Tertia Pars
Lecture 10: The Hypostatic Union and the Soul-Body Composition in Christ

Transcript
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Should we go on to Article 5 here? To the first one proceeds thus, it seems that in Christ there was not a union of soul and body, because then you'd have another, what, person, that's what they thought, right? From the union of soul and body and us is caused the person or hypostasis of man. If, therefore, the body and soul were united in Christ, it would follow that from the union of them, some hypostasis was constituted, but not, however, the hypostasis of the word of God, which is eternal. Therefore, in Christ there would be some person or hypostasis apart from the hypostasis of the word, which is against the force, it's the faith, right? Moreover, from the union of the soul and body is constituted the nature of the human species. For Damascene says in the third book that in our Lord Jesus Christ there is not a, what, common species, huh? An individual one, huh? Therefore, in him there was not made a composition of soul and body, huh? Damascene is saying there, but communal species, huh? Common species. Moreover, the soul is not joined to the body except that it might, what, vilify it. But the body of Christ was able to be vilified by the word of God, which is the fountain and beginning of life. Sounds a little bit almost like areas, right? The word of God was the place of the soul. Therefore, in Christ there was not a union of soul and body. But against all this is that the body is not said to be animated, which comes in the word soul, anima, right? Except from the union of the soul. But the body of Christ is said to be animatoma, according to that which the church sings. Assuming an animated body. He chose, or he thought, worthwhile to be born of the virgin, huh? Therefore, in Christ there was a union of body and soul, right? Thomas is briefing to the point here, his response. The answer should be said that Christ is said to be a man univocally with other men, right? So I always say this is, you know, I like to teach people and say, is anything said univocally of God and man, right? And of course, Thomas says, you know, in the earlier part, people are saying, nothing is said univocally of God and the creature, right? But, yeah, yeah. I hear Thomas is saying, yeah. That man is said univocally of Christ and us, right? As existing in the same, what, species. According to that of the apostle. It's at Tone of Messiah again, right? Philippians chapter 2, verse 7. Made in the likeness of men, right? But essential likeness. But it pertains to the notion of the human species that the soul be joined to the body. That's how you get a man. For the form does not constitute the species except through the fact that it is the act of the matter. And to this, and this is that to which generation is terminated. By which the nature intends the very, what, species. Whence it is necessary to say that in Christ that the soul is united to the body and the contrary is, what, heretical, right? And my text is a reference to the second consul of Constantinople. As being, what, yeah. From the truth of the humanity of Christ, huh? If he wouldn't be a man, as well as God, he'd be, what, a soul and a body, but not a man. The Russian Orthodox Catholic Convert, I think he was talking a lot about how these different heresies that misrepresented Christ's natures and personhood gave rise to various types of authoritarianism within the Byzantine Empire. And in destabilizing sort of ways, totalitarianism in certain ways, you could say, because government, forms of government, it seems can be inspired by an understanding, a misunderstanding of the nature of Christ. And only the correct understanding of who Christ is, one person, two natures, seemingly would give rise to maybe good government. I'm not going to be reading too much into it and going too far off on a tangent, but just sort of it's connected to what we just read. The first objection, Thomas says, to the first therefore it should be said, that from this reason some were moved, right, who denied the union of the body and the soul in Christ, right? So it's the history behind this, right, but it's hard to close in here at all, right? Lest through this they be forced, right, to bring in a new person or hypostasis in Christ, new or in addition to that of the word. Why? Because they saw that in pure men, right, that means what, just men, mere men, from the union of the soul to the body, a person is constituted, right? So they thought if there's a union of the soul and body in Christ, then they'd be constituted a person. So you can see how they got into this way of thinking, right? But this happens in mere men because the soul and the body are thus joined in them that they exist, what? They're safe. But in Christ, right, they're united to each other so that they might be joined to another more chief one, right? That they might subsist, this chief thing, person, in nature, right, in the nature composed from them, right? So they're joined together so that this other person, I'm going to speak of other there, could subsist in human nature or be a man. An account of this from the union of the soul and body in Christ is not constituted a new hypostasis or person, but the thing conjunctum, I think, joined together from body and soul is, I've seen it, it comes to, right, a pre-existing person or hypostasis, right? So that's why I make myself an example, right? You say, now, if you bring another line, right, and this line is, what, finite, this line is going to have to have an end