Tertia Pars
Lecture 44: Christ's Defects, Knowledge, and Passibility of Soul

Transcript
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The punishment which he sustained would have been owed to him for his own, what, sin. It wouldn't be satisfactory for us, then. I suppose Mary could be more helpful than any of the saints because she had no sin, right? Okay, the fourth objection. He was made for us sin, right? I don't have to understand those words, huh? It's pretty strong, right? Okay. To the fourth, it should be said that God made Christ sin, not that in himself he would have sin, right? But because he made him the, what, victim of the host for sin. As is said in the prophet O.C. chapter 4, the sins of my people, what? Yeah. To it, the priests who, according to the law, ate the hosts offered for what? Sin. And according to this way, and in this way, it said in Isaiah chapter 53, that the Lord placed upon him, right? Placed in him the iniquities of all of us, right? Because he handed him over that he might be a host for the sins of all men, or he made him sin, that is, having the likeness of the flesh of sin. And in this, on account of the fact that he took on a body that was able to suffer and was mortal, right? So he took on the body in the condition that it has as a result of sin, but without the sin, right? And so he had said to have a likeness of the flesh of sin. Is that clear, the two solutions that he gives to that? Now, the fifth one, how about an example of what? Repentance, yeah. To the fifth, it should be said that the one being penitent is able to give a praiseworthy example, not for the fact that he has sinned, but in this that he sustains or undergoes punishment voluntarily for what is sin. Whence Christ, most of all, or gave a greatest example for penitence, when not for his own sin, but for the sins of others, he voluntarily, right, he wished to undergo punishment, right? It's very good the way he does it, right? I've often thought about the virtue of faith, right? Did Christ have the virtue of faith? I often thought, well, isn't then Mary the greatest example of faith, right? So there seems to be some virtues that are not in Christ, but that is in somebody else, right? And I suppose Thomas is saying in some way Christ is giving an example to those who are penitent, right? Because they are praiseworthy insofar as they voluntarily undergo punishment for sin, but for their own sin, by he for the sins of others, right? But in terms of, if you're looking at it, for example, someone who's penitent because of their own sins, and you have to go to, you know, the savings, right, but not to Mary, right? Right. No? So for Mary to go to faith, but not for Christ, it's having that virtue. And for someone doing penitence for his own sins, you can't go to Mary even. You've got to go to Peter, you know, who went out and wept after he denied Christ three times. That's what I want to say in the bottom of the sermon, the Feast of Mary Magdalene, she says, the example of the saints for us, in terms of innocence and repentance, but since you can't have both of those in the same person, God designed that they have the same name. So that's what Mary Magdalene, the Blessed Virgin Mary Magdalene, in terms of innocence and penitence. Now, second article, whether in Christ there was the fomes peccati, right? And I know the best way to translate fomes, that's kind of like the, you know, the fountain of the sort of stuff, the, I think it was foaming down there, right? You know, this revolt, you know, another one inhabiting my flesh there, against my reason. And the second one precedes us, it seems that in Christ there was the root of sin, or the fountain of sin, huh? How does your book translate that, Dave? You have the English text there. Dave, you know it's the same word, foaming. Yeah, yeah. It's just the Latin word that I looked up. It's like tender or kindling for a fire. Yeah, yeah, yeah. We're inflammable. The sin, yeah. The sin won't matter down there. Later, really. Yeah. From the same beginning, right, is derived the fomes of sin, right? And the sufferability of the body, right? Be able to suffer. Or its mortality, right? To it from the subtraction or taking away of original justice. Stimulus peccati. Yeah. Yeah. By which, or through which, at once, or together, the lower powers of the soul were, what? Subject to reason, and the body to the soul, right, huh? So after he lost original justice, right? And his body was no longer subject to his soul, so he could be immortal. And his lower powers are no longer subject to reason, and so on. But in Christ there was the ability to suffer the body and the mortality. Therefore, also, there must have been in him the fullness of, what? Sin. Moreover, as Damascene says in the third book, by the consent, you might say, of the divine will, the flesh of Christ is permitted to suffer and to do those things which are proper to the flesh. But it's proper to the flesh that it lusts or desires, things desirable for itself, right? Since, therefore, the foams are nothing other than concupiscence, as is said by the gloss in Romans 7, verse 8, it seems that in Christ there were the, what? Foams of sin, yeah. Moreover, by reason of the foams, the flesh desires against the spirit, right? As is said, Galatians chapter 5. But a