Tertia Pars
Lecture 51: Christ as Creature and the Problem of Precise Language

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So, we have to argue later now. To the eighth one proceeds thus. It seems that this is true that Christ is a, what, creature. For Leopapa says, a new and unheard of, what, coming about, huh? God who is and was becomes a, what, creature. But that is yet to be said of Christ, that the Son of God was made through incarnation. Therefore, this is true, Christ is a, what, creature. Moreover, the properties of a nature are able to be said of the common hypostasis of both natures. By whatever name it is, what, signified. But it is a property of human nature to be a creature. Just as it is a property of the divine nature to be a creator. Therefore, both can be said of Christ, to wit, that he is a creature and that he is uncreated and the creator. Moreover, the more principled part of a man is the soul than the body. But Christ, by reason of the body, which he drew from the virgin, is said simply to be born of the virgin. Therefore, by reason of the soul, which was created by God, he hath to be said, simpliciter, that Christ is a, what, creature. But against all this is what Ambrose says in his book about the Trinity. Nunquit, and dicto factus es Christus. Never should it be said, is that? How does he translate that text here? What way can a creature in God be said to be? For God is of a simple nature, not of a conjoined word. Therefore, this should not be conceded that Christ is a, what, creature. I actually, it should be said that as Jerome says, I did that thing again, that from words disorderly put forward, heresy arises. Whence with heretics, we ought needed to have, what, names in common, lest we favor their, what, error, right? But the Aryans, heretics, said that Christ was a, what, creature, and less than the Father. Not only by reason of the human nature, but also by reason of the, what, divine person. And therefore, it ought not to be said absolutely that Christ is a creature, or less than the Father, but with a determination to it according to human nature. And there, I think, absolutely has a sense of simplicity there, right? It's, you see? Okay. By the other text we're looking at there, absolutely was opposed to relative there. Um, and cum determination, like saying, secundum quid, in a sense. To it, according to his human nature, right, eh? But those things about which, what, one's not able to suspect, right, that they belong to the divine person according to himself, uh, what? Right, they are able simply to be said about Christ. Yeah. I guess the things about which there's no confusion. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, those things about which one would not suspect that they could be, what, belong to the divine person in himself, right? Can be said simply about Christ by reason of his human nature. For we say simply that Christ suffered, died, and was buried. Just as in bodily things and human things, huh? Those things which in doubt, uh, to the whole or the part, if they're in some part, we do not attribute to the whole simply. That is without determination. For we do not say that the Ethiopian is white, right? But that he is white in his, what? Teeth. And that example is back there, Aristotle's book on the, uh, on the fallacies, huh? Oh, yeah. Okay. But we say that he is without, what, determination, crisps and hair, uh, because this cannot belong to him except according to his, what, hair is, right? Now, what about this text from Neopaka? To first, it should be said that sometimes the holy doctors, right, uh, causa brevitatis, an account of brevity, right, having omitted the determination, right, use the name of creature about Christ, right? But it ought nevertheless in their sayings to be understood, right? Mm-hmm. To second, it should be said that all properties of human nature, as of the divine, are able in some way to be said of Christ, right? Whence Damascene says in the third book that Christ, who is said to be God and man, is, what, creatable and increatable and visible into parts and not visible into parts. But nevertheless, those things which have some doubt about it in nature cannot be said without, what, determination. Whence he himself, afterwards, huh, that adds or joins, that that one hypostasis to wit of Christ is, what, increated by its deity and created in its, what, yeah. Just as a converse, so it ought not to be said without determination that Christ is incorporeal or unable to suffer to avoiding the error of the Manichaeans, right, who posited that Christ did not have a true, what, body, right, uh, and that he was not truly, what, suffering, right? But it should be said with determination that Christ, according to his divine nature, is bodiless and unable to suffer, right? So there's a little leeway there, right, especially when there's a heretic around the corner, huh? To third, it should be said, about the nativity from the Virgin, no doubt is able to arise that it belongs to the person of the Son of God, right? As it could be about creation, and therefore the reason for both is not, what, see? Thomas seems to be saying that you can say that Christ is a creature according to his human nature, but you can't say simply, or it's dangerous to say simply that Christ is a creature, huh? Because you might say that the