point. And since this line already has end point, this other line is going to have its own end point, too, right? But the point is, this other line is drawn, what, to that point, so that the already existing point there, right, becomes the end point of the second line as well as the, what, being the end of the first line, right? So at the same point is in both of these things, it's existing in there, right? Where if the point in us, it's not, what, drawn to the divine person, so it has its own end point, its own individual person. It helps me there, you know, be careful with the imagination, but it means likeness there, right, then? See, where he draws this nature from the Blessed Virgin, right, to his own person, right? So it subsists in this, so it's a divine person, subsists in this nature drawn from the Blessed Virgin, right? Rather than subsisting by itself, or by itself, right? As they say, we're talking there on the break there, with this mystery of the incarnation, you must be promised to understand that in heaven, right? The way we can't understand it on earth, right? That's part of our blessedness. Thomas some days explains, you know, when Christ gives the definition of eternal life, in the 17th chapter of John, this is eternal life to know you and him whom you have sent, Jesus Christ. Mary seems to say as if what eternal life consists of, knowing not in the divinity, but also knowing what the one who sent and sent his man, right? It's going to be the mystery of the incarnation, right? After that, I suppose, Mary would be the interesting thing to understand, right? Yeah, in Christ the 12th, he says after, you know, God and Christ, you know, Mary's the joy of heaven, right? But it's kind of a great, great mystery. What did the comic say of Mary, that she partakes of the hypostatic? No, what Monsignor Dianne, I guess the comic said, you've got to write an article. So Monsignor Dianne laid it out in kind of a bald way, you know, just to, the soldiers and the order is, and said, okay, you flower it up, in other words. And, but the name of the article was, the grace of Mary is of the hypostatic order, right? And that's what I was saying, you know, that when Mary says, I am the Immaculate Conception, you know, does she not know grammar, you see? And I raised the same question there, with the text of chapter 11 of John, right? Where he says to Martha, I am the Anastasis, I am the resurrection and the life, right? Does he not know grammar, you know? My purpose doesn't know grammar. Or does he say resurrection, because resurrection is that by which everything that resurrects, resurrects, right? And so the resurrection of Christ is in some way the cause of the resurrection of everybody else, right? So he's not just, you know, resurrected, but he is the resurrection, because his resurrection is the universal cause of everybody else's resurrection. So Paul can say that if Christ, you know, if Christ rose from the dead, then we will rise from the dead, right? But if we don't rise from the dead, then Christ didn't rise from the dead, right? That connection. And so maybe when Mary said, I am the Immaculate Conception, she's speaking of one of her privileges, right? And in a sense, the first privilege in time, right? The mother of God is the greatest privilege, right? But this makes her suitable to be the mother of God. And there's, so that it's a prerogative of Mary, right? But because there's something universal about Mary's causality, I mean, she's called the, yeah, she's called the mother of mercy, right? Okay. So there's a universality there, right? Because mercy extends to all those who are saved, you know? Everybody's saved in some way. So she's the mother of mercy, then. She has, well, the mediatrix of all grace, as you say, right? So maybe the Immaculate Conception is being said in that way, grammatically, right? Indicate that there's something, what? Universal about what's been given to Mary, right? That we're all going to, in some way, share in her excellence, right? It's going to, in some way, be derived to us, you know? She's the aqueductist, as Bernard of Claremont says. Okay, we're still in there, probably the first ejection there, right? And this, he says, because in mere men, it happens, because the soul and the body are thus joined in them, that they might exist per se, right? Just like that, why don't I lie, right? It's per se by itself, right? Okay. But in Christ, they are joined together, that they might be joined to something else, more principal, right? More chief. Which will subsist in the nature, right? That is composed from them, right? An account to this, from the union of the body and the soul in Christ, is not constituted a new hypostasis or person, but the thing, conjunctum, joined together, right, comes to a person or hypostasis preexistent. Just like my only example here, this other line is what? Comes to a point, to an end point that already exists. That's kind of an amazing thing, though. I can stop and think about it, right? That this line has an end point that exists before it existed, right? But it wasn't the end point of this other line, so that line was drawn to it. And so this person, that is the word, did not subsist to human nature, took human nature and been drawn to this person from Mary. Nor, on account of this, does it follow that the union of body and soul in Christ was of less, what? Efficacy, right? So we might argue and say, well, okay, but then, you know, the union of soul and body and me produces the person of Dwayne Burkwist. And Christ, it doesn't produce a person, so it has less