Tertia Pars
Lecture 11: The Union of Divine and Human Natures in Christ

Transcript
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Nor secundumachidens, right? Nor in an accidental way. But in a middle way, according to what? Subsistence or epistasis. Whence in the fifth synod one reads, since in many ways unity can be understood, right? Who follow the iniquity of Apollinaris and Eutyches, right? Worshipping the what? Yeah, but interrepsion is the kind of destruction of that, right? Because they're destroying, right? Intermenentis, both natures, right? So you end up with something that neither God nor man, right? It's a rather serious mistake. They speak of union, confused union, huh? But Theodorus and Nestorius, their followers, rejoicing in division, right? Division and agonentis. Introduce a what? An effectual union, a union of wills, right? But the holy church of God, rejecting the impiety of both perfidious, confessed the union of the word to the flesh according to composition. There you have the word composition, right? It gives old Thomas' use, right? That's kind of an issue, right? So I can't be too tough on Thomas, huh? So I can't extend his way of speaking. Which is secundum what? Subsistentium, according to the person, right? The subsistence. Thus, therefore, it is clear that the second of the three opinions, which the magister, the teacher, lays down, which asserts one hypostasis of God and man, should not be said to be an opinion, but the position of the Catholic faith. Likewise, the first opinion, which lays down two hypotheses, and the third, which lays down accidental union, should not be said to be opinions, but heresies condemned in the councils by the church. Boom. Now, the first objection was taken from this misunderstanding of the text of St. Paul in the Philippians, huh? 2, verse 7, right? Text from St. Paul. They were reading St. Paul in the Mass this morning, the one to the Galatians. He's calling them, you know, you stupid. Yeah. Insensate. I think the latter says, insensate, you senseless men, right? Let's see if I used that text in class one time. Yeah. Because the Galatians was supposed to come from some part of France or something. Oh, my God. At least a dumb Frenchman up there. The ancestors of the Irish. The Celts, yeah. The ancestors of the Irish. Because the Celts live in the Celts. To the first, therefore, it should be said, that as Damascene says in the third book, it is not necessary that in every way and with no defect to assimilate, what? Examples or likenesses, right? For what is in every way alike would be the same thing and not a, what? Example, huh? So don't assimilate my lines here, too. In every way, right? It's just... I'm trying to say that the second line there, right, doesn't have its own end point. But it's drawn to an existing point. It's already there, right? But don't, don't, don't, don't extend this too much. Yeah. Yeah. That's the point. And most of all, in divine things, right? For it is impossible to find a similar example, both in theology, right? That is in the deity of persons and in the dispensation, that is in the mystery of the incarnation. You can't find a perfect likeness on it. But what poor St. Patrick had to do there, you know, he was supposed to have picked up the shamrock, you know, well, it's one in three, right? But you want to extend that, you know, every way, it's like a Trinity, right? It was good enough for the Irish, but... I'm half Irish, my mother was a Burke. There's one line of Burke's that descend from one of the sons of Charlemagne, so... So we'd like to think that we're descended from one of the sons of Charlemagne, but there's no real scholarship behind that assertion. Neighbors of ours. It's kind of a common name, because you don't know how you spell it, too. Now, it says, This human nature, therefore, in Christ, is assimilated to habitue, it est vestimental, right? There is a sunlight, that's what he's saying, right? Not as regards accidental, what? Union. But as regards this, that the word is seen, right? To the human nature, just as a man to his, what? His clothing, yeah. And also, as he guards this, that the, what? Clothing is changed, because it is formed according to the figure, the one who, what? Puts it on. That's why I say outfit, you know, but I mean, kind of like, when they say, you know, you've got a new shoe, you've got to break it in, you know? Before you go on a trip or something, you know? And so the fit, the shoe, what, takes on, in a sense, the man who's wearing the shoe, his own size of his foot, right? Okay? Who from his form is not changed on account of the investment, right? And likewise, human nature, assumed by this word of God, is made better, right? But the word of God is not changed. And this is the way Augustine expounds in the book on the 83 questions, right? Okay. Of course, Aristotle, both in the, actually in the categories, in the last chapter of the categories, is about the word to have. And Aristotle distinguishes many different meanings of the word to have, right? So you might also be able to explain the text of St. Paul by saying, he's not comparing it to clothing, you know? But there's some other sense of having, right? But anyway, that's the way Thomas does here, right? Now, the second objection, so what, human nature comes to the Son of God, right? In time, right? Something that can be or not be there without it. That seems to be the definition of what? Accident, right? In time he says, well, to the second it should be said that that which comes after esse completam, after complete being, comes accidentally unless it be drawn into the communion of that complete, what? Being, yeah? It gives you a very interesting comparison here. Just as in the resurrection, right? The body comes to the soul already existing, huh? It does not, however, come, what? Accidentally. Why? Because it is taken to the very same, what? Being, huh? So the body might have vital being through the soul. So it's not joined accidentally to my soul at the resurrection, right? But it's not thus about whiteness, huh? Because other is the being of white and other the being of man to which, what? Whiteness belongs, huh? So even now, my body shares in the being existence of my, what? Soul, right? But my soul is a very unusual substantial form because it has existence not only in the body, right? But it shares its existence with the body, right? But the body doesn't completely, what? contain the existence of the soul. Now how do I know that? How did Aristotle know that? Because the soul does something not in the body, namely understands. And that's, you know, many arguments that they show in philosophy that this is soul, right? But one argument is that the soul understands the universal. And the universal is separated from what? The continuous, right? From body, yeah? Because everything in the continuous would be what? Individual being in the continuous, huh? So the fact that you understand the continuous in an un-continuous way is a sign that reason is what? Not continuous, and therefore not a body. So the operation of understanding which remains in the reason is not in your body. But you have to be before you can do something. Even Descartes do that, huh? I think, therefore I am. And that's kind of like an axiom, right? You have to be before you can do anything. So if the soul understands not in the body, then its being is not entirely in the body. And the soul, when it leaves the body, understanding the soul, it takes its being with it, huh? And then the body no longer shares in that being, right? But when the body is joined again to the soul, it will again share in the very same being that it shares in now. So it's not going to come to the body, to the soul, what? Accidentally, right? My geometry comes to my soul, what? Accidentally, right? So to be a soul or even to be reason, right? It's not to be a geometer. But I am a geometer now, right? I have a new being, right? You know? I mean, repetition, repetition too, huh? That's really a great book that he's booked there on continued proportion, right? The book of continued proportions. What a book. Wow. New York Times best art. Best art for 2,000 years. What did Einstein say? If Euclid did not arouse your youthful enthusiasm, you were not born to be a scientist. He said something right there. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He speaks, you know, his early life to two wonders, right? One was the wonder about the magnet, right? How could something move somehow apparently being in contact with the magnet as far back home? The other one was the wonder at the order of Euclid there, right? He seemed to be so clearly shown, right? He's pretty good there. He's also pretty good on his appreciation of what? Mozart, right? They describe Einstein being in the house there and someone who's playing some Mozart. He ran upstairs, you know, got his violin. You know? But, you know, he's here to mark, you know, Beethoven made his music but Mozart found it. Mozart's music seems to have been always a part of the universe. There's going to be music properly speaking in heaven, you know. Vocal. Yeah, properly speaking. Physical sound. Yeah. Vocal sound. Vocal friends. So, brother, Benedict, yourself. Hope springs you, sir. So, if Palestina and Mozart met it, you know, you can imagine what kind of... I'm going to have a concert tonight for Palestina. That's why I'm so enjoying it. I'm so excited for this. He's a nobody. He's a nobody. Of course, Socrates says in the Thetal that philosophy is the highest kind of music, right? Kepler has it. Of course, Aristotle says that with the truth all things harmonize. Then there's a harmony of reason and desire, right? Philosophy means a harmony of action and reason. This is the highest kind of music, the highest kind of harmony. So, I don't think I'm completely disordered to just talk to music of Mozart. Not completely. And Benedict XVI, you know, he likes to play Speckstein Mozart, huh? At the end of it. At least 35 minutes a day, 37 minutes? Yeah, yeah. So, yeah. And as John Paul II said, the church could not fail to do homage to Mozart. He didn't tell something he'd find. Yeah, I see that, yeah. Incarpable motet there. I'll be a hero. He's a priest of the queen of Mozart. So, if you understand this... What? I'm sorry. Is that St. Thomas' text, too? I don't remember. Or did you write that in him? I don't know. It's more ancient, I think. More ancient, yeah. Okay. And Mozart, too, for the Eucharist, you know, for the literary Eucharist, you know, beautiful, where he begins and ends