spirit is shown the more to be stronger and more worthy of a, what? Crown, huh? The more it has, what? Over the host or over the enemy, right? Dominated the concupiscence of the, what? Flesh. According to that of 2 Timothy chapter 2, he is not crowned to as not legitimately or lawfully, what? Fought, huh? Stroubled. But Christ, however, had the strongest and most victorious spirit and most of all worthy of a crown. According to that of Apocalypse chapter 6, verse 2. He was given to him a crown and he went forth, what? Conquering, right? That he might conquer. It seems, therefore, in Christ there was the, what? Most of all the foams of sin. So he can most of all conquer and most of all deserve a, what? Crown, right, huh? But against all this is what is said in Matthew 1, verse 20. What is born in him is of the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit excludes sin and inclination of sin, which is implied by the name of the foams, the fountains here. Therefore, in Christ there was no foams of sin, huh? Well, Thomas says, I answer it should be said, that as has been said above, Christ most perfectly had grace and all the, what? Virtues, huh? This might seem kind of strange. He should even have a question about the defects of the soul, right, huh? And of course he's going to exclude in these first two articles dealing with sin as such, huh? But moral virtue, which is in the irrational part of the soul, makes it subject to, what? Reason, right? Even Aristotle saw this, right? So when Aristotle divided the virtues of man, he divided those into the virtues of reason itself, and the virtues of something other than reason, that's irrational in that sense, but is able to partake of reason, huh? And the moral virtue makes the lower powers subject to, what? Reason, huh? He habituates them to follow reason, right? That's why Aristotle, in the eighth book of the politics theory, he talks about how important it is that you listen to the right kind of music, because your emotions are moved in accordance or in harmony with the, what? Music. Music, and I remember years ago there, my brother Richard was at the College of St. Thomas there, and Australia was still there, he forgot to Notre Dame, and he had a course with him in the arts and so on, and that's when I first read Australia's essay, which is a copy of it, Towards an Evaluation of Music, right? He was talking about why the music of the 18th century was so good, right? But it represents the emotions in a reasonable state, huh? So when you listen to Bach or Mozart or something like that, or Handel, your emotions are moved in sympathy with the music, your emotions are being moved in a reasonable way. And that's a kind of a, what? Disposition for moral virtue, right? If you listen to rock and roll or this other crazy stuff that goes on now, your emotions are being moved in an irrational way, in a way that is opposed to reason, right? You're being disposed, right? For vice, huh? Moral vice, huh? So this is totally neglected in education now. Aristotle speaks to, you know, you have to observe, too, what paintings you look at, too. But he said the music is even more important than the paintings because it's much more powerful with emotions than the painting is. Of course, in Aristotle, it speaks of, you know, defines tragedy. I think you do the same thing with comedy, but we've lost that part. But in the definition of tragedy is that it produces a catharsis, right? The purgation of emotions, huh? So to remove something irrational from the emotions, huh? Okay? Remember one time, a friend who was in contact with his brother, right, huh? And they happened to be showing the Shakespeare play there, the one that's about brothers there, right? You know? As you like it, huh? It's like, that took him to see the Shakespeare play. It seems to change his rapport with his brother, right, huh? Because you see that very much, right? In that play, you have, you know, the older brother offending the younger brother, right? Keeping him down and so on. And then the other pair of brothers, the younger brothers, who strip the thrill of the older brother, right? Of course, eventually end up in the, what, Forest of Arden, which is where it represents nature, right? And then they're finally reconciled the two pairs of brothers, huh? It's beautiful. So, good fiction and good music are a stepping stone to moral virtue. This is an interesting thing. There's two quotes that were related. It was kind of interesting. One had to do with Carl Rahner talking about how he really just wasn't interested in art and music. And then this other quote by Carl Rahner talking about unnamed chord space. a certain theologian, big and post-Vatican two-timer, who sort of reprived himself on being a barbarian. Anyway, Cardinal Ratzinger talks about, he says, for a theologian, to not be in touch with the beautiful is a very dangerous thing. It's very interesting to see that. Of course, he plays Mozart, right? Yeah. He had something, he said Mozart, and in Mozart music, you see all of the human tragedy. On a related note, Ilan Waugh's novel, Helena, about Constantine's mother, it was his favorite work, all of his works. And there was a fascinating character, a Roman poet, who was quite gifted, and he was a Christian convert. He was very concerned that poets and