Tertia Pars
Lecture 36: Christ's Knowledge of Infinite Things

Transcript
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Well, it's in certain cause mentioning a bit of the 15th there. There may be another book on the doctrines of the church, but St. Ephraim wanted to be a man in one book, and that book is the Bible. And everybody really had a book, you know, and you forget about the rest of them. But I was talking to somebody here about, somebody's telling me where it's the Dominican thing there. Thomas is supposed to have said the way to become wise, to be a man in one book. I was saying Ephraim, you know, in a very good way. Okay, second objection. Yeah, the more perfect the mind is, the more things it sees in the beginning. Now, to second, it should be said that God more perfectly knows his own, what, essence than the soul of Christ does, because the God comprehends his own essence. And therefore he knows all things, not only which are an act in some time, right? Which is said to know by the science of vision, right? That's why they call it the scienzi visionis, because the past, the present, and the future are all present to God in his eternal, what? Now. You see? Okay? It's just like he's seeing them. My old teacher, Kassir, used to joke, there used to be a program, I know, it was on the radio in the old days. You were there, did you ever? I was there. No, I was there. And it reenacted some historical event, you know? The trial of Socrates, you know, that's why he's doing it, you know? And they're concerned talking about the division. You'll be there, right? The past will be present to you, right? You know, it's kind of a thing because of this program, when you listen to this thing, you know, it's kind of fun to listen to this program, the reenactment of these events, and they're present to you, and I think it's happening right now, you know, Socrates is being led to the trial or something. But that's what I call it, the signs of visiones, right? When I read, you know, history, that's not really, that's very much in the past, you know? I'm trying to guess what's going to happen in the future, and so you're not seeing what's going to happen in the future. It may be quite different from what I imagine it to be. But also, all the things that he is able to make, right, which he is said to know, per simplicium intelligentium, right? Simple understanding, as it had in the first. I think those phrases Thomas didn't invent, they were already, you know, among the theologians, but that's a distinction of what? God's knowledge by reason, huh? But it's not a distinction of two knowledges in God, huh? God is one knowledge, it's altogether simple. But you're distinguishing it by the things, what? Known, right, huh? And they're all known by the same knowledge. Okay. The soul of Christ, therefore, knows all things, in this sense, right, which God knows in himself by the knowledge of vision. But not all the things which God knows in himself by the knowledge of simple intelligence, right? And therefore, God knows more things in himself than the soul of Christ. What? That's not a good thing. No, no, no. No. So it's not a lack, either, because the soul of Christ is perfect, so it has everything that the soul could possibly have. Yeah, he knows everything that pertains to him and his dignity as a son of man, right? And it belongs to his dignity as a son of man to be the judge of all of us. So, and therefore, he has to know everything that's... So maybe that, maybe that's... He's not going to judge those people who could have been if your mother had married somebody else. You see? That's the idea to judge those people that never were, are, or will be. Now, even in the sciencia visionis, he's going to make a distinction here, or see a distinction in the third objection now. The idea there being some, what? Identity of the, I mean, equality there. To the third, it should be said that the quantity of knowledge is not only to be noted according to the number of things known, but also to the clarity of the, what? Knowledge, huh? Okay? So in that sense, I might be said, I know more of the square than, let's say, the soul. They know more clearly what the square is than the soul. Okay? So although the knowledge of the soul of Christ, which he has in the word, is equal to the, what? Science of vision, right? Which God has in himself, as regards the number of things known, right? Nevertheless, the knowledge of God exceeds infinitely as regards the clarity of the knowledge. The knowledge of the soul of Christ, huh? In St. Thomas' communion prayer there, he's pushing the clarity of his infinite mind. Because the uncreated light of the divine understanding infinitely exceeds the created light, any created light received in the soul of Christ, right? Not only as far as the, what? Way of knowing, but also as far as the number of things known, huh? So if you limit yourself, you know, there is, he's going back now to the old thing, right? But he knows infinitely more things than Christ knows in his soul, and even the things that Christ knows in his soul that God knows also, he knows in his divine knowing much more clearly, right? Than Christ, huh? It does not mean that Christ has a confusion that we have when you see these things darkly and so on. So should we take a little break before we go on? So should we take a little break before we go on? So should we take a little break before we go on? So should we take a little break before we go on? So should we take a little break before we go on? So should we take a little break before we go on? It seems that the soul of Christ is not able to know an infinity of things in the Word. For that the infinite be known is impugnant to the definition of the infinite. Insofar as it's said in the third book of the physics, that the infinite is that whose quantity is taking always. There's always something outside to be taken, right? So Aristotle's talking about the division of the continuous. You can always divide the line more, right? There's always something more to be taken. The same way with numbers, right? You can always have a great number. But it's impossible to separate the definition from the defined, because this would make contradictories to be, what? The same time. Therefore it is impossible that the soul of Christ knows what? Inflanta. Moreover, a knowledge of infinite things is infinite. But the science of Christ cannot be, what? Infinite. For his capacity is, what? Limited. Since he's a creature, right? As man. Therefore, the soul of Christ is not able to know an infinity of things. Moreover, to the infinite, there can't be anything greater than the infinite. But more things are contained in the divine science, absolutely speaking, than the science of the soul of Christ, as has been said. Therefore, the soul of Christ does not know what? Infinite, huh? You can see how, what's his name there? No, the other guy, that tear-tick. Oh. Faribach, right? Oh, there he is. Yeah, Faribach. Oh, that's true. But against this is the soul of Christ knows his whole power and all the things that he's capable of, right? But he can, what? Yeah, cleanse infinity of sins, huh? For he is a propitiation for our sins, as is said by St. John in his first epistle. Not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world, right? So if we keep on sinning, he can still cleanse us. Therefore, the soul of Christ knows infinite things, huh? The answer. It should be said that science is not of anything except of what is, of being. In that being and true are, what? Convertible. These are two of the so-called transcendentals, the most universals. Now, in two ways, is something called a being. In one way, simply. Namely, what is a being and act? In another way, secundum quid. Which is, what? Being and potency, right? Okay. So do we have any toothpicks in this room? Impotency. Yeah. You have to qualify, right? You wouldn't say simply. Unless you have some. What? Impotency, yeah. Yeah. But you wouldn't say simply, though. Not that you're an act. And because, as is said in the ninth book of wisdom, ninth book after the book is an actual philosophy, each thing is known according as it is an act, huh? Not according as it is in, what? Potency, huh? One way our style shows that is from geometry. Where you have to draw a line, make it actual, to see the proposition. Okay. And because, as is said in the ninth book of wisdom, each thing is known according as it is an act, not according as it is in ability or in potency. Knowledge, first and chiefly, regards being in act. But in a secondary way, it regards being in, what, potency, which is not noble by itself, but according as, what? Yeah. So, it regards the first way of knowing, or knowledge, the soul of Christ does not know what? But, because there are not infinity of things in act, huh? Even if one takes into account all things which are in act, huh? According to every time. This is something taken up earlier in the first poem, if you know, first prima paris. In that the state of generation corruption does not remain forever, right? Whence, there is a certain number, not only of those things which are without generation corruption, but even of generible and, what, corruptible. There's a number of cats, a number of dogs, right? But as regards the other way of knowing, the soul of Christ in the word knows an infinity of things. For he knows, as has been said, all things which are in the power of the creature. When, since in the power of the creature are an infinity of things, in this way he knows an infinity of things. But as by a knowledge of simple, what? Intelligence. Not, however, by a knowledge of, what? Yeah. Because things are actually, in some time past, present, and future, are not infinite, huh? But the things it could have been, right? Twist there the distinction. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But it's scienzius impici intelligentsia, not of the things that are in the power of God, but of the creature, huh? It's the distinction that he sees. What about this objection drawn from the consideration of the infinite in the physics there? Infinite, it's in motion, and so on. To the first, therefore, it should be said that infinite, as has been said in the first part, is taken or is said in two ways. In one way, by reason of form, and in this way, the infinite is said negatively. To it, that which is a form or act not limited by some matter or subject in which it is what we see. So when you say God is infinite, the negative there, I-N, is a mere negation. It's not a, what? Lack. And this kind of an infinite in itself is most knowable, right? Because it's most an act, and the kind of perfection of the act. Although it is not able to be comprehended by the limited power of the, what? Creature. For thus, God is said to be infinite, right? And such an infinite, the soul of Christ does know, although it doesn't, what? Comprehended, right? In another way, the infinite is said according to the potency or ability of matter, which is said, what? Privitive, right? It's a different kind of opposition. From this, that it does not have the form which it is naturally apt to have. And in this way, it's said the infinite in, what? Quantity, huh? And such an infinite, by its very reason, is unknown, because it is, as it were, matter with the lack of form, as is said in the third book of physics. But all knowledge is being informed, huh? It's through some form or act. Thus, therefore, if this kind of infinite were known, according to, what? It's very way of this thing being known, it would be impossible for it to be known. For its way of being known, considered in its own nature, right, is that one takes part of it after part, huh? As is said in the third book of physics. And in this way, it is true that taking its quantity to it, part after part, there is always another one to be taken. But just as material things can be taken by the intellect in a material way, and many things in a united way, so infinite things can be taken by the intellect, not in the manner of the infinite, part after part, but as it were, what? In a limited way. So that those things which are in themselves infinite, are limited. So that's what we did. So that's what we did. to the understanding of the one knowing. And in this way, the soul of Christ knows infinite things. Insofar as it knows them, not by running through, right? Singula, one after the other, but in something one, right? As an example, in some creature in whose power there pre-existed infinity of things, but that power is something one, right? And chiefly in the word itself. Well, that's a mouthful, right? But you can see how the problem that the infinite gives, right? To us. I remember some Jesuit there I met, Phil Salkheim, there's a whole big book on the infinite, you know? And you don't have been moving there that much about the infinite. I mean, kind of the history of the description of the infinite, huh? Who is it? I think it's Barclay who doesn't like the idea that something should be infinitely divisible. He doesn't like that idea at all. I refute him thus, said Samuel Johnson. Kicked a stone. Samuel Johnson kicked a stone and said, I refute him thus. Or I'd say, even Bishop Barclay, you know, opens the door to a study before he tries to leave. You know, we go down to the Rhode Island to go swimming, you know, because it's a little warmer down there. And I go by the place where he gave work to America for a while. Oh, yeah. And there's some kind of, I haven't actually visited the place, but I see the signs for it, huh? And a little missionary work or something he's doing in the States here, I don't know. But Bishop Barclay. Now, the second objection is going to say, what? He's a creature, therefore he's finite, right? Okay. Some distinction has got to be seen here. To the second it should be said, that nothing prevents something from being infinite in one way, that another way is, what? Limited, huh? Just as if we imagine in quantities a surface, which is in its length infinite, but in its width, what? Finite, huh? Thus, therefore, if there were infinity of men in number, they would have infinite being in some way, right? Namely, according to the multitude of them. But nevertheless, by reason of their, what, nature essence, they would not have, what, infinity. In that every essence is limited by reason of one, what, species. But that which is simplicitare infinitum, by reason of its essence, is God, as has been said in the first part, huh? Aristotle talks about that, and he gives them, the meanings of perfect, right? He distinguishes between the way in which God is perfect, and the way in which other things are perfect. Other things are perfect in their kind. But God is simply perfect, huh? He's lacking in nothing. And even if Erroes saw that Aristotle was talking about God there. And of course, Thomas sees that he's talking about God there. It's beautiful. Now, the proper object of the understanding is what it is, as is said in the third book about the soul, to which pertains