Tertia Pars
Lecture 53: The Unity and Existence of Christ

Transcript
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They're uterus, huh? Not from the uterus. That's the etymology, I don't know if that's the Dorian etymology, but some of them are kind of, you know, interesting. So the neuter genus designates something unformed and imperfect, right? But the masculine genus designates something formed and perfect, right? But the historians, the heretics, laying down in Christ two persons say that Christ is not only too neutralitaire, but also too, what, masculine, right? But because we place in Christ one person, right, and one suppositum, right? Because we, person and suppositum, just differ as, what, suppositum is more general, right? And person is a suppositum of a rational nature, as is clear from the things before. It follows that we say that not only is Christ one masculine, but also one, what, trolliter. So he's one and not two, huh? I'm sure he's glad to know that. He's really, these people, these theologians or these scriptural scholars, they have Christ doubting whether he's, what, God and, you know, not quite sure. He's gradually realized, maybe I'm God. Imagine how, what a feeling he had when he finally realized. That wasn't a great job. How about the word of Augustine there in the first to the Trinity, right? These both, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that that word of Augustine should not thus be understood that utrumque holds itself on the side of the, what, predicate, as if to say that Christ, right, is both, but it holds itself on the side of the subject. And then the word utrumque, both, is placed not as it were for two supposita, right, but for two names signifying two natures in the concrete. For we are able, I'm able to say that both, to it God and man is God on account of God taking both natures, and both, to it God and man is man on account of the except man. I think I'll think about that another day. Okay, yeah, that's a little bit dense even for this guy. Okay? To the second, it should be said that, when it is said that Christ is alioed and alioed, right, other and other, the speaking locution should be laid out, exposed, expounded, that in the sense that he has, you know what, other and other nature. And in this way, Augustine expounds it in the book against, what, Feliciano, right, where, when he says, in the mediator of God and man, other is the, what, son of God, other the son of man, he says other for the, what, distinction of substance of the two natures, right, but not, what, alios, right, for the unity of person. Well, again, that makes no more sense in the Latin, right, because alioed is what, neutro, I guess, right, and so he's alioed and alioed, he has two natures, right, but he's one person, so he's not alioes and alioes, in the Sharmada scriptural stuff. that's a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, in a form that is in creatore, called compendium of theology, and it's written for what? His friend? Yeah. Alliud quidum et alliud, right? Those of which the savior is. If it is not the same, the invisible to the visible, right? And what is without time, to that which is under time. So there's the two natures, right? What is not alliud et alliud? OBSIT! For these are both what? One. Now to the third it should be said, and this is another argument from the alliud and alliud. To the third it should be said that this is false, that Christ is only what? Man. Because it does not exclude another suppositum, but another what? Nature. In that the terms and the predicate are placed, and they hold themselves as form, right? Notice how in a statement there sometimes it will say, we divide in three parts, huh? Say man is an animal, right? Or man is a subject, and animal is the what? Predicate, huh? Well, why do we call man the subject? Subject means what? Nature. Yeah, yeah. So that the subject is like matter, and the predicate is like the what? Form. And notice how when we divide something universal into particulars, we tend even like a board, you know, to put the particular under the what? Yeah. The same way that we put matter under what? Form, right? Now, why do we do that? Is that reasonable, right? Well, one time when I was watching my little nephew before I was married, I'd build up a little tower, right, huh? And he would, what? Knock it over and laugh. But if I got him distracted, and I could build the tower taller than him, he'd go, oh, oh, oh, with his little finger pointing at it, and admiration, right, of the marvelous work I had done. And he didn't try to knock it over, right? And why? Yeah. In other words, if he tried to mess with that tower, it was going to act upon him. Why, if it was below him, he could easily act upon, right? Mm-hmm. So we think of the agent as acting upon the what? Yeah. And now, as you know, you can be hammering something into the roof and say, well, now you're under it, right, huh? But as you know, it's kind of hard to do that, you know, if you hand. It's much easier to be pounding it like this, right? Mm-hmm. So that's where we get the idea that the agent acts upon the what? Patient, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. And so I translate, you know, those two categories, which I translate in life and axiopassio, right? I translate them as acting upon and undergoing, right, huh? So you think of the agent as acting upon the matter, right, huh? But the result of the agent acting upon the matter is to give the matter ultimately a form, right? So if the form