Tertia Pars
Lecture 16: Multiple Divine Persons and Natures in the Incarnation

Transcript
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In number of nature, right? And then the reverse, where the one person could assume what? More than one nature? Yeah. It's kind of funny, huh, because you know how you have this reverse situation in the mystery of the Trinity and the mystery of the Incarnation. In the mystery of the Trinity, you have three persons in one nature, and then in the mystery of the Incarnation, you have one person in two natures, right? And now we're kind of saying, well, could... Two of these persons, or even three of these persons, have one human nature together, and then could one person have two men? Mm-hmm. Yeah. I love that people up. These are questions, you know, of whether something's possible, right? You know, in the Summa Contra Gentile, sometimes you'll say, you know, you'll argue from Scripture, did God become man, right? And some paratakes deny this, and they'll take up their misuse of Scripture, and so on, and answer that, right? But then you'll show from Scripture that he did become man, right? But then you'll have another section where he talks about, is it possible, though, for God to become man? And then there are arguments drawn from, you know, misuse of philosophy that seem to indicate that it's not possible. And then you'll have to answer those, right? And then, but is it suitable? Then he'll come back. And that's still another question, right? Okay? So, and they're separate things, but here they're kind of, you know, in the same question here, right? A little bit of both. Because especially that last article would be on the... Subility. On the Subility, yeah, of the Sun, right? But could the other ones have become... I can see how the average guy would think, what the heck are you asking such crazy questions for, right? Why does Thomas ask these questions, huh? Yeah. You know more about them. You know what you can do. Yeah. You know what it's lower. What? You know what it's lower. What? Yeah. You know what it's lower than that. To the sixth one proceeds thus. Thus, it seems that two divine persons are not able to assume one and the same nature and number, right? Dr. Thomas could take it aside. For supposing this, either they would be, what? One man or what? Many. But not many. Because just as one divine nature in, what? Many persons does not suffer for there to be many gods, right? So one human nature in many persons would not undergo many what? Yeah. Many men. Likewise, they could not be one man because one man is, what? Kind of this man, right? Which demonstrates one person. And thus, they would be taken away the distinction of the divine persons, which is inconvenient. Therefore, two or three persons are not able to, what? What do you mean, Jim? Moreover, assumption is terminated at the unity of the person, as has been said. But there is not one person of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, three persons cannot assume, what? Yeah. Moreover, Damascene says in the third book, and it goes to the first book about Trinity, that from the incarnation of the Son of God, it follows, that whatever is said of the Son of God is also said of the Son of Man, and conversely so. So we can say that God died for us, okay? We can say this man is God. If, therefore, three persons assumed one human nature, it follows that what is said of each of these three persons would be said of that man, and conversely, what is said of that one man could be said of each of the, what? Divine Persons. Thus, therefore, what is proper to the Father, to it, to generate the Son from eternity, would be said of that man, and consequently would be said of the Son of what? God. Which is not fitting, right? That's suitable, yeah. It doesn't come together, right? It doesn't hold up. It's not, we'd say in English, maybe, yeah, because it sounds like inconvenience, huh? It's kind of fun of it, it sounds like inconvenience. It's not, therefore, possible that the three divine persons assume one human nature. I know what Aristotle says in the third book about the soul, where he contrasts reason and the senses, huh? And they both know by undergoing, right? They both know by receiving, huh? But the senses receive in a body of the organ, right? And reason receives without a body, right? In a material way, completely in a material way. And Thomas will point out, you know, how too large a sound will kind of, what, harm the ear and make it deaf or make it not hear for a while, right? And too bright a light will, what, make the eye not able to see for a while. And, you know, too sharp a hot, hot Chinese food or something, you know, or hot Indian food or something like that, you can't taste anything afterwards, huh? Okay? We had some of that Chinese hot mustard in the house there, you know, just kind of nice about it, put a little bit of, you know, poo-poo cut or something like that. You never did enough. But for the fun of it, I was putting on a hot dog, you know. See? But Aristotle said, when you consider something very understandable, like, you know, the angels or God or something like that, one is not less apt to understand other things, huh? But one can understand them, what? Better, right, huh? I know the students out at Thomas Aquinas College, huh? Some things that you study in your freshman year seem very difficult to you. But then when you