the notion of the, what, species. So he defined the species, but it's genus, and what difference. Thus, therefore, the soul of Christ, on account of the fact that it has a limited capacity, that which is simply infinite, in its essence, to what God, it attains, in some way, but it does not comprehend, as has been said. But that infinite, which is found in the, what, in creatures, is in potency, and it can be, what, comprehended by the soul of Christ, because it is compared to it by reason of what it is, of which side it has no affinity. For even our own understanding understands universal, to it the nature, the genus, or the species, which in some way are infinite, insofar as it can be said of what. So in a sense, we're knowing the infinite, and non-universal, but we're knowing it in a, what, limited way, because it's definitely, what, what it is, right? Yeah. So I know what a number is, right? And therefore, I kind of know something that can be said of infinity of things. So I'm knowing an infinity of things and knowing what a number is, but I'm knowing an infinity of things in a, what, finite way. It's one of the explanations we give of what Shakespeare says, that reason is the capability for a large discourse, right? Kind of discourse that covers a large area. I'll speak a little bit metaphorically there, right? Because the universe, you might say, covers a large area. Because it can be said of many things, and some can be said of infinity of things. So in my mind, it says, no odd number is even. I'm making a statement about infinity of things, or two infinities of things, right? But God is simply infinite, huh? That's another way of going up. But I mean, this kind of distinction, you know, runs through philosophy. And if you go through Verstappen's books, you'll see in every book this distinction is being seen, this kind of distinction. He calls the infamy, what? A surgismos tis. But in Latin, you say, a surgism, secundum quid, right? It's not simply a surgism, huh? It has something of a surgism, huh? But I used to, and I talked to students about this a bit, I say, I know this is hard to understand, but all day long, you're mixing up these two. If you're doing something bad, because in some, secundum quid, it's good, right? Or you're not doing what is good, because it couldn't quid, it's bad, right? And so there's nothing in this world that's so good that doesn't prevent you from doing something else. And therefore can be considered, in some way, as bad. And so, you know, you take the example there, you know, if you annoy me, is it good for me to kill you? It's your time. In some way. It did remove an annoyance from my life, right? So even something like killing somebody can be seen as, what, good in some way, right? And getting up and going to Mass on Sunday, well, I can't sleep then, you know? So in some way it's bad. It prevents me from getting the rest that I think I deserve and I feel like having anyway. So all day long we're doing that, right? Aristotle talks about how the man who's following his passions or his senses, right? And something here and now is good, but if you look at the whole picture, simply, it's not good to be doing this, right? That distinction runs through the whole of ethics, huh? So I mean, abortion is obviously something very bad, but, you know, it avoids embarrassment, maybe in some case, right? Or it, as you can, do you pursue your job or something, right? Or, you know? It's like that, right? So, the mind can always find something to justify even the most horrible things, huh? to win an election in the presidency. Yeah. So the relativism, which is so common today, where people say there are no absolutes, which of course is an absolute statement, where they're saying that, well, you know, everything is relative because I guess it depends on its context, is... Is this maybe what's happening today an example of a twisting of real pursuit of philosophy, of love and wisdom? I'm not saying it very well, but... You see, the first philosophy that we have, at least the fragments, that talk about reason, right? The great Anaxagoras, right? And Aristotle praises him, he says, he sounds like a sober man among drunk men. But what did he attribute to this greater mind? The distinction of things and the ordering of them. So Thomas will oftentimes refer to Anaxagoras as having seen this, right? So here we're talking about a distinction, or a kind of distinction, right? And it corresponds to, or it's a basis for understanding the second kind of mistake in the physical recutations, the second kind of mistake outside of speech, right? And the first kind of mistake outside of speech is the mistake of the accidental, right? And the second one is accidentally, simply and not simply, right? In some way. I think I mentioned how, in this great dialogue of the potato to Mino, he represents Mino as objecting to investigating what virtue is, because you can't investigate what you don't know. If you know what you're looking for, how can you go looking