Tertia Pars
Lecture 12: Relations, Union, and Assumption in the Incarnation

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so time hardly exists so it's hard to know but the cause of wisdom or theology being more difficult than geometry is because the weakness of our mind and Aristotle says that as the eyes of the bat are at the light of day so is our mind knowing about God Aristotle thought that the bat flew at night time because the sunlight was too bright for him but yet it's light that makes things visible and knowable so the daylight things should be more knowable but not to us because the weakness of our eyes are meant to be the eye of our soul and so Plato in the Republic he compares us to those who are born in a cave right and they live in a cave and they can't get out but if they get out of the cave they would be kind of blinded right well I mention that because on the one hand you have these relations even the real relations in the world around us they have hardly any being right I being taller or shorter than you you know but it's hardly anything right so those kinds of relations are hard to know because they're hardly what goable right they're the difficulty is in them right the cause of difficulty we have in knowing them is in them because they're hardly there on the other hand you get to study the Trinity you get relations again and actually these things are the most knowable of all but not to us right so Aristotle says that what's more knowable is less knowable to us and what is less knowable is more knowable to us it was a great discovery of Aristotle a very unusual situation though so I mention that because it seems to me if you take as a whole the study of relation it involves both causes of difficulty different relations and people are constantly getting to what trouble because of this it's a very difficult thing so as they say it comes up in the study of God and the Trinity and it comes up in the study of creation and now it comes up here in the study of what incarnation right so he says in answer to the first objection this union is not in God really but only according to what reason right for God is said to be united to the creature from the fact that the creature is united to him without any what change taking place in God so it's that kind of situation that Aristotle talked about in the fifth book of wisdom right where Aristotle's example was that of the knower and the known right where the relation on the one side is a real relation right the knower is really related to the known but the known not to the what the second objection is saying well doesn't this relation terminate in God right it says to the second it should be said that the ratio the thought the definition of relation just as also that emotion depends upon its end or its turn right but its being depends on its what subject right so fatherhood is something in me towards my son right so fatherhood is a real relation based on something in me right so it's real because there's a real foundation in me or my being a teacher right Thomas says if I teach you logic I have one relation to you if I teach you geometry I have another relation to you so though the teacher is related to the student as his term right the reality of his being a teacher goes back to a foundation in him and he's possessing the science that he's teaching right so Thomas points out that distinction and because such a union such a relation does not have esse reale real being except in a created nature consequently it follows that it has only what created being okay the third objection the third should be said that man is said and is God an account of the union insofar as it terminates at the what divine hypostasis it does not ever follow that that union is the creator himself or God because when something is said to be created this more regards its what being than the what relation that would suffice for a first little look at that subject so let's look down at the eighth article where the union is the same thing as what assumption what does the word assumption mean by the way yeah to take to oneself as a word right what do we speak when we speak of the assumption which marriage what does that mean what takes on the glorified body of Christ Mary assumption of Mary she's assumed body and soul so she's glorified yeah like resurrection yeah I mean is her body taken to her soul I guess there's some controversy about that but assuming you know church fathers think you know but she did die right okay so her body and soul were separated but then the body was what taken to the soul right most of the eastern ones say that they called the dormition that she was yeah that she was preserved from death because she was freed from her original sins so then she went to like sort of went to sleep yeah and then it was assumed that yeah yeah yeah yeah I mean St. Paul is thinking death is you know asleep you know because of the facility of resurrection for God power right okay and this again is very subtle the distinction that he's going to be putting out you said that the idea you said the assumption is what the rejoining it's yeah yeah I looked at some of the church documents and one of Pius XII right Pius XII was one who defined the assumption yeah and there it seemed to me that she had died right you know it didn't speak of her as being assumed body and soul together you know and it you That she never died, but again, it's not, maybe it's clear. Yeah, but it seemed to me more in a quarter of what the words of the text were, you know? Okay. And so, if you say that she did die, then Assunction would mean that her body was being taken to her life. So, yeah. Okay. Otherwise, you'd speak of the