Tertia Pars
Lecture 47: God Is Man: Predication and the Incarnation

Transcript
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Whether in Christ was at the same time a viator, man on the road, and a compreensor, right? One who's arrived, gotten a hold of things. To the tenth one proceeds thus. It seems that Christ is not at the same time a viator and compreensor. Because a viator, it pertains to him to be moved to the end of beatitude, right? But to the one who has gotten a hold of things, compreensor, it belongs to rest in the end. But one cannot at the same time move towards the end and rest in the end. I can't disagree with that. Therefore, it seems it cannot be together that Christ was both a viator and a compreensor, right? If he is, he's going to arouse wonder. He'll be apprable. That's true. Moreover, to be moved to beatitude, or to obtain it, does not belong to man according to his body, but according to his soul. When Augustine says in the Epistle to Dioscorus, that to the lower nature, which is the body, beatitude rebounds, you might say, or overflows from the soul, right? Excuse me, not beatitude, but not beatitude, strictly speaking, which is proper to the one enjoying and understanding, right? But Christ, although he had a sufferable body, but he could suffer, nevertheless, according to his mind, enjoyed God, what? Fully. Therefore, Christ was not a viator, but a pure, what? Comprehensor. Moreover, the saints whose souls are in heaven, and whose bodies are in the sepulchers, enjoy the attitude according to the soul, although their bodies are full, although their bodies are, what? Subbed to death. And nevertheless, they are not said to be viatoris, but only comprehensors, right? Therefore, for a like reason, although the body of Christ was mortal, because nevertheless his mind enjoyed God, it seems that he was a pure, comprehensor, and in no way a viator on the road. In no way. It's kind of interesting, I was thinking of that objection there, you know, in terms of, what do you say about these souls there? They don't, even Augustine says that the soul was, he got even more perfectly after it reunited with the body, right? So, aren't they still on the way, you know? Okay. Well, this makes use of that, right? So, you know, why say it about one and not the other, right? But against this is what is said, Jeremiah's chapter 14, huh? That, like a, what? Column? Columnus? No, killer, tenant, farmer, columnist, and animus. Yeah. Yeah. And as a viator, declining to what? Yeah. So, I guess the farmer holds to the crop. Yeah, yeah. But this is being said about Christ, apparently, huh? The whole context there, huh? Because he's trying to maintain that he is a viator in some way, or was. Answer, Thomas says, it should be said that someone is said to be a viator from this that he, what? Tends towards a beatitude, huh? But he said to be a comprehensor from this that he has already obtained beatitude. According to that of 1 Corinthians 9, sic curite just so run, right, that you might, what? Comprehend, huh? Okay, there you see the word for, in the Latin either way, you get the word comprehensor, right? And that's obviously talking about beatitude. And in Philippians 3, again, same word. I follow if in some way I might, what? Yeah. Okay. But the perfect beatitude of man consists in the soul and the body, right? Okay. There's a secondary way in the body. As has been said in the second part, when he talks about what beatitude is. In the soul, as regards that which is proper to it, according as the mind sees and enjoys, what? God. And incidentally, you know, Thomas says that when you see God as he is, face to face, you know other things in God, besides God, right? And Thomas argues very well, in the Summa Conscientiles and elsewhere, that you see in God everything you naturally want to know. So all those theorems in Euclid, I'll see them all. I'll see them all at once, right? And I think it's beautiful there, because you see that the whole supernatural order, so to speak, is in harmony with the natural order, right? That their natural desire to know and to understand, this thing here, will be satisfied there, right? Not that that's what beatitude will be chiefly about, but the natural desire will be satisfied. In the body, however, according as the body rises, spiritual, being very subject to the, Thomas explains this in some detail, and in power, right, and in glory and in corruption, right? All these dotes, as they call them, right? The gifts. But Christ, before the Passion, according to the mind, he fully saw God, right? And thus he had beatitude as regards what is proper to the soul. But as regards to the other things, what gets to be bestowed upon the body, they were lacking, right? The beatitude was lacking to him. Because his soul was able to suffer, right? And his body was able to suffer and was mortal, right? As is clear from the things said above. And therefore, at the same time, he was Comprehensor, insofar