efficacy, right? Because that junction, right, to something more noble, right, does not, what, take away power and dignity, but instead, what, increases it. It's an interesting comparison here. Just as a sensing soul in animals constitutes a species, which in the animals, in the beasts, that is to say, is considered as its last or ultimate form, but not in men, right? Although in them it is more noble and more, what? Powerful. So we say, well, the sensing soul makes a complete substance there in the dog. The sensing soul that I have doesn't, what, make me completely, but actually, what? It's joined to something more noble, the, what, understanding soul, right? But not hover in men, although in men it is more noble and more virtuous, huh? I mean, I would teach you this, right, just to compare the plant soul with the animal soul, right? Animal soul. Animal soul. Yeah. And he says, and he compared the sap of the tree with the blood and the animal, right? Kind of the same thing, the sap and the blood, but the blood is, what, more perfect, huh? Than the sap, huh? And you can say that the sensing soul in men is more, what, more perfect, more noble, huh? Especially the sense of touch. Oh, because I was going to say, I mean, the sense of the soul, of the ego, allows it to see much better than I can see. Yeah, yeah. Seeing, you know, all kinds of elements out of the hearing house, or... The kind of foundation of the senses is the sense of touch, right? Which is found in all the senses. And, you know, it's interesting, I was reading in Aristotle there, where he talks about the sense of touch, and he says, the man who's got a better sense of touch would have a better understanding, right? And, and... I said, well, how does he know that? If I felt the skin of Thomas would be finer and softer than my skin, you know, my skin's kind of rough. But anyway, in the commentary there, at the end of the second book on the soul, Thomas gives two reasons why the man who has a better sense of touch will have a better understanding, a better soul. And one reason, he says, is the sense of touch is the foundation of all the, what? Senses, right? So the man who's got a better sense of touch will have a better sensing soul. And that is a disposition for the, what? Understanding soul, right? And then he says that the sense of touch, you know, depends upon a certain balance, hot and cold and dry and wet and so on. And, therefore, a better balanced body will receive a better soul. And, therefore, you're going to understand better, huh? DeConnick has the same as talking back to Gayle, I guess, a commencement address at Assumption College, and Assumption College is a very small place. But it's kind of a reply to DeCartney, in a way. He says, I sit, therefore I am. But the fact that that that that that that We prefer, you know, in my world, the sense of sight. I can say an eagle to the sense of touch, you know. But he's pointing out how the basic, what, thoughts all go back to the sense of touch. And let's all get the words, the idea of substance and so on from the sense of touch. And even the sense of sympathy for others, right, goes back to the sense of touch. Did you ever see that movie there, the one that Orson Welles plays? Was it the fifth man or the third man? The one where he's in Vienna after the war. He's making money by diluting medicines and people are dying from it and so on. And Cotton, you know, shows up and finds out what his friend is doing, you know. And eventually gets caught Orson Welles, you know. But they go up in this kind of, you know, amusement park, you know, but you're looking all the way down. And just people down there, you know. Just from off like that, you know. You don't feel anything with these people, right? You know, you've got no feeling. It's just, it's all visual, right? It's hard to walk it off and how much money that is. It was written by a Catholic, the third man. Was that a book first? Yeah. I think it was a third man. Was it called The Third Man? I remember just the version with Orson Welles and Joseph Cotton, you know. And Orson Welles was the guy who was doing these bad things. He eventually gets caught. But it's a very, very, very good, well done movie, huh? You ever saw that? It's kind of a famous movie. There's a, there's a, there's a, there's a parlor that would be true that the man has a better sense, he has a better soul, he has a better sense of touch. What else means more sensitive to pain? And that's what all the meditation does, Christ's passion is that he had a more perfect soul. Therefore, even a slight thing for him was more painful than us. Not because he was weak, but because the soul was noble. And then the hands and the feet had the most nervous or touch. Shakespeare touches upon that, you know, at the end of Julius Caesar, right? The eulogy of Brutus, right? The helmet's just so mixed in him that all the world, like stand up and say, this was a man, right? Yeah. So, now the second objection, and this is kind of the, what would Damascene mean by those words? The second should be said that the word of Damascene can be understood in two ways. In one way that refers to human nature, which does not have the notion of a common species, right? That's the word. According as it is in one individual alone, but only as it is, what? Abstracted from every individual, as it is found and make it, huh? Contemplation without any images, right? Anything that pertains to singular. Or according as it is in, what? All individuals, huh? Well, the Son of God did not assume human nature insofar as it was only in the consideration of reason. Because