Tertia Pars
Lecture 9: The Hypostatic Union and Unity of Person in Christ

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Prayer first, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, and help us to understand all that you have written. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. So now, some of these things may seem a little picky on Thomas' part, but it goes back into a long history, right, of people you know, or misusing these words, right? And some would say there's one person, but two hypostasis, and all kinds of things, right? So to the third one proceeds thus. It seems that the union of the incarnate word was not made in the underlying, the suppositum, or in the, what, hypostasis, right? And it's those two words, the one from Latin, one in Greek, is saying, what, etymology, right? Okay. But they properly name something subsisting, right, in the genus of substance. For Augustine says, in the Incuridium, faith, hope, and charity, that the divine substance and the human substance, both are the one son of what? God. But other, on account of the word, and other, on account of the what? Man. And Leo the Pope, huh, says in the Epistle to Flavian, one of these, right, breaks forth miracles, right, huh? I guess it goes back to the idea of horns, huh? Fuck! The first meaning of it is very vivid in Latin or Greek. And the other succumbs to, what, injuries, right? So he does his miracles, in a sense, by his divine nature, primarily, and by his human nature, he succumbs to the suffering and death, yeah. But everything that is other and other, kind of like a little Latin here, right, because you don't have this as distinct in our grammar, right? They differ in what? Yeah. Therefore, the union of the incarnate word was not made in the, what, suppositum, the underlying, huh? Interesting, huh, you've got to be kind of careful with grammar, right, in different languages. I was thinking of the word nothing the other day, right? And if I say, nothing is nothing, that statement is true, right? But that's an affirmative, what, or negative statement, nothing is nothing. It's an affirmative, but not a negative. Yeah. But it is an affirmative statement, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. Now, suppose I say, nothing is better than God. Is that it? Also an affirmative statement? Huh? Well, if that was an affirmative statement, it would be false, right? Mm-hmm. See? Now, so it's actually I'm a guilty of throwing nothing there, right? If I said, no thing is better than God, right? Then it would be clearly that it's a negative statement, right? But yet, speaking as a logician, right, and understanding this in the same way, right, I'd say this is a, what, negative statement, right? Even though it seems to be, what, grammatically affirmative, right? I mean, grammatically speaking, is is a verb, verse, right? Just like that. And nothing, I suppose, would be classified as what? Yeah, or a noun. It's a noun, right? But if you say no thing, this would be a noun, but this is, yeah, it's a sign of a negation. We have all kinds of problems, because Thomas will often see in some of these articles a distinction between alius and what? Yeah, yeah. So, like in the study of the Trinity, is the father alius from the, you know? If you use the neuter like that or something, it might signify that there's a different nature, a different thing, huh? But if you say alius, maybe that's okay to say, huh? Because that could be applied to a distinction of what? Persons, right? Now, since we're in hypostasis, there's other problems, right? Because even though etymologically hypostasis should be used for any subsisting individual in the genus of substance, maybe by custom it comes to mean, what, the same thing as person, right? So the Greeks would confess their faith, maybe, saying there's three hypostasis in Christ, huh? I mean, the Trinity, yeah. Yeah, but they talk about the incarnation as the, what, hypostatic union, right? Okay. But meaning the same thing by union in hypostasis as we mean by union in the, what? Yeah. I know some philosophy, too, you know, we have words like, anyone home? Well, anyone, does that refer to a chair or table? Am I thinking, is there anything in the house? No, I mean a person, right? But etymologically, anyone could fit, any one chair, any one, you know? But it's some things you've got to, you know, have a little common sense, you know, but they're different from one language to another, right? Everybody is somebody, then nobody is anybody. Yeah. You're on the soul. And what's a Greek word for nothing? Yeah, I think so, uden, yeah. So you have the negative O-U there, and you have one, so no one means nothing, you know? For us, no one would be listening to, you know? Yeah. So, back and forth in the Greeks and the Romans, you can see there could be lots of room for misunderstanding, and lots of room for the heretics, too, right? So, there's a history of these things, you know? What does the other and other mean in this objection? Well, I mean, allios would be used more for, what, a distinction of persons? Yes. And allios more for a distinction of substance, something that's more neutral. Allios and other. Yeah, yeah. It's like what St. Vincent of Laeran says about, in the Trinity, it's allios and allios, but