person, there is a creature, huh? That's not true. Considering how prone and I make mistakes. Okay, to the ninth one proceeds thus. It seems that that man, pointing to Christ, right, beginning to be. For Augustine says upon John, Before the world was, neither we were, right, nor that mediator of God and men, the man Christ, Jesus, right? But that which was not always began to be. Therefore that man, going to Christ, began to what? Be, yeah. Moreover, Christ began to be a man. But to be a man is to be simply. Back to that again. But that man began to be what? Simply. Moreover, a man implies the suppositum of human nature. But Christ was not always the suppositum of human nature. Therefore, that man began to be, right? But against this is what is said in Hebrews, ultimate 8, Jesus Christ, yesterday, today, and here. Well, Thomas was going to say, I think that this should not be said simply, right? I answer it should be said that this ought not to be said, that that man, according to Christ, began to be, if nothing is, what? Added. And this for a two-fold reason. First, because the saying is simply false, according to the, what? Position of the Catholic faith, in which we lay down in Christ one suppositum and one hypostasis. Just as, what? One person. According to this, it's necessary that when it is said that, or according to this man, according to Christ, one designates the, what? Suppositum. To whose eternity it's repugnant that he began to, what? Be. Whence this is false, this man began to be. Nor does it stand in the way here that it belongs to him to begin to be of, what? Human nature. Which is signified by this name man. Because the term and the subject posited is not held formally for the nature, but more materially for the suppositum, which has been said above. So you say, this man began to be, right? You're talking about this person. And this person didn't begin to be. Secondly, because even if it were true, it ought nevertheless not to be used without determination to avoiding the heresy of Arius, right? Who, just as he attributed to the person of the Son of God that he was a creature, and that he was less than the Father, so he attributed to it that it began to be, saying that it was what it was not, huh? Yeah. In English, I can't remember what time I was saying. Yeah. Now, that first text there from Augustine, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that that authority should be understood with determination, as if one were to say that the man, Christ Jesus, was not before the world was according to his humanity. That's kind of sick and unquiet, right? You must know he's going to cause all these verbal problems, right? By taking on to my nature. Yeah. Moreover, Christ began to be man, but to be man is to be simply, right? To the second, it should be said that with this word or verb in shape and right, there does not follow the argument from the inferior to the superior. It does not follow, this thing began to be white, therefore it began to be, what? Colored, huh? And this, therefore, because to begin implies now to be and not before. It does not however follow, this was not before white, therefore this was not before, what? Colored, huh? Now, esse sublijiter is, what? Superior, more universal, to being a man, right? Once it does not follow that Christ, when he began to be a man, therefore he began to, what? Be, huh? Back to the first book of natural hearing. The dog becomes a cat, and the cat is an animal, and the dog becomes an animal? No, he always was an animal, right? Okay, to the third, it should be said. Notice he's saying the third objection. Man implies a suppositum of human nature, right? But Christ was not always the suppositum of human nature. Therefore, that man began to, what? Be. To the third, it should be said that this name, man, as it is taken for Christ, although it does signify human nature, which began to be, nevertheless, it stands for, or it supposes, the eternal suppositum, which does not begin to be him. And therefore, because, according as it is placed in the subject, it stands for the suppositum, right? According however, it is placed in the predicate, you phrase the nature, and therefore this is false, that the man, Christ, began to be, but this is true, that Christ began to be a man. Christ, I thought, meant Messiah, Messiah and the one of the people. Yeah. And he wasn't a man until he became incarnate. So why would you say Jesus? Jesus began to be a man, but not Christ, because Christ had to be, Jesus always, you could say, Christ had to have a time of his creation, you know, in the incarnation. That's right. Well, I guess it depends on a lot of him. Because, if you read it this way, it sounds like Christ always was, but then Christ always wasn't. The second person of the Trinity was that he wasn't always Christ, because he wasn't always a knight, he wasn't the Messiah. I guess he explained that before, about the different meanings of Christ, and so forth. It's, I guess, it's a subtle thing. Okay. Again, if you go over it a few times. It's interesting that St. Paul, when he's talking about the exodus, there's that famous line where he says, the rock was Christ. It doesn't say the rock was the second person. It doesn't say the rock was the word. It's interesting. I don't know. Different ways in which Christ is present. You have a complicated