Tertia Pars
Lecture 38: Christ's Knowledge: Discursive and Habitual Knowing

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My God, my God, have you forsaken me, right? Which is one of the seven words that most of all reveals the fullness of the suffering. And it's found the same words, really, in Matthew and Mark, but only those words in Matthew and Mark. And then you have these other two groups of three, right? But there seems to be a connection between the three in Luke with each other, right? And then the three, especially the last two, I see more clearly in John. It's interesting that the Gospels are written, you know? I remember when I first started just kind of studying the Gospels and began praying them, I was shocked! In the account of the Last Supper in John, there's no account of the Eucharist, right? Although there's this chapter, you know, chapter 6 that talks about the Eucharist, but, you know, I was shocked, you know? But you've got to realize the first three Gospels have fundamentally talked about it, right? And so John is giving what was missing, you know? I guess John's account, too, of Christ's public life goes back earlier than the other Gospels writers, huh? Yeah, that sounds like... Yeah, yeah. And the Church Fathers say that, yeah. Yeah. He makes a distinction, I was reading a Matthew's Gospel to call the Apostles. Sometimes they're different accounts. Yeah. Synoptics and then John, and he says, well, it seems there may have been more than one time that he called them. First he was sort of initial sort of introduction, later he called them a little bit more close to discipleship, and then later he made them an Apostle. So really it was like multiple times that he called. That's why it's very different accounts. This is going back to the thing from Thomas here in the beginning, though. Chris is sitting there in the golden chain there when he's talking about no prophet is honored in his own country. He has a very strong statement about this effective custom upon us. And if we sum it up in our proverb, you know, familiarity breeds contempt. And you see all these wonderful things said about Thomas, why don't the Catholic theologians and so on nowadays read Thomas more carefully and so on, because it's clearer. I can learn more from him in one year, he says, than in a lifetime of the studies of the rest. But it's part of this singularity, at least of the name, right, that they have a certain contempt, you know. But it shows the influence of custom. No prophet is honored in his own country. I remember when Vincent Smith there, you know, he was the big shot at Notre Dame for a while, and they went to St. John's, because he had set up an institute there for the philosophy of science. And they had a big blow up at St. John's there, you know, about that's rich. He went over to Columbia University and was teaching there for a while. He said he was more free to teach Aristotle there than he was at St. John's, which was the Catholic school, you know. I think they have some of his books, isn't he? Yeah, he has books on natural philosophy, yeah. Kind of funny, they're trying to see whether they're a Catholic college or not, and the former they came up with was, you know, Catholic in ecumenical sense. Anyway, let's go back to the text here. Okay, we're up in the, this response, okay. I think it should be said that Christ in the status before the Passion was at the same time the viator, on the road, and a comprehensor, one who's grasped the divinity, as we'll be more clear later on. The first act of reason, they call it, what? Simplex apprehensia, right? So when you grasp what something is, you know what it is, right? But when do you know what God is? When do you know God as he is? Yeah, when you're a comprehensor, right? Not in the sense you comprehend him, you know him as much as he's knowable, but you know what he is, right? And then you grasp him, huh? Okay. And that's the reward of hope, huh? Get a hold of God, so to speak. And especially, right, the conditions of a viatoris he had on the side of his body, right? In so far as it was able to suffer, right? By the conditions of a comprehender, he had maximae, right? On the side of his understanding, what? Soul, right? Now, it is a condition of the soul comprehending that in no way is it subject to its body, right? Or, what? Depends upon it, right? But it wholly, what? Dominates it, huh? Whence, after resurrection, from the soul, glory pours out into the, right? Overflows into the, what? Body, right? From this aura, huh? The soul of the man who's on the road, right? Needs to, what? Turn to the images that he is tied to the body, right? And in a way, subject to it, right? Perfect and dependent upon it, huh? And therefore, the, what? Blessed souls, yeah. This is before the resurrection, but when they're in heaven, yeah. They are able to understand without, what? Turning towards the images. And this can be said about the soul, necessary to say this about the soul of Christ, which fully had the faculties of one who comprehends, huh? That maybe, when he was dead, I guess you'd say his body couldn't suffer anymore. It's the outdoor anymore. Yeah, certainly, because he had to be dead. Yeah. He had a bit of vision before that, too. Yeah. His body was not included. But