philosophers have their character well-developed, because he greatly feared someone with the gifts of a Cicero who was the soul of a jackal. He's sort of like Nietzsche. That's something you want to worry about. I don't know. So we're into what, the body of the archivist? Okay, I think it should be said, it has been said, Christ most perfectly had grace in all the virtues. But moral virtue, which is in the irrational part of the soul, makes it subject to what? Reason, right? And the more so, the more perfect it is, a what? Virtue. Just as temperance, the concubiscible appetite, and fortitude and gentleness, the irascible appetite, that distinction between the concubiscible and irascible goes back to Plato and Aristotle. And the concubiscible appetite is concerned with what is pleasing or agreeable to the senses or disagreeable to the senses. And the irascible is more the fighter for the concubiscible. So, desire and pleasure and pain or sadness and so on are in the concubiscible. And anger and boldness and fear are in the, what? Irascible. So temperance then moderates the desire for sense pleasure, right? And fortitude strengthens the irascible, right? To undergo fighting and defense and so on. And mansoitudo moderates what? Anger. Now, the inclination of the sensual appetite, sense appetite, sense desire, towards that which is against reason, right? It pertains to the, what? Notion of the, this foams, right? Thus, therefore, it is clear that the more virtue is in someone perfect, the more in him is weakened the force of, what? Foams, huh? Since, therefore, in Christ was virtue in the most perfect way, it follows that in him there was no, what? But, yeah. Since even this defect is not able to be ordered to satisfying, but it more inclines us to the contrary of, what? Satisfaction. And the first objection says, weren't both of these things derived from, what? The subtraction of original justice, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the lower powers belonging to the sensual appetite are naturally able to obey reason. But not the bodily powers, huh? Or of the, what? Bodily fluids, huh? And so on. Or even those of the, what? Yeah. So who's thinking about it can have them cube it to themselves as, which I was tolerated, or, you know. Okay. And therefore, the perfection of virtue, which is according to right reason, does not exclude the, what? Ability to the body to suffer, right? But it does exclude the, what? Fountain of sin, the foams, whose reason consists, or whose definition consists in the resistance of the sense appetite to reason, huh? You know, if you go back to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, and he says, well, it makes a nice proportion, he says, just as the medical doctor who's going to try to cure the body by medicine, right? By the art. Must know something about what the body is by nature, right? So the moral philosopher has to know something about the soul, what's its makeup. And then Aristotle divides the soul in a way that's appropriate to the ethics into the rational part, right? Then the part that doesn't have reason, right? Or isn't reason. But then he subdivides it, the rational part, into the part that can, what? Obey reason, can be trained to obey reason, and the part that, what? Cannot, right? See, like my ability to grow, right? Okay? So, my ability to be angry there, to be sad, that can be trained, the repeated acts, right? To obey reason, huh? But my ability to grow can't be really trained by my reason, huh? Okay? So Plato compares, you know, reason is to emotion something like a man to his horse, right? And of course, if the man gets on the horse at first, the horse wants to film off, right? If the man gives up, you know, then the horse wins, right? And, but if the man gets on the horse again, and he continues to get on the horse, eventually he can, what? Tame the horse, right? In Washington Irving's tour on the prairies there, huh? Beautiful descriptions of how they're taming the horses, these wild horses that they would capture. How they're, they're very wild at first, right? But how quickly they can be, what? Brought into subjection, and then they obey the man, right? And, now sometimes we compare reason to the emotions like a man to, what? The boy, right? And Aristotle, though, has a very interesting question there in the Nicomachean Ethics. He says, should reason rule the emotions like the man rules his son or like the master rules his slave? And, he argues that reason should rule the emotions like a man rules his son. When the master rules his slave, the slave has nothing to say about what he's going to do, right? And, the master rules the slave for the good of the master. Not for the good of the slave, right? But, the father rules his son for the good of his, what? Son. Son, and for, the son has something to say about, she has something to say about what he does in life, right? So, sometimes a father tries to force the son into what himself is or what he wished to have been or something, right? And, it's not really what suitable for the son, right? I always remember my father there talking about one of his business friends, you know, it all paints a hope for his son. And, so, he sent him out to Amherst, it was kind of a prestigious, you know, college out here. And, the first year, his son, of