature's causes, right? Nature's determined to one, and the will is open to, what, opposites, right? Doing or not doing it, or doing it this way, or doing it that way. Moreover, Damascene says in the third book that in some way to will is not of nature, but of our, what, standing, namely our personal understanding. But every will is some kind of will, right? Because that is not in a genus, that is not in one of its, what, species. And that's a reference to Aristotle's book, the topics there, right? Quote from that. Therefore, every will pertains to a person. But in Christ, there's only, what, one person. Therefore, in Christ, there's only one will. How can a person have two wills, right? You know, some of you might say, right? A will is something personal, very personal. There's only one person there. Therefore, there's only one will. Does the fourth one seem to follow on the third? What? In terms of the, the fourth objection seems to follow on the third one. Yeah. I mean, if it doesn't pertain to the nature, it pertains to that. Yeah. But against this is what our Lord says in the 22nd chapter of the Gospel of Luke. Luke, Father, if you wish, transfer this chalice for me, right? Take it away. But truly not my will, but yours come about. Be done. Which, bringing in, Ambrose bringing in in the book to the emperor, past Grecian, says, just as, what? He took on my will, he took on my, what? Sadness, huh? And upon Luke, he, what? He brings back his own will to the man, right? And of the father to the divinity. But the will of man is temporal. The will of the divinity is eternal, right? The will. Now, Thomas begins a little bit of the history of this thing here. I answer it should be said that some lay down in Christ there to be one will only, right? But depositing this in diverse ways, they seem to have been, what? Moved, huh? Well, Apollinaris, right, does not place an understanding soul in Christ, but says that the word was in place of the soul, right? Or also in place of the intellect, right? So some people take the word and say, the word was made, what? Flesh. Flesh. There's no rational soul there. It's just flesh and body, right? And so, you know, the word is in place of, what? The human soul. Well, then there's only one will there, right? Right? Okay. Whence, since the will is in reason, meaning in the rational part of the soul, right? As the philosopher says in the third book about the soul, it would follow that in Christ there was not a, what? Human will. Well, and thus in him there would not be except the one will, which would be the divine will. And likewise, Eutychus, huh? And all who place or posit one nature, huh? Composed in Christ, right? Monophysites, huh? Okay. Because physis is the big way for nature, but one nature. They are kind of forced to place one will in it, huh? So it's the divine nature. That's those two different things moving, right? The one is saying, hey, you didn't have a human soul, and in place of human soul was a word, so you have only one will. Others say, well, the two natures came together and made one nature. So the will of that one nature is the only will he has. So different ways of moving them, right? And then the third way he has in the stories, right? Who placed the union of God and man to be made only according to what? Affection and will. And of course then Christ would just be a man, right? So he posited one will in what? Christ, huh? Doesn't really have a divine will. So you get one position there. He's really got the divine will. Other than when he's the third position, that he has just human will. And in between, you know, some kind of a will of this composed nature, right? It's kind of interesting the way Thomas has arranged those three positions. But after this, he says, Macarius, Antiochian, Patriarchan, and Cyrus, the Alexandrian, and Sergius, the Constantinopolitan, that's three big cities, right? And some of their followers, right? Posited in Christ one will, although they, what? Placed two natures in Christ, united according to, what? The hypostasis. Because they opined that the human nature in Christ was never moved by its own motion, but only according as it was moved by the, what? Divinity. As is clear in the synodic, the epistle of the synod, of Agathon, the, what? Pope. I'm sure you're all thoroughly familiar with that, right? But my text has got a, the third council of Constantinople, for that particular thing. And therefore, in the sixth synod, celebrated at Constantinople, in the text of Act 18. It was determined that it's necessary to say that in Christ there are, what? Two wills. Where it is read thus, according as of old, the prophets about Christ, and he himself instructed us, right? And the symbol that the Holy Fathers handed down to us, there are two, what? Natural wills in him, and two natural operations. We preach this. Proclaim this, right? Reach this, I guess you'd say. He's going to go on into the operations in the next question 19. Here you have a text saying both of them, right? So what does Thomas do at this point? He's given the various heresies, right? Maybe four groups there, right? And then the definitive judgment there, the council, right? And now Thomas is going to give a