Ascension of Mary, right? See, I don't know. I always thought the distinction was, our Lord ascended because he went up by his own power. But Our Lady was assumed because she didn't do it by her own power. Well, I suppose you could take it if you take care of her not and die, yeah. But I've never heard the explanation of the Assunction as the body didn't take her to the soul. I don't think there is an official teaching whether she died or not, because it's like a big theological point between East and West. Yeah. It may not be defined, yeah. That's what other things. They can't say they assumed by themselves anymore. Okay. Relations, just as motions are specified by their term or limit, but the same as the term of Assumption and of the Union, to wit, the divine, what, person, divine hypostasis. And therefore, it seems that the Union and the Assumption do not, what, differ, right? Moreover, in the mystery of the Incarnation, the same would seem to be the one uniting and the one assuming and the one united and the one, what, assumed, huh? But Union and Assumption would seem to follow the action and passion of the one uniting and the one united, huh? At least grammatically, one's active, one's passive there. Or the one assuming and the one assumed. Therefore, it seems that Union is the same thing as Assumption. Morva Damascene says in the third book, Other is the Union, other the, what? Incarnation. For Union only shows the joining, huh? To which, however it is made, it does not, what? Show. But, notice those words of Damascene in the Latin here. Incarnatio, ultimate, humanatio. You don't often say the word humanatio, but Incarnatio is, you've got a figure of speech, we said, right? Which is what? What's the figure of speech called? Yes, nektiki, yeah, yeah. See, Antonia Messia and Synecdoche are alike, and he's got a whole in the part, right? But in Synecdoche, you've got the integral or composed whole, and it's part. And in the Antonia Messia, you have the universal whole, and it's part, right? So, when you say the word was made flesh, right? The word was made a man, right? Then you're taking a part of man, right? For the whole of man, right? The composing part, right? So, that's called synecdoche, right? So, those are kind of awful words there from the Greek, but we don't have any English of the word for them, right? And they're quite common in Augustine and Thomas and so on. So, it's good to know those words. To what, however, it was made, not yet. But incarnation and humanatio determine to what the union was made, right? But likewise, assumption doesn't determine to which the union was made. Therefore, they seem to be the, what? Same, right, huh? But against this is that the divine nature is said to be united, but not assumed. They don't seem to be exactly the same, right? These two, huh? The answer should be said, that has been said, huh? Union implies the relation of the divine nature and the human, according as they come together in one, what? Person. So, we would say the divine nature and human nature united in the one person of the world, right? Now, every chain, every relation, rather, which begins to be in time, right? Or from time, so I'm glad it says it, is caused by some, what? Change, huh? And change consists in acting upon and, what? Undergoing, huh? Acting upon, being acted upon. Thus, therefore, it should be said, that the first and chief difference between union and assumption is that union implies the relation itself, huh? But assumption, the acting upon, right, by which someone is said to be, what? Assuming. Or the undergoing, or being acted upon, according as something is said to be, what? Assumed, huh? That's the first difference he sees, right? Assuming and being assumed, huh? Like action, passion. Some change, right? He took from the Blessed Virgin something, right? And something was taken from the Blessed Virgin, we can say, right? And that's what assumption he's referring to, right? Why, union is what? It's relation, huh? The human nature and the divine nature are united in the person of the world. Now, from this difference is taken another difference, huh? For assumption is taken as in, what? Coming to be, right? In theory. But union is something that has been, what? Made. And therefore, the one uniting is said to be united. But the one assuming is not said to be assumed. Now, the human nature is signified as in the term of the assumption to the divine hypostasis, which it is said to be a man. Whence we say truly that the Son of God, who is uniting to himself, huh? Human nature is a man. But human nature, considered in itself, as signified in the abstract, is signified as the assumed, huh? But we do not say that the Son of God is, what? Human nature. He took human nature, right? Okay. From the same, there follows a third difference, huh? That relation, especially one of, what? Equality. Does not have itself more to one extreme than to the other. But acting upon and undergoing, or acting upon and being acted upon, have themselves in diverse ways to the one acting upon and the one undergoing, and to diverse terms. And therefore, assumption determines both the limit from which and to which, right? For assumption is saying, as it were, and they use the Latin there, ab valio, from another, right? To oneself, sumptial. Taking, right? But union determines none of these things, huh? Whence indifferently, one can say that human nature is united to the divine, and the reverse, right? Right? The divine nature is joined to the human in this one person. But one would not say that the divine nature was assumed by the human, but the reverse, that the human nature was assumed by one. Because the human nature was joined to