factor of time versus eternity, and we're thinking in a temporal fashion, whereas eternity is the ever-present. And so, I don't know how that complicates things. But it does. It's hard for us to think about. But the rock is signifying Christ. He's present there, but in a way, in a certain way. I think in the Old Testament, many things signify Christ. Doesn't mean Christ, the man yet is. The same with the comment that St. Thomas makes about when Christ began the Sermon on the Mount. He said to him that he opened his mouth. He says, why did he say he opened his mouth? He says, when you talk to him, he says, he opened his mouth. Well, because he often spoke and taught through the mouths of the prophets, but now he's speaking with Zoma. So, That's probably touching on what you're talking about there. But like you said, Christ sometimes refers to divinity, sometimes humanity, the anointing divinity, because the two are joined there. So you have to read through the Bible, St. Thomas, a bunch of times. I think there are texts in Thomas where he'll say that Christ is naming him from his human nature, right? Then I find the other ones where he'll say it's both. But it's because he says the word Christ means what? The anointed one, so it brings in the anointer. It's implied at least there, right? And the anointed, and therefore both the divine nature or the divine that anoints and the human that is anointed, right? If you say no, it just means the anointed. And the eval that implies someone anointing. And I'm more inclined, you know, to think of Christ as signifying the human, yeah. And it fits in with not only Peter's affection of faith, right? But when they say that, you know, kings and priests and prophets are anointed, all these are things that belong to Christ as man, right? You know, that's the kind of way they divide sometimes Matthew and Mark and Luke, you know, and say, well, Luke is emphasizing the priesthood of Christ, right? And therefore it begins and ends in the temple and tells us about his preaching in the temple and so on. I mean, as a child and so on. And then Mark is, what, emphasizing his prophetic role, and therefore it begins with the voice in the desert and so on. And then it kind of ends with them going out, you know, and the Lord confirming their teaching with the miracles, signs he worked. And then Matthew emphasizes the kingship of Christ, and that's why the adoration of the Magi and so on are the things they point to. But they're kind of thinking, you know, that you're dividing them according to the human nature, right? As opposed to John's emphasizing more of the divine nature. As they say, sometimes Thomas does take the name Christ, right? You know, as involving both the anointer and the anointed, right? And then both, right? But, you know, I always take John's confession of faith at the end of chapter 20, you know, obviously the gospel there makes the last chapter. These things are written that you might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and, you know, in believing you would have a life in him. It seems to me that's the same profession of faith as that of Peter. You know, in John, Peter and John are so close, and you see them in the Acts of the Apostles, and they're very close. And the difference being, of course, that Peter makes his profession of faith in the presence of Christ, and he says, thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God. And, of course, John is not doing it in the presence of Christ like that. So he doesn't say thou, but he says Jesus, right, is the Christ, the Son of God. He doesn't use the word living, but it's the same really profession of faith. But there, you know, I say, why is Jesus in the subject, and Christ and Son of God in the, what, predicate, right? Well, it must be that Jesus in some way, you know, it's more appropriate, and not as explicitly either man or God, right? Why Christ is more man, and the Son of God is... There's even evidence of that, a different way of seeing it in the scholarship, they refer to this Jesus of history, Christ of faith. So in a certain way, humanity is this Jesus, and divinity is the Christ. That seems to be there, at least my simple understanding, what they're presenting anyways. They're saying there's a difference between believing in him as God, living in him as a man. They identify the name Jesus with the name of Christ, and I guess. But, you know, when Jesus is kind of explaining the name there in Matthew there, and the angel says, call him Jesus, because you'll save people from their sins. Well, you know, when Christ, or who called him now, when he later on is forgiving people of sin, and they're offended, some of the Pharisees, whatever it is, because this is the only thing God can do, he can't, you know? So you might say, the name Jesus, you know, isn't that, you know? Well, to God, as well as to his humanity, right? He's named that as man. Yeah, yeah. Because of the union. Yeah. That touches on what he said before about the way of speaking, by his power, and his, refers to by his power, something that belongs to both, because he says there, only God can do good sentences, that you may know that the Son of Man has sin. There's something referring to the powers of divinity, yes, but it manifests itself. Yeah. There's something. Yeah. Where are we up here? I'm tired of going. Ten. 