Savior, it's allio and allio. Oh, okay. That's more or less the same type of distinction. Oh, okay. Moreover, in hypostasis is nothing other than a, what, particular or individual substance, as Boethius says in the book about the two natures. But it's manifested in Christ, there is a, what, another particular substance besides the hypostasis of the word. To it, the body and soul and the thing composed from these two. Therefore, in Christ, there's another hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the word of God, right? The other dangers of these things. Moreover, the hypostasis of the word is not contained in any genus, nor under any species, as is clear from those things that have been said in the first part. That's in the question of the simplicity of God, right? That God is not in any, what, genus or any species, huh? But Christ, according as he's made a man, is contained under the human, what, species. For Dionysius says in the first chapter about the divine names, he was made within, right, our nature, right, who exceeds every order according to, what, every nature, right? In a super substantial way. But there's not contained under the human race except the, what, hypostasis of the human species. The human race, the human race, the human race, the human race, the human race, the human race, the human race, the human race, the human race, the human race. Therefore, in Christ, there's another hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word of God. And that's the same as before. You can see how pinning down the stories and his followers and her senses can be hard to get very precise. But against this is what Damascene says in the third book. In our Lord, Jesus Christ, we know two natures, right? Recognize two natures. But one, what? Hypostasis. I guess Damascene is writing in Greek, right? Now, Thomas says, this is the way this comes up, right? I answer that some, being ignorant, right? Of the relation of hypostasis to person, right? Not understanding the distinction and so on. These two. Although they concede in Christ that there's only one person, right? They laid down, nevertheless, that there's a other, what? Hypothesis of God and another one of, what? Man. Saying as if the union was made in the person, but not in hypostasis. Now, this all appears erroneous in three ways, right? First, from the fact that person does not add above hypostasis anything except a determined nature. To it, a rational nature. Rational being used in the broad sense for reason or understanding. According as Goetheus says in the book about the two natures, that a person is an individual substance of a rational nature, right? And therefore, it is the same thing to attribute its own hypostasis to the human nature in Christ, right? And its own, what? Person. Do you see that? So, in other words, if you say that the hypostasis, yes, a human hypostasis, you're saying what? It's a human person. Now you've got two persons there. So, if you say the human nature in Christ has its own hypostasis, you're admitting that there's a person besides the divine person there. Now you've got two persons, and now you're in the air of Mysterious, right? She should not be called the mother of God, but the mother of Christ. Okay? Theotokos. People say, there's nothing wrong with what he's saying. Even the people in the pew, that they did their pews in those days. Which the Holy Fathers, right? Understanding, both in the, what, Fifth Council, celebrated at Constantinople. I guess it's the Second Constantinople. Damn the earth, huh? That's the Latin for anathema, right? You're damn, did you say that, huh? Okay. If someone attempts to introduce into the mystery of Christ, right, two subsistences, right? Or two persons, such a one is accursed, right? Nathema. For the Holy Trinity does not receive an addition of, what, a person or subsistence in the, what, one incarnate word of God, who came from the Holy Trinity, right? It doesn't emit two persons in there, but two subsistences. Subsistencia, he says there, is the same thing as the subsisting thing, right? Which is proper to the hypostasis, as is clear through Boethius in the book on the, what, two natures, right? Secondly, because even if one were to give, the person does add something over, what, hypostasis, in which there could be a union. This would be nothing other than a property pertaining to, what, dignity, huh? According, as by some it is said, and now this is Bonaventure down there, we've got to watch out for that guy. Yeah, that's funny, huh? Yeah. That person is in hypostasis by a property, by distinct property pertaining to what? Dignity, right? Okay? It's almost like saying just that a person is a hypostasis that has some dignity. Which is not false if you say, well... That's true, isn't it? Yeah, it's a hypostasis of a rational nature, so it has a certain dignity, right? Because of that. If, therefore, there was made a union in a person and not in a hypostasis, right? Okay? Consequently, it would not be made a union except by according to a certain dignity, right? That's using... Thomas did not say this is what Bonaventure is doing, no. He's saying, if you say this is... So you look at the difference there, right? And you say, well... There's a union in a person but not in hypostasis, so