he wasn't limited by that. Yeah. He's saying now, even if he was in the, before the passion, right? Mm-hmm. He still could, what I understand by this infused knowledge without turning to the images, right? Just as in the division he would do this. So you've got some surprises coming to you as to how you're going to understand after your soul leaves the body, right? Mm-hmm. I mean, Aristotle and Thomas both see our soul as not understanding itself through itself, right? But has to know itself, the soul, through its powers, right? And has to know the powers through their acts and the acts through their, what? Objects, right? So from the objects we discourse to the acts and the acts to the powers and from the powers to the soul, right? But if the soul knew itself through itself it would be just the reverse. You know, in the soul you'd know the powers of the soul and their acts and objects. Lots of authority. When our soul is separated from the body then the soul will know itself through itself because it would be actually understandable because it's separated from matter now. Because you know even in this life things become understandable and they're separated from matter. The singular matter. Now that likeness that Aristotle saw there between images, right? I'm sorry, I just had this thought that does that anyway explain that in the sense of our own clarity of the judgment of ourselves through ourselves that you know that clears understanding of ourselves. Yeah, but there'll be some infused now at that time you know so we'll see the justice and the judgment of you and me and everybody else, right? Yeah, okay. You know, it's kind of frightening, huh? Yeah. I didn't know you were such a bad guy, Burkwist. No place to hide. My sins will be shouted on the rift house or something. Yeah. To the first therefore it should be said that that likeness which the philosopher lays down is not to be observed as he guards all things. For he's manifest at the end of the power of sight is to know what colors, huh? But the end of the power of understanding is not to know what the image is but to know the, what, understandable species or forms which it grasps from the images and in the images, right? According to the status of the present life. Explicitly St. Thomas says that we the human understanding knows the image not the things that they're in there but the image itself that's what he says. Go ahead. It's kind of confusing. He says the end of the intellect is to know the intelligible species, but is the end of the intellect to know the intelligible species, or to know a thing that's true to the intelligible species? In other words, what are we knowing? Aren't we knowing that? You know, you could take the species there as being the object, though, too, you know. There's a little ambiguity in the way those words are used sometimes. I was looking at a text in the Summa Conagentias this morning there, where Thomas is speaking very explicitly about knowing things in themselves, right? And not knowing just, you know, he speaks of the eratio in Latin, right? And, you know, a lot of times we think eratio is meaning thought or something like that. And, but in English sometimes we'll say, I know the reason why he did that. And what do you mean? You're knowing a thought about why he did it? I don't mean that by reasoning, do you? You mean something in the thing itself, right? What's causing him to do what he did, right? And sometimes eratio even has that sense, right? So species, if we're at the oracle, can have that sense. Species is the, could be taken in the sense, to use Aristotle's words, of what it is of something what's sensed or imagined, right? Okay. So you say, what is that? You say, well, that's a man. What is this? This is a glass, right? So I'm knowing that what it is of something sensed, rather than what is sensed, strictly speaking. Species is something, what? Universal. Species is said of many differing in number, right? Signifying what it is. So, therefore, the likeness is in regard to this, to which both, what? Powers look, you might say, right? But not as to that in which the condition of both powers terminates. Perhaps I'll sell Thomas's here, because he's coming back upon this proportion and understanding it more perfectly than maybe some people do, right? And seeing exactly in what way these two ratios are, what? Alike, huh? Okay. Now, he says, nothing prevents my diverse statuses from diverse things for something to, what? Tend towards its end, but a thing's own end is always, what? One, huh? And therefore, sight knows nothing without color, but the understanding in some state is able to know without the image, but not without the, what? It was taking more in the sense of that from which he had to stand there, right? Okay. So, so long as the soul is in the body, right, it naturally turns towards the, what? Images, right? So, the body is a kind of a share, right, in this activity. When the soul is separated from the body, right, in that status, it knows in a different way, right? It knows itself to itself, right? And without turning towards, what? Images, huh? Now, the third objection was the one saying he's going to, the second one, okay. To the second it should be said that although the soul of Christ was of the same