as he had the beatitude proper to the soul, and he was a Viator, insofar as he tended towards Beatitude, according to that which was lacking to him, of Beatitude. Now, the first objection says you can't move towards something and being there, right? He says, To the first, it should be said that it's impossible to be to move towards an end, and to rest in the end according to the same thing. But according to diversity, nothing prevents this, huh? Just as a man, at the same time, is knowing as regards those things which he already knows, and learning as regards those things which he does not yet know, right? So am I a knower or a learner? What do you think? If I'm a learner, I haven't arrived. If I'm a knower, I have arrived. Well, can I both be arriving and have arrived? Well, if it's about the same theorem, right? Either I'm learning it or I know it. Yeah, but I can know some theorems and be learning other ones, okay? I can't be learning the very theorem that I know. Yeah. Well, that's a nice way of getting out of that, huh? See, the sophist wants to make you appear to contradict yourself, right? Now, the second objection here. To the second, it should be said that Beatitude chiefly and properly consists in the soul, according to the mind, huh? That's the reason and the will. But nevertheless, secondarily, and as it were, instrumentally, there is required for Beatitude the goods of the body, right? Just as the philosopher himself says in the first book of the Ethics, that the exterior goods even serve, tool-wise, Beatitude, right? I don't know about that one, yeah. So, notice, huh? This book here, this is, you know, tool-wise, right, huh? This is an exterior good of mine, but it's serving my mind as a tool, right, huh? Yeah, I mean, he's agreed with Augustine that Beatitude chiefly and properly consists in the soul, according to the mind, meaning the intellect and the will, right? But in a secondary way, to the goods of the what? Body, right? So that's why, since it's only secondary, that's why we would just go ahead and call the comprehensors. So in some way, it was a viator, and so far as you didn't have those secondary gifts in the body there, right? Which are kind of listed there in the body, the article there, but they've taken up more detail in other places. Now, what about this third thing, though, right? Why not call it in the saints that, right? There's not the same reason about the souls of the, what, dead saints, and about Christ in account of two things. First, because the souls of the saints are not, what, passable, they can't suffer anymore, as was the soul of Christ. Secondly, because their bodies don't do anything by which they tend towards beatitude. As Christ, according to the passions of the body, tended in beatitude as regards the glory of his body. It's pretty good, this guy, the way he gets out of these Nazi ties. But that doesn't exactly tell us. Well, they're comprehensors in their soul. Yeah, yeah. But what does it tell us about their body? Well, they don't have full beatitude. Yeah, yeah, but through their bodies, they're not, what, striving to get to the goal, right? And their soul, even, is not, what, undergoing. Not able to. Yeah, yeah. So with the soul of Christ, it's undergoing these passions we talked about, right? Things of that sort, fear, sadness, and so on, right? So that is not sharing. Yeah, yeah, and through his body, he's, what, gaining his, glorification of his body. That's right. So he's more, we used to call him a viator, right? Right. Then these guys are just waiting for the body to be. He's resurrected, huh? We should stop there. We should just look at the, at what's going to come up. in the next article, huh? Yeah, this guy's really a thorough, he's a really thorough guy. Isn't this Thomas? What do you think of this guy? Hard to be. Interesting that, was it Urban IV that commanded him to do the Golden Chain, huh? I think he, I think the Pope died before he finished it, you know, but it is dedicated to him. Okay. Then we're not to consider about those things which follow upon the, what, union, huh? Now, I'll go way, way back here to the question one here, I guess. You're still not going to get, see, if you look at the end of the prologue there, right, he's talking about the Savior, and there's also going to be a section on the sacraments, right? But about the Savior itself, he says there's a twofold consideration at the end of the prologue, right? First about the mystery of the Incarnation, according to which God for our salvation was made of man, right? Secondly about those things, through our Savior, as the Incarnate God, were done and suffered, right? Okay. And that's not going to be until question, what, 27, right? Okay. So then you have to go to the premium to begin with question one. About the first three things occur. First about the suitability of the Incarnation. Secondly about the way of the, what, union of the Incarnate Word. And then about those things