10th, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st, 1st Now he says, I answer it should be said, that when it is said that Christ, according as he is man, right, this name man can be what? Taken? Restate that, right. In doubling, yeah, in doubling. Another way of saying it. Either by reason of the suppositum or by reason of the nature, right? If it is taken over again by reason of the suppositum, since the suppositum of human nature in Christ is eternal and uncreated, this will be what? False, right? Christ, according as he is man, is a creature. If our word is taken over or resumed by reason of human nature, thus it is what? True. Because by reason of the human nature, or according to the human nature, it belongs to him to be a creature, as has been said, huh? It should be known, however, that a name thus resumed in reduplication more properly holds for the nature than for the, what? Supposito. It is resumed in the strength of the predicate, which holds, what? Formal, right? For the same in speech, Christ, according as man, as if one had to say Christ, according as he is a man. And therefore, this should be more conceited than, what? Negated or denied. Christ, according as man, is, what? A creature. If, however, there be added something to which it is drawn to the supposito, then the statement should be more denied than conceded. If, for example, one were to say Christ, according as he is this man, is a, what? Creature. You see the difference between that, right? You say Christ, as he is this man, is a creature. Well then, as he is this man, you refer to the person. That person is not a creature. But if you say Christ, as man, is a creature, right? Then you're thinking of what? Yeah, you're thinking of the, on the side of the predicate, as you said, huh? And therefore, it's referring to the, formally, and therefore, it's referring to the, what? Nature, right? Out of TAC, you know, they get, they do a little bit of the Latin, the medieval grammar, you know? I forget who the main text is for that, but I remember Mark, I think, has to teach that, you know? Because he has his background in Latin. But, uh, Warren, where I was criticized as saying, you know, they should be teaching them to, to read Latin, not, not to say Latin grammar, but, but I mean, you know, we're not familiar with that too much, you know? I remember when I was at the ball, there were people in the, in the linguistics there, you know, some of them had gotten back to the Latin grammar, you know? It would get pretty, pretty subtle, you know, huh? But, you know, that's where he got the, the awareness that the Latin grammarians were too stupid to figure out the grammar of their own language. So they copied the Greek grammar and tried to force it onto Latin, and that's where they got mixed up in their cases. Because, um, the, uh, in, in Greek, I guess, they have four cases, right? If you want to call it on to the case, it's not a case in this sense. And the genitive, they say, um, imagines something that is before the action of the verb, and the dative with the action of the verb, and the accusative after it, right? So Latin said, we've got something like the nominative, genitive, dative, accusative, right? And then they had this thing they don't have in Greek, so they added on at the end, abative, right? But abative really functions like, what, signifying something before the action of the verb, right? I hit you with my, my, my sore or my club or something, and, uh, so it should be replaced last, right? And, and, uh, so what you might find, you know, the abative in Latin might be in the genitive in Greek, right? And then I guess the dative in Latin is after the action of the, of the verb, and after the accusative, right? So I gave the book to you, you know? And so, so, so it's all that stuff to Latin. And then, then they said, then the English grammarians imitated the Latin grammarians. And, uh, so, so we were off to stupid figure out the grammar of our own thing, you know? So they're trying to figure out what the grammar of our own language would be, right? And, uh, it gets very, very, uh, complicated, you know, and very, uh... From the inordinate words. Yeah, yeah, yeah. We see, of course, the Greeks is actually the sophists, I guess, to begin, the, the state of grammar, huh? But the Greeks, you know, succeeded in understanding their own wonderful language, but we're not, huh? And so we're still kind of stumbling along, yeah? We've got priests and missionaries who've figured out and wrote out the grammars of the American Indian language. We've got priests and missionaries who've figured out and wrote out the grammars of the American Indian language. We've got priests and missionaries who've figured out and wrote out the grammars of the American Indian language. We've got priests and missionaries who've figured out and wrote out the grammars of the American Indian language. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. I had a colleague who was kind of his work, you know, working in Indian Languages. I don't know what to do, but it motivates these people, but that's rough stuff. Is he that assumption? Yeah, yeah. Well, George O'Banee's retired now, not like me, but all kinds of research, going out and talking to the Indians and picking up all kinds of old things. Was this part of him when he had been with? Well, he was in French and linguistics, you know, kind of. He used to teach a linguistics course at Assumption, but he taught French too, you know. French was the original background there, you know. Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that though Christ is not human nature, right? He is nevertheless having human nature, huh? Now, the name of creature is apt to be said not only of the abstract, but also the concrete, huh? For we say that humanity is a creature and that man is a, what, creature. So when you're saying Christ as man is a creature, you're not saying that Christ is human nature, you know, the word creature can be said of the concrete as well as the abstract, huh? Satisfy you? I don't know. Now, the second objection, huh? To the second it should be said that man, according as it is placed in the subject, more regards the suppositum, right? But as it is placed in reduplication, it more regards the, what, natures has been said. And because the nature is created, the suppositum is uncreated, right? Therefore, although it is not conceded this simply, that this man is a creature, right? It is conceded nevertheless that Christ, according as he is man, is, what, a creature, huh? So he's a secundum quid creature, right? Hope he knows that. Wasn't Thomas Ray in the Territory of Paras when Christ appeared to him from the cross and said, have any scripts just to him? I mean, Thomas was supposed to come in with a manuscript of it, you know, and says, is this, you know, acceptable is worthy of you? The Lord was supposed to be supplied from the cross, you know? You've written well, Thomas, huh? I went to the College of St. Thomas on the main two buildings there. Between the two of them is kind of a, there's two archways you can go under, you know, and then there's a kind of walkway between this, on the second floor, you know, you can walk. Don't look at the other ones. And there's a, right in the center there's a statue of Thomas, and underneath it says, Bene skipsiski toma, you written well, Thomas. So we can't be too, we can't be very docile here to this Territory of Paras. Your memory makes the details in our books in particular. You've written well. That's the detail I remember, but it just makes it more personal. That's another show. He didn't take that part in. That's a fancy gloss. I have a third objection here. Whatever is said of any man according as he is man, is said of him, what, per se and simply. But this is false, that Christ is a per se and simply creature. Therefore this is false, that Christ according as he is man is a creature, right? To the third it should be said that to any man who is a suppositum of only human nature, right? Yeah. It belongs that he does not have being except according to what? Human nature. And therefore about any such suppositum it follows, if according as he is man, he is a creature, that he be a creature, what, simply. But Christ is not only a suppositum of human nature, but also of a divine nature, according to which he has uncreated being. And therefore it does not follow, if according as man is a creature, that simply he be a, what, creature. Two more goes to go. What time do we have to stop here? We should, we should go ahead. Okay. Visible, we say in Latin, right? He's capable of laughter, right? Well, if you understand the nature of man as an animal that has, what, reason, right? Because he's an animal, he can make the sound of laughter. But more primarily, because he has reason, he can see the, what, absurdity of something, huh? And I was laughing earlier there about the czar there, Obama, who thinks that animals should have a right to be represented in court, you know, by a lawyer. So if I'm getting rid of my dog or throwing my dog away, or I'm going to, you know, cut up the cow and eat him, the cow's got a right to sue me in court. There's something funny about this, right? So if you understand that I'm a rational animal, you can see why I'm capable of laughter. about these sort of things. So then you can... The logic is not that they say to make those things, the logic is that everybody else takes that seriously. Yeah. That's the funny thing. Yeah, yeah. Well, that's funny, too. Yeah, they take it seriously. But by understanding that, then, you can answer the objection just because you know the right definition? Yeah, you know, it solved the difficulty, right? And so I say the discovery of a good definition of a thing, like place or a person, right, is a major work of the mind, right? When something has been most spiritually defined, that's what does all these things that Aristotle says in the fourth book, Thomas repeats in the sentences there. This is a major accomplishment of reason. And so I admire Boethius not only for his definition of a person, but the definition we saw earlier of eternity, right, in the freedom of hearts. And there's other definitions, you know, that are attributed to Boethius, that they come from Boethius. You say, this is a major mind, this Boethius. I know myself, you know, when I first started out in philosophy, I got interested in the poetics of Aristotle. And the poetics of Aristotle is announced to be about tragedy and comedy, right, primarily. And we have the part in tragedy, but the part in comedy has been lost, right? So in invitation to Aristotle, I was sitting out to try to define comedy, right? And