reason why this, right? And this was necessary to have been said, right? And why? Because it's manifest that the Son of God assumed a perfect, what? Human nature, as has been said above. But to the perfection of human nature pertains a will, which is a natural power of it. just as the understanding or intellect or reason is a natural power that is clear from those things which in the first part have been said about the human soul and so on. Whence it is necessary to say that the Son of God took on a human will in his, what? Human nature. But through the taking on of human nature the Son underwent no, what? Lessening or diminution and those things were attained to his, what? And become less divine because he became man to whom it belongs to, what? Have a will. God has said in the first part. Whence it is necessary to say that in Christ there are two wills one to it the divine and the other, what? Human, huh? So I never personally have had any difficulty in accepting the idea there being two wills in Christ, you know? But there's a whole tradition here of errors, right? Mistakes, huh? This is implicitly saying it's true God and true what? Man it has two wills, huh? I suppose then this is a consequence of some problem in which you can tell that part of the nature is something Yeah, if you think it's one nature or you think that there's the word is a place of the human soul all these things that will lead you to these false conclusions. Now, the first objection is saying what first moves and commands in Christ is the divine will, right? In a sense, the will moves you in all your parts to some extent, right? At least all your higher parts. To the first, therefore, it should be said that whatever was in the human nature of Christ was moved by the, what? Potion of the divine will. It does not, however, follow that in Christ there was no, what? Proper motion of the will of its human nature because also the wills of what? The pious wills, that is to say, of the other saints are moved according to the, what? Will of God, huh? This is the famous text that Thomas often refers to who works in us both to will something and to perfect it, right? As is said in Philippians 2.15, Thomas is always quoting this, right? He quotes the one in the Old Testament that the will of the king is in the hand of God. He turns it in when he wants to, right? This gives all kinds of promise to him about this, you know, give free will. But he moves the will, what? Not violently, right? But to freely will something. Because although, this is a very point that Thomas makes, for although the will is not able to be moved inwardly by some creature, right? Even the devil's, I mean, he tempts you because he can't move your will inwardly. He can persuade you, try to persuade you, seduce you, right? But inwardly, nevertheless, it is moved by what? God. As has been said in the first part in Thomas' show, that is soul, he takes that thing up. He's just referring back to God. And thus also, Christ, according to his human will, followed the, what? Divine will, right? He says in the gospel, right? That's why he loves me, right? He always do his will. According to that is Psalm 39, that I might do what? Your will, my God, I will, right? Whence Augustine says against Maximum, huh? Where he says, where the Son says to the Father, not what I will, but what you will, right? What age you, that these words, he, what? Joins them, right? And says, show truly his will subject to the, what? The one who generated him, right? As if we deny that the human will ought to be subject to the will of what? God. So God can move your will so you freely, what? Choose the good. He doesn't go against your, what? Nature, right? So that you, he doesn't move your will by, what? Certain violence, right? Because the violence is something outside the will, right? It's hard to understand, right? But it's kind of a marvelous thing, huh? When St. Paul says, not me, but the grace in me, right? Okay. Now, the idea of an instrument or a tool is something that is moved by what? Another, right? Thomas is going to say, well, if one is only moved by another, one doesn't have a what? A will. Okay? He's going to point out a distinction here. To the second, it should be said that it belongs appropriately to the instrument or tool that it be moved by the what? Chief agent, the principal or chief agent. but in diverse ways according to the what? Properties of its nature. Now he makes the distinction here. For the instrumentum in animatum, right? As the what? Axe or the saw is moved by the artist through a motion that is only what? Bodily. But the animated instrument, the one that is animated by a what? Sensing soul, right? Is moved by sense desire as the horse by the what? The rider. But the tool that is animated by an understanding or reasonable soul is moved through his will, right? Just as by command of the lord or master, the servant is moved to what? doing something. Which servant is a what? Animated tool, as the philosopher says. Aristotle first made this distinction. Thus, therefore, the human nature in Christ was a tool of the divinity so that it be moved through its own what? Will, right? What? What? What? What? Now, the third objection