which follow upon the, what, union. And that's question 16 starting, right? So, division into two and the first of those two is divided into three, yeah. He's as far as the rule of two or three, right? Thomas, he's not very rich now, right? He's limited. He's limited. Yeah. He doesn't think outside the box. So, let's just look at the premium here to question 16 here. The beginning of question 16. Then we're not to consider about those things which follow upon the union. And first, about those things which belong to Christ, secundum se. Secondly, about those things which belong to Christ in comparison to God, the, what, Father. Now, I was reading the golden chain there. Christ is saying, well, you can't believe because the Father is not drawing you to me, right? And only those whom the Father has drawn can believe, right? And so the church fathers say there, why do they attribute this to the Father? All they say is, because he's the beginning of the Son and the Holy Spirit. They both proceed from here, right? So, they attribute it to the Father, but it's not really, what, limited to the Father. The Father, not by, you know, without the Son and the Holy Spirit is drawing them. But it's kind of interesting in the way it's kind of, it's kind of, I suppose, appropriation, right? It's appropriated to the Father. It's the Father who... Well, the Father speaks in the beginning is the way he's called. Yeah. And those ones that the Father's given me, you know, he's going to keep and so on, right? Right. So, it's interesting. I suppose it's appropriation there, to the Father. Because he's the one that speaks. Yeah. So, maybe some things will be cleared up about him and the Father there, right? And then about those things which belong to Christ as regards, what, us. And that doesn't start until down to question, what, 25. See, this guy's thorough, you know? So, it's going to be, what, 16, 17, 18, 19? Oh, my gosh. We can only hold up, you know. I think, yeah. Now, how's this first thing divided, right? They couldn't have said, what the heck does that mean? About the first, there's a two-fold consideration. First, about those things which belong to Christ according to, what? Essay, a theory, being and coming to be, huh? Secondly, about those things which belong to Christ by reason of, what? Unity, huh? And that's going to be starting in chapter, what, 17? What? Reminds me as a student of wisdom there, metaphysics, it's about being in the one, right? So, essay, et theory, and unitas, huh? So, it may help you to learn a little bit of philosophy. It could be just coincidence. Okay. But, about the first, twelve things are asked. Oh, my gosh. I didn't know that many things were asked about this. Whether this is true that God is, what? Is a man, yeah. Secondly, whether this is true that man is God. You know, when Augustine says, God became man so that man could become God, that's a different sense here than what he's saying here. But, it's interesting, huh? Whether Christ can be called, what? Homo Dominicus, huh? Dominicus. Yeah. He said Dominicus. Fourth, whether those things which belong to the man, the Son of Man, can be said of the Son of God in a conversor, right? Five, whether those things which belong to the Son of Man can be said of the divine nature. It's a different thing now, see. And human, those things which belong to the Son of God, huh? He's a very solid, this guy. Whether this is true that the Son of God was made man. I know he was made flesh, but was he made man? And secondly, whether this is true that man was made, what? God. That's strange, huh? Very thorough, though, right? Whether this is true that Christ is a creature. I know there's something wrong with saying that. You gotta, you know, oh, he couldn't have quit, so he's not some teacher there, huh? Because, I think he's a divine person now, right? Nine, whether this is true that this man, right, pointing out Christ, began to be, or was he always? Ten, whether this is true, Christ, according as he is a man, is a creature. Yeah. I'm careful about that, too. Ten, whether this is true that Christ, according as he is man, is God. I'm kind of worried about that one. I think it would be, yeah. Secondly, whether this is true that Christ, according as man, is a hypostasis, or what? Person, huh? Stuff here, huh? Rest up for this. Take a week off go into this. Go into this. The Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. Dios, gracias. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, drink from the lights of our minds, order in the room in our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Amen. And help us to understand the Lord Jesus Christ. Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. So what are those words that Thomas quoted earlier in the Summa there? Is it from Hillary or Jerome? Ex verbis in ordinati polatis, heresis, heresis incuritor. So you can see why this question is here, right? How can you speak now about Christ because of what he's taken on here? The word he's taken on. So let's look at the premium again. Then we're not to consider about those things which follow upon union. And Thomas divides this into, hey, three, yeah? Okay. And first is regards those things which belong to Christ by himself, right? Secondly, about those things which belong to Christ in comparison to God the Father. And third, about those things which belong to Christ as regards, what? Us, right? Now, about the first, a two-fold consideration occurs. First, those things which, about those things which belong to Christ according to his being and his coming to be, huh? And secondly, those things that belong to Christ by reason of his, what? Unity, and that will be the next couple, next three, I guess, questions, huh? Well, what's efficient for the day is the evil thereof, right? Now, I was looking at the Katina Oria, right, huh? And then looking at the text a little bit of the Gospel of St. John, the 13th chapter is the one where he washes their feet and so on. And Christ mentions, you know, and usually the text will say, you call me, what? Yeah, or actually teacher, I think, and it's teacher and master. And I am so, right? And so, he goes on to explain this. I was looking at the text there, and it actually has the article for both teacher and Lord. You know, because you never get to the translation. And so, you call me the teacher. But it's almost like, you know, when you say there's only one teacher, Christ, he's the teacher by Antonia Messiah, right? But the article is there in the Greek, huh? So, I don't mean to see another example of Antonia Messiah there, you know, but it's not using the translations, huh? You know, see that. Now, here, of course, you don't have, what? In Latin, you don't have the articles, huh? So, Latin is missing a part of speech. But you do have the article in Greek, huh? It shows, it's priority in Greek, Latin, huh? So, about the first, he says, 12 things are asked, huh? First, whether this is true, that God is, I suppose in English you'd say, a man, huh? So, is that true? God is a man? Secondly, whether this is true, that man, or a man, is, what? God. Third, whether Christ is able to be called the lordly man? Fourth, whether those things which belong to the Son of Man are able to be said of the Son of God. And the reverse, huh? And then, whether those things that belong to the Son of Man are able to be said of the divine nature, huh? And of the human, those things which belong to the, what? Son of God. A lot of things here about predication, huh? I had somebody at the house last night, and we were going through the, uh, Terry Hermeneus, huh? The book on the statement there, and the, talking about the verb being a sign of something, said of something, right? And I was remarking how this runs through logic, right? The way in which something is said of something. So you have the, in Latin, you know, you have the first work in logic is the predicability, huh? That comes with the Latin word for said of, huh? So genus, difference, property, or species, property, accident could be taken as, what? A complete division of names said minimically of many things, huh? Then you have the categories, but in Latin, they call it the predicamenta. And then you have, uh, in, uh, the logic of the third act, you have all kinds of things about the, the four predicates and the dialectic, huh? And so on. And a lot of times when Thomas is, is commenting on Aristotle's, uh, metaphysics there, he'll say that here he's borrowing from logic, or here he's borrowing from natural philosophy. Because here he's proceeding per via motus, by way of motion. So it's like a borrowing from natural philosophy. And then, per viaem predikandi, you know, that's borrowing from logic, right, huh? Well, a lot of this here is about, can you say this or that, right? And how can you say this or that? When can you or not say it, huh? You better be careful about what you say of what. Not what you say of me so much, but what you say of this one, you know? They've been studying here, huh? Sex wither, sixth question. Whether this is true. Two, the Son of God was made a, what? Yeah. It didn't say made flesh, right? It's made a man, huh? Seven, whether this is true, that man was made, what? God. Think about that. I am a little more, you know, a little more. Cautious about that. Whether this is true. Christ is a creature. You have to be careful about that one, huh? Nine, whether this is true, that this man, pointing at Christ, right, began to be, or was, what? Always, huh? Ten, whether this is true, Christ as man is a, what? Creature. Eleven, whether this is true, Christ as man is God. Well, let's be careful about that one. Twelve, whether this is true. Christ, according to Jesus, a man is a hypostasis or a, what? Thomas wants to get involved in these things I don't know, but it makes us stop and be careful here. So to the first one goes forward thus. It seems that this is false. God is