thus he would not have assumed the very thing of human nature. Unless perhaps someone said that human nature was a separated form as the Platonists laid down man to be without matter, right? But then the Son of God would not have assumed flesh against what is said in Luke, chapter 24, 39, after the resurrection, right? Spirit does not have flesh and bone as you see me to have, right? Likewise, it cannot be said that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is in all individuals of the same species, right? Because thus he would have assumed all men. It remains, therefore, as Damascene afterwards says in the same book, that he assumed human nature in optimal, right? Which is the Greek word for individual, huh? But not in another individual that is the suppositum or hypostasis of nature than in the person of the, what? Son of God, huh? Another way can be understood the saying of Damascene that does not refer to human nature as from the union of the soul and the body there does not result one common nature which is human, but it refers to the union of two natures, the divine and the human from which is not composed some third thing, right? Which would be a common nature, right? Because thus that would be, what? Apt to be said of many, huh? And this he intends there, huh? Whence he subjoins for neither is it, what? Is it generated, nor will there ever be generated another Christ from Godhood and humanity, right? In Godhood and humanity. A perfect God the same, a perfect man, huh? That's a little obscure the whole text of Damascene but Thomas follows it through, right? But it could be but it probably does be, huh? So don't worry too much about that. My third objection is saying couldn't you have the body there being vivified, you know? So on. And the third should be said that two-fold is the beginning of body life. one is effective and that means like an efficient, what? Cause, an extrinsic cause. And in this way the word of God is the beginning of all, what? Life. Another way something is the beginning of life as a form, right? Since to live is for living things to be as the philosopher says, huh? Just as each thing formally is through its own form so the body lives through the soul. And in this way the body cannot live through the word because it is not able to be the form of a body as we showed in the treatise on me. On the simplicity of God. So the body and the soul were joined, huh? Otherwise he would not have been a, what? Man, huh? So when you see the body and blood of our Lord in the Eucharist you receive his, what? His soul as well, right? Okay. Divinity too, but well, here's the question of the soul, right? You ever say that prayer there that one that's anima Christi? You know, that's kind of a prayer you say after you receive communion a lot. But the first thing is anima Christi sanctificame corpus Christi salame and so on. But the first thing is anima Christi because the anima's there, right? Would the anima be there if the soul and the body were not joined? Because the body is there from the words of the consecration but the soul is there because it's joined to the body. Not from the words of the consecration because it's joined to the body. It wasn't joined to the body. Would that prayer be, right? They say lex orandi lex credendi Yeah. Okay, time for another sure, yes. Michael. Michael. Now, whether human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally, right? I was reading this in the other Summa, yeah. And I was teaching the categories of Aristotle, right? And there are ten categories. And one of the students there wanted to divide the ten into two. But you can do it, right? Substance and accidents, right? But Thomas divides it into three, right? So you have substance, and then those that signify something existing in the substance, right? But not what it is, right? Quantity, quality, relation. And then you have these last six. Are they really accidents in the same way that the quantity and quality are? Well, suddenly it's something like my being clothed. My clothing is not really in me, like my size is in me, or my health is in me, or my geometry is in me. Or even my fatherhood is in me, right? Brotherhood is in me. And Thomas, you know, some people, you know, misunderstand the words there, and Paul there, that he's found. And habitus, you know, it's in Latin, as a man. Like that category of habitus, which is being clothed and so on. So God has since clothed himself within the nature, you know. But he uses the term, actually, didn't tell you to say, having itself accidentally towards, right? Well, that's something like an accident, because I could lose my health, right? Become sick. I can take off my clothes, and so on, right? So I can be with or without my clothes, right? Like I can be with or without my health. I used to a little time. But if you look at the last six, then, at least some of them especially, like to be in this room, you know, to be clothed and so on. It seems less an accident than something that is like an accident, right? And Thomas used that phrase, actually, didn't tell you to say habits. So in that sense, maybe the division into three is a little better than the division into two. But it brings out something that the other division doesn't bring out the distinction of the... Actually, you could subdivide the two, you know, but this one you see. And this is the text that he gives here. To six, one proceeds thus. It seems that human nature was not united to the word of God. Or it was united to the word of God, accidentally. He's going to take the wrong side first, right? Please. And this