look back upon them, you get to the more difficult things, the more understandable things that are on, they seem kind of, what? Easy, you know, huh? See? So the way in which the mind we sees is different from the way the senses we see, huh? Well, in a sense, these particles like this, right, are really making you, what? Understand lesser things better, right, huh? You take your time on these things, right? Your mind is exercising these things, you turn back up, and it feels easy to understand now, huh? I'm reading the De Potencia again, they're kind of going through the articles there, you know. And something like, ethics seems so simple, or, you know. Or you could seem so simple, or something, you know. Or logic seems so simple, you know. The first time you've studied those things, they seem very difficult, you know. But you go on to these more intelligible things, and come back, right? Against this, huh? The, except counter, I guess, yeah, right? But against this, the incarnate person subsists in two natures, the divine and the human. But three persons are able to subsist in one divine, what? Nature, right? Therefore, they're able to subsist also in one, what? One nature, huh? To it, that there be one human nature, assumed by the three human beings. That would be interesting, right? Yeah. It would be... What personality? Yeah, it would be kind of an image of what takes place in the Trinity, right? Three persons subsisting in one nature. It's very hard for us to understand how there can be three persons but only one God. And the Mohammedans, I think, were polytheists. We slipped back into the polytheism, you know? And they can't understand that. And you'd have a hard time trying to explain to them. And so here you'd have, what? Three persons in one nature. Why not? Who's going to try and talk at once? I mean, who's going to do the talking? I often think, you know, of God the Father and God the Son and God the Holy Spirit having only one will, right? And that's kind of unusual, right? And even among friends, you know, there's still usually a little bit of disagreement of will, a little bit of clashing in us, right? And it's kind of hard to understand they could have one will. Would you want to have one will as another human being? I mean... Some of you always agrees with me. But if you and the other guy had one will, you'd always be in agreement, right? Because the human being could be possibly conflict, right? But I could have used the will... I mean, one person could have used the will to will one thing, but the other person is not one, could they? If three persons didn't assume one human nature, would it be possible that, you know, the person of the Father uses the human nature to say something, where the Son and the Holy Spirit aren't using the human nature? You see, that's kind of thing. Because there's one operation. There's one well, right? So all three persons... Whenever the human nature did anything, you would have to give the three persons... Or, I think, you know, just like the divinity. It's kind of amazing to think of God in His divine will, because He is free, you know, in regard to creatures, right? And yet, there's not going to be a free act of the Father that is not a free choosing. The Father, you know... It's not going to be like the God's up in Olympus there in Homer, you know, where... Yeah, yeah. We sometimes do that, you know, we create these imaginations, like God the Father wants to punish us and God the Son is intervening for us. Let's see what Thomas does with this in the body of the article, isn't he? The answer, it should be said, that it has been said above, from the union of the soul and the body in Christ, right? There has not come to be either a new person or a, what, hypostasis, as you see in the Greek and the Latin names. But there comes about one assumed nature in the person or divine hypostasis, which does not come about to the power of human nature, right? Or the human nature, but to the power of the divine, what, person. But such is the condition, huh, of the divine persons, that one of them does not exclude another from communion in the same nature, but only from communion of the same, what, person, huh? Because, therefore, in the mystery of the Incarnation, the whole reason for what has been done is the power of the one doing it, right? As Augustine says in his epistle to Volusiana, which I'm sure you're acquainted with. Father Glaze liked to go to these letters on Augustine and try to understand things in them. More about this should be judged by the condition of the person assuming than by the condition of the human nature assumed, right? Thus, therefore, it is not impossible for the divine persons that two or three of them assume, what, one human nature, huh? It seems to be argued from the fact that what they do in the Trinity, right? Okay? It would be nevertheless impossible that they assume one hypostasis or one human person, right, huh? But that's, that would be heretical anyway, right? You'd have to call it a condition. As Anselm says in the book on the Virginal Conception, that many persons cannot assume one and the same one. Man. Yeah? It would seem strange to have two persons that try to assume one and the same one. It seems to me it would be either one or three, not two. Why would it be two? Yeah, but, yeah, that's the question, but, I mean, it would either be possible, but, you know? It would be