a man, huh? For every statement, affirmative statement, in matter, remote is false. So if you say that man is a stone, they say, well, they're so far apart, man is stone. How can man be a stone? But this proposition, this statement, God is a man, is in remote matter. Because the form signified by the subject, God, in the predicate, man, are maxima, most distinta, and further apart than man is stone, right? So you can't say man is a stone. How can you say God is a man? I mean, this, this, this, this, you know. Since, therefore, the foresaid statement is affirmative, it seems that it is false, right? So, incidentally, this is a little sider, but propositio, right, is originally the name for the premise of the syllogism. And then by custom, propositio began to stand for statement, huh? So I still like to translate it as statement, but rather than proposition, but it's customary to translate it by proposition, right? That's, that's the way, that's what it is, you know, the word. But propositio means placed before, placed for, right? Yeah. And so it's really the name of statement, not by itself, but insofar as it's a premise in the syllogism. But Thomas is following the custom here. I don't know why he does that, but he does that. Moreover, the three persons, right, more come together to each other than human nature and the divine nature, right? But in the mystery of the Trinity, one person is not said of another. That would be radical to say the Father, the Father is God, the Son, wouldn't it? But yet they have more in common than human nature and divine nature, right? For we do not say that the Father is the Son or the reverse. Therefore, it seems that neither can human nature be said of God as when it is said that God is, say, what? Man, huh? Moreover, our great friend here, Athanasius, says that just as the soul and the flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ. When Christ is, this is false of the soul as the body. Therefore, this is false that God is what? Man, yeah. Notice in that second argument, it seems to be arguing that what? From the fortiori, right? That he can't say the Father is the Son even though they have more in common than human nature and divine nature. Well, how can you say it about the other, right? Can you say it about them? Though Christ does say the Father and I are one. That's a hidden third thing there. Yeah. Moreover, as in the first part is bad, and we're talking about predication there, what is said of God, not relatively, right? But absolutely, right? Notice the word absolute is often just taken as the, what? Opposite of relative, right? So relative is, what? Prosti, idoliquid, towards another, right? And then they sometimes say the absolute is in itself, but understood negatively, right? Not towards another, right? I'd say it to oneself, right? But we, not to another. So what is said of God, not relatively, like Father and Son are, but absolutely, belongs to the whole Trinity and to each, what? Person. But this name, man, is not relative, but what? Absolute. If therefore it were truly said of God, it would follow that the whole Trinity and each person is man. Which is clearly, what? False. So are you all convinced now? If I dropped dead at this moment, you'd all, I'd bid you all straight. Running out. I actually explained it to you upstairs. Or downstairs, where they sent me. But against this, this is one of the most beautiful texts for the incarnation. Thomas often refers to it. But against this is what is said in Philippians chapter 2, verses 6 and 7. Who, when he was in the form of God, emptied himself, right? Taking on the form of a servant, made in the likeness of men, in the essential likeness of men, and habit to inhabit, right? Found as a man, right? And thus the one who was in the form of God, or God, in other words, right? Is man. But he who is in the form of God is God. Therefore, God is a man, huh? That's a pretty good sound. Excellent. Thomas says, I answer. It should be said that this proposition, this statement, God is a man, is conceded by all, what? Christians, huh? Not the Roger Height department. He's not a Christian. He's a Jesuit. But incidentally, you know, which is worse, to lose charity or to lose faith? To lose faith. Yeah. Because if you lose faith, you lose hope and charity, huh? So it's worse to lose faith than to lose charity, huh? I think I made that point before, you know, that I used to ask the students in class, you know, which is better, to breathe or to philosophize, right? Of course, I know, it all adds it to breathe, right? And so you ask them, well, why is it better to breathe than to philosophize? And they'll, they get out, some reason they'll say, well, if you're not breathing, you won't be doing anything else, right? And I'd always point out that your argument here by the fallacy of convocation, huh? Because you're saying that you can breathe without philosophizing, but you can't philosophize without, what? Breathing, right? And