the personhood of God, the divine personhood, so that the divine person might subsist in what? Human nature. He's fairly convinced now that these don't mean exactly that sentence. So he points out, he replied then to the first objection, that union and assumption do not have themselves in the same way to the, what, term, but diversity. That's been brought out in the body of the article. To the second it should be said, that the one uniting and the one assuming are not entirely the same. Why? Because every person assuming is uniting, but not the reverse. For the person of the father united human nature to the son, but not to himself. And therefore he is said to be uniting, but not what? Assuming. And likewise, they are not the same, the united and the assumed. Why? Because the divine nature is said to be united, but not what? Assumed. So what does Hilary say? From words put forth disorderly, heresy arises. So you don't want to say that human nature assumed the divine nature, right? Human nature took on the divine nature, so to speak. You don't want to say that. Words put forth disorderly, huh? Heresy arises. Ex herbis in ordinati polatis. As Charles Dickens says, we're not always masters of our words, right? Sometimes they get out of control. They master us. To third, it should be said that assumption determines to whom is made the copulation on the part of the, what? One assuming. Insofar as assumption is, etymologically honest, ad se sumcio, taking to oneself, right? But incarnation and humanatio, right? You thought this is now repeating the words of Damascene in the Latin translation, you write. On the part of the assumed, which is flesh, right? Or human nature, right? And he's just following the words incarnatio and humanatio, right? Because when he was made flesh, he was made of man. And therefore, assumption differs in definition, both from union and from incarnation, or humanizing. A humanized God, huh? God is humanized. People are human. You've got to be careful about that. A few words is misused. It's not a good deal for him. We'll take a little break now. That's after those two horrendous articles. A little bit on Thomas as a teacher of sacred doctrine. In his exposition of Psalm 48, Thomas says, it's kind of simple way he does it here. Whoever teaches, either he teaches things or he teaches, what, words. It's an awful simple way of stating it, but it's kind of profound in the way. Obviously a man who teaches things is going to use words to teach them, right? He might stop and talk about what's up front, you might say, it's the things, right? He's going to talk about it. Or he teaches words. Obviously he's going to talk about the things that the words signify, right? What's up front is the words that you have to explain, right? The words of St. John or St. Matthew or St. Paul or something, right? When we preach faith and morals, what we sometimes call dogmatic and moral theology, we teach things, right? And that's what he's doing in the Summa Theologiae. He's teaching things. What's the thing he's teaching? Mainly God. Incarnation, other things, right? When we expound upon a scripture, we teach what? Words. That's an interesting distinction, I think, that he's made there. Trying to get that thing through the words? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But I mean, if I'm writing a commentary or exposition of the Gospel of St. John, right, I'm going to explain the words of St. John, right? But you're going to want to explain the realities of the words of St. John? Yeah, yeah, obviously, yeah. But what's up front there is the words of John. I have to explain what those words signify, right? And not get into the things, right? Now, if you take Dionysius, the Arapidator, Pseudo-Arapidator, what he is, he's kind of in between these two, right? But his works are about names. And the one that Thomas commented on is called, what, in Latin, De Divinis Dominibus, right? It didn't say De Deo, about God, but it's about the divine names. Yeah, see? Why Thomas would say the Summa is about God, not about the names of God, okay? So there's a little distinction there, right? Now, what happens? Now, I think I gave you people a copy of Pernita Salafidator, didn't I? That's in the library? Oh, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Books, yeah. Well, anyway, you'll find when you expound in the words of Scripture, right? Like, for example, God will be said to be good, right? But many, many places in the Scripture are said to be good, right? Or God will be said metaphorically to be fire. Many places in the Scripture, right? Now, every time the word good comes up, are you going to say all that you want to say about my God is to be good? You'll be repeating yourself again and again, right? So let's, in a separate book, talk about the word good said of God. And then, in another book, we'll talk about the metaphors, right? Which are words, right? The word fire, right? Okay? And so, Cuneus Alapide, he, I've seen somebody talking about the word fire instead of God in one passage, and he said, but more fully, maybe in the Apostles' name, when the Holy Spirit comes down, fire and so on. I've explained it more fully, right? You see what I mean? So, in a way, Dionysius is kind of in between, right? But the fact that he titles his books, and his books are distinguished by proper names of God, metaphorical names, et cetera, he's closer to what? Verbal, right? Okay? So this is a distinction, you could say, between a work of Thomas, like the Summa Theologiae, the Summa Cana Gentiles, or the Compendium of Theology, even the Catechetical Instructions, right? And then the Exposition of the Gospel of Matthew, John, St. Paul, and so