for it? And if that objection were good, then you'd do away with logic, and you'd do away with the art of calculation, right? Because both of these arts are to come to know what you don't know, to what you do know, right? And if there's no way to come to know what you don't know, then there wouldn't be these arts, then? So it's an objection that's going to destroy the whole logic. It's eliminate, right? Like that. And I told you the simple example I would use in class. I'd come into class, and I'd say, I don't know how many students are in class today, but I can direct myself to what I don't know, the greatest of ease. This is a very simple example. And so I count the students, right? And let's say I get a number, let's say 23, right? How did I direct myself with such great ease to 23, and I didn't know I was trying to arrive at 23? What's the answer to that? Well, yeah, but how did I know that that's what I should have done? A certain way, and I'm getting to 23. Yeah, but how did I know the way to what I didn't know? Because I don't know, you know? You know, I always take example in class, I'd say, and I go into the filling station or wherever it is, and I say, how do you get there? What's it going to say to me? Where? Yeah, I can't tell you how to get there, and I don't know where you're trying to get, right? You see what I mean? So if what I'm trying to get is something unknown, how can I possibly know the way? Well, you knew it was a number. Yeah, so I knew in some way, right? See? So in knowing that I was looking for the number of students in class, I knew to take the road of counting, right? If the question had been, what is a student, I would have taken the road of defining, right? But now 23 is in fact the number of students in class today. So in knowing, I was looking for the number of students in class, did I know in some qualified sense, 23? Yeah. I always told you as an example, I'd always exemplify this, I'd pick out a young lady in the class, you know? And I'd ask her, do you know my brother Mark? And she'd say no. I'd say, oh, here's what she said. She doesn't know him. I'd say, you know how to contradict yourself in a second. I'd say, do you know where her brother is? Yeah. Do you know where her man is? Yeah. I'd say, that's where her brother Mark is. You'd say, you didn't know him. See? Well, in sickling them quid, she didn't know where her brother Mark is. She knew every man in the world, right? In some way, right? Every brother, right? Okay. As long as you have a wise guy in class, I'm going to go home and tell my father, you know, Professor Brooker says I know everything. Well, in some sense, when you know the difference between something and nothing, you know everything, don't you? Because everything is something, right? But that's not to know simply, without qualification, everything, right? So this is one of the main ways that the sophist makes you appear to kind of get yourself, right? And so Mino, in a sense, is using that against Socrates. And if you read the dialogue to Mino, Socrates makes that same kind of mistake, in a more subtle way, when he tries to answer Mino, because he, what? So that he knew it. Yeah, he says, maybe learning is just recalling, which you already know. And then he said, well, that's an interesting idea, but do you know, give me evidence of this? And so the slave boy of Mino is there, and the slave boy has never studied geometry. He was born in the house of Mino, and he was a slave, doing menial things all his life, never studied geometry. And so Socrates is asked the slave boy, how do you double a square? He says, we double a sign. And then Socrates asks him questions, and the boy sees that he's mistaken about that. And he asks him more questions, and eventually, out of the answers of the slave boy, comes the way to double a square. And Socrates says, well, I didn't teach him it. It came out of what he himself said, right? So he must have already known how to double a square, right? Well, you could say that the slave boy already knew things from which he was able to know how to double a square, right? Was that to know what to double a square? Actually, he didn't know how to double a square. He was mistaken about it. He thought you'd double the side, right? So to know something in ability, is not to know it. Yeah. I think it's anybody who comes to the class at the beginning of their studies already knows what he's going to learn, in which case he doesn't have to pay to learn. Look around, right? So Socrates is making the same mistake, right? He's saying the slave boy already knew what he didn't really already know, except in the sense that he knew his things so much he could, you know. Or in their crude minds, they say you've got a man and a woman and therefore you've got a baby, right? I don't know. Maybe you have a baby in ability, but I actually got a baby. There's a big difference there. To get this idea across. But you see how that distinction underlies the whole logic, right? Because by knowing in