possible. It would be possible. It's in the Trinity there, you know, where you say the power of generating the Son is the divine nature insofar as it's in the Father, right? The power of breathing the Holy Spirit is the same as the divine nature, but the divine nature is it's in the Father and the Son. As if there wasn't the beginning, right? You have these odd things where they come together, two of them. To the first, therefore, it should be said, that this being positive, right, that the three persons assumed one human nature, right, it would be true to say that the three persons are, what, one man on account of the one in number, right, human nature, right? Just as now it is true to say that they are one God, and not three gods, on account of the one in number, right, divine nature, right? Nor does the one there imply a unity of, what, person, but the unity in the, what, human nature, right? But one would not be able to argue, from the fact that the three persons are one man, that they would be one, what, simplici terrenia, that's coming in that distinction, right? For nothing prevents one to say that men who are many, simply, are one as regards something, right? Like one people, right? One family, okay? As Augustine says in the sixth book of the Trinity, diverse by nature, right, the spirit of man and the spirit of God, but by adhering they become one spirit, right? According to that of 1 Corinthians 6, verse 17, who adheres to God is one spirit, right? But that one simply, isn't it? So Tom seems to be arguing, from the fact that the three persons can subsist in one divine nature, that they could also, what, one human nature. I'm not going to get the perfect apology, but I hope that the harmony that they have in the... What's your favorite ice cream? Oh, no. Split personality, yeah. Literally split personality. Now, the second objection says, assumption, termination... here now in Article 7, whether one divine person can assume two, what, human natures, right? To the seventh, one proceeds thus, it seems that one divine person is not able to assume two, what, human natures, huh? For the nature assumed in the midst of the Incarnation does not have any other suppositum, any other underlying, apart from that of the divine person. If therefore it be laid down to be one divine person assuming two human natures, there would be one suppositum of two natures of the same species, which would seem to imply contradiction. For the nature of one species, the nature of one species is now multiplied except by the distinction of the what? Suppositum, yeah. But we are taking account as a divine person. There's something maybe infinite about the divine person, huh? Moreover, this supposition being made, it could not be said that that divine person incarnate was one man, because he would not have one, what, human nature. Likewise, it could not be said that there were many men, many men, because many men are distinct in what? Suppositum, yeah. And there there would be only one suppositum. Therefore, the force of vision is altogether impossible. Moreover, in the mystery of the Incarnation, the whole divine nature is united to the whole nature assumed, that is to each part of it. For Christ is perfect God and perfect man, holy God and holy man, as Damascene says in the third book. But the two human natures are not able to be totally, what, united to each other, because it's necessary that the soul of one of them was united to the body of the other, and also that two bodies would be together, which would induce a confusion of natures. Therefore, it's not possible that the divine person would assume two human natures. But against this is whatever the father is able to do, the son can do. But the father, after the Incarnation of the son, could assume a human nature other number from that which the son assumed. But in no way through the Incarnation of the son is diminished the power of the father of the son. Therefore, it seems that the son, after the Incarnation, could assume another human nature, besides that which he assumed. I answered, should be said, that that which is possible in one and not in more has a power limited to that what? One. But the power of a divine person is infinite, nor can it be limited to anything created. Whence it should not be said that a divine person so assumes one human nature that he cannot, what? Assume another. For it would seem from this to follow that the personality of the divine nature was so, what? Comprehended, huh? To the one human nature that to his personality another one could not be assumed. Which is impossible. That's why it's impossible, he says. For something uncreated cannot be, what? Surrounded by, comprehended by, a created. It is clear, therefore, that if, that whether we consider the divine person according to its power, which is the beginning of the union, right? Or according to his personality, which is a term of the union, right? It is necessary to say that the divine person, apart from the human nature, which is assumed, is able to assume a, what? Another human nature, another number, right? So that both his power is infinite and his personality is infinite, right? So there can't be any limit. Or he can assume three if you want it, two or four, right? Okay, so let's look again at the first objection, huh? Just trying to maintain that there's a contradiction here, right? Because there would be one suppositum of two natures, right? To the same species. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the created nature is perfected in its definition through its form, which is multiplied according to the division of what? Matter. Matter is the source of individuation, right? In material things. And therefore, if the composition of form and matter constituted a new suppositum, right? It would follow that the nature is multiplied according to the multiplication of what? Supposita. But in the midst of the incarnation, the union of the form and the matter, that is of the soul and the body, does not constitute a new, what? Suppositum. This has been said above, right? And that goes back to our understanding of what the incarnation was, right? He didn't assume a human person, but he assumed a human, individual human nature into his person. And therefore, there can be a multitude, a number on the side of nature, on account of division matter, without there being a distinction of what? Yeah. Or be assumed by the divine person. If they had their own suppositum, right? Then they would have to be like the injection says, right? Okay? It would be one man or many men. This is the objection, right? It can't be one man because it would not have one human nature, right? Similarly, it couldn't be many because many men are distinct and suppositum, right? The second should be said that it can be seen that the foresaid position being done, it would follow that there were two men, right? On account of the two what? Individual natures, yeah. Without this, that there would be two suppositum. Just as conversely, the three persons would be said to be one man, right? This is the previous article, I guess. On account of the one human nature assumed, as has been said above, right? Just like their one God, right? But this does not seem to be what? True. Because names should be used according as what? They are to signifying, that they are imposed to be to signify, right? Which is from the consideration of those things which are among us, right? And therefore, it's necessary about the way of signifying and consignifying to consider those things which are among us. In which I never write, a name imposed from some form is imposed in a plural way except on account of plurality or what? Suppository. For a man who is clothed in two what? Garments is not said to be what? Closed twice, right? But one man closed by two what? Presidents. And who has two qualities, it's said singularly, to be thus according to two qualities. Now, the nature assumed, to some extent, now you're very careful because you don't get into the heresy there, right? Has itself in the manner of a what? Garment. Although this is, this likeness is not should be taken in regard to all things, although you can hear it, right? And therefore, if the divine person assumed two human natures, an account of the unity of the suppositum, you can use an account of the unity of the suppositum, you can use an account of the unity of the suppositum, you can use an account of the unity of the suppositum, you can use an account of the unity of the suppositum, you can use an account of the suppositum, you can use an account of the suppositum, you can use an account of the suppositum, It's at the unity of the person, but there's not one person of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. And Thomas says, to the second it should be said, that position being made, human nature would be assumed in the unity not of one person, but the unity of what? Singular persons, yeah. So that just as the divine nature has a natural unity with what? But the individual persons, so the human nature would have unity with the singular persons by assumption. Third question was a problem about what? What could be said of one being said of the other, right? So you can say of Christ that he's born of Mary, he's born of what? The Father, right? And then he's saying, well, then what is said of any one of the members of the Trinity could be said of the man, right? And then vice versa, back over to the other persons, right? And get these contradictions. To the third it should be said about the mystic incarnation, that there is a communication of properties pertaining to nature, right? Because whatever things belong to the nature, can be said of the person subsisting in that nature, by the name of whatever, what, nature being signified, God or man. But the foresaid position being made about the person of the Father could be said, those things which pertain to human nature, right? And those things which pertain to divine nature, right? And likewise about the person of the Son, the Holy Spirit. But not what pertains to the person of the Father, by reason of what? His own proper person, right? Could be attributed to the person of the Son, the Holy Spirit, on account of the distinction of the, what? Persons, huh? Which would remain, right? Is able, therefore, to be said, that just as the Father is ungenerated, right? So that man would be, what? Ungenerated, according as man stands for the person of the, what? Father, right? But if one proceeds further and says, man is ungenerated, the Son is man, therefore the Son is ungenerated, there would be the fallacy of, what? The figure of diction, which is in the six fallacies in speech, right? Or of the, what? Accident, right? Just as now we say God is ungenerated, because the Father is ungenerated, right? Or are we able to conclude