is the text I was referring to. For the apostle says in the Philippians 2, verse 7, right? About the Son of God, quad... And you've got to look at the Latin here. Quad habitu in ventus est ut homo. Now Aristotle calls that category in Greek ekene, right? Which means to have, right? And in the Latin of Thomas or Albert and so on, this category would be called habituus, right? And in that is being clothed, right? Okay. So you've got the word habitu there, right? That kind of suggests this false understanding, right? But habituus accidentally comes to that of which it is, right? Whether one takes habituus as one of the ten genera, right? Well, that's what I was referring to, right? Being clothed. In English, sometimes habituus, I don't know how to translate it, but sometimes habit. You can speak of a monk's habit or something like that, right? But it doesn't come across in English. I used to call it outfit sometimes, right? Or outfitted, right? Because it kind of gives the idea, you know, it's something, you know, extrinsic, right? But still fitted to you. And then it's one of the ten genera, right? Or insofar as it is a species of quality. The first species of quality is habit or disposition, right? Second one is ability or power or impotency, right? And the third one is a sense quality. And the fourth is figure or shape, right? But habit, in the sense of a species of quality, would be something in you, right? As a genus of itself would be something, what, outside, right? It's kind of interesting, Aristotle used the word eke now, because in English, for example, you hear sometimes people speaking of the haves and the have-nots. Was that talking about virtue? Those who have virtue, those who don't have virtue? No. It's talking about something expensive to you, right? It's either have or you don't have, right? You've seen Benedict XVI talking about money, you know, and how to, you know, unreal thing it is, in terms of this, you know, it's kind of international now, this financial problem. But then you see something, perhaps the word, well, Aristotle used the word to have, right? That have, though it has many meanings, right? What comes to mind first, maybe, is something exterior, right? You know, I have a house, I have a car, I have a book, I have clothes, you know, I have money, you know, you know? But these are all things that are extrinsic to me, right? Yeah. Yeah. But that's more intrinsic, right? You know? Okay. So this is arguing in for the text of St. Paul, right? The year of St. Paul, right? He's in trouble there. So they're for human nature, accidentality, right? There's that term, accidentality, right? It's not like there's something existing in him, right? Moreover, everything that comes to something after its complete being, right, comes to it accidentally. Sounds like a good philosophical principle, right? For we call an accident, and this goes back now to the isogogy of Porphy, right? Aristotle's treatment of accident in the fifth book of wisdom. For we call that an accident, what can, what? Be present or absent to something apart from the corruption of the, what? Subject, right? But human nature comes from, what? In time, right? To the Son of God having, what? Perfect being from eternity. Therefore, it must come to imagine that thing. It must have still just been made. Yeah. That's something with a great, great argument. I wonder, you know, what's his name? Porphy wrote some, I guess, some nasty tax upon Christianity. One of the, we've lost them because the Christian emperor is burnt. He's a tax, I see. He might have been kind of devastated, you know? Augustine discusses, you know, Porphy there a bit in the City of God, why he didn't become a Christian, you know? Was it pride or what was it? He's, you know, but he's a pretty sharp guy, you know? That doesn't save you from pride, you know? Moreover, whatever does not pertain to the nature or essence of something, it's an accident of that thing, right? Because everything which is, is either a substance or a, what? Accident. But human nature does not pertain to the essence or nature of the, what? To the divine nature of the Son of God, because the union was not made in the nature. Therefore, it's necessary that the human nature come to the Son of God accidentally. After all, the Son of God has a nature, doesn't he? Yeah. So this human nature came to him after he had his nature, so it must come to him, what? Accidentally, yeah? Moreover, a tool comes to something accidentally. But the human nature in Christ was a tool of his divinity. For, Damascene says in the third book, Svide Orthodoxa, that the flesh of Christ was an instrument, existed as an instrument of his divinity, right? Therefore, it seems that human nature was not, was joined to the... the Son of God, accidentally, no? I'm convinced, aren't you? But against this is that what is said accidentally does not predicate a liquid, but how much, or how, or having itself in some way. If therefore human nature came accidentally, when Christ is said to be man, there would not be predicated something, but how, or how much, or in some way having itself. Which is against the decree of Alexander the Pope, saying, since Christ is perfect God and perfect man, who has the temerity, dares to say that Christ, according as he is man, is not what? Yeah, I'll equate him. Okay, now Thomas has got a long reply here, huh? I answer, it should be said, that to the evidence of this question, it should be known that about the mystery of the union of the two natures in Christ, unless he calls it a mysterium, right? Some of we can't fully understand. A