then you remove hypostasis from what pertains to the person. You only have the dignity left, right? And then you have an accidental union. And this, the Council of Ephostasis approving, is demned by Cyril, by Cyril, rather, under these words, if one in Christ divides the, what, subsistences, after the union, right? Only joining them by a conjunction which is by dignity, or authority, or according to power, and not more by the coming together, by natural union, is anathema. Third, because only in hypostasis is that to which we attribute the operations and the properties of nature, and those things which pertain to the notion of nature in the concrete. For we say that this man reasons, right? That is capable of laughter, right? And this man is a rational animal, right? And by this reason, this man is said to be a, what, suppositum underlying, because he, what, underlies those things which pertain to, what, man, receiving their, what, predication and being said of. If, therefore, there was a other hypothesis, hypostasis in Christ, besides the hypostasis of the word, it would follow that one of these, of someone other than of the word itself, would be verified those things which are of man. For example, to be born of the virgin, to suffer, be crucified, and to be buried, right? And this also was damned, huh? The Council of Ephesus approving, right? Under these words, if someone, right, to two persons or two subsistences, those things which in the Gospels, right, in the apostolic writings are imparted, gives words either about Christ said by the saints or by him about himself, and some of them, as a word to the man, apart from, what, the God, right? The words, especially understood, applies. Some of these, as sayable of God, only from, what, to the word that is from God, the Father, he's anathomous sin. He's saying you can say, well, the man died, but you can't say God died. That's, what, anathomous. Yeah, yeah. And if there was a different hypostasis to the human nature from the divine hypostasis, that you'd have to say, right, some things can be said of the man Christ, can not be said of, what, the word, right? So you couldn't say that God died for us. You couldn't say that his man died for us, but you couldn't say that God died for us. So you're convinced by those three reasons, huh? Three's enough, huh? How many kinds of sin are there, by the way? How many kinds of sin are there? Two? Twenty-three. but often two is not enough so many kinds of sin are there in general two is not enough two is not enough two is not enough in a different way two is divided into original and actual in actual and mortal and venial so eventually three kinds of sin right the original would be a different kind of sin than from mortal and venial right so two is not enough right to understand men you've got to have three sins right and they're all just busy to God but some obviously quite more than some than others two of them would keep you out of heaven I guess thus therefore it is clear that there's a heresy right from ancient times from long ago condemned right to say that in Christ there are two what hypostasis or two suppositives or that the what union was not made in the hypostasis or the suppositives two things he's saying there right you see there's two hypostasis two things underlying all this that's going to be something damned and if you say the union was not made in hypostasis that's the same thing once in the same synod it reads if someone does not confess that the flesh by subsistence was united from God the Father the word the word from God the Father and one to be the Christ with his flesh to wit both God and man your anathema anathema six so if you only predicate the operations and the properties of the nature to the hypostasis so then it would be false to say something like you can't say Christ's human nature was angry yeah it's not really correct to say you say Christ through or by his human nature is angry right Christ by his divine nature created the world and so on right through his human nature yeah but you can't predicate the anger of the human nature yeah in the same way even in me you can't say that my my individual human nature walks or my individual human nature understand right but that I understand through my nature right so some things Christ does or undergoes through his human nature and some things he what um does through his divine nature right now I was looking at the text if you are where Christ is saying there in the chapter there John to Martha right I am the what resurrection and the life right and it seems to me that when he says I am resurrection he's thinking of something that belongs to him by his human nature because by his human nature that he he rose right from the dead right okay he couldn't rise from the dead by his divine nature he's like he couldn't be dead by his divine nature right okay but by his divine nature he's life itself right and it's interesting that you have the same order there as you have in the the words that later on he's going to say I am the road the truth and the life right but as man he's the road that's why Thomas takes at the beginning of the third part which is about Christ he says who as man is the road to God but as God he's truth itself and life itself what's the difference