that the Son is ungenerated, although we be God, huh? That kind of goes back to the business of supposition, right? See, in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was toward God, right? You can't be toward yourself, right? So therefore, the, what? The Word is not God, right? It makes sense with Heideic, right? The Word was God, right? So, when you say that the Son, the Word is toward God, God is standing for, what? The Father, yeah. So you said to be towards God, in so far as, what? God stands for the Father, huh? Not towards the divine nature, because then the divine nature is something different from the Son, right? I felt, so the accident is one that deceives even the wise. You speak of, you say, does the Holy Spirit have the power of breathing the Holy Spirit? What would you say? Yeah. Yeah. I could say the power of breathing the Holy Spirit is the divine nature. The divine nature is in the Holy Spirit. Therefore, but is that the fallacy of the accident, though, see? See? Because, maybe the power of breathing the Holy Spirit is the divine nature insofar as it's in the Father and the Son. And insofar as it's in the Father and the Son, it's distinct from the Holy Spirit, right? So, it's accidental, I think, to the divine nature, insofar as it's in the Holy Spirit, to be the power of breathing the Holy Spirit. We have a healthy respect to that, the fallacy of the accident, huh? Yeah. It's part of the same thing. It comes up in the very first, part of natural philosophy there is to speak of, of, change, right? And, Heraclitus says, you know, that, hot and cold and dry and wet are the same thing because one, well, becomes the other, right? If you become something, then you are what you become, right? So, if I become a geomater, then I'm a geomater, right? So, if the cold becomes hot, then the cold is hot. If the dry becomes wet, then the dry is wet. What's the difference? I became a geomater, so I am a geomater, right? I became a father, so I am a father. If you became a monk, so you are a monk. Right? That's the fallacy of the accident, isn't it? Yeah. Therefore, I am a fallacy of the accident. I know the prayer. So, it's not really the sick as such that become healthy, right? It's the body as such that becomes healthy, right? But because to be sick belongs to the body before it becomes healthy, then we see the sick become healthy, right? It's kind of hard to separate those two because you're always sick before you become healthy. And so, it seems to be, what, essential. Yeah, it's accidental. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Every teacher will tell you, at least a college, you know, a level of college at least, that they always learn the subject better when they teach, right? So, the teacher always learns what he's teaching. Yeah. But, is that, belongs to the teacher as such to learn what he's teaching? Because he's learning insofar as he doesn't know it, right? And he's teaching insofar as he doesn't know the subject? You know, I told you that about Karl Marx, right? Karl Marx wants to see man's fulfillment in making, right? Okay? And Aristotle would say, well, making is perfecting of the thing made. Making a chair is perfecting of the chair. And therefore, it's not perfecting of man. And Marx says, well, but when you make something, you change yourself too. You're kind of making yourself, right? Okay? And, well, you know, I heard a carpenter say, you know, that you like this job because he's learning or something, you know, but just doing the same thing over and over again, right? And you say, well, yeah. But does that belong to the maker as such, right? See, insofar as the maker doesn't know how to make, he's not a maker, right? In a sense, accidentally, to the maker, he did not know how to make. Essentially, he does not know how to make. He did not know how to make it. He did not know how to make it. He did not know how to make it. He did not know how to make it. He did not know how to make it. He did not know how to make it. It could be said to be what? One man having two what? Human natures. It happens, however, that many men are said to be one people on account of the fact that they come together in something one, not, however, on account of the unity dispositive. And likewise, if two divine persons assumed one in number human nature, they would be said to be one man, not on account of the unity dispositive, but insofar as they come together in something one, not now, which is horrible, huh? So Thomas seems to be preferring to say that it's, what, one man having two human natures? Because there's one person there? One and his own. What a monster, huh? I'm a joke on Mr. Howard. You wouldn't want to talk about that in the poll, huh? Yeah. Yeah, I hope you're not taking this as a preaching material, yeah. You can write the next New Year's letter article on me. But I think the right question itself is skandalized, you know, the average person or whatever they say, don't cast your pearls before swine if they turn on you. A third objection, you know, and that's about the, what, the penetrating, you might say, of the human nature, but the divine nature, right? And the two human nations cannot be that. To the third, it should be said that the divine and the human nature do not have themselves in the same order to the one divine person. But per priosan, they are compared to it, the divine nature, which is one with it