this took me a long time to do, right? It was a major work, you know, huh? And so it's a major accomplishment. If you go to Aristotle's book in logic there, they call it in English the topics, but that's a transliteration, not a translation. It means really about places, right, huh? Where you look for galactic arguments, huh? And there's eight books of topics, or books about places. And as Aristotle explains in the first book, all of this is ordered, in a way, to definition. He's here, all of this, you know? And there's a whole book there, you know, about seeing whether something belongs to something or not, right? And then another book about whether, if it belongs to it, does it belong to it, what? Essentially, right? Or is it outside? Yes, that's right. And then another book, you know, does it belong to it or belong only to it? And all those into the definition. Because the definition has to belong to the thing, right? It has to belong to it, essentially, in its very nature. It has to be, what? Belong only to the thing being defined. And even that's not enough. And there still is another book, you know, where he says, now, we require some other things of definition besides all this. We've got another book about how to, you know? You see, my goodness, this is a, what, a major work, huh? Is it? And, you know, when I admired Shakespeare's definition of reason, huh? So to gradually, I began to realize how good his definition of reason was. But the more I understood it, the more I realized that this was a, what? This was a great accomplishment, right? This is, you know. Mostly by just, you know, using the word definition in a very loose sense, you know, for some explanation of what they mean by their words, and maybe not too good an explanation of what they mean by their words, and so on, right? I don't realize what it really would be to define these things, huh? I'd come into class, and I'd say, what is love? And the students, love and friendship class, and we're staying, well, it's a feeling. I said, there may be a love that is a feeling, I said. But anger's a feeling too, isn't it? You know? So is anger love? You know, that's about where they are, right? It's a feeling, right? And that's only, you know, one kind of love, and maybe not the fullest sense of love. But even that is not, you know, it's not that every feeling is love, right? And so, it takes a lot to, in logic, I'm doing the logic with a student in the house there, Wednesday nights, and the definition of statement and the definition of syllogism, right? These are really, you know, major accomplishments, huh? Most philosophers can't define these things. You ask them, you know, out of the blue, huh? Or if you ask them what a genius is, you know, they can't define it. They don't have a distinct knowledge of what it is. And the whole rest of philosophy depends upon having a distinct knowledge of what a genius is. Even theology does, right? You know, we have an article in there as God and a genius, and they know what a genius is, right? Or you're told, you know, when you carry over the word, wisdom say to God, you drop the genius and keep the difference. What the hell does that mean? You know? You know, but, you know, Father Goulet there at Laval, they really, you know, drum this into us, and you see it over and over again in Thomas, huh? And so you've got to know. And that's the first thing in the Isogogae, right? I asked my colleagues one day, you know, how many of you read the Isogogae? None of them had. And some of them didn't even know, you know. Yeah. It's like that in Acts of the Apostles. The Holy Spirit, we haven't even heard of him, you know? Are you in the Holy Spirit? Who's that? You know? You know, this is the equivalent of that in Fossil, right? In the Isogogae, you know? First course I had at Laval, really, was, first semester there was the Isogogae there with Albert the Great's 200-page commentary, you know, paraphrase, so much, you know, so you've got a certain foundation there. So, here we have the definition of person, right? He's saying, well, if Christ, according as he is a man, he is a individua substantia, right? He's not a universal substance, right? And he's one of a rational nature, right? Human nature. Then he's a person, right? Isn't that the way, you know? Okay? But notice, now we've talked, just take an example there, Shakespeare's definition of reason. the ability for a large discourse looking before and after, right? Well, what does the word discourse mean, right? In order to understand that definition, you have to spend a long time understanding what you mean by discourse, huh? And then what does it mean to call discourse large, right? And there's a whole series of things that involves, right? So, even if you have the words of the definition, it doesn't mean you understand the definition, huh? And I just love Thomas' article, said, on the definition of eternity, right? And there's four or five parts of the definition and maybe objection one will attack this part and objection two that part and objection three that part and objection four and each one that will be answered, right? But notice how he's focusing your mind on each part is very, what, stingy there, right? Well, let any word in the definition go, huh? So, sometimes you can misunderstand the definition. That's a strong argument though, but it's