on, right? Thomas, of course, teaches both, right? And in teaching either, Thomas is what? Praised, right? Okay? Now, in the rest of this first page, I go to him as a teacher of red, and then in the second page, as a teacher of what? Verbal, okay? Now, the Second Vatican Council states this about Thomas as a teacher of things, when the dogmas of our faith are taught. In the teaching of dogmatic theology, the Council proposed this order of learning, and this is from the Decree to the Institution in Sacerdotale, about instruction of priests and so on, and about studiis ecclesiasticis record, right? Okay? And it says three things here, huh? Dogmatic theology should be so ordered or disposed that first, these biblical themes are proposed first, right? Then, what the fathers of the Orient, the Eastern, right? Church, and the Western, right? Ad singulas revelationis veritatis. Notice the word singulas, right? It's kind of an ad hoc character to the, what? Fathers of the Church, because a heretic has denied this article of the faith, huh? So now we're going to defend this article of the faith. Singulas, let's support it. Here's the word singulas there. What they, you know, brought in to what? Faithfully transmitting, right? And unraveling, right? In the Pleiandes, right? That's the second thing you should do. And the further, what? History of dogma related to the general history of the Church, right? The different councils and so on, huh? Then the third thing it says, huh? This is the one that we're interested in as far as Thomas. Then he says, to the mysteries of salvation, right? Integrae, meaning as what? As a whole, right? As opposed to what? Ad singulas revelationis, right? Tatis in the middle. Quantum fury potestis, as much as possible, right? Illustrano, huh? Making them, what? Bringing them into the light, right? That work of what? Looking at these things as speculation, right? With Thomas as a teacher, right? To more intimately, what? Penetrate these mysteries. And also to learn their, what? Penetration. Yeah. Okay. So he's saying, in a sense, to illumine as much as possible. When should, what? Take Thomas as a teacher, huh? And to penetrate more fully these mysteries. And to see the order of connection among them, huh? So I say, according to English here, three reasons are given here for looking at the mysteries of salvation with Thomas as a teacher. First, so the students might learn to cast light upon them as a whole, as much as is, what? Possible, right? Secondly, so they may learn to penetrate them more inwardly, huh? And third, so that they may learn to see their, what? Inection. Now, his encyclical and sacred scriptures, this is going to, Thomas is one, doce verba, right? These are the words. His encyclical and sacred scripture, Pope Leo XIII, praises Thomas in particular as a teacher of words, and he discusses the contribution of the scholastics to the study of the, what? Bible. With the age of the scholastics came fresh and welcome progress in the study of the Bible. If you go back to this Providentissimus Deus, it's kind of the first encyclical on scripture there that you have on the Vatican website. And there he speaks of the contribution of the church fathers and the contribution of the scholastics and the contribution of the modern scholars and so on, right? And it gives you a kind of view of the whole that you don't have in the later ones. The other ones are doing more contemporary problems and so on. So he says, Some people translate that to literal sense. But then they would exclude from that the metaphors, right? By metaphors, pertain to the sense of the letter. You say the Lord is a rock, right? The sense is not that he is really a rock. But the sense is what the sacred author means by calling him a rock, right? He's strong support, stable support. Then you have the spiritual sense, right? Which, as you may recall from the beginning of question one, and the summa distinguished into three senses, right? And then the assignment of the value of each sense in theology, right? The division of books into parts. So you know how Thomas is always dividing these things up and showing the order. And the summaries of the various parts. I mentioned before how he divides the Gospel of Matthew into, what, three parts? As Matthew says, emphasizes the humanity of Christ. And so he's represented by the man in the four figures. And as man, he came into this world. He proceeded through this world. And then he left this world. So he divides into those three parts. And he subdivides and subdivides down. And the investigation of the objects of the writers. What we call in Greek there the skopos. The demonstration of the connection of sentence with sentence and clause with clause. All of which is calculated to throw much light upon the more obscure passages of sacred value. So there's illumination here, as well as in the healing. And he says, the valuable work of the scholastics of Holy Scripture is seen in their theological treatises and in their scripture, what? Commentaries. And in this respect, the greatest name among them all is St. Thomas Aquinas. So I rest my case. The case of Thomas. We won't throw him out. I was reading Thomas on the virtue of hope, you know. Very interesting. He says, and I got thinking about it a little bit. He says, hope has two objects. And one is eternal life. Because by hope, you're seeking eternal life to see God as he is, face to face. And you're seeking to do so by the help of God, right? Primarily. So those are the two objects, right? Of hope. Well, you know, when we study theology, we say, we talk about God in himself. And God is the Alpha and Omega. The first and the last. The beginning and the end, right? And