between your individual human nature and your person well in my own individual human nature there pertains there's nothing to be found except human nature right but in me Dwayne Berkwist the person right I'm not only a human being but I'm also a geometer right I'm also white I'm also sitting right it's very hard you see you can see how much room there was wiggle room for the heretic and so on right now the first objection was talking about what Hollywood right the first therefore it should be said that just as an accidental difference makes what alterum right so a essential difference makes what Hollywood right now it's manifest that alteration which comes about from the accidental difference can pertain to the same hypostasis or suppositum in created things in that the same in number can undergo what diverse accidents swine both they what both white and a geometry right that's all you to all you to me right yeah my my being white is something other than my being a geometry but it's not however possible in created things that the same thing in number subsists under diverse what essences or natures whence just as alterum and alterum in creatures does not signify diversity of suppositum but only diversity of accidental forms so that Christ is said alliud et alliud right he's Latin does not imply a diversity of what suppositum or hypostasis but the diversity of what natures whence Gregory Nazianzen says in his epistle to Celidonium alliud et alliud are those from which the savior is but not alliud et alliud right and then he makes the contrast that I was making there I say vero alliud et alliud a contrario right than the way it's had in the trinity for there we say alliud et alliud because the father is alliud and from the son right that we do not confound the subsistences of the persons we don't say the trinity alliud et alliud that's kind of interesting right because in a way the mystery of the trinity and the mystery of the incarnation are contrary right because in the one you have a unity of nature and a multiplicity of persons and the other one you have unity of person multiplicity of nature right and therefore you know when they talk about the heresies or the mistakes about incarnation of trinity and they say the truth is in between what two extremes right so the truth about the trinity is in between the stream of saying there are three persons and three natures and there's one person and one nature right and you can explain the mistakes by the truth because there's one nature and three persons you could see why somebody might think there's three natures to correspond to three persons so the person says there's three persons and three natures as part of the truth three persons he's mistaken about there being three natures and vice versa the man who says well because there's only one nature there's only one person there he's got part of the truth too because he has one nature and he's mistaken about there being one person right but But if you say either one of these heresies is the truth, it can't explain it's what? Yeah. If there's really only one nature, one person in God, why would anybody think there's three natures and three persons? Is it? There's no basis at all in what you claim to be the truth, right? And vice versa, if there are truly three natures and three persons, right, in God, why would anybody think there's just one nature, one person? There'd be no basis, no truth in there, right? But if the truth is as it is, that there's one nature in three persons, then you can see, right? So the truth explains in some ways why people may be, what, mistakes, huh? But mistakes can't explain each other. It's interesting, you know, when you study the soul there, you find out that Plato apparently, and the Platonists thought that the souls of dogs and cats are immortal too. And of course Aristotle rejects that, right? And sees that just the human soul, the understanding soul, is immortal. Then you have the other position that says no soul is what? Immortal, huh? So Aristotle's position is in between those who say no soul is immortal, which is the opinion of the early scientists, the early philosophers, and modern scientists still, and we use the word soul, but they have the same idea, and the Platonists, right? But they can't explain each other, right? But Aristotle's position explains both, right? So like he said in King Lear, right? All my reports go with the modest truth, nor more, nor clipped, but so. In Shakespeare, instead of saying neither nor, they say nor nor. Instead of saying either or, they say or or. So he says, all my reports go with the modest truth, nor more, nor clipped, right? Neither more nor less, huh? But so. Or as Faustus says, if they say more or less than the truth, they are villains and the, what, sons of darkness. Because he's a big liar himself. He's a man of spirit. Yeah, he's a big liar himself, don't say. Or a politician. Yeah. But then you see, you know, it often explains that in the courtroom, you say, I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. The second and the third phrases are not just reiterating what the first one says, but they're excluding the two ways you could depart from the truth by saying more than the truth or saying less than the truth. Saying more than the truth or clipping