that shows that breathing is before philosophizing and the second sense of before in the categories. Second sense is in being, right? If this can be without that, but not vice versa, right? First style's example is one is before two. And, why, we're not asking about that sense of before, we're asking about the fourth sense, which is better? So I first point out that they have this philosophy. Okay, then I say, okay, now I'm going to help you, though, you know, I'm going to help you, say. And I said, which is worse, to kill a man or to kill a dog, say? Well, it's worse to kill the man, right? And, which is worse, to be blind or to be deaf? And most people say to be blind, right? So, it seems that the opposite of the worst is the better, right? But there's an exception to that rule, right? Which is what? Well, when the lesser good is before the greater good, not in goodness, obviously, but in being, right? Then the loss of the lesser good is worse than the loss of the greater good because it involves the loss of the greater good as well. But the loss of the greater good doesn't, what? Involve the loss of the lesser good, right? So which is greater, charity or faith? Well, charity is greater than faith, right? As St. Paul teaches us. And, therefore, if there was no order of being there between these, right? If you could have charity without belief, then the loss of charity would be worse than the loss of what? Faith. But if faith is before charity, in the sense that you can have faith without charity, you've got a dead faith, you can have faith without charity, but you can't have charity without faith, then the loss of faith, right, is going to be worse because then you lose, what? Charity, right? And in that sense, despair, which is even opposed to hope, right, would be worse, right, than to lack charity, huh? Because if you despair, like poor Judas did, right, then you would lose charity, too, right? Okay. So, you don't incur heresy here, right, because you might lose even greater goods with losing faith, huh? Which is bad in itself. So he says, but it's not, however, conceded by all according to the same, what? Reason, right? For some concede this statement not according to the, what? Proper taking of these, what? Terms, God and man. For the Manichaeans, huh? Say that the word of God is a man, not a true man, but a, what? Fictitious, I like this, huh? Insofar as they say the Son of God took on an imaginary, huh? Body. The Manichaeans The Manichaeans As if we say that God is a man, is a what? Yeah, it's called a man, right? Bronze? Copper? Probably related, huh? Because it has a likeness of man, right? Just like I said, who's that there on the wall? If he's a particular person, that's George Washington, or that's Charbel or somebody, right? Okay. But he's not, only seem to be narrated, right? It's like this again. Likewise, he says, those who lay down that in Christ, the soul and the body were not, what? United, huh? Remember that problem people had about, they're afraid if the body and soul were united, you'd have a human person there. Then you had two persons, right? Okay. And we answered that promise about that earlier, right? But those who lay down in Christ, the soul and the body were not united, they would not say that God is a true man, right? But he'd be said to be a man figuratively by reason of his, what? Parts. But both of these opinions was disproven above, right? Others, conversely, lay down truth on the side of man. See, you've got a real man there. And deny the truth on the side of God. There's so many ways to be mistaken about these things. For they say that Christ, who is the God-man, to be God not naturally, but by partaking of this. To wit, to grace, right? Grace is sometimes said to be partaking of the divine nature, but it's not to have the divine nature as your nature. Just as all holy men are said to be, what? Gods. The text that Christ quotes sometimes, right? People kind of misunderstand that text, because they say, they're attacking him for saying he's the son of God, right? And then he quotes the text, you know, that you'll be gods, and from the Psalms, and so on. It's almost like Christ is equivocating, you know? But he's saying, you know, he's really arguing, if those who only partake of the divine nature are called gods, what about the one who has the divine nature? He's not, what? Unreasonably called the son of God, right? You know? But Tony might misunderstand the text and say, well, he just means I just, you know. God in the way these saints are said to be God, right? In some of my editions there, Albertans will say the divus, or divi, you know, in the genitive. Yeah. It looks like almost the divine, over in the great, right? But Christ was, according to these people, more excellently so, before others, on account of a more abundant, what? Grace. And thus, according to this, when he said that God is man, God does not stand for the true and natural God. And this is the heresy of