course, flung down at Amherst. I mean, not fit for Amherst, he wasn't fit for college at all, right? So, comes back home, you know, and the father says, what do you really want? And, I guess he wanted a filling station, you know, a gas station. He was happy doing that, right? I think my father was telling me, you know, he's kind of admiring the father's wisdom, right? So, you know, you don't just decide you're going to be this, you're going to be that, because to me he's not fit for that. And so I used to work in my father's factory, you know. My father would come through sometimes and he'd be with another business friend and the guy would say, you know, oh, let me introduce me, you know, ah, learning it from the ground up, you know. Because none of us really wanted to go into my father's business, you know. So finally, yeah. So finally, my father and my uncle, Al, they said, before we were to the college, we'd take one of those night courses and the philosophy that he was all about. But before he died, my father says, you're going to have an easier time in life than I did. But no, it's your style of making those comparisons, right? Because it's easier to see the comparison or play-to-is, you know, of a man to his horse or the man to the boy, right? But if you, when Thomas talks about the concupiscence there and the vices, you know, he speaks of them as being childish vices, right? Well, if you let a child have his own way all the time, eventually he ends up being unmanageable, right? And the parents can't do anything with him, you know. And that's the same way with your emotions, right? You let them have what they want all the time. And eventually you get to a point that you just can't control them, right? It's like an unruly child. And so you can see what virtue is and isn't, right? What vice is. So if Christ has a perfection of virtue, then his, what? His emotions, his concupisal appetite, his irascible, are completely, what? Subject to his reason, right? So there's no room there for the vices. But that irrational part that isn't subject to reason can still have, what? Defects, right? Christ, you can get tired and so on, right? I can't really say to my body, you know, don't be tired today. You know? I know you didn't sleep last night, just kept on thinking about something. That doesn't work, that doesn't work. I can't even say to myself, are you going to sleep that way? Now it's time to sleep. Now it's time to get you. Now it's time to sleep you need. The body doesn't obey, you know? That's a fun delay, the problem, you know? They had him in the hospital one time, trying to see if they could find a, you know, sleeping pill that would help them to sleep without being groggy the next day. I guess those things have a bad effect. Anyway. This is what Thomas is pointing out there, right? In the reply to the first, what, objection, right? And the second objection here, right? Wasn't it God's will that Christ would allow his body to undergo what the body naturally undergoes, right? To the second it should be said that the flesh naturally wants that which is pleasing to it, huh? By the desire or concupiscence of the sense appetite. But the flesh of man, huh? Who is a reasonable animal, right? Wants this according to the mode and order of what? Yeah, the measure and order of reason, right? So Aristotle had already taught this, right? That a good human act is a, what? Reasonable. And so good desire is a reasonable desire, right? And a reasonable desire is one that is ordered and measured by reason, huh? And in this way, the flesh of Christ, by the desire of the sense appetite, naturally desired food and drink and sleep, right? So after 40 days there, he's hungry, right? And other things of this sort, which are desired in accordance with the right reason, huh? As is clear by Damascene in the third, what, book, huh? From this offer, it doesn't follow that in Christ there was the foams of sin because that implies a desire for pleasant things outside the order of reason, huh? Okay? Outside the mode, huh? Thomas is always pointing out how the word mode comes from measure there, as Augustine explains. Of course, the word measure is to have with the word mind, huh? Men's, huh? Men's, sure. What about conquering, you know, and getting a crown because you've conquered this vicious part of your lower nature there, huh? You say about St. Francis de Sales, he had a real temper and he became a very gentle saint who was a model for Paul VI and John XXIII and so on. And there he overcame this irascible disorder that he had in nature. To the third, it should be said, huh? That the strength of the spirit, some strength of the spirit, is shown from this that it resists, right? The desires of the flesh contrary to it, right? Joseph Bendix was supposed to have jumped into the bush, right? With the thorns and so on, right? St. Francis. Yeah. Okay. I thought it was Benedicto in the evening. Yeah, maybe they did too. I know St. Francis. Yeah. Yeah, St. Francis did it too. St. Francis did it too. They had that road motion. Yeah, yeah. So that's in Fortuit of Spirit, right? Right off these gifts of the flesh. But even greater strength of the spirit is shown if through this, what? Power it is wholly compressed, right? So that it is not able to, what? Desire or want against the spirit, right? And