at. It's like the Avivarum Corpus and he gets some of that excellence, you know. And sometimes the Mozart's church music is not as liturgical as it should be, you know. I told you the scandal, you know, knowing, knowing the beautiful aria from where you figure out Dove Sona and then you sing in early Agnus Deeg, you know. He borrowed that, you know, he made it a beautiful, you know, perfect operatic aria, but I mean... Actually, I find my soul getting me disordered. I don't go to Monsai, go to Karelia. Don't get to rectify it, huh? The Archangel. So he says, that which comes... So it's a beautiful comparison Thomas makes here, right? Just as in the resurrection, the body comes to the pre-existing soul, right? But it doesn't come to an accidentality, right? Like geometry comes to my soul because it is taken to the same, what? Being, huh? So that the body might have living being through the soul. But it's not best about whiteness, huh? Because other is the being of white and the being of man to which whiteness belongs, right? But the word of God from eternity had complete being according to hypostasis or person, right? And from time, there comes to it human nature, not as it were assumed to one being insofar as there's something of nature as the body is assumed to the being of the soul. So you see the difference, right? But to one being insofar as this being is of a hypostasis or what? And therefore human nature is not joined actually to the Son of God. That's something to chew, right? What's the nature of our reason, you know? It's the nature of our reason to think about something before you understand it, huh? So you think about this and you understand a little bit, right? And you say, I thought about that another day sometime. I understand it even a little better, right? But you have to think about this union enough to realize that it's, like you said, not accidental, right? And one's kind of helped if you understand the being of the soul, the understanding soul in the body, right? But there's a difference, right? But it helps you to understand it a bit, right? And not everything that comes to you comes to you accidentally. When my body comes to me in the resurrection, right, it's not going to come to me, what, accidentally. It's not going to give me a being I don't already have in my separated soul, but it's going to come to me to partake of that being that my separated soul has. And I'll be even more satisfied than it was. If I had a division at that time, you know, I'd be more perfect. You'd be out of faith, huh? Because I'll be more complete. Okay. Now, the third objection says, Whatever does not pertain to the nature or the essence of something is an accident of it, because everything is either a substance or an accident. But human nature does not pertain to the essence or nature of the Son of God, who is the Divine One, because the ego is not made in the nature. Therefore, it is necessary that the human nature come accidentally to the Son of God. That sounds pretty convincing, right? Thomas says, To the third it should be said that accident is divided against substance, huh? Substance, however, as is clear in the fifth book of wisdom, the fifth book after the book is the natural philosophy, is said in two ways, as Aristotle says. In one way, the essence or nature, right? So therefore we speak of the substance of a thing, meaning what it is, right? Another way, for the suppositum or hypostasis. So that's a pretty important book, that fifth book of wisdom, huh? And once it suffices to this that there be not an action of a union, that there be a union secundum, what? Hypostasis. Even though it's not made a union according to nature, right? Or when my body is joined to my soul again, that would be, what? To form one complete nature, right? I was thinking, you know, these words, you know, working on it for a while there in Shakespeare, you know, where he says, or Friar Lawrence says, wisely and slow, they stumble, they run fast, right? But you see this over and over again in the 14 books of wisdom of Aristotle. And I was thinking, you know, that these words of Friar Lawrence, if you should go forward wisely and slowly, should be followed most of all in wisdom. Where more than in wisdom should you try to go forward wisely and slow? When I see road, you should do so, right? Go forward wisely and slow. But a fortiori, in wisdom itself, nothing should proceed wisely more than wisdom. It's kind of amazing, huh? In the beginning of the fourth book of wisdom, Aristotle finally finds out that wisdom is about being as being and the one and the many. And at the same time, he realizes that being is, what, said equivocally by reason. The word being and the word one, right? And then he spends his whole fifth book distinguishing and ordering the senses of the words used throughout wisdom and used also the axioms because all those words that are used throughout wisdom or in the axioms are words equivocal by reason, right? And so wisely and slowly, he goes through each word distinguishing the meanings of the words and ordering the senses. That's amazing that he does that. The whole fifth book of wisdom is that way. And if you think along with that, you know, wisely and slow, they stumble, they run fast. As Aristotle points out in the book on mistakes