nature with our souls, right? It had, nevertheless, some status, right? Some state, which our souls do not have now, in reality, huh? But only in, what? Hope. To wit, the status of comprehension, huh? I was at Mass here a couple of days ago, and the text is from Hebrews, the epistle of Hebrews, right? And the translation, the definition there, it said, the reality of things hoped for. Well, no, no, the reality of things hoped for is to be division. And that's not what faith is, not the reality of things hoped for. So, I said, I just got to say this to the pastor, I first said, that translation's got to go, I said. I came up and got the door, and then the pastor's going there. And he agreed, he said, you know, just saying it. And I said, well, who translates these things? He says, he says that there's some committee that does it, he says. And now in the translation, what they do is tweak what they want. Yeah, yeah. Well, he's saying, though, that Christ has a status that the blessed will have eventually, right? In the epistle of vision. By means to be the vision. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, that it's not impossible, right, for him to have this other status that angels have, right? Which is less than what you have to be envisioned. He can have that status even in, what, this life, right? When he's still a viator, right? So, it's kind of an argument, I think, from the A. Fort Siro, right? If he has the status of the blessed, right, even before, even for the passion, right? Then he can have another supernatural knowledge, right? Which is much less, it would be a division, but much more than our natural, what, knowledge. Right, that's why it confused me, because he's arguing, he's using this comprehensor status as like his principle for reaching his conclusion. Yeah, if he has a status that high, right, of a comprehensor, then he's not, what, limited to our natural way of knowing, right? So, he can have another knowledge that is, what? Not even that, not even comprehensible. Yeah. But it's kind of an A. Fort Siro argument, in a sense. The question is, is that infused supernatural knowledge such, the nature of that knowledge such, that he doesn't have to turn to the phantasm to use it to understand, you see? But that's what he's saying here, right, you're right, this is a knowledge that is above the human knowledge, and it's, I think he's going to compare it later on a bit to the angels and their knowledge, right? So, he has, you know, the vision in a way, like God, a little bit, and then the infused knowledge like the angels have, and then, what? Yeah, yeah. That's kind of appropriate, you know, sometimes, you know, when Thomas was talking about why is it appropriate, and many reasons for it, of course, but one of the reasons why it's appropriate for him to take on human nature was to take on, in a sense, the whole of, what? Yeah. Universe, right? And, because man is kind of, what, a little cosmos, right, his body and soul, right? And, but in a way, having this knowledge here, he's taking on, what? What the angels have, naturally, huh? So, in a sense, he's all, everything. Now, the third objection was saying, well, these natural powers in Christ would be in vain if he had this knowledge that didn't require this. To the third, it should be said that although the soul of Christ is able to understand, not turning to the images, right, nevertheless, he's able to understand, turning to the images, huh? And, therefore, the senses were not in vain in him, huh? Especially since the senses are not given to man only for understanding knowledge, but also for the necessity of, what, animal life, right? It's a little bit between himself and the earlier work, right? Okay. It's a little bit between himself and the earlier work, where he was denying, apparently. Oh, oh, yeah. He changed his mind, right? You know? So, but it's not only because of the animal life, right? But also, right? He says, pretty certain, right? But he also had that knowledge where he turned to the, what, images, right? And I don't know about, maybe Thomas will touch upon here later on, but, you know, when he meets the, who is the guy, the centurion, is it? But, you know, having found such faith in, kind of marveled, you know, what, that's where human knowledge just seems to be, right? You know? And it doesn't seem to be, by his infused knowledge that he wondered so much, I've been thinking, right? I think it would be more by, you know, it's a strange creature here, you know, in front of my eyes, right? And it's making this beautiful, beautiful understanding and perfection of faith, really. Okay, you want to take a little break? Thank you. To the third one goes forward thus. It seems that the soul of Christ did not have this knowledge by way of what? Colatio. Which means literally what? Bringing together, right? For Damascene says in the third book, In Christ we do not speak of what? Counsel. Nor of what? Choice. That's kind of a strange thing. But looking at choices, what? Consequence of counsel, right? But these are not removed from Christ except insofar as they imply bringing together in discourse. The way I understand it, Colatio and discourse, you have to bring together before you can discourse. You have to bring together the major and the