notice how faith, which is defended by theology, this kind of theology here. This is the science by which faith is engendered, nourished, strengthened, and defended. How that prepares the way for hope, right? Because one of the objects of hope pertains to God as he's the, what? The end of all things. But in a special way, the end of the rational creature. And the other object of hope, that's by his help, pertains to Christ as he's the, I mean, to God as he's the, what? Beginning, right, huh? And of course, he singles out later on his omnipotence and his mercy, huh? Especially in terms of his being the beginning, right? That he has the power. And also, those things tie together, right, huh? The connection between them is kind of marvelous to see. That by faith, you know he's the Alpha and the Omega, and you see that, as the Alpha and Omega, he's the object of hope, right? Which is the next theological virtue that comes out of that, huh? But there, that's a text where he speaks omnipotence and mercy. There you see the, I always think of the connection between mercy and hope, right? You can see that in the Hail Holy Queen, too, right? Mother of mercy, our life, our sweetness, and our hope, right? But the mother of mercy and hope, they go together, those two, very much so. I suppose Sister Faustina has something to say about that, too. I don't claim to be an expert on her. Okay, so we're up to the ninth one, right? Where the union of the two natures is the, what? Greatest of unions, right? The ninth one proceeds thus. It seems that the union of the two natures is not the, what? Greatest. Yeah. And most of all, of all unions, right? For united falls short in the notion of, what? Unity from that which is one, right? For united is said by participation. One is said essentially. But in created things, something is said to be simply one. This is especially clear about the unity, which is the beginning of the number. Therefore, this union about which we speak is not the greatest, what? Unity. What about the one that's beginning of the number, right? I've been in the science of numbers now, you know? What's that? What's the one that's the beginning of numbers? Isn't that more one than this union here? Oh. I'm getting more one. Moreover, as regards those things, the more of those things that are united are more distant, the less would seem to be their, what? Union. But those things which are united according to this union, most of all are distant from each other, namely, what? Divine nature, human nature. Because they are, what? Infinitely distant from each other, huh? Therefore, this is the least of unions, right? Minima. How can you unite things that are infinitely apart? If you're united, you must be barely united, right? String, yeah. Huh? By string. Yeah. She's got an infinitely long string. Moreover, by union, something becomes, what? One. But from the union of the soul and body in us, there comes about something one, both in person and nature. But from the union of the divine human nature, there comes something one only in, what? Person. Not one nature there. Therefore, more is union of the soul to the body than the divine nature to human nature. The body and the soul make up one nature, right? The divine nature, human nature, remain two distinct natures. And thus, the union about which we speak does not imply the greatest unity, right? For the said country there is a little strange. Thomas will imply that he said country. Against this is what Augustine says in the first book about the Trinity. That man is more in the Son than the Son in the, what? Father. But the Son is in the Father by the unity of essence. Man is in the Son by the union of incarnation. Therefore, more is the union of incarnation than the unity of the divine essence, which nevertheless is the greatest of, what? Unions. And thus, consequently, the union of the incarnation implies the greatest unity. Yeah, that way he's going to do the extreme a little bit, huh? A little puzzled, but I guess. Thomas and the response. I answer you, it should be said that union implies the joining of some things, like quorum, in something one. Therefore, the union of the incarnation can be taken in two ways. In one way, on the side of those things which are joined, huh? And another way, on the side of that in which they are joined, huh? And from this side, this union has a preeminence among other unions. Because the unity of the divine person, in which are united two natures, is what? Maxima, right? But it does not have preeminence from the side of those things which are, what? Joint, huh? So the human nature and the divine. My nature remained distinct and infinitely apart, right? When someone says to Christ one day, you know, you're good, he says, why call me good? God alone is good, right? He's aware of the difference between himself as God and himself as what? Man. So they remained distinct, those two natures, and they even remained, you might say, infinitely what? Distinct, yeah. Distance, right? But if you consider what you're united in, in the one person, the word, then this is the greatest of unions, huh? It's what union is more than the union of a, what? The unity of a divine, what? Person, right? Now this goes back somewhat to our understanding to what one is in regard to the first objection, right? Of course, Plato and Avicenic got a little mixed up, right? They mixed up the one that is the beginning of number with the one that is convertible with what being, huh? And that was the great distinction that Aristotle was the first to see in history, huh? And most people since him have not been able to see that distinction. But Thomas was able to understand it with the help of Aristotle. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the unity of a divine person, I'm not saying human person now, the unity of a divine person, is greater than the, what? Numerical unity, which is the beginning of, what? Number. So a divine person is, his unity is, oneness is greater than that of the one, huh? It is the beginning of number. A unit, as we call it. For the unity of the divine person is a unity subsisting by itself, right? Not received in anything by partaking. For it is complete in itself, having in itself, whatever pertains to the notion of unity. And therefore, there does not belong to it the notion of a part. As to the numerical unity, which is a part of a, what? Number, yeah. And which is partaken of in things, what? Number, huh? And therefore, as regards the union incarnation, it proceeds on the numerical unity by reason of the unity of the person. Not, however, by reason of the, what? Human nature, which is not the unity of the divine person, but is united, what? To it, huh? So he's saying here that one is not a number, right? He's following on saying one is a unit, a part of a number? No, he's saying that the one, which is a big unit of number, is not as much one as a divine person is one, huh? And the, which you have to go back to the Prima Pars there and say that we, the article again of the question on God being what? One, right? But what does he mean then when he says the unit is a part of a number? Well, if you take one, it's comparable to being, one means what? Undivided being, right? So to be most one, he says in the Prima Pars, he had to be most being as well as most undivided. And so he points out that the divine person here is Parasite subsisting, right? He has more being than the, what? One that's the beginning of, what? Number, right? In fact, the number, you know, is something that, the number that the arithmetician at least considers is something that in the way exists fully only in the mind. Yeah. Yeah. So that's what that's being, right? Not Parasite subsisting, as he says here. But I say I can understand that more fully if you go back to the distinction that Aristotle first solved between the one that is the beginning of number and the one that's convertible with being. So being and one go together. So what is first in being is first in, what? Unity. Thomas is talking about accidental being there. And how much being does white geometry have? How much being does white geometry have? Now sometimes we try to show that white geometry is hardly exist, right? Aristotle praises Plato for saying that sophistry is about non-being, right? It's about the accidental, right? And it's hardly is, right? Now, am I a white geometry? Or am I someone who is white and is a geometer? There's something by which I'm white, namely a certain color that my skin has. There's something by which I'm a geometer, right? Namely a certain science or knowledge that I have. Is there anything by which I'm a white geometer? Is there anything called white geometry? Or color geometry, right? Is there something? It probably is now. You probably get a special studies black geometry at Harvard. So, organics say, if I was not born a white geometer, right, is there a way of becoming a white geometer? There's a way of becoming white and there's a way of becoming a geometer, but there's no way of becoming a white geometer. So it hardly has any being, right? But, if you look at it now from the point of view of oneness, of unity, right, does the color of white and the science of geometry somehow come together to make white geometry or to make a white geometer? Do we become one? Well, again, we'd say they're one only procedence, because to be white and to be a geometer belong to the same man. That's why we say, right, white geometry. But they don't really come together with my color and my geometry to make anything, do they? So you can see as a thing is in being, so is it in unity, right? So the first example of accidental being is when two things belong to the same thing, right? And they said to be because they belong to the same thing. but that's also the first example maybe of accidental unity, right? Why my body and soul are more one than my color and geometry are. But the being that I have in the union of my body and soul by being a man is more being than the being I have as a white geometer. I am very much a man, but not much a white geometer. It could use anything. White geometer, is it? To be white is something. To be a geometer is something, but to be a white geometer, is that something? Don't really come together and make anything, do they? So as a thing is in being, so is it in what? Unity, right? So the fact that the divine person is per se subsistence, right? shows that it has being, right? In a way that the one which is the beginning of number does not have being. In fact, the one that is the beginning of number is kind of elusive. You come right down to it. But the one that is the beginning of number is found really in the category of quantity. Goes back to the division of the continuous, right? One straight line is one, right? It's not divided. And a point is very much one, but a point doesn't exist by itself. Some days I have a student in class who would question whether points exist, right? And the way you try to show that points exist in some way is that bodies don't go on forever. Therefore, there's a surface to a body, right? And the surface doesn't go on forever. Therefore, there's an end to surface, a line. That line doesn't go on forever. So there's an end, and it's an end to the point. So in some way they exist, right? But the end of a line, can you cut it off? Can you cut a point off from a line? Can you