was trying to insist upon the difference between nature and will as causes, right? Because the one is determined and the other is not. To the third, it should be said that the power of the will is natural, right? And follows the nature from necessity. But the motion or the act of the power, which is also called the will, sometimes is, what, natural and necessary as it regards, what, happiness. So you don't choose to be happy or to, what, be miserable. What should I choose to be, right? But sometimes from the free judgment of reason it comes, right? And it is not necessary nor natural. And this was taught in the second part, it takes up more of the will. And nevertheless, the very reason itself, which is the beginning of this motion, is natural, right? And therefore, apart from the divine wills necessary in Christ to place a human will, not only insofar as it's a natural power, or insofar as it's a natural motion, but also insofar as it's a motion of what? Reason, huh? Okay. Remember Shakespeare's definition of reason as the ability for large discourse, looking before and after? Well, sometimes they say this is the definition of reason as reason, right? Because does reason naturally understand or naturally come to understand some things before reasoning? And you see, most of our understanding is arrived at by some kind of reasoning. And the understanding that you arrive at by reasoning, I call reasoned-out understanding. And reasoned-out understanding comes after reasoning, after reasoned-out. But it's just some understanding that comes before reasoning. Well, how do you know that? Yeah? Yeah? Yeah. Yeah. If you understood nothing before reasoning, you'd have nothing to reason from. So, although we're kind of aware of trying to reason out things and understand them, and therefore kind of more aware of reasoned-out understanding, there must be some understanding that is before reasoning. We call it natural understanding, right? But Shakespeare seems to sometimes make a distinction then between reason as a nature, right? Insofar as it naturally understands some things. And reason as reason, right? Okay? And in some ways, I suppose, reasoning is more known to us. But Shakespeare says, Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs. And reasoning, as he calls it in the definition of discourse, right? It comes from the Latin word running, right? So reason runs from one thing to another. And this motion of reason is more known to us than it's standing still and understanding. And so it gets its name from reason and so on. Okay, now something like that in the case of the will, right? That if you wanted to define the will in a way proportional to the way reason was defined by Shakespeare, you'd say, well, reason, or will rather, is the ability to choose. And that's perhaps more known to us as distinguishing the will from other things. But could the will choose something if it didn't will something without choosing? Because it chooses something with a view to some in, right? So it must be something as an in that is willed naturally. And then through the librum obitrium of the reason, you say, I'm going to choose this or choose that as a way of getting to my goal, right? He's kind of touching upon those distinctions. At the end of the theory of objection that I applied to it. And therefore, apart from the divine will, is necessary to place in Christ human will. Not only insofar as it is a potentia naturalis, right? Or insofar as it is a natural motion, right? But insofar as it is a rational motion, right? Like, chooses something, right? Aristotle speaks of choice there in the Nicomarcan Ethics. It's like it's an act of will or an act of reason because it involves both, right? So he calls it mutus rationalis, right? He'll come back to that when he gets to the article in Debrum obitrium of this free will in Christ. So he'd say, nevertheless, that even the ability to choose, though, is something that, what, man has because of his, what, nature, right? Now, the fourth objection. The argument that the will is something personal, right? You've got a modern touch, you know? To the fourth, it should be said that through this, the one is said to will in some way, is designated a determined way of willing. But a determined mode or way is placed about that thing of which it is, the mode. Whence, since the will pertains to the nature, this, which is to will in some way, pertains to the nature. Not according as it is considered absolutely, but according as it is in such a, what, hypostasis. Whence also the human will of Christ had a certain determined mode from this, that it was in the, what, divine hypostasis, huh? That it would be moved always according to the motion of the divine will. Could Christ sin, people ask that, you know? Don't think so. Be careful about that. Okay, so take a little break here. 2 here in question 18, to the second one goes for it thus, it seems that in Christ there was not another will of sensuality, and sensuality doesn't have the sense of badness like it does in English, right? Sometimes I'll translate sensuality by sense desire, right? Desire that falls upon the sense qualities, but apart from the will of what? Reason, right? I kind of