minor premise. Then you can discourse to the conclusion. You can run to the conclusion. Therefore, it seems that in Christ there was not a, what, bringing together or discursive, what? Knowledge, eh? Moreover, man needs bringing together in the discourse a reason to inquire into those things which he does not know. But the soul of Christ knew all things, as has been said above. Therefore, there was not in him this discursive or cognitive of a knowledge, eh? You have an ability for a large discourse around like that. Quite as such. Moreover, the knowledge of the soul of Christ had itself in the manner of, what? Those who comprehend it. Which is, what? Conformed to the angels, as is said in Matthew 22, 30. But in the angels, there is not a discursive or bring together knowledge. As is clear through, no less a man than Dionysius, the chapter of the divine names. Therefore, in the soul of Christ, there was not a discursive or bring together knowledge. But against this is that Christ had a rational soul. But the proper operation of the rational soul is to bring together, here's the thing, and to run from one thing to another. So Shakespeare defines it by discurary, because that implies that you can confer, here. You define something by the ultimate, huh? Shakespeare knows what he's doing, huh? He obviously wrote this before us. Therefore, in Christ, there was a discursive or bringing together knowledge, huh? I answer, it should be said, that some knowledge or science can be called discursive or callativa, bringing together in two ways, huh? In one way, as far as the acquiring of that knowledge, as happens in us, who proceed to knowing one thing to another, has an effect through causes and the reverse. Incidentally, sometimes when Thomas gives a division of discourse, right, he'll say, there are four discourses, right, as far as things are concerned. From cause to effect, like in geometry. From effect to cause, more commonly, like in natural science and other places. From like to like, where one is not the cause or effect to the other, but there's a likeness there, right? And then from what? Opposite to opposite, huh? It's interesting that division into four. So Thomas mentions, sometimes mentions just these first two effects, through causes and causes to effects. And of course, in the book, in the Postal Analytics, you talk about two kinds of demonstration, huh? Which in Latin they call the demonstration procter quid, which is from the cause to the effect. And then the demonstration quia, that it is so, from effect to cause. And in this way, the knowledge of the soul of Christ was not, what, discursive or bringing together, right? Because this knowledge, about which we now speak, was, what, given to him, what, divinely. And not acquired by the investigation of, what, reason. In another way, a knowledge can be called discursive or coletiva, as regards its, what, use. Just as those knowing, sometimes from causes, what, conclude effects. Not, as it were, learning new, but wishing to use the knowledge which they already have. And in this way, the knowledge of the soul of Christ is able to be, what, coletiva and discursiva. Because he's able, from one, to conclude another, just as it, what, pleases him, right? Just as, in Matthew chapter 17, the Lord asked from, what, Peter? Yeah. From which do the kings of the earth take tribute? From their sons, or from, what, aliens, huh? And Peter answered, from aliens. He concludes, therefore the friends are free. Or the time, you know, in the other time, in the chapter there, when they say, whose son is Christ? And they say David, so then, being David, then how can they call him, what, Lord, right? He's kind of syllogizing there, right? Okay? Getting them in trouble. Okay. So I was a little surprised in the beginning when he said that he's going to take the opposite side from what the objection says, right? They did not have science by way of collation. Well, of course, he's saying in the body of the article here that this infused knowledge was not, what, acquired by Colatio, which is what I would expect. To the first, therefore, it should be said that from Christ is excluded counsel, rightly by Damascene, the counsel that is with what? Doubt, right? And consequently, the choice, which in its definition, in Aristotle's definition of it, includes such what? Counsel. The choice is the result of taking counsel. Thinking what I should do and then choosing to do. But does not exclude from Christ the use of what? Counseling, right? The second objection, huh? Christ knows all things. Therefore, he doesn't need to use these things. To the second, it should be said that that argument proceeds about discourse and bringing together insofar as they're ordered to acquiring knowledge, right? Christ doesn't have to use these to acquire knowledge. Now, what about this conformity to the angels? To the third, it should be said that the blessed are conformed to the angels as regards the gratuitous gifts, huh? But there remains a difference which is, what, according to nature. And therefore, to use collation and discourse is connatural to the souls of the blessed, not, however, to the, what, angels. So I'll still be doing Euclid there in heaven, huh? I say, what's the guy? What about that guy? Look at the theorem