and stumbling, the most common mistake is from, what, mixing up the senses of the word. And it's words equivocal by reason that we tend to mix up the senses. So you can see how in book five, he's proceeding, what, wisely and slow and consequently not stumbling, right? And this prevents him from stumbling throughout the rest of wisdom. But it's again and again, you see him doing this. But in the amazing era, Thomas goes back to the fifth book of wisdom and I say, yeah, yeah. As Decony said, Thomas was a humble student of Aristotle, right? And he reads them carefully, frequently and with reverence. That's what it means to be teachable as far as the will is concerned, huh? Be willing to hear or to read carefully, frequently and with reverence the words of these guys. Now, the fourth one I was talking about, the way he makes use of this, words in the Ambrosian Creed, you know? Not Ambrosian, but the Athanasian Creed. That the, nothing is more like the incarnation than the, what, Venus, soul and body. Thomas says, well, not as far as form and matter, but as far as instrument, right? In being a joint instrument. To the fourth, it should be said that not everything that is taken on as a tool pertains to the, what? Hypostasis of the one taking it up. As is clear about the, what? Yeah, and the sword, right? Gladio, right? But nothing prevents that which is taken up to unity of the hypothesis to have itself as an instrument. Just as the body of man or his, what? Membrance. So the distinction Thomas makes there in the Summa Contagentilis, he talks about this between a joined instrument, right? And what? One that isn't joined, huh? Difference between my hand being an instrument of Dwayne Berkwist and my ballpoint pen or my hammer being an instrument of Dwayne Berkwist, right? For Nestorius laid down that human nature was taken up by the word only, only, huh? That's important. To per modem instrumenti, the manner of a tool. Not our, to the unity of the hypostasis. And therefore he did not concede that that man was, what? That man was truly the son of God, but only, you could say again, his instrument, right? Whence Cyril says in the epistle to the monks of Egypt, this Emmanuel, that is Christ, not only, right, to take on the office of instrument, the scripture says, but God himself was truly, what? Humanatum. There he's speaking properly and not synecchically. That is, he was made a man. For Damascene, however, lays down human nature in Christ to be a tool pertaining to the unity of the, what? Hypostasis. The saving of my hand, right? It's really my joined, what? Tool, right? It's certainly getting a serious thing to think about. As well as accomplishing other things by becoming mad, right? I'm going to be dealing with union itself. I love them. I love them. I love them. I love them. I love them. I love them. I love them. I love them. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, Lord, my timid, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, pray for us. Help us to understand all that you've written. Father, Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. A little item here in Chapter 24 of her life, where she had certain friendships that were not maybe the best friendships, right? And her confessor was kind of urging her to break off these friendships. He told me that I ought to leave nothing undone so as to become entirely pleasing to God. And he treated me with great skill, yet also very gently. For my soul was not at all strong, but very sensitive, especially as regards abandoning certain friendships, which were not actually leading me to offend God. There was a great deal of affection beneath these, and seemed to me that if I abandoned them, I should be sinning through ingratitude. So I asked him why it was necessary for me to be ungrateful if I was not offending God. He told me to commend the matter to God for a few days, and to recite the hymn, Veni Creator. And I should be enlightened as to which was the better thing to do. So I spent the greater part of one whole day in prayer, and then, beseeching the Lord that he would help me to please him in everything, I began the hymn. While I was reciting it, there came to me a transport so sudden that it almost carried me away. I could make no mistake about this, so clear was it. This is the first time that the Lord had granted me the favor of any kind of rapture. I heard these words. This is the words. I will have thee converse now, not with men, but with angels. But the words of our Lord, right? I would have thee converse now, not with men, but with angels. So my old teacher, Kisurik, used to say you should make an act of will, opening up your mind to your guardian angel, right? So he will be more able to, what? Direct you in your thoughts and in your life, huh? Another little thing here from St. Teresa of Avila's thing. It's a little bit about the glorified body, right? Which is nothing compared to the glorified soul, but you've got to be led into things gradually, huh? Okay? It's very interesting what our Lord does. One day when I was at prayer, the Lord was pleased to reveal to me nothing but his hands. Talk about my deduction, being led by the hands. The beauty of which was so great is to be indescribable. This made me very fearful, as does every new experience that I