usually use the word voluntas for what follows upon sense, but for the philosopher says in the third book about the soul, right, that the will is in reason, right? And Thomas takes that as being in the rational part of the soul, right, the material part of the soul. But in the sensitive part, in the sensitive appetite, there's the irascible and the, what, the concubiscible, right? Now, Thomas, to me, is the one author that unfolds the emotions of the irascible and concubiscible, right, most fully, right? You have the, in Greek, you have this distinction in Plato, right, and Aristotle, right? The kind of breaking down of the emotions. And the concubiscible emotions are the emotions that follow upon what is agreeable or disagreeable to the senses. And so there's three emotions about what is agreeable to the senses, and three emotions about what is disagreeable to the senses. You like or love it, or you, what, dislike or hate it. Now, if you like or love it, then you'll want some, and you don't have it. When you have it, you have, what, pleasure or joy. And if you hate or dislike something, you, what, try to avoid it. And if you can't avoid it, there's sadness or pain. Okay, so you have those six emotions in the, what, concubiscible. Then the irascible emotions are ones that arise when there's some difficulty about getting or avoiding what you like or dislike them. And so if there's some good that you want, but it's difficult to get, right, then there's two emotions that can arise. One, the hope that you can overcome the difficulties, and what, despair that you think you can overcome the difficulties, and then if there's something bad that's difficult to avoid, the emotion, it would be fear, right? Or if you think you can overcome it, boldness, right? Okay. But now there's a fifth emotion in the irascible, and that is when the bad is inflicted upon you, you're suffering or irritated by it or pained by it, right? And you think you can do something about it, then there arises, what, anger, right? Okay, so the concubiscible then has six emotions, love, desire, pleasure or joy, hate, aversion, and sadness or pain, and the concubiscible has five. Now, if you listen to Mozart's music, you know, it's very much a representation of the emotions. And Mozart, you know, unlike Haydn, Haydn will go from key to key just, you know, for brides' sake of, but for Mozart, it's always, what, significant, right, huh? And sometimes he goes from hope to despair, and he'll go from the major key to the minor key, right? You know, tend to use certain keys, you know, for the irascible, you use more D major, let's say, or C major, right? Right, for the concubiscible, more G major or B flat or something. But it also depends upon the rhythm and so on, the instruction of the melody, but you're actually aware of it, right? We have the famous letter from Mozart to his father, where he's describing the, what, anger of Osman and the abduction from the seraglio. And he's representing the anger in the music, and he says, you know, just as a man, when he gets angry in this way, loses control of himself, so Osman has to be represented as losing control of himself, right? And he says, not in a way that becomes displeasing to the ear. In other words, cease to use it. But now, an understanding of those emotions is fundamental for at least three or four arts of sciences, because when Aristotle talks, for example, about the poetic art, he talks about tragedy, and he talked about comedy, though we lost that part. But tragedy and comedy move us to different emotions, and if they're written well, they're going to move these emotions in a way that kind of purifies them. And so when Aristotle defines tragedy, it's like this of an action that is serious, you know, in some magnitude, right? In Sweden language, he says, right? Moving us to pity and fear, right? So it's to purge these, right? So it moves us to pity, which is a form of sadness and fear. And white comedy moves us more to mirth, which is a form of joy, right? And hope, you see? So it's important for understanding fiction, you see? Of course, there's some forms of fiction that are actually tabbed with anger, you know, the ones where someone's trying to revenge, something's happened, right? And the whole thing is built upon the idea of revenge, right? You have a little bit of that even in the Odyssey of Homer, right? Where Homer is, this is coming home, and you've got all these people eating his food and courting his wife, and, you know, and they close the doors, and... And you have, you know, Electra, you know, meaning the wife who's killed the father, right, and so on, and he's a lover, and so on, and so on, and so on. So, but then it's important for the art of rhetoric, because you move people to what? Like, it's an emotional thing, it is. So, Shakespeare, or Aristotle has in the second book of the rhetoric a whole section on the different emotions that you use in rhetoric, and how you arouse these emotions, or how you calm them, right? So, if I'm defending you in court, I'm going to make them feel pity for you, right? If I want to really get you punished, I'll get, you know, them to feel angry towards you, you see, and if I'm in the political