comes to the matter from being acted upon by the agent, then the form is, what, above the matter. That's the way we would speak, right? Mm-hmm. And so, again, now the universal is like a, what, form that can be realized in many, what, matters, right, huh? Like the form of this table might be realized in many tables here or this form of this chair, right, huh? So the universal is like a form, right, huh? And you're more apt to predicate the more universal, the less universal, right? You more say animal or man than, or dog, than the reverse, right? Dog and animal, huh? So it holds itself, what, formally, right? The predicate. So that's a common thing from some logic, and there might be more reason than I'm giving there, but that's a little bit of that, huh? So to the third objection, it should be said that this is false, that Christ is only man, because it does not exclude, what, another suppositum, but another, what, nature, yeah. Now there is no other suppositum, but there is another, what, nature. In that terms or words in the predicate placed hold themselves as like form, right, the matter, formaliter. If, however, there be added something by which it is drawn to the suppositum, it would be a true speech, huh? If we said that Christ is only that which is a man, huh? It would not, however, follow that he is something other than man, because aliud, since it is the relative of diversity of substance, properly refers to the symposium, just as all relatives making a presumilation. It would follow, therefore, that he has, what, another nature. Okay, I've got to go to another appointment, so I think I better stop right at 4.20, huh? Okay. And we'll meet again next week, same time, same place. Human time, no, not a jolly time. Thank you. Thank you. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, to deepen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, help us to understand all that you've written. Father, Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. What's the feast of St. Robert Bellarmine today? I don't know if you have a new calendar. Is that today? Next month. 17th of September, it's today. That's today. It's October, but today is the stigmatization of St. Francis. It's the feast of, I think it's Alberta, Jerusalem. And your granddaughter's feast day, St. Sophia. I think we're in a faith, hope, and charity, where we're three daughters or something like that. They're martyrs. So you can wish your grandmother... That thing on that psalm's in there, I think, is by Bellarmine, right? Yes. Grandi Salapide, it's not by him, but by Bellarmine. So I guess Grandiis must have been a Jesuit too, I think. Grandi Salapide. Yeah. So, keeping the family. Let's just look a little bit more at question 17, article 1, and look at the reply to the last, the objections. I think it's a little more clear there. Yeah. To the fifth, it should be said that in the mystery of the divine trinity, the divine nature is said in the abstract, can be said in the abstract, of the three persons. And therefore, one can say simply that the three persons are what? Unum and latina. But in the mystery of the incarnation, both natures are not said in the abstract of Christ. And therefore, it cannot be said simply that Christ is what? Two. It's a kundum quid, you could say, right? Okay. But you have to say he's what? Two in nature, right? You'd have to qualify it, right? That's he's two. And now in the reply to the sixth objection. To the sixth, it should be said that two is said, as it were, having what? Dwelt. Not that in something else, but in the very one of whom the two are what? Said. For the predication is said of the, what comes about in regard to the suppositum, which is implied or indicated by this name, Christ. Although, therefore, Christ has a duality of what? Nature's. Because, nevertheless, it does not have a duality of supposita. There's not two persons there to supposita. It cannot be said to be two without qualification, right? And to the seventh, it should be said that the Latin word alterum implies a diversity of what? Accidenta. And, therefore, a diversity of action, of accident, suffices that something be said simply to be alteruma. That's more in the Latin. Indian. But aliud implies a diversity of what? Substance. But substance is said not only the nature of the thing, what it is, but also suppositum, as Aristotle says in the fifth book of wisdom there. And, therefore, the diversity of nature does not suffice for this, that something be said simply, what? Other. Unless there be also a diversity according to what? Supposita. But the diversity of nature makes something other secundum quid. That is to say, according to nature, if there is no, what? Diversity of the supposita. So, basically, he's saying because Christ is one person, right? You shouldn't say he's two. Okay? So, if he appears to you, we shouldn't say, you know, not the two of you. No. I don't think he would appreciate that. And, you know, say, didn't Thomas teach you how to speak to me? Unless we're in the presence of a carrot, we can sort of clarify. So, sometimes it's kind of hard to get that because of the Latin, you know, but you can see it in English, huh? That the two of you, it doesn't seem exactly right, does it? You can talk about your two natures, but I wouldn't say the two of you. Because it's the same person who has the two natures. Now, the next article, another difficult one here, who does, There's one existence in Christ, one, one to be, right? And one of my former students there, she went down