there in Euclid this morning there about, if you subtract from an even number an odd number, the result will be what? Yeah. Or then the reverse, you know, if you subtract from an even number an odd number, the result will be what? Odd number, right? But if you subtract an odd number from an odd number, you'll get a what? And how do you prove those things? You better be Euclid, yeah. It's interesting, even before you see the proof, you kind of guess what it would be. You don't need dialectic there in the sciences. Okay. So we look at article, what? I often wonder about music there, huh? Because Thomas speaks as if the pleasure of music will be found in heaven. But do the angels appreciate music, huh? Not having ears? Huh? Maybe they could produce it for us. Madison's Music of Mozart, I say, how could anything be more beautiful than this? And I'm sure in heaven there must be more beautiful music than Mozart, but I mean, I can't imagine it or picture it, huh? Imagine there could be anything more beautiful than Mozart's music. Okay, the fourth article. Okay. Okay. To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that in Christ, just one more word about Mozart there, the pieces that John Paul II singled out by Mozart were, of course, the rachium, right, because he had a concert of the rachium there, and the gross mass on the great mass of Mozart, and then the incomparable motet, the Ave Verum Corpus. But if you listen to Mozart's things of the Eucharist, he has the Eucharist, and the introduction to one of those is just absolutely perfect. And when he comes back to it, he brings it back again. It's magnificent. After bringing it in some way, you hear it. There's some of the greatness of Ave Verum Corpus. Oh, he says, now what do you want for your funeral? I said, well, the Ave Verum Corpus there during the day. Days of Joy of Man's Desire by Bach, and I have to see what the rest will be. You have the curate from the great mass. I don't know if they can sing it, though. Oh, you have some pretty good singers in the church there, in the parish there. Very good. To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that in Christ, this knowledge was less than in the angels. I doubt that very much. For perfection is proportional to the perfectible, but the human soul, according to the order of nature, is below the, what? Angelic nature. Since, you know, she took on a nature inferior to the angels, right? But not in a condition inferior to them. Since, therefore, the knowledge about which we now speak is infused to the soul of Christ for its perfection, it seems that knowledge of this sort was below the knowledge by which the angelic nature is perfected. Thomas Essie is not going to reply to his objections in detail, right? Moreover, the knowledge of the soul of Christ was in some way, what? Collativa and discrisiva, which could not be said of the knowledge of the angels. Therefore, the knowledge of the soul of Christ was below that of the knowledge of the angels. Moreover, when some knowledge is more immaterial, it's so more potent, but the knowledge of the angels is more immaterial than the knowledge of the soul of Christ because the soul of Christ was the act of the body, right? That's the definition of the soul, the first act of a natural body composed of tools because the soul of Christ was the act of a body and it did have turning towards phantasms, which could not be said to the angels. therefore, the knowledge of the angels was more potent than the knowledge of the soul of Christ. They'll bring me to stake if I maintain that. But against this is what the apostle says, Hebrews chapter 2, verse 9. He who was a, what? A little bit less than the angels, right? You see Jesus on account of the passion of his death crowned with glory and what? Honor. That goes back to what the psalm 8, I think it is. Okay. I use that part of the psalm there for one way of dividing the six mysteries about Christ. You have the three ones where he's, what? Humble. And the three ones where he's glorified. The answer should be said that the infused knowledge of the soul of Christ can be considered in two ways. In one way, according to that by which he had a, what? Cause flowing this into him. In other way, according as he had it from the subject receiving this. Now, as regards the first, the knowledge infused of the soul of Christ was much more excellent than the knowledge of the angels. Both as regards the multitude of things known, the number of things known, right? And as regards the certitude of his, what? Clarity of his knowledge. Because the spiritual light that was poured into the soul of Christ is much greater than the light that pertains to the angelic nature. But as regards the second, the knowledge poured into the soul of Christ was below the angelic knowledge as regards, what? the way of knowing which is naturally and so, which is by conversion to the, what? Images and to, it's usually admitting it more in terms of the early human knowledge of Christ that that's inferior to the angels in some way, right? And that is that he involves turning the images and so on. See my guardian angel thinking about me, what? What are you turning the images all the time for? Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Whether the infused knowledge in Christ was a, what, habitual science. To the fifth, one goes forward thus. It seems that in Christ there was no habitual knowledge. As you know, in God, in his divinity, right, there's no habitual knowledge. There's only knowledge in the sense of actually knowing. Otherwise he'd have some kind of potency, right, to be actualized. You have an accident and so on. It has been said, for it has been said, that the soul of Christ is befitting the soul of Christ, the greatest perfection. But more is perfection of knowledge existing in act than pre-existing in, what, habit. Therefore it was suitable, right, that he would know all things in act. And therefore that he have no habitual knowledge. But he's not pure act, I don't think, in his human nature. He was tired there when he got to the, to the Samaria there with the Thirsty too. It's in the, it's part of the, we're in there. The lawsuits is in the, the Deziria, the old mass in the Deziria. It's sort of asking mercy from Christ because you did this great work. You came down, you were tired. Yeah. So don't let that go to waste. That's part of the hymn. Did you sing it? I didn't sing it, no. We had a father that was a friend of my sister's, you know, because of the voice. Oh, he sang it, really? 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Wow. Moreover, habitual knowledge is the assumed perfection of the one knowing, but perfection is more noble than the, what, perfectible. If, therefore, in the soul of Christ there was some created habit of knowledge, he would follow that something created was more noble than the soul of Christ. Therefore, there is not in the soul of Christ some habitual, what, knowledge, huh? But against this, huh? The knowledge of Christ about which we now speak was univocult to our knowledge. Why is he saying that? Just as his soul was the one species with our soul, but our knowledge was in the genus of habit. Therefore, the knowledge of Christ was, what, habitual? Maybe he's going to be talking there about his human knowledge, right? To have his infused knowledge. I answer. It should be said, as has been said above, that the mode of this knowledge, this infused knowledge, the soul of Christ, was suitable to the subject, what? Receiving it. From the general beginning that the received is in the receiver, and the, what, mode or way of the receiver. That's always a consolation to a professor, right? What the professor says to receive in each student according to the way of that receiver. Some are more prepared than others, right? But this way is connatural to the human soul. That sometimes it is understanding in act, sometimes in, what? Potency. Christel talked about this very much in the third book. But the middle between pure ability and complete act is, what? Habitat. And of the same genus as the middle and the, what, extremes. And therefore it is clear that the connatural way of the human soul is that it received knowledge by way of, what, Habitat. And therefore it should be said that the infused knowledge of the soul of Christ was, what, habitual. He was able to use it whenever he, what, wanted. The first objection is talking about the maxima perfectio, right? And it seems to be contrary to that. To the first, therefore, it should be said that in the soul of Christ there was a two-fold knowledge. And both in its own way was, what, most perfect. One exceeding the mode of human knowledge by which he saw the essence of God, right? And other things in that essence. And this was the most perfect simpliciter. And such knowledge was not habitual, but actual with respect to all those things which in this way he knew. When you get the Vedic vision, you'll always be, what? Yeah, you'll always be actual. You'll never be habitual. You won't, you know, I think I'll see him as he is today and not do something else tomorrow or something. No, you'll be seeing him as he is always, huh? Another knowledge was in Christ according to the way proportioned to human nature insofar as he knew things through species or forms poured into him divinely, right? About which knowledge we now, what, speak. And this knowledge was not simpliciter, right? Most perfect. But most perfect in the genus of, what? Human knowledge. Whence was not necessary that it always be and, what, act, huh? Now the second objection here, right? Which is the one from this infinity, huh? The second it should be said that habits are reduced in act at the command of the will. For a habit is that which someone, by which someone acts when he wants to, huh? And it goes back to what? Great affair was. Not so great affair was. But anyway, that's good there. Now the will has itself to infinity of things in indeterminate, what? Way, it's not limited to human. And this is not in vain, although, what? It doesn't tend in all actually, so long as it tends actually in what is, what, suitable to the place and, what, time, huh? So I can't go to Euclid now. You guys, okay? Wouldn't be appropriate for me to go to Euclid at this time, huh? Maybe a couple of minutes. And therefore also, the habit is not in vain, although not all things are reduced to act which are subject to the habit. So long as that is reduced to act, that is what? Fitting to the suitable end of the will according to the need of what? Business.