therefore this belonged to Christ whose spirit attained the highest, what? Grade of fortitude, yeah? And although he did not sustain the interior fight on the part of what? The foams, right? He had sustained nevertheless an exterior fight from the side of the world and the devil, huh? And by overcoming of which, he merited the crown of what? Victory, huh? The temptations of Christ in the desert then wouldn't have been possible to actually have been tempted? He can be tempted and attacked from the outside, right? But he doesn't have an emotion there that is what? Yeah, he's prone to give in to these things. So he wouldn't be tempted the way we're tempted. Yeah. But no, no, he could be tempted by hunger in that sense, right? That's not something vicious, right? The emotions that you should be hungry after 40 days and 40 nights, huh? So you're saying that he could be tempted by hunger but not by gluttony. Yeah, yeah, yeah. All this nonsense about him and Mary Max, but I'm glad it says. But hunger is a temptation. I mean, if I feel hungry and I want to eat the correct, reasonable amount, that's not a real temptation, right? Well, that's what Dallas points out in his commentary on that. It was no sin for him to change his son of his breath. It wouldn't have been a sin. It wouldn't have been a sin because it was in his power to do it. There's nothing wrong with it. And he was hungry. But it was a temptation also to cry. Yeah. I am a son of God. Yeah, I am a son of God. So it was always, he said, he used that as, because he knew he was weak in terms of his hunger. So that's why the devil approached him. But it was, the devil always tempted one obvious thing against something other. There was always two points to his temptation. So all the temptations were in a certain sense that way you have to make a comment there. And I think Jerome said something about, it was a temptation to, again, the providence. I mean, it's just called it providence. So it wasn't directly in the providence. But you think, in those cases, so could the Lord actually be tempted to cry? Well, no, he couldn't be tempted to cry, but the devil didn't know that. So he's tempted by something exterior. He's more tempted to cry than the later temptations, right? Because he starts with the body, more or less, the hunger, and then he talks about going up to the top of the pinnacle and throwing yourself down. You go back to that text in St. John, that everything that is in the world is the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, the pride of life. You have these three temptations corresponding to those three sources of sin, right? John the Cross likes to talk about those three, you know? and sing Chana. Should we do that one here before we take our break? Yes, okay. Okay? Within Christ there was ignorance, right? It seems that in Christ there was ignorance. For that was truly in Christ that belonged to him according to human nature. Although it does not belong to him according to his divine nature. Just as suffering and death, right? He truly suffered and died, right? But ignorance belongs to Christ according to human nature. For as Damascene says in the third book, they took on an ignorant and slavish nature, huh? You see what Damascene thought of us, huh? Therefore, ignorance was truly in Christ, huh? Moreover, some was said to be ignorant through the defect of knowledge, huh? But some knowledge was lacking in Christ. For the Apostle says, He who did not know sin was made sin for us. Therefore, in Christ there was, what? Ignorance. Moreover, Isaiah says, chapter 8, Before the boy knew to call, what? The father and his mother. The strength of, what? Taken away. But that boy is Christ. Therefore, in Christ there was some ignorance of things. That means he was ignorant of his father and mother? I don't know. But against all of this, huh? Ignorance is not taken away by ignorance, huh? Christ, however, for this reason came, that he might take away our ignorances. It's the plural. For he came, that he might enlighten those who were in darkness and who sat down in the shadow of death. Therefore, in Christ there was no ignorance, huh? I answer, it should be said, that just as in Christ there was the fullness of grace and, what? Virtue. So also in him there was the fullness of all knowledge, as is clear from the things foresaid, huh? For just as in Christ the fullness of grace and virtue excludes the fullness of sin, so the fullness of knowledge excludes ignorance, which is opposed to knowledge. Whence, just as in Christ there was no fullness of sin, so in him there was none of ignorance in him, right? So St. John says, full of grace and, what? Truth, huh? There's many senses of the letter. I was looking at that container already this morning. There's many senses of the letter of that, huh? But you can apply it to this then, huh? Full of grace would be no fullness of sin in him, and full of truth there would be no, what? Ignorance in him, huh? Now the first objection there, he took on a ignorant and servile nature. How can he say that, right? Without the ignorant, how can he take on such a nature? You can see how this comes in with the treatise here, right? The things assumed with, what he took on, huh? Well, if he took on a servile and ignorant nature, then he'd take on with it civility and