from, what, eternity. But the human nature is compared to the divine person, where it is, subsequently afterwards, as assumed from time by the divine person. Not to this, that the nature be, what, the person itself, but that the person subsists in that nature. For the son of God is his own, what, deity, but is not his own, what, humanity. And therefore, to this, that the human nature be assumed by the divine person, it remains that divine nature, by the personal union, is united to the whole nature assumed, that is according to all its parts. But if two natures assumed, there would be a, what, uniform relation to the divine person, nor would one assume the other, right? Whence it is not necessary that one of them be totally united to the other, that is that all its parts of one would be united to all the parts of the other, right? Makes sense, doesn't it? I don't think it's worth it. Hmm? I think it's worth it. No, I mean, the divine nature is going to flood both human natures, but one of them is not going to flood the other one entirely, right? Okay. But Marx is, in a sense, trying to make man his what? Man perfects himself by making. And therefore, since man's in his perfection of man, well then, making is how man reaches his perfection. That's really accidental that a man is in any way perfected by making. By Friday, Friday, every morning, I'm perfecting myself at all. You don't want me to learn about frying an egg, I guess. Or slicing an orange or something. In Chinese philosophy, I have a corrupt call which philosopher it was, but he was making a point about a butcher and how, over the years of being a butcher, he was able to make a lot of cuts without having to sharpen his blade because of what the constant practice, the level of perfection of his technique, he wouldn't go away by hitting the bones like a more amateur butcher might. And so, well, to be a maker, you could be a maker and not be very good at making. For example, if you're making a cup out of clay, if you're a beginner, you're a maker, maybe an amateur maker, but you're not so good, but over time, you perfect your ability to make. But that doesn't necessarily have any sort of bearing on perfecting yourself as a man. Yeah. In other words, what Aristotle would point out is, does it belong to making as such to perfect the maker? Yeah, perfect the, yes. So, you can't make, you know, man's perfection consistent activity that is essentially, you know, perfecting something other than man. Is it possible to, in some of the martial arts from Asia, there's this notion of, through perfection of technique, there's a spiritual component to it, that if you become, the Japanese would say, a sword saint, somebody who's completely dedicated to mastery of the sword, and supposedly there's a spiritual value which perfects him spiritually, which may or may not be perfecting him supposedly as a man, I'm not sure, would that apply to anything that... Well, it's like I was mentioning before class here that Aristotle's school of philosophy is called the peripatetic, right? Because they walked around, right? So, if I go for a walk, you know, in the woods, and I think about nature, and, you know, nature imitates God and so on, right? But, that's something other or in addition to my walking, isn't it? So, we say, is walking a way of thinking about God? What would you say? But, you know, I mean, some people when they see their office or something like that, they walk, right? In case, once you're on there walking back and forth, it's an office, you know? You know? And, sometimes you'll get restless, you know, I don't know. I think they do. So, but still, it's kind of accidental, nevertheless, to walking, you know, is walking praying? Or, in case, he fulfills his canonical obligation by walking. He's dedicated to walking. Very, very dedicated. Yeah. Because, also, in Asia, there are different paths to the same goal, I think, which would be, instead of devoting yourself to the sword, you can devote yourself to a flower arrangement, or a polygraphy. And people do. I mean, and these are all, they have this type of enlightenment. Well, sometimes people, you know, will say, you know, that they go to bed thinking about, right, something, and they wake up and they kind of solve it, right? A lot of people say, you know, they get the great idea of shaving in the morning or something like that. Yeah. And, you know, it gets your hands on what you do, I suppose, and, you know, it doesn't require too much attention, right, huh? So, I mean, that's apparently a common thing, huh? Or something, yeah. A friend of mine went down to the University of Chicago there in some of the old days, you know. But, kind of these seminars, you know, and everybody smoked a pipe. So, he comes back smoking a pipe, too. Smoking a seminar. Well, you see, you know, you're packing in and letting up, you know, you need time to think, you know, with the other guy. But, it's still kind of accidental, right, huh? Smoking a pipe, you know, to think of. Yeah. Yeah. Okay, rock. Yeah. It's conflict. It's very part of his own Osberger syndrome or whatever. He has that, he's like autistic Osberger syndrome. You can tell him to play Minesweeper. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, we're great. Okay. So, we finish this or not? Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, we've got Article 7 in that. Yeah. So, we're going to play Minesweeper.