Hortinus, which also was disproven above, right? Others concede this statement with the truth of what? Both terms, laying down Christ, and what? Both a true God, and a true man. But they do not, what? Save or keep the truth of, what? Predication. For they say that man is said of God through a certain conjunction, right? A certain joining either of dignity or authority or of affection, right? Or of indwelling, right? And thus, Nestorius said, God is a man, and through this, he signified nothing other than that God is joined to man by such a junction that man is inhabited, you might say, right? Indwelling by God. God dwells in him like a special temple or something, right? And he's united to him according to affection. They will the same thing, right? And according to a certain partaking of authority and of the divine honor. And in a like error fall those who lay down, what? Two hypostasis or two supposita in Christ, right? Because it is not possible to be understood that if two who are, what? Distinct in hypostasis or suppositum, one is properly, what? Said of the other, right? So my wife might be my better half, but it's never going to be me. But only according to a certain figurative, what? Speech, right? Insofar as they are joined in something. If we say that Peter is John because they have some, what? Union to each other. And these opinions also above have been, what? Disproving, right, huh? Whence supposing, according to the truth of the Catholic faith that the true divine nature, right? is united with a, what? True human nature, right? Not only in person, but also in supposito, right? Or hypostasis. If you recall, you know, supposito or hypostasis is, what? more general than a person, right? So a person is, by definition, a hypostasis of a reasonable nature, right? The intellectual nature. So Thomas, you know, is alluding to the fact that you don't distinguish those, right? Some are saying, well, they're united in one but not the other. We say that this is a true statement and said properly, right? That God is a man, right? Not only an account of the truth of the terms, because Christ is a true God and a true man, right? But also on account of the truth of what? Predication, because one could be said of the other truly, huh? Now, Thomas is going to explain a little bit how this is possible, right? Because is the human nature and the divine nature the same? Can you say that the human nature of Christ is his divine nature? No, no. So if you take those in the abstract, you can't say one or the other, right? But now we come back to the idea of how in the concrete, it can stand for the one who has the nature, right? Okay. So he says, the name signifying a common nature in the concrete is able to, and I think the best way to translate it is to stand for, right? For any one of those contained in that common nature, right? Okay. Just as this name, man, can stand for any singular man, right? The example I take is very simple, as I say. Dwayne Berquist is the son of a man. Well, a man there stands for my father, right? See? It doesn't stand for what? Universal man. Strange sense that I'm the son of a universal man, right? Even though man is universal, right? But when I say I'm the son of a man, a man there is standing for my father, right? Okay. Or I'm the father of a woman. Well, a woman there is standing for my daughter, Maria, right? Okay. I won't say how many I'm a grandfather up, and thus this name God from its way of signifying, well, that's very important, right? This concrete rather than the abstract, right? Is able to stand for the person of the son of God, right? When we were talking about how in the beginning of John's gospel, right? of John's gospel, right? of John's gospel, right? of John's gospel, right? In the beginning of John's gospel, right? In the beginning of John's gospel, right? In the beginning The beginning was the Word, and the Word was, what, towards God. Well, what does God stand for there? The Father, yeah. Well, in this case, it's standing, though, for the Son, because He also has that same nature. For of every suppositum, that's the latter word, corresponding to hypostasis, placed under, of any nature, truly and properly is able to be, what, said of it, a name signifying that nature, if that name signifies it in the, what, concrete. Just as a Socrates and Plato properly and truly can be said man. Because, therefore, the person of the Son of God, for whom, what, stands His name God, right, is also the suppositum of human nature, truly and properly this name man is able to be said of this name God, according as it, what, stands for the person of the Son of Adam. Like you say, a man is, a man is my father. Is that true? Not just a man, but a man can stand for my father, right, because he has human nature, right? Okay? Okay, so now, come back to the objections here. The first one was saying, this is remote matter, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that when diverse forms