ignorance, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the nature taken on by Christ can be considered in two ways. In one way, by reason of the specific kind of thing it is, huh? And according to this, Damascene says, it is ignorant and servile. When C joins that, what? That it is a servant to human nature, the one who made him, of God, right? And it does not have knowledge of what? Features things, huh? You have to get the knowledge of what? In another way, it can be considered according to that which it has from its union to the divine person, the divine hypostasis, from which it has the fullness of knowledge and of what? Grace. According to that, exactly in John 1, verse 14. We saw him as the word, the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth. So, the union of those two in that one sentence there of John, right? He's saying, okay, he's full of grace and truth because he's the unigenitum apatria, the only begotten from the Father. So it's referring to the person there, right? And in this way, human nature in Christ did not have, what? Ignorance, right? Human nature considered in terms of what Christ is. Yeah, yeah. What it has because of its being united to the divine person, right? And according to the text of John, right? Because of that union, being the only begotten, it's full of grace and truth, right? If you just consider human nature by itself, you say, yeah, it's naturally the servant of God, right? And it's naturally, what? Ignorant of things, especially the future. They say, that's the way Thomas, I think, and Augustine take the temptation of Adam and Eve, right? They're not tempted by sins of the flesh, because their flesh is subject to their reason at that time, but they're tempted by this, what, knowledge of future contingents. They won't have to rely upon God's providence, huh? So it's a very intellectual sin, you know, a very proud sin, right? Yeah. And they're like the temptation of Christ, right? The second one, about Christ not knowing sin, huh? The second should be said that Christ is said not to know sin, because he doesn't know it by, what? Experience, right? But he knows it by simple, what? Knowledge, right? So you know what it is to be in battle. Very simple knowledge, but not through experience, right? To the third, it should be said that the prophet there speaks of the human knowledge of Christ. Christ, he says, therefore, before the boy knew right, to wit, according to humanity, to call his father Joseph, who was his father, what? Thought to be. And his mother, to wit, Maria, the fortitude of Damascus is taken away. You know what that means? Well, this is not, he says, to be understood that at some time he was a man, and he didn't, what? Know this, huh? You don't want to say he didn't know where he was himself, you know? I mean, he didn't know about this as well. But before he knew, that is, before he, what? Man, huh? Having human knowledge, has taken away either, literally, the strength of Damascus, right? And the spoils of Samaria by the king of the, what? Syrians. Or spiritually, right? Because not yet born is people being called upon only as the gloss of Jerome expounds, huh? Now, Augustine, however, in the sermon on the Epiphany, says this was completed in the adoring of the Magi, right? For he says, before, through human flesh, human words, were what? Yeah. He took the power of Damascus, that is to say, the wealth in which Damascus prided itself, right? Yeah. I suppose it's the ones that the Magi are bringing, right? The spoils there for Samaria are the same things, right? Where Samaria is taken for idolatry, and there the people were turned towards, what? Worshiping idols. And these first spoils the boy, what? Took away idolatry. And according to this, it is understood before the boy knew that is before he was, what? Yeah, that's kind of strange. Obscure passage there, right? As Augustine says, there's more things in Scripture I don't understand than I don't understand. Take a little break here now? Yes. Before here now, whether the soul of Christ was possible, able to what, undergo, right? Okay, we had an undergoing soul, to the fourth one goes for it thus. It seems that the soul of Christ was not able to what? Able to suffer, right? Able to undergo. For nothing undergoes except from something stronger than it. Because the agent is more outstanding than the patient, as is clear through Augustine in the twelfth book on the Genesis to Letter, and through the philosopher in the third book on the soul. So, Augustine and Aristotle are saying the same thing, eh? I used to teach the first book of natural hearing, and Aristotle faces a certain problem and resolves it, right? Well, Augustine has the same problem, right? As far as we know, he does it independently of Aristotle. So, and that's from our point of view, more interesting, right? So that Aristotle and Thomas, to the same difficulty, give the same solution, but independently of each other. Of course, Thomas comes along and has the advantage of being able to read both of these masters. But no creature was more powerful and outstanding than the soul of Christ, right? Therefore, the soul of Christ was not able to undergo anything from any creature, and therefore he was not able to suffer. For there would be in vain in him the ability to suffer if he could