from the very definition, right? Moreover, Christ, according as he is man, is a thing of a human nature and a suppositum and hypostasis, and one is the Latin word, one is the Greek-derived word, of the same nature. But every hypostasis or suppositum and thing of a human nature is the person, you know? it's true even of him but it's not the same person therefore christ according as he is man is a person but against all this christ according as he is man is not an eternal what person if therefore according as he is man he were the person it would follow that in christ there are what two persons one in time and one eternal which is what sounds like the story is right which is erroneous this has been said above so let's see what the master does here i should really leave you for another day in your cell nothing else so it might take care of man's mind you know you can't let them read the daily newspaper or some other thing that follows our mind up the answer should be said that it has been said above this term man incidentally um you say this term man right that really comes from the logic of the third act because the syllogism has what two premises and uh three terms three or all the same degree right three limits but because um those limits might be expressed by one word then um the word limit started to be used for a name right so we still use in english to say define your terms why do we say terms we say define your names or define your words which would be more accurate right and so even even thomas here kind of follows the what custom right just like when you teach the logic of the second act what is the logic of the second act about well i say it's about statement a lot of people will say it's about the proposition right but originally proposition meant a what premise in syllogism propositio was a latin word for premise um and propositio placed before right because you got to know about the inclusion right so propositio is not naming statement by itself but it is but the statement insofar as it's being used to what yeah yeah just like saying well i'm i'm a man and i'm a father right now but i'm a father because i gave rise to somebody right now okay um so i prefer to use the word statement right as i say it's common to use the word proposition now for statement and likewise they tend to use the word term for what of course probably part of the reason for that is that the uh the act that seems to be most characteristic of reason is called reasoning and you can see that in the word itself right reasoning would seem to be the act of reason right and so it kind of stands out reasoning and therefore we borrow the word proposition for statement and term right for what the names that make up the proposition jim and thomas saw that okay it shows it shows the force of what custom right you heard my little complaint there you know you know you sit down to eat you know people say let's say grace and they say bless us oh lord and he's like this that's not really grace that's not the thanksgiving for what you're going to eat that's the blessing right and then there's another prayer which is the thanksgiving which should be said after the meal you know but usually after the meal you're not in a very vicious state people forget it yeah yeah but i mean they're accustomed to call what the blessing grace they're accustomed to call the the blessing the thanksgiving which is not what it is right but even i you know tend to follow the custom because you know what else are you going to say you know it shows you the force of custom right because aristotle says you know when he's talking about the force of custom he says even something we know is unreasonable we'll continue to follow that so even the scientist will say this on the road we said six you know even though he knows that's not the way it is so he says this term this word this name man placed in what duplication right can be taken and this is essentially saw i guess in the previous body right either by reason of the supposed term right or by reason of the what nature right now so you can see that even with the word god right to say the word was toward god you're taking it by reason of what when you say that god is eternal or something like that right or that god is all-knowing or something like that that is taking the reason of the nature right when therefore it is said that christ according as he is man is a person if it is taken by reason of the suppositum it is manifest that christ according as man is a person because the suppositum of the human nature is nothing other than the person of the son of god if or were it be taken by reason of the nature thus it is able to be understood in two ways that reminds me of what aristocracy says he says most men are not good at seeing a distinction and thomas is always seeing a distinction i know this one dominican there a guy who's been in dominican and he said the head is the one teacher you know he always said never affirm seldom deny always distinguish that's a bit of exaggeration but there's some truth to that right you see that thomas is not going to simply affirm or deny a lot of these things but he's going to see a distinction and then eventually he may affirm or deny something in regard to the parts of that distinction but the other version of that is don't say yes don't say no say distinct one yeah yeah