two-fold heresy rose up, right? One was that of those confounding the natures, huh? Just as Eutyches, huh? The monophysites, from the Greek word for one in nature, right? And Dioschoros, huh? Who laid down that from the two natures was constituted one nature. Thus that they confessed Christ was from two natures as distinct before the union, but not in two natures, right? After the union of what? Natures, the distinction would be, what? Seizing, going away. Other was the heresy of Nestorius and Theodorus, Mopsotenus, separating the persons, right? And so we talked about those two, what? Eris, right? Because there's one nature. Yeah, I told you, it's trinity, I don't know. Because there's one person, there had to be, what? One nature, right? And others say, because there's two natures, there had to be two, what? Persons, yeah. Yeah, for Nestorius and Theodorus, who I guess came before him in time. They laid down, other is the person of the son of God and the son of what? Man, huh? Which they said, they were united to each other, first, according to what? Indwelling, yeah. In habitaxionum, right? Okay? And that's more like the last six categories and like, you know, acts in the sense of quantity or quality, you know, insofar as the word of God dwelt in that man is in a temple, right? Just like we say, you're a saint, don't you know you're the temple of the Holy Spirit, right? Well, the Holy Spirit is, if he's dwelling in you, is there a substantial union there? No. Well, I mean, being in my house or something, right? Okay. Secondly, by a union of affection, right? Insofar as the will of that man was always conformed to the will of God, okay? The same way of the two men, maybe they can have a harmony of wills, right? Same thing. And a third way, by what? Operation, insofar as they said that that man was a tool of the word of God, right? But like a hand was a tool, right? I had something that's substantially joined to me. Fourth, by dignity of honor, insofar as every honor which is shown to the Son of God is shown to that man on account of this conjunction to the Son of God. And fifth, by equivocation, according to the communication of names, insofar as we say that man to be God and the Son of God, right? That's the question I was asked about Martha. Martha, how is she understanding the Son of God, right? And we're sons of God, too, you know, as St. John says, so that's equivocal, right? But it manifests that all of these ways imply some accidental, what? Union, huh? Some people coming later, some later teachers, thinking themselves to, what? Be declining or going away from here, he sees. They fell into these through, what? Vigrants, huh? For some of them conceded the one person of Christ but laid down two hypotheses, huh? You talked about that before, right? Or two supposita, saying that a certain man composed from body and soul from the beginning of his conception was assumed by the Word of God, huh? And this is the first opinion which the magister, and that's what Peter Lombard, lays down in the sixth distinction of the third book of the sentences, huh? I think the first two books and sentences are talking about everything proceeding from God, right? The procession of the divine persons and then the procession of creatures from God, right? And the last two books are the return of everything to God, right? So that's where he takes up the incarnation in the third book, which Thomas does a little bit in the Summa Contagentia, or Summa Theologiae, right? Where the incarnation is taken up in the return of all things to God, right? Others wishing to preserve the unity of the person laid down that the soul of Christ was not joined to the body, right? And we had another article on that, right? That's what I was saying. These articles might seem to be logic-chopping almost, you know, why is he getting so precise? But they all correspond to the history of the development of this and trying to avoid the mistakes. But that these two separated from each other were united to the word, what? Accidentally, right? That thus they could, what? Could not increase the number of persons in Christ, and this is the third opinion which the magister lays down there, right? That's quite a star house of the history of theology. But both of these opinions falls into the heresy of Nestorius. First, because it is the same thing to lay down two hypostasis, right? Or two supposita in Christ as to lay down two persons. Because a person is nothing other than hypostasis in a rational nature. And if one wants to make strength in the name of person, it should be considered that Nestorius also used the unity of person on account of the unity of what? Dignity and honor, right? You've got to be kind of careful there with it. Whence the fifth sinad, huh? It's, I guess, the second council of Constantinople, defined as anathema the one who says there's one person secundum dignitatem, right, huh? Honorum and adorazione. It's Theodorus and Nestorius insanely, right? Both together, right? The other opinion falls into the air of Nestorius as regards this that it lays down in accidental, what? Minion. For it does not differ to say that the word of God is united to the man Christ by indwelling as it is temple, as Nestorius says. And to say that he, that the word was united to man according to clothing, as the third opinion says, huh? But he says something worse than Nestorius, that the soul and the body are not what? But the Catholic faith medium tenets, right? Between the four suppositions. Neither says that the union of God and man was by essence or nature, like Utica is the same, right?