cut off a line from this table or piece of paper? Can you cut off a line? If I try to cut, you know, down, you know, I can make it very, very, you know, I can make it very thin, you know. But can I cut off a line? Something that's linked but no width? It doesn't really exist by itself, right? Yeah. So this one, in the sense of a point, which is like the one that's being a number, doesn't really subsist by itself, right? It doesn't have that being. Now, the second objection, Thomas sees some truth in it, right? That reason proceeds on the side of the things joined, right? Not on the side of the person in whom is made the union. We call this union sometimes the hypostatic union. That means the union is in the hypostasis, in the person of the word, right? So if you consider it on that side, then it's the greatest of unions, huh? Because the union of the divine person is that great, huh? But if you consider it on the side of the things being joined, huh? Well, the human nature and the divine nature don't come together to form, what? One nature or one thing, right? So in that sense, it's not the greatest of unions, right? But if you consider it that in which they are united, that's the greatest of unions. The third objection there about the body and the soul. The third should be said that the unity of a divine person is a greater unity than the unity of person and nature and us. And therefore, the union of the incarnation is greater than the union of the soul and the body and us, huh? Because that which is objected on the contrary supposes something false, that greater is the, what? Union of the incarnation than the unity of the divine person and the essence. It should be said to the authority of Augustine that human nature is not more in the Son of God than the Son of God and the Father, but much, what? Less. But this man, in some way, is more in the Son than the Son of the Father, insofar as the same thing is, what? Supposed, in this that I say man, and is taken for Christ, and in this that I say the Son of God, this is the same, what? Person, right? But there's not the same, what? Suppositum of the Father and the Son, they're different, what? Persons, right, huh? So in the incarnate word, there's only one person. Father and Son is two persons. So in one respect, there is, what? More union if you consider just that, right? Okay. But since the Son is the same thing, it's the divine nature, and the divine nature is in the Father, right? Then the Son and the Father are more, what? One, right? Okay? Even though there's two persons there. These objections make me, you know, talk about, what I was saying here, this thing here, seeing their connection, right? Because you've got to think about the incarnation and the trinity here, right? And the unity in both, right? And which is greater, right? Correcting us, or simply giving us a benevolent interpretation, or? Well, as he's saying, you can say that in the incarnation, there's more unity of person than there is in the trinity. Because in the trinity, you've got two persons here, or three persons. I mean, if you take the Father and Son, you've got two persons. But in the incarnation, you're only one person. If you look at it that way, then there's, one is more than, more one than two. Is that what Augustine was saying? Well, that's what Thomas understands, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Somebody is as great as a guest and you understand him in a way that makes sense. When I read that said conference this morning, I said, that doesn't sound right. Yeah, yeah. But that's what Thomas is in a way that's expect, you know? You know, I'm saying Thomas' explanation of teachable on the part of the will, you know, is his willingness to read carefully, frequently, and with reverence or respect, right? The words of the, you know, wiseness. And so, he tries to read Augustine that he will with great respect, right? It does the same thing with Aristotle, with Aristotle, right? When Aristotle's talking about God's knowledge, right, some people misunderstood what he says, right? What Aristotle's bringing out is that God's knowledge must be a knowledge of God. It must be God that he knows, right? And some say, well, then Aristotle's saying that God knows only God doesn't know us. Well, that's ridiculous, Aristotle would think that, right? And, of course, there are at least two places, you know, where Aristotle criticizes Empedocles' position about knowing, right? Because Empedocles' position about knowing would make us know something God doesn't know. And Aristotle thinks that's absurd, you know? But follow some Empedocles' position, right? And, I mean, Empedocles is saying we know hate because we have hate in us, right? And then because there's no hate in God, then God wouldn't know hate. And therefore, we know something God didn't know. Aristotle thought that's absurd. So there's something wrong with his position, right? So Thomas, so Aristotle's talking about God knows chiefly and primarily, right? And so, that's what Aristotle's trying to determine there, right? Not everything that God knows would God knows, you know, chiefly, fundamentally. And so he determines Aristotle as meaning that, not meaning this is all that God knows. Right? And I see that that's the other text of Aristotle. He says this about God, right? It would be absurd to say we know something God doesn't know. Thomas isn't going to say, as Dustin insanely said. So you'd say the union of the incarnation is a hypostatic union, a union of one person, right? Why the union of the father and the son is not the union of what? One person. In that sense, the union is what? More, right? But yet... But yet... But yet... But yet...