not suffer from anyone. Moreover, Tully, that means Cicero, right? In the book of the Tuscan questions, eh? The Tuscan questions. That the passions of the soul, passiones, are certain sicknesses, huh? But in the soul of Christ, there was no sickness. For the sickness of the soul follows upon sin. As is clear through that of Psalm 40, verse 5. Moreover, the passions of the soul seem to be the same with the foams of sin, right? When the Apostle says, he calls them the passions of what? Sins. But in Christ, there was no foams of sin. Therefore, it seems that in him, there were no, what? Passions, huh? I know this is kind of a general one, leading into the next series of articles, which would be about particular passions, huh? But against this is what is said in Psalm 87, verse 4. In the person of Christ, my soul is filled with what? Evils. Not sins, Abraham, but human evils. That is, sorrows, as the gloss there expounds. Therefore, the soul of Christ was able to undergo, huh? I answer it should be said that the soul in the body constituted, right? Happens, or is able to undergo in two ways, huh? In one way, a bodily undergoing, in another way, an animal or a soul-like, huh? Undergoing. By bodily undergoing, it suffers through the wounding of the body, huh? For since the soul is the form of the body, it follows that the being of the soul in the body is what? One. Actually, the body shares in the existence of the soul. But the existence of the soul is not entirely immersed in the body. And therefore, it has some activities that are not in the body. And therefore, it is necessary that the body being disturbed through some bodily passion, undergoing, it is necessary that the soul, right, be disturbed, as far as the being that it has in the body. Because, therefore, the body of Christ was able to suffer, it was mortal, it was necessary also that his soul be in some way, what? Undergoable, huh? Sufferable. Able to suffer. Now, by an animal passion, the soul is said to undergo, according to the operation, which is either, what, private to the soul, or chiefly of the soul, then of the, what, body, right? And although, also, according to understanding and sensing, the soul is said to undergo something, that's kind of a, what, extension of the word, right, then? Now, I think we've talked about this before, maybe a bit. About that word, huh? We've talked about that word, huh? Passiel, which means, originally, suffering. But the word, in Greek, and the word in Latin, right, have been, what, carried over to other things, huh? And the English word, suffering, has stuck on the first meaning. Mm-hmm. Okay. So, um, to suffer means to what? Receive something that is harmful to you, right? And destructive of you, right, huh? But now, if you drop out the idea that what you receive is destructive, right, but nevertheless, keep the idea that it's being received in the body, then you have something like sensing, right? And if you drop out the idea of the body, but just keep the idea of receiving, then, as Aristoteles says, even understanding is a kind of, what, undergoing, right? Okay. Now, um, in English, right, they say the word suffering is stuck on the first, what, meaning. And so, either you have to carry the word suffering over, or find another word that, in some way, undergoes this carry over, and, to me, the best choice in English is the word undergoing, right? Because it seems to me, in its first meaning, undergoing has a sense of something bad. And I point to the fact that we say that you're under the weather, what does that mean? See? It means that the weather has acted upon you in a way that's harmful to you, right? It made you sick, huh? And if we say about somebody, you know, he's undergone a lot. Well, it's not a good thing he's undergone, right? A friend of the good, bad things, right, huh? You see? See? But now, if you drop the idea of what you receive is being harmful to you, right, but nevertheless is receiving, right, well, then, Aristotle will carry that word over, say, sensing is a kind of undergoing, right? Okay? And, of course, since there's a body there, you could maybe, you know, undergo in a bad sense if the sounds are too loud, you know, or your eye, you know, if you shine a light in the eye long enough, you can go blind, I suppose, right? But really, the eye is being, what, perfected by sound and by color and so on, right? But it's nevertheless being received in a body, right? And then when Aristotle gets to talk about reason, he says, understanding is also a kind of undergoing, right? Because you're receiving something whereby you understand, huh? So, and so the word understanding, you've got the word under there, too, but it's not, to understand something, is that to be like being under the weather? No. You dropped out the bad sense, right, huh? Okay. So Thomas is referring to the fact of what's taking place in the Greek word or the English word, right? Okay. You find this a lot, you see, there's one of the great difficulties in our thinking, it's very simple, though, the cause, that the English word was never carried over, and that's because we learn philosophy and theology from the Greeks and the Romans, right? And so sometimes we don't carry the English word over, and we take over the Greek word and transliterate it, right? Not translate it. And, uh...