have when the Lord is beginning to grant me some supernatural favor. A few days later, I also saw that divine face, which seemed to leave me completely absorbed. I could not understand why the Lord revealed himself gradually like this, since he was there to grant me the favor of seeing him holy. Until at length, I realized that his majesty was leading me according to my natural weakness. One year on St. Paul's Day, when I was at Mass, I saw a complete representation of this most sacred humanity, just as in a picture of his resurrection body in very great beauty and majesty. I would only say that if there were nothing else in heaven to delight the eyes, but the extreme beauty of the glorified bodies there, that alone would be the greatest bliss. A most especial bliss, then, will it be to us when we see the humanity of Jesus Christ. For if it is so even on earth, where his majesty reveals himself, according to what our wretchedness can bear, what will it be where the fruition of that joy is complete? Although this vision is imaginary, I never saw it or any other vision with the eyes of the body, but only with the eyes of the soul. So I thought that was appropriate for us to hear him and study the humanity there, a little bit of Christ. So let us proceed now to Article 7 here of Question 2. This is a very difficult reading. Will the union, huh, of the divine and human nature is something, what, created? Or something, yeah. To the seventh one proceeds thus. It seems that the union of the divine and human nature is not something created. First Injection says, For nothing in God is able to be created. Because everything that is in God is God. But the union is in God because God himself is united to human, what, nature. Therefore, it seems that the union is not something, what, created. Moreover, the end is always the most potent thing in each thing. But the end of the union is the divine hypostasis, huh, or the divine chrism, to which the union, what, is terminated, huh? Therefore, it seems that a union of this kind ought to be most of all judged according to the condition of the divine, what, hypostasis, which is not something created. Therefore, neither is that union something, what, created, huh? Moreover, this is a great principle in philosophy. Procter quod unum quod quede ilum magis. On account of, what, that more? Isn't that a principle, right? But man is said to be the creator on account of the, what, union. And of course, it's God, he's creator, right? Therefore, much more is union something not created, but the creator himself. Now, in the sin contra, everything that begins to be in time, huh, extempore, right, is something, what, created. Because God is, what, outside of time, huh? God is eternal, right? But that union was not from eternity, but began to be, what, from time. Or we'd say in English, I think, in time, if you see, in preposition, right? In the fullness of time, right? Okay? So if this union is something that began in time, can it be something uncreated? It must be something created, right? Therefore, the union is something created, right? Now, I don't know if you had a chance here to study the body of the article here, huh? It goes back to some very subtle things, huh? That Aristotle and Averro is, and so on. First Saul, right? Aristotle, first Saul, really. And Thomas, what? Learned from them, right? And this is a truth about, what? Relations, huh? Now, relations have hardly any being. At least relations that are in the future, right? Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. And there's a distinction here between relations that are real, they're real things, right? And relations that are just of what? Reason, right? Now, these relations of reason come under the larger category of beings of reason. Sometimes the lack of ends, which is being, or actionis, right? And there's two kinds of beings of reason. One are these some kinds of relations, right? And even real relations has a little being, some people thought they were all something of reason. But there are real relations, and there are relations that are just what? Of reason, right? The other kinds of beings of reason are negations, right? So, we can talk here about nothing, for example, right? In fact, I can make a true statement about nothing. Nothing is what? Yeah. That's a true affirmative statement about nothing. Or I could say nothing is not something. It's a true negative statement, right? Am I talking about something, or am I talking about nothing? Is nothing anything? How can I make two statements about nothing? I'm not making statements about anything. Huh? Yeah. Nothing has no being except in the mind, right? But the mind takes nothing as if it were what? Something. Something, yeah. So, my old teacher, Kasurik, used to joke, you know, philosophy is the only subject, he says. We can get paid for talking about nothing. That's true, huh? Now, take something that's not quite as negative as nothing, but take what they call privation or lack. Take blindness, right? Is blindness something in the world? Aren't there blind men out there in the world? And isn't it true to say about some people that he or she is blind? Sometimes a dog is blind or a cat, right? So, is blindness something out there in the world? Is blindness really something? Or is the