and studied with the Dominicans, right? And I remember she was coming up for one of these big final exams or things. And the Dominican was kidding her, he was going to ask her about this. It was kind of the idea that this would be the meanest thing you could probably do to someone in the exam. So we'll see a little bit what Thomas says here. To the second, one goes forward thus. It seems that in Christ there is not only one to be or one existence, but what? Two. For Damascene says in the third book that those things which follow upon the nature in Christ are duplicated or double, right? But to be follows the nature. For to be is from the what? Form, right? And therefore in Christ there are two what? Beings, yeah. Moreover, to be of the Son of God is the very divine nature itself. That's what we found in our treatise on the substance of God, if you recall. Let me see right there then. And it is eternal. But the being of the man Christ is not the divine nature, but it is temporal being, when in the fullness of time, right? St. Paul says. Therefore, in Christ there is not only one to be, right? Moreover, this is an interesting argument. In the Trinity, although there are three persons, there is nevertheless one to be, on account of the unity of the nature. But in Christ there are two natures, although there is one person. Therefore, there are two natures, although there is one person. Therefore, there are two natures, although there is one person. Yeah, but two. Moreover, in Christ the soul gives some kind of existence to the body, since it is its what? Form. But it does not give to it the divine being, since that is uncreated. Therefore, in Christ there is another to be, another existence, apart from the divine to be, the divine existence. And thus, in Christ there is not only one to be, huh? See, especially confused by now? You know, the teacher, as Sirik said, you know, the deed of the teacher is to confuse the issue. But against this, each thing, according as it is said to be being, is said to be one, right? And this is the great truth that Aristotle brings out at the beginning of the fourth book of wisdom. Because one and being are, what? Convertible, right? You know, the text, the kind of famous text for the, those most universal things that are convertible, what does convertible mean? Well, convertible like a thing and its definition are convertible, or a thing and its property in the strict sense are convertible, right? So you can say, every square is an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral. Turn around and say, every equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral is a square. That's the meaning to say convertible, right? Okay. Or, if you have a property in the strict sense, every two is half a four. And everything half a four is, what? Two, right? Well, Aristotle discovered that being and one and good and true are all, what? Convertible, right? Okay. I happen to be looking at a text in the sentences, again, about that today. And one of the objections, you know, again, saying this was, well, do they add something in definition, right? Do they note the contract? Well, Thomas says, yeah, they add something in definition. definition to being, but they add something that follows upon all being, right? So it's convertible, right? And Aristotle talks in particular about being in one at the beginning of the fourth book of wisdom, where he shows that wisdom is about being as being, and about the one and the many. The consideration of being in one, in a way, is a consideration of the same thing, but they differ in definition, right? One adds a negation to the idea of being, undivided being. And Thomas, in the consideration of the substance of God, he gets down to the unity of God, if you recall. He has an article or two in there about what the one is and how it's convertible with being and so on. So the said contra is saying each thing according as it is said to be a being is said to be one, right? And sometimes they add to one, it's undivided in itself but distinct from everything else. Because one and being are what? Invertible, right? And that's why when Socrates is what? Getting you to define something, you'll sometimes turn around, right? He says to you, what is a dog? You say, well, a dog is a four-footed animal. Socrates says, well, every dog is a four-footed animal. What is every four-footed animal dog? If you can't turn around, you haven't yet completed your definition of dog. If, therefore, in Christ there were two, what? Two bees, right? And not only one, God would be two and not one. Contra is what we were saying in the previous article. I answer it should be said that because in Christ there are two natures, huh? And one hypostasis, right? That's why we speak of the hypostatic union, right? The two natures don't become one nature, but they're united in one hypostasis. It subsists in both of them. It is necessary because of this that those things which pertain to the nature in Christ are two. As we'll see in the next one about the will, right? Christ has two wills because it pertains the nature. But those things which pertain to the hypostasis in Christ are one, what? Only, right? Now, a little complicated here. To be pertains to the hypostasis and to the, what? Nature. Nature. But not in the same way. To the hypostasis as to that which has to be, that which has existence. But to the nature as to that by which something has existence. For nature is signified by way a form which is said to be a being from this fact that by it something