assembly, I want to get some money for defense, I'm going to arouse fear if I can, you know. It's going to happen, you know, if you don't, you know, increase the army or something, or get this airplane, or this rocket, or whatever it is. So, the emotions have a different role to play there in rhetoric than they do in the poetic art, but there's some similarities, and, but then when you study the, what, music, because I said Mozart's music, you represent the, what, emotions, all of them, right? In the 20th, the piano chair of the representation of anger there, right? In the 24th, and so on. And then when you come to talk about the moral virtues, huh, in ethics, some moral virtues are about these passions, right? Like, say, temperance is about, what, desire and pleasure and so on, right? And then maybe courage is about, what, fear and boldness and so on, right? And magnetism is about hope and so on, right? And so, part of the distinction of the, many of the moral virtues is by the emotions that they are about, right? As I say, Thomas would distinguish all 11 emotions there, and then he can sometimes bring in more accidental differences, you know, different kinds of, what, sadness, right? So, like, what's the difference between pity and envy and melancholy? And then, so this is important then for at least those four arcs. Arts are sciences, huh, for ethics, and even theology, right, but you take up the more bridges in that, and then for rhetoric, and for understanding the poetic art, right, and then of course in the poetic art you have representation of characters in this or that emotion, right, but then it also has an emotional effect upon the audience of this double aspect. But, so, touching upon this, the irascible and the concubiscible here in the first objection, right, the name in Greek for the concubiscible is epithumia, and for irascible is, what, thumas, huh, but they're kind of named from one virtue, like irascible is named in one emotion, irascible is named from what, anger, right, and thumas has some of that sense, right, because that's the most manifest, you know, emotion, right, and concubiscible is named from what, sense desire, right, because that's the most hunger, sexual desire, you know, on this sort of thing, desire to get drunk or something, you know, see, and of course when Thomas takes up, you know, the virtues in the secunda secunda in great detail, he takes up faith, hope, and charity, the theological virtues, and then prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance, right, but then he attaches to justice or fortitude or temperance other virtues that share the same mode, as he says, even though they're about a different matter, right, and so he attaches to temperance, which moderates the desire for sense pleasures, huh, eating, drinking, reproducing, mildness, which moderates, what, anger, right, you see, and there's certain similarity between those two because they quite strongly move you, right, and that's why Shakespeare, you know, in, uh, as you like it there, uh, when, uh, the two young lovers fall in love quickly, you know, uh, these characters speak, they're in the very wrath of love, but there's no wrath there, isn't there, right, but it's a metaphor from, what, species to species, right, because it has a sudden, you know, and he kind of plays it, the very wrath of love, clums cannot part them, right, well, yeah, two dogs are angry, funny, you know, and these lovers, you gotta have a, if you're a father, you gotta, you know, your daughter's on the porch with the guy, you need a club to separate them, right, and, uh, so, uh, but, uh, or like, in the other place, he says, when the guy is, uh, very angry, you know, he says, what, drunk with collar, you see, well, drunk is in, is in the matter of temperance, right, and collar in the matter of the virtue of mildness, but there's a similarity, right, drunk with anger, right, like, uh, there's a rashness, a man who's drunk too much, you see, so, you tend to name these from the ones that stand out, ira, anger, huh, and ketubacins, uh, desire for sense, experience, um, more of Augustine says in the twelfth book of the Trinity, that sensuality is signified by the serpent, now, when the spiritual senses, but there's nothing serpentine in Christ, uh, uh, for it has the likeness of a, what, yeah, without poison, as Augustine says on John, just as he, what, yeah, therefore in Christ, there was no will of sensuality, um, moreover, the will follows what nature says and said, but in Christ, there was not except what, there was not, there was it would not be more than one, what, human will, right, of course he does have soul and body, right, right, the one before the image about Christ, uh, is like serpent, when he's saying he's, uh, similar to a venomous animal, but without the venom, it's, uh, what, because of his human nature, what does he mean by the venomous animal, similar to a venomous animal, I think that that is, because of his human nature, he has, uh, his sensuality? Well, he says he's likened to the serpent in, in, in that, uh, spiritual sense of, of Moses raising up the, you know, the cross, you know, kind of figure of the cross. In the sense that if human nature