some way what you don't know, you can direct yourself to what you don't know, right? And why do we pay people to find, you know, the cure for cancer or some other disease, right? They must in some way know what they're looking for without knowing it. And that's how they can do something that's relevant to finding out what they don't know. Because they do know it in some way. So that distinction is fundamental in action, right? In ethics. Fundamental in here. It's fundamental here. You know, these higher things. So understanding that kind of distinction helps you understand this kind of mistake and this kind of sophistical and real reputation, right? Where a person appears to contradict himself. So, but understanding this kind of distinction, you've got to see this distinction, this kind of distinction in all kinds of things to learn them. Well, when I went to school, I didn't know what letters were. The teacher just told us what they were. And then the person was, yeah, but you know what sounds were. That's a sign for this sound. That's a sign for that sound. Mm-hmm. Okay. Now we're at the third objection. Third objection. Okay. It can't be something greater than the infinite, right? The more things are contained in the knowledge, divine knowledge, than the knowledge of the soul of Christ. Now we can't be knowing infinite, right? To the third, it should be said of the soul of Christ. The death of the soul of Christ. The death of the soul of Christ. The death of the soul of Christ. The death of the soul of Christ. The death of the soul of Christ. That which is infinite in every way cannot be except one, right? Whence the philosopher says in the first book about the universe, which in Latin they call it the Decello e Mundo, that because a body is, well, in every direction you might say, right? In every dimension, it is impossible for there to be many, what, infinite bodies. But if there is something infinite in one way only, nothing would prevent there from being many such things infinite, huh? As if we were to understand many, what, infinite lines, right? Contracted or extended, rather, in length on some, what, surface, right? According to their latitude. On some finite surface according to its latitude. These speak about what parallel lines, right? You know, when extending them to infinity and they never meet, right? You're going to have more than one infinite in that way. Because, therefore, the infinite is not a certain substance, but it happens to things which are called infinite, as is said in the third book of the physics. Just as the infinite is multiplied according to diverse subjects, so it is necessary that the property of the infinite be multiplied, thus that it belongs to each of these according to its subject. So there is some property of the infinite, and that to the infinite, there is not something, what, greater, huh? Just as if we take, what, one infinite line, in that one there is not something greater than the, what, infinite, huh? And similarly, if we take any one of the other infinite lines, it manifests that, what, the parts of each of them are, what, infinite. It's necessary, therefore, that, what, there's nothing greater in that line than all those, what, infinite things, huh? Nevertheless, in another line, in the third one, there are more parts, even infinite, besides, what, these, huh? And we see this happen in numbers, right? For the number, for the species of, what, even numbers, huh? Even numbers, huh? Are infinite, and likewise, the species of, what, odd numbers, right? And nevertheless, both, what, even and odd numbers are more than just the, what, even numbers, huh? Contrary to Bertrand Russell, right? Oh, right. Yeah, but they kind of refuted that. Okay. Thus, therefore, it should be said that to the infinite, simply, right, as regards all things, nothing is greater, right, huh? But to the infinite, according to some, what, determined thing, right, there is nothing greater in that order, right? But one can take something greater outside that, what, order, right? So we've got infinite line, there's nothing longer than that line in that line, right? But you can take another line next to it, or, okay. In this way, therefore, there are infinite things in the power of the creature. Nevertheless, there are more things in the power of God than in the power of the creature. And likewise, the soul of Christ knows infinite things by the knowledge of simple intelligence. But God knows more in this way of, what, understanding it. Each encounter with the infinite is something to relish or sigh for. Say that you'll understand it better the next time you see it, huh? But you can see a little bit of it, right? A distinction he Thomas sees there, right? But it is a distinction of the kind between what is infinite simply, right? Namely God, and what is infinite in some, what, way, huh? If there was an infinity of men, they'd be finite in some way, right? Because they'd all be the same kind. Kind of thing, a man. To put an animal. Okay. Gotcha.