is, huh? Just as whiteness, huh? Just as by whiteness is something white, huh? And by is an habit, I guess. And by humanity or by human nature is someone a, what? Man. And by health you are, what? Healthy. And so on, huh? It should be considered that is some form or nature there is which does not pertain to, what? The personal existence of a subsisting hypostasis, right? That to be is not said to be, that to be of that person, what? Simply, but, what? They couldn't have quit. Now, what does that mean? White is an example to help you understand that. Just as to be white is, what? A to be of Socrates, not insofar as he is Socrates, huh? But insofar as he is, what? White. And of this sort, nothing prevents that to be multiplied in one hypostasis a person. For other is it to be, by which Socrates is white, and by which Socrates is, what? Musical, right? Okay? Well, this is to be, and it's like, couldn't have quit, right? So when I came to be in this room, right? I got a new being, right? Yeah, yeah. But you wouldn't say simply without qualification that I came to be today, see? And I used to talk to him about that. If you leave this room, you will cease to be. If I don't qualify it, you know, it sounds like a threat, huh? It is. But that to be that belongs to the, what? Hypostasis itself, right? Or to the person, right? Or to the person, huh? Which is a hypostasis of the rational nature. But that to be that belongs to the hypostasis or person as such, huh? Or by itself, huh? It is impossible in one, what? Hypostasis or person to be multiplied. Because it is impossible that a one thing may not be, what? One to be, huh? If, if, therefore, the human nature came to the Son of God, not hypostatically or personally, but accidentally, as some posit, right? It would be necessary to place in Christ a two-fold to be. One according to which he is God. Another according to which he is, what? Man. Just as in Socrates, one posits another to be according to which he is white. Another according to which he is, what? Man. Because to be white does not pertain to the, to be of the person, right? To be itself of the person, of Socrates. Now, to be headed, huh? And to be bodily and to be animated, the whole pertains to the one person of Socrates. And therefore, from all of these, there's not come about except one to be in Socrates. And if it were to happen that after the constitution of the person of Socrates, there came to Socrates' hand or feet or eyes, it happens to one born blind, huh? From these, there would not exceed to Socrates another to be, huh? But only a certain relation to things of this sort. Because he said to be not only according to those things which he had before, but also according to those things which afterwards came to him. Thus, therefore, since human nature is joined to the Son of God, hypostatically, the hypostatic union, or personally, as has been said above, and not accidentally, like maybe some heretics would say, right? It follows that according to human nature, there's not come to him a new, what? Personal being. But only a new relation of the, what? Being pre-existing to the human nature. That now that person is said to subsist, not only according to the divine nature, but also the, what? Human. So if we read him right, he's saying that there's only one, what? Essay, Christ, huh? Okay. So it reminds a little bit, you know, of what you learn about the human soul, right? That, as Aristotle was perhaps one of the first to show, the to-be of the human soul doesn't depend upon the, what? Body, right, huh? Okay. And Plato kind of saw this too. But then for Plato, the body was kind of, what? Like a clothing for the soul. It wasn't really one thing, you know? And so the Platonists have a hard time explaining the, what? Unity of man, right? That the body and the soul together are one thing, a man. But you can... You say that the body, what, partakes of the existence of the, what, soul, right? It's a little bit like that in Christ, huh? That the human nature, in some sense, right, partakes of the existence of, what, of God, right? I've got to be kind of careful when it's not exactly the same thing, huh? But because it's joined to the, what, divine person, right? Then it's not giving Christ really, what, another existence, right? Simply, huh? Maybe his being a man, right? But it's not the human nature that he gets to be simply, okay? It's only one being simply that he has as a divine person, right? And that he had before, he pulled human nature to himself, right? The same with the soul, you know, before the resurrection of the body, right, huh? The soul will have an existence that the body will be, what, drawn to, right? And practically, it's hard to understand, right? What led Aristotle to his conclusion was that the, he saw that understanding the universal is not in the body. And therefore, the soul has a, what, a doing that's not in the body. And that shows that his existence is not, as we say, immersed in the body, huh? It's not, if it had existence, our soul, only in the body, it would have operation or doing only in the body, right? But it understands not in the body. And that shows his existence is not just in the body, but the body sharing in existence that it doesn't equal, right? That's why Aristotle says in the book, The Generation of Animals, that the human soul doesn't come from the mother and father, right? So you thank God, right, for choosing you to be, right? But your soul comes from God, but not through your parents, but from God immediately. So I thank God for my soul, which came from him, and I thank him for my body, which came from him, but through my parents, right? But I didn't get my soul from God through my parents, huh? But he infused my soul at the time that they were bringing my body into existence, huh? It's interesting to think, you know, about thanking God for choosing you to be, because he didn't choose you to be because you were better than all these other persons he could have chosen to be, right? It was really very gratuitous on his part, yeah? And very merciful in a sense, huh? That if he hadn't chosen me to be, I'd be nothing. And I wouldn't know that you'd have nothing. You'd have nothing to show for. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I suppose you have to thank him for choosing the universe to be, of which you could be, however humble, a part, right? Yeah, yeah, you know? And if you could ask him, you know, well, why would you choose me to be? Well, free act, free act, you know? So it wasn't because of anything, you know, any excellence you had over, or he's lucky what I could have done, you know? It's kind of a... You didn't have anything better to do. The priest used to say, he didn't choose you because you're good-looking. Did you say, Dr. Perkins, it just says the soul isn't fully immersed in the body and the divine nature is not fully immersed in the human nature? Well, now we're not going to say that. Because the soul and the body, you know, are nevertheless four-on-one thing, right? Yes. Why the human nature and the divine nature don't come together and form one nature, a monophysite, you know? You'd be a monophysite if you said it. Yeah, yeah. There was fully immersed. Well, if you say there was one nature of the two, you know? Oh, now I see. Yeah, yeah. You know, I guess it's in the creed of St. Athanasius, right? The Athanasian creed. That this comparison is made between incarnation and the soul and the body and so on. When Thomas explains that in the Summa Cane Gentiles, it's that the human nature of Christ is like a tool of his divinity, right? And like a joined tool, right? So it's not like forming matter so much, but like agent and tool, right? But anyway, it's another topic for discussion. Now, the first objection was saying that what follows the nature is twofold in Christ, right? And Thomas goes back to the distinction of the body of the article, and he applied to that first objection. To the first, it should be said, he says, that to be follows upon the nature, not as having to be, right? But as that by which something is, right? But it follows upon the person of the hypostasis as the one having existence. And therefore, it more retains unity according to the unity of the hypostasis than does it have duality according to the, what? Duality of nature, yeah. Like he said, same distinction that he pointed out in the body of the article. Now, second objection here, right? What about temporal being and eternal being and so on? He says, to the second, it should be said that that eternal existence of the Son of God, which is the divine nature, becomes the existence of, what? Man, insofar as human nature is taken on by the Son of God in the unity of the, what? Person, right? That's why it's comparing a bit to the body of the soul, right? That the body takes on, what? Or shares in the existence of the, what? Soul, right? The understanding soul. The understanding soul is existence in its own, what? Right. Which is not true about these other forms that matter, right? Even if they're going to be represented in the court and so on. Okay. So this is kind of a profound thing, a difficult thing, right? But it's because you have one really hypostasis there, that you have one to be simply, right? Now, the third objection was trying to say, well, if you have one existence in the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit, they have one existence because they have one nature, then children should have two existences because they have two nature, right? To the third, it should be said that, as has been said in the first part, because the divine person is the same with the nature. In the divine persons, there is not another to be of the person apart from the to be of the, what? Nature. And therefore, the three persons do not have except one to be. But they would have a threefold to be if, what? In them, there was a, what? A different to be of the person and another to be of the, what? Nature, huh? Now, what about the soul giving to be to the body? To the fourth, it should be said that the soul in Christ gives to be or existence to the body insofar as it makes it to be, what? Animated in act, huh? But if the body is understood to be perfected by the soul without the hypostasis having both, right? This whole composed from the soul and the body, insofar as it signified the name of humanity or human nature, does not signify that which is, but that by which something is. And therefore, the to be itself of the subsisting person, according as it has a, what? Relation to such a nature, who's, what? Which relation that causes the soul, right? Insofar as the, what? It perfects human nature by informing the body. I suppose the body in some way shares in the, what? Divine being, too, huh? But through the, what? Soul, yeah. Oh, let that rest for a while in our heads, huh? Oh, let that rest for a while in our heads. Oh, let that rest for a while in our heads. Oh, let that rest for a while in our heads. Oh, let that rest for a while in our heads. Oh, let that rest for a while in our heads.