are not able to come together in one, what, individual substance, in one suppositum, then it is necessary that a state would be in remote matter, right, whose subject signifies one of those forms and the predicate, what, signifies another. But when two forms are able to come together in one individual substance, there is not remote matter, but natural or contingent, as when I say that the white one is what? But, yeah, so human, divine nature and human nature, although they are most distant, right, those two natures, nevertheless, they come together through the mystery of the Incarnation in one individual, what, substance, in one person, to which neither of them is in it, or atchidans, right, but, as I couldn't even say, right, most substantial. And, therefore, this statement, God as a man is not either in, what, remote matter, right, nor in contingent matter, but in, what, natural matter. And man is said of, what, not per archidans, but per se, as its, what, hypostasis. Not by reason of the form signified to this name God, but by reason of the individual substance, which is the hypostasis of, what, human nature. So, satisfactory? What about the second objection here from the Trinity, huh? Don't they have more in common, so shouldn't we say the Father is the Son? To the second should be said that the three divine prisons come together in the nature, but they are distinguished in the, what, suppositum. And, therefore, they are not said of each other, right? But in the mystery of the Incarnation, the natures, because they are distinct, are not said of, what, each other, when they are signified in the abstract, for the divine nature is not the human nature, right? But because they come together in the suppositum, they are said of each other in, what, concrete, huh? So the concrete, in a sense, is saying God signifies as what has the divine nature, right? Even though the haver and the had are not really distinct, right? But it signifies as having the divine nature. And man signifies as having the human nature, right? Well, this divine person, the Word of God, has both of these natures, right? So you can say that the one who has this nature is also the one who has that nature. You can predicate, therefore, the concrete names, one or the other, right? But you couldn't predicate the divine nature of the, what, human nature, right? Can you say that this Christian is a geometer? Or can you say that this healthy one is a geometer? I assume a healthy animal. But is geometry health? No. But the one who has health is also one who has some geometry, right? So you can say the geometry is healthy. But you can't say geometry is health. So I'm all right. Now the third objection, huh? Taken from Athanasius. To the third, it should be said that soul and flesh are signifying, what? As in the abstract, right? Just as divinity, meaning the human divine nature, and humanity, the, what? Nature. In the concrete, though, they are called, what? Animated. And fleshy, or corporeal, right? It's just as in the other case, in the concrete, you say God and, what? Man. So you say what has a soul has flesh, right? And what has flesh has a soul, right? So the soulful is corporeal, and the corporeal is soulful. But the soul is not the body, and the body is not the, what? Soul, right? I was looking at a book there in the bookstore there about scientists and religion and so on. And a big section there, you know, from Einstein, Edward Einstein, right? You know. And he was praising Spinoza, you know, for saying that the body and the soul are the same thing. I mean, Einstein's view of God is, in a sense, is, what, pantheistic, right? I taught the philosophy of nature and you'd read the fragments of the great Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras is the first Greek philosopher really to, among those who know about him, I heard fragments from, to speak explicitly of a greater mind that's responsible for the distinction of order in the natural world. And so, but he comes to it, you know, not as a believer or a fowler or the religion of the time. As you know, Anaxagoras got in trouble for saying the sun is a stone on fire and they say he was influenced by, what, meteors, huh? Sometimes a meteor, when it hits the atmosphere, bursts into flames, huh? It's consumed usually before it hits the earth, thank God. But occasionally, what, it, it, it, it hits the earth as a burning rock still. There's one down in the southwest of the United States, the Indians talked about and now they can locate that where it was, you know, and you can see the terrain the way it was, so that'd be a frightening thing, right? And then they knew that there was one that landed over and Anaxagoras as part of the world, right? So, you know, it's like the falling star, you know, falling, it's stone on fire, right? And Aristotle himself rejected that because, at least I would have burned out when I was wrong. But anyway, but this was impious because you're saying that the God