non-being a something? It's a lack of something, right? And yet we can truly, what? Affirm, right? Of this man, right? Or this woman. That he or she is blind, right? Okay? Notice the word blindness, like the word science or something, right? Dramatically, they can function, right? Just like any other noun, right? So, just by science, I'm a scientist. So, by blindness, I'm what? Blind, right? Okay? So, this man is a scientist by science, right? And this man is blind by blindness, right? Okay? So, it's an odd thing, you know. It's an odd thing, these beings of reason, right? Now, there are many kinds of relations of reason. And there's one kind of relation of reason that you find in logic, huh? Take, for example, what we call genus and species in logic. Well, you could, you know, you could porphy redefine the genus and species in relation to each other, right? Okay? And we can speak of the relation of animal to dog, cat, horse, and elephant, right? And the relation of dog and cat and horse and elephant to what? Animal, right? And that's like the relation of number to odd and even number, right? And vice versa, odd and even number to number, right? Okay? But, do those relation of genus and species, do they exist in the world around us? This is something that follows upon our, what? Understanding and separating out what's common to dog and cat and horse, right? And even dog, cat, and horse don't exist out here, do they? There's just this dog or this cat, right? Okay? So, I compared the cats and I separate out what they have in common, right? It happened when I was early with some of these things, huh? Your mother or someone said, that's a dog, or not? Is it a dog? A little kid, after having a number of dogs going out, will, what? Say, mommy, there's a dog in the thing, right? On his own, right? So, you somehow separate out what they have in common, right? Okay? But separating out what they have in common, that's only in the reason. Unless you're a patronist, right? But Aristotle has pretty well refuted that in the seventh book of wisdom, in one of the other places, in the last books of wisdom. So, relation of animal to dog, and even relation of dog to, what? The ones running around out here. That's a relation that exists, what? Only in the reason, right? That's one kind of group of relationship reason, huh? Now, what if I say, Socrates is Socrates, and see, is that a real relation? To have a real relation, you have to have two things there, right? You really have only one thing there, right? But because the mind can come back upon itself, right? Then I can, what? Multiply, right? Socrates, in my mind, twice, and then say, Socrates is Socrates, and the same, right? This is another example, but a different kind, right? Of a relation of what? Reason, right? Okay? Yet, the statement that Socrates is Socrates is very true, right? And Aristotle says that if you say the same thing as a sudden predicate, you don't have to give any reason for something being itself. He says that's a brevity, huh? That's a brief one. Briefly. It's obvious. Is today before tomorrow? Because that relation of being before, is that a real relation? So, I guess you've got a problem there. Yeah, yeah. Now, I might be taller or shorter than one of you guys, right? But those are real relations. My being taller or shorter than you. It's based upon my size and your size, right? Okay? So, these are real relations and things, huh? But today and tomorrow, does today and tomorrow both exist? Yeah, that's the problem, yeah. And yet, you see, it's true to say that today is before tomorrow, right? Or today is after yesterday, right? But to have a new relation, the things that are related have to both exist. So, today and tomorrow don't both exist. Something of today exists, but nothing of tomorrow exists yet, huh? I don't think so, do you? And nothing of yesterday exists, right? So, you don't have a real relation between today and tomorrow, right? Even though you'd say that it's true to say today is before tomorrow. But reason, what? Takes together today and tomorrow and compares them and says, Well, it's true to say that it's true to say that it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it's true to say it it's true to say it's true One is before and the other is after, right? Is the mind false saying that? But it's relation of what? Reason that. You get the arm or something like that, you get it on the right foot from your left foot, right? But now, right and left, are they real relations in me? I'm right-handed, huh? This arm is stronger than the left-hand, right? Maybe some of you just reverse, right? So it's real basis in me for saying this is my left-hand, this is my right-hand, right? But now if I say, for example, Thomas Seuss, the left side of the column and the right side of the column, right? This is the column to the right of me, this is the column to the left of me, if I'm standing there in Rome there, all those pillars there, between two pillars, huh? The left and the right. Is left and right really in the powers? The powers? There's no real basis in them for left and right. There's no real basis in my body for left and right, huh? So, there's many kinds of what? Relations of reason, right? And now the one that's going to come up here in the chapter here, is