is a serpent with, with poison, and he's like the serpent, but no poison. But sensuality is a serpent with the poison, right? Yeah, yeah. But sometimes I suppose sensuality is like the, the translation of, you know, sensuality in English right now would tend to have the sense of something bad, right? If I say something's sensual, I think it's some kind of excess, right? And, uh, but you find another word, it's like self-love, right, that uses a bad sentence, right? He loves himself, right? Well, you must have loved himself, but, you know, he loves himself too much, right? Or more than he should, you know? Um, okay. But against this is what Ambrose says in the second to the emperor of Gratia, huh? That's what he saw before, right? Mine is the will which he calls his own, right? Because as man he, what, takes, takes, yeah, undergoes sadness, yeah. From which is given to be understood that sadness pertains to human will in Christ, huh? But sadness pertains to sensuality as has been had in the second part when we talked about these things. Therefore it seems that in Christ is the will of what? Apart from the will of reason, right? So in the way Thomas is in ordering the consideration of the, of the incarnation after the second part is, uh, can use things that just understood in the second part. I answer it should be said, that it has been said, that the Son of God took on human nature with everything that pertains to the perfection of that nature. But in human nature is included also the nature of what? An animal. As in a species is included the, what? Genus, huh? So animal is divided into man and beast, right? What is a man if his chief couldn't let the stupid feed a beast no more, right? Whence it is necessary that the Son of God, huh? With this human nature assumes also those things which pertain to the perfection of the nature of the animal. And among these is sense desire, which is called sensualitas in Latin, right? And therefore is necessary to say that in Christ there was sensual desire, but it would be better to say sense desire, I think. Um, or, uh, sensuality, then you have to realize Latin right there. Uh, there's no different sense of connotation in English, right? Now I've spoken out before how, how when they talk about the senses of the sacred scripture, in the Latin they say sensus literalis, and then the sensus, you know, spiritualis or mysticus sometimes. Um, well, if you just transliterate sensus literalis, it's what? Literal sense. And I usually translate it sense of the letter, because you say literal sense, and the way people use the word contemporarily now, uh, they exclude the metaphorical, because that's metaphorical, not literal, right? But for Thomas, under sensus literalis is what? The metaphor, right? Okay? So, uh, when I say, that the Lord is my rock, that's metaphorical, but that's the, what? Yeah. The senses, yeah, yeah. Well, I think, you know, sensuality, um, or sensual appetite is probably the pejorative sense, right? If it's something like sense. That's why sense desire doesn't have that. Now, it should be known, however, that sense desire, insofar as it is what? Naturally apt to obey reason, is reasonable by what? Partaking, as is clear through the philosopher in the first book of Nicomachean Ethics. So, Aristotle in the beginning there, the Ethics, he says that you have to know something about the soul, right, and the powers of the soul to understand ethics, huh? And so he speaks of one part as being reasonable essentially, and another part as being, what, reasonable by participation, right? A part that is where to listen, right, or obey, or be led to obey reason, right? And because the will is in reason, huh? For a like reason, it can be said that sensuality is will by what? Yeah. So that's why he says, oh, no, I don't think there's a reason to say that, right? In the same way, you know, that Aristotle speaks of the, what, the emotions as a part that can be reasonable by participation, right? It can be reasonable in the sense of what? Obeying reason, right? And so the emotions can obey the will, follow the movement of the will, right? And then they can be called, right? And then they can be called, what, will by participation, right? Okay. You listen to the music of Mozart, and it's in some ways the most reasonable music ever written. And what I mean by that, say, well, I don't say that it's reasoning, but he's representing the emotions as moving in accordance with what? Reason, right? Aristotle has, I think, a very good thing when he speaks about this in the first book of the Ethics, huh? He raised the question, should reason rule the emotions as the master rules the slave or as the father rules the son? And kind of the stoic position or the caricature, at least, of the stoic position, right? Is it reason should rule the emotions like the master rules the slave, right? You know? My cousin Donald, who's a philosopher, too, is explaining this one time, talking to a woman psychologist. And she's saying, well, that's really behind the, you know, some of the psychological, they call it, the problems people, right? That their reason is what? Yeah, not on the emotions, right? And there's a kind of an explosion, I suppose, in