yeah same thing if or were it be taken by reason of the nature thus it is able to be understood in two ways in one way that it be understood that it belongs to human nature to be in some person you're not going to have human nature there without a person there right yeah you're not going to have human nature there without there being a person who is who is a man right okay and in this way it is true for everything that subsists in human nature is a person in another way it can be understood that to what the human nature in christ there is owed or belongs its own what personhood that is caused from the principles of what human nature like your personhood or mine is right and thus christ according as he is a man is not a person because the human nature is not what existing by itself apart from the human nature which is required for the rights of your person okay now just to go back and give you my my imaginative explanation of this here you have a line with an end point right now if another line is drawn apart from that right it has its own what end point right but if this other line is drawn to that point yeah and then that point which is a divine person subsists both in the divine nature and in the human nature right so you might say that it belongs to the line a reason of being a line to have an end point but to have its own end point well if it's drawn separately right but if it's drawn as the human nature of christ is drawn to his divine person then it has an end point but the end point is the end point original line which is the divine what person which is the divine which is the divine which is the divine which is the divine which is the divine which is the divine which is the divine which is the divine the guys tell the joke, you know, about being in a Catholic Philosophical Association where some nun, you know, got up to give her paper and the title of her paper was Audiovisual Aids to Metaphysics laughter Well, when the paper was announced, people were like you know, just kind of spontaneously, you know, not being mean just burst out laughing, you know laughter It's like Obama's speech last night at one point, you know, they spoke out of laughter when the Congress could write Oh really? Yeah So See, this is the point that Thomas is making here, right? So if it was separate, it would cause its own what? In point, right? But it's not in this case here because the human nature is not by itself apart from existing the divine nature, right? Now he says to every man applying the first objection every man has got a person, right? It is that man And Thomas says it should be said that to every man it belongs to be a person according as everyone subsists in human nature is a person but this is private, huh? A lot of times people don't know how to translate proprium, right? But I don't think in a lot of cases you know, it should be translated as proper but private, right? But this is private I mean it belongs to this man alone, right? But it's private to the man Christ that the person subsisting in human nature is not caused from the principles of human nature but it is eternal, right? Just like in this line over here, right? The end point is not caused in that line but it's caused from the other line And therefore in one way he is a person according as his man since it belongs to every man to be a person but in another way not Okay? In that way he's not like us, huh? Otherwise he's not like us either Now the second objection is the one that was drawn from the definition of what? Person, right? To the second it should be said that individual substance which is placed in the definition of person in the definition that Wethius worked out, right? Implies a complete substance subsisting by itself separated from others, right? Otherwise the hand of man could be said to be a person, right? Since it is something substantial and it is individual, right? But because it is an individual substance existing in another it cannot be said to be a, what? Person And for the same reason neither can the human nature in Christ be said to be its own, what? Person because it exists in the, what? Divine person But it can nevertheless be said to be individual or singular thing, right? But not be individual or singular in the sense of the definition of person Thomas is explaining there the definition Okay, now the third objection Moreover Christ according as he is man is a thing of human nature and is supposed to him in hypostasis of the same nature but every hypostasis is supposed to him and thing of human nature is a person therefore Christ according as he is man is a person Thomas says to the third it should be said that just as person signifies something complete and subsisting by itself in a rational nature so hypostasis suppositum and resonator signify in the genus of substance something subsisting by itself whence just as human nature is not by itself alone right apart from the person of the sun so also is not by itself in hypostasis or suppositum and therefore in the sense in which this is negated Christ according as he is man is a person is necessary to negate all the others in K. Thomas so shall we go on or take a little break or take a little okay you can still get the premium not inter it's not a reduction premium you know uh it's not a reduction it's not a reduction so it's not a reduction it's not a reduction