one that Aristotle first pointed out. And he says that the relation of seeing and the seeing. The relation of seeing to the seeing is real, but the relation of the seeing to the what? The seeing is not real. But our reason, when it tries to understand the relation of this to that, right? It has to what? Understand that as reciprocally related back to the first thing, right? Okay? So if I see you, you must be seen by me, right? But is your being seen by me anything in you at all? Well, I see this glass. Well, it's a real relation of me in my seeing to the glass there, right? But is the glass being seen a real relation in the glass? Well, seeing is really kind of an immaterial activity. Kind of a spiritual activity in a way. But the glass is something quite material. It doesn't partake at all in that love, right? If someone loves you, they're really related to you by loving you, right? But if you don't know that you're being loved, does anything mean you're being loved? So this is a very strange situation where you have two relations, because you always have relations that come in couples, right? But the one is a real relation, the relation of the knower to the known, right? And the other, the relation of the known to the knower, is just a relation of what? Well, it's kind of a general point about the relations that are said of God from time, right? Like he begins to be what? The creator, right? Well, something changed in God, so he's now gone from not being a creator to being a creator. Has there been a real change in God? So he takes on now a new relation to the world? Or... He keeps it going. Yeah, but St. Jude said there's no change at all in God. I'm not even a shadow of a change, right? So there's no change in God whereby he changes from being not a creator to being a creator, right? The whole change is in you and me. He created your soul or my soul, right? So we have a real relation to God, but does God have a real relation to us? It's hard to understand, right? But it comes up, huh? It came up earlier in the Prima Paras. Well, now, the same distinction is necessary here when you talk about this union. Has God been changed? Having something united to him? Well, Thomas recalls a teaching in the Prima Paras. I answer it should be said, he says in the Body article, that the union about which we speak is a certain relation, right? Which is considered between the divine nature and the human nature, right? According as they come together in the one person of the Son of what? God. The one person who is the Son of God, right? Now, Thomas recalls a teaching from the first part. Just as in the first part has been said, every relation which is considered between God and the creature, really is in the creature, by whose change, right, such a relation, what? Comes to be, is born, right? But it is not really in God, but according to reason, what? Only. Because it is not born by the change of what? That, huh? Notice how different that is from my kicking you, right? I'm your kicker and you're being kicked, right? But we're both, in a way, changed by this, right? And the activity that results in your being kicked is changing the shape of your body a bit, right? But I'm involved in this motion too, right? My leg is moving and, you know, coming in and getting it, see? Is that the way God changes us, huh? Is he really involved in his activities so that he's changed too? Thus, therefore, he says, it should be said, huh? That this union about which we speak is not in God, what? Really, but according to reason only. Now, that doesn't mean you can't truly say that the divine nature is, what? United with the human nature, right? But in the human nature, which is a certain creature, this union, this relation is really there. And therefore, it is necessary to say that this union is something, what? Created, huh? Now, sometimes I think, you know, that Aristotle and Thomas and maybe Averroes too. I mean, Averroes, I mean, Averroes, I mean, Averroes, I mean, Averroes, I mean, Averroes, I mean, Averroes, I mean, Averroes, I mean, Averroes, I mean, Averroes, I mean, Averroes, I mean, Averroes, I mean, Averroes, I mean, Averroes, I mean, Averroes. And, uh, develops these thoughts some more, but these, uh, he usually distinguishes, you know, in that text, five different kinds of gradations of reason. And one kind that's kind of separated from the other four is the, what, uh, gradations of logic is about, huh? But then he distinguishes four other kinds, two kinds of which he gets directly from the text of Aristotle and two from, what, Avicenna. So he puts them together, right? Okay. It's the most complete text. It shows the extreme subtlety of these guys. But go back a minute to some of the things we stood in in the first part there. When we take up the divine understanding, the divine will, we take them up in a certain order. We talk about the divine understanding first. And then we talk about the divine will, right? And in creatures like you and me, our reason or understanding and our will are two different abilities or powers that we have. And the reason or the understanding moves the what? Will. It poses its object to it, right? The object of the will is the good as understood in some way. And so when we try to know God through creatures, we speak, you