the prison sooner or later. But, so Aristotle concludes that reason should rule the emotions as the father rules his, what? Son. Now, the difference is that the master rules the slave for the good of the master, not for the good of the slave. And reason rules, I mean, the father rules the son for the good of the son, right? And another difference is that the slave has no, nothing to say about what his, his, what he should do, right? But the son has something to say about what he should do, right? And you kind of see this, you know, in families there where the, sometimes where the, the father might want the son to continue in his line of business or what he hoped to accomplish and didn't accomplish, wants the son to accomplish it. And sometimes he doesn't listen to the son, right? And I told you that story my father told me of his business friend, didn't I? Tell you that. He got this, this son into Amherst, which is kind of a prestigious college out here. And of course the guy flunked out of Amherst the first year. He wasn't suited to Amherst, he wasn't suited to college at all, right? So finally he comes back home and the father says, what do you really want? He wanted a filling station, a gas station. You got to put in with cars, right? So daddy bought him a gas station, right? You know, I think my father was telling me this, that he's not going to try to force us into something that, you know, the father, he was a businessman, you know, but, you know, he wasn't going to force us to be a businessman, you know, or, you know, purpose in son. You know, if we were, if we were in kind of something else that was good, you know, and better, you know. And so this is the two differences between the way the father rules the son, right? And, and the way the master rules the slave, right? So, but that difference, you know, accepting them the way reason should rule it. If the emotions are led that way, right? Then they are reasonable by partaking the reason, huh? That's why I say, I say Mozart's music is perhaps the most reasonable music ever written. He represents the emotions. And years ago, I read Austerly there. I think I mentioned the essay there, the Thomist. Austerly taught at the College of St. Thomas there, but he wasn't there a day before I got in. But my brother Richard had him, you know, and Austerly had a little essay on Towards an Evaluation of Music, right? And that's how I first read these things. But he was talking about the superiority of the music of the 18th century to that of the Romantic period, right? Because the music of the 18th century in general represented the emotions as, what, in a reasonable state, huh? And whether the Romantics were not accepting, the reason should really rule the emotions, right? The emotions had better be their own. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And, you know, you can say like a Tchaikovsky there, right? Tchaikovsky goes out in the middle of the river to drown himself, right? He can't finally do it, you know, huh? But then, you know, but then you go and listen to the music of Mozart. You say, oh, yes, Mozart, that's not you. So, you know, the insanity, you know, of the world, which he was a part, right? He said to get back to something. So, it's good that this Benedict XVI likes to play Mozart, right? You know, that's a good sign. That's a good sign, yeah. Do the animals have such desire then in a way that doesn't protect the reason? Yeah, but you wouldn't speak of them as having voluntas per participazione, right? Yes, okay. But, you know, going back to this analogy here, you can, like Plato does the dialogues there, and he sometimes says that reason is to the emotions like a man is to his horse, right? When you first get on the horse, it wants to throw you off, and you can give up, and this horse goes its own way, and so on. Or you can keep on getting back on top of the horse until you finally attain the horse, and the horse begins to, what, obey you, right? Well, it's easier to see the relation between the man and the horse, and who should command, who should obey, than reason and the emotions, but it's, what, analogous, right? And Thomas there, when he's talking about temperance, you know, he's talking about intemperance, and how this is a childish advice. And he has a precise reason for saying this, not just, you know, throwing words out, but he says, if you don't correct a child, eventually he becomes unmanageable, and you can't control him, right? And, but the same with your reason and your emotions, if you always give in to your emotions, then eventually they come to a point that they simply rule you, or you can't really control them, right? You're a slave of your emotions, right? You're a slave to your emotions. That's not good, huh? That's why he calls it childish advice, right? It becomes like a second nature there, right? You become habituated to these things, huh? Yeah, you see, I think I've talked about the, the division of pleasures, right? There's some pleasures we share with the dog and the cat, right? And we're going to have steak tonight, so I'd say to Tabitha, you know, we're going to have some steak tonight. She seems to, she seems to know, but, you know, you know.