know, of what? He understands himself and his own goodness, and therefore he what? Loves himself, right? And so you have a certain relation of move and move there, divine understanding to the divine will. That's the way we understand it, right? But is there a real relation between the divine understanding and the divine will? Why not? The same thing? Yeah. Just like there's no real relation of Socrates to Socrates, right? It's only in our mind that there's two Socrates, right? So it's only in our imperfect thoughts that represent God in a very imperfect way, right? And we have one thought of his understanding, one of his will, right? But these two thoughts correspond to what? The same thing. Yeah. So it's not a real relation there, right? Of the divine understanding to the divine will, right? When we try to understand what God primarily understands, we say, well, the form by which God understands is himself, and therefore he primarily understands himself. It's a kind of reason from the form by which he understands, right? So we're seeing to what he understands, right? So we're seeing the form by which God understands is like the beginning or source of his understanding. Well, again, is that a real relation, God? Is God really the beginning of his own understanding? If that was so, then God's understanding would not be the same thing as he learned. So again, that's the relation of what? Yeah. But now when you get to the Trinity, right? The relation of the Father to the Son and of the Son to the Father, right? These are real relations, huh? So this distinction between real relations and relations of reason, right, is absolutely essential to understanding God and understanding the Trinity. So it comes up again here, too, right? It will come up again when you study creation, if you study the par, the prima paris and creation, right? Is creation something in God or in us? What's our kind of our relation to God, right? It depends upon God, right? And that's the real relation in us. And when we try to understand our real relation to God, we understand God in relation to us. It's our creator, right? But then that's not a real what? Relation, huh? That's hard to understand, right? But get a little bit into it, right? Okay. This text, when you get any more copies, we'll look at it. But when the Second Vatican Council was talking about reading St. Thomas, right? He says, Then, to illustrating the mysteries of salvation, integre, huh, as a whole, quantum fury potest, as much as is able or as possible, right? They should proceed by looking at it with St. Thomas as a teacher. So, as much as they can, we're trying to understand, right? These mysteries. So, something that you'll come across many times in theology, right? This distinction between relations that are real and relations that are what? Are reasonable. There's another distinction that Aristotle brings out in the categories. And you'll see this. And it's kind of, it's always confusing, but you can get a distinction. Relations. And they say a matter. Secundum dici. And secundum esse, right? And some people say, well, that means reason, this means real. No. That's just understanding what the words mean. Okay? This other distinction is the one that Aristotle makes in the chapter on relation to the categories. See, Plato had defined relation as what is said to be of another or towards another in any way whatsoever, right? And that means that not only is double and half relations, because one is always double of something, right? But also knowledge is a relation, because knowledge is knowledge always of something, right? Yet knowledge is fundamentally not a relation at all, but a what? Quality, right? So though it is said to be of another, right? It's fundamentally a quality, but a quality that has a relation following upon it, right? So knowledge is something absolute, right? But double. That's not anything absolutely, but whole being, its whole nature, is to be what? Of another, right? Nothing is double in itself, is it? Double is nothing in itself. It's only something of another, right? And so double will be put in the category of relation, right? While knowledge will be fundamentally in the category of quality. So you have this distinction and then this distinction, and sometimes Thomas will crisscross them and you get four members, right? So it's really quite a study relation, so I wouldn't recommend it until you're... You've got a very quiet room to... Catted room. It's very, very difficult, right? I'm always reminded of what the great Aristotle says in the second book of Wisdom. where he's talking about the difficulty of knowing the truth. And he spends more time saying why it's difficult to know the truth, right? And he sees a very important distinction. He says the cause of the difficulty of knowing something can either be in the thing you're trying to know or it can be the weakness of our mind. Now, natural philosophy and wisdom are both more difficult than geometry. But the reason why natural philosophy is more difficult than geometry is in the thing you're trying to know. Because time, as you were saying earlier, hardly what? Hardly exists. Hardly exists, right? How much time is ever here now in the strict sense? No time at all. There's no time in the now. And that's all that's real.