it, in the words of the one, right? So there's a little likeness there between the virtues of reason and the moral virtues, which are very clearly, you mean between two extremes, huh? Like courage is in between cowardice and full-heartiness, huh? But in a way, truth is something like that. You know, it's in between two mistakes, two falsehoods, one of which is an excess, you might say, and the other falls short. But when you say that what is, is not, then you're cutting. When you say what is not is, then you're adding, right? Say, how many days are in class today? Nine. Okay, what's he saying? How many people are in class today? He said, oh, twenty. So now I'm saying more than the truth. I'm saying what was not, was, right? But if I say that only five guys showed up today, then I'm saying less than the truth. In both cases, I departed, right? In one case, I'm saying that who was there was not there. In the case, who was not there was there. You know, the second objection, I'm part of here. Because it seems that the definition of person, or hypostasis, in general, is an individual substance, right? Okay. And Thomas said, well, it could be the more precise there. To the second it should be said, that hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not just in any way, but insofar as it is in its what? Completion, right? For as it comes into the union of something more complete, it is not called hypostasis. And he gives the example there, the hand or the foot, right? You say, oh, my hand is what? In the genus of substance, and it's something individual. It's an individual hand, right? But is this a person? Here's another person? Here's another person? No. And likewise, the human nature in Christ, although it is a particular substance, because nevertheless it comes into union with something more what? Complete. To it of the whole Christ, insofar as he is God and man. It cannot be said to be a hypostasis or suppositum. But that complete thing to which it what? Runs together, is said to be the hypostasis or what? Suppose he told him. So that's a very kind of precision of what the Greek Goetheists are saying, right? Now the third objection, right? If he's a man, how can he have a hypothesis other than a human hypostasis, right? If he doesn't have a human hypostasis, how can he be a man, right? Well, you're not a man by your hypostasis, but by the nature you have. And he has the human nature as well as the divine nature. To the third, it should be said, that even in created things, a singular thing is not placed in a genus or species by reason of what pertains to its what? Individuation. But by reason of its nature, right? Which is determined by its what? Form. In that famous text in Philippians, when he was in the form of God, he took on the form of a slave, right? The form there is taken for what? The individual nature. For individuation is more by matter in composed things, right? Therefore, it should be said that Christ is in the human species by reason of the human nature he assumed, not by reason of what? Hypostasis, huh? Back to my homely example there, right? When I drew that line to the other point, right? Remember that, huh? So that point now is the beginning of this new line, right? But it's not the beginning of the new line by reason of being what? That new line's own end point, is it? Maybe it's another point it already was. So, got to spell these things out, huh? Have to look again at that text on Thomas there from the Second Vatican Council, right? What if my printer works? You never know. I've been told I sit on my computer, my printer more, because then it ink dries up, you know? I mean, you can have a new ink thing in there, but if you don't use it for a while, it just doesn't work yet. Use it or lose it, you know? That's the way it is. The last years I had an assumption that you really had a nice thing there in the secretary's office, you know? You could just, you know, press a button, and you walk down the hall, and you're already printed out, you know? It's your own copies. It's so fast, you know? So I was in the class, you know, I was talking to the secretary one time, but it was expensive, you know? I mean, reading was efficient, just perfectly crisp and clear, you know? And the joke was, you know, I'm going to try to run and sell you a bitch, you know? So I was pretty happy, you know, for a while. Well, the hair tick got caught there. Now let's see if you can do something else here, huh? I'm going to try to do something else here, huh? I'm going to try to do something else here, huh? I'm going to try to do something else here, huh? I'm going to try to do something else here, huh? I'm going to try to do something else here, huh? I'm going to try to do something else here, huh? I'm going to try to do something else here, huh? To the fourth, one recedes thus. It seems that the person of Christ is what? Composed, huh? For the person of Christ is not other than the person or hypostasis of the word, as is clear. But in the word, there is not another what? Person and nature, as is clear from those things which I said in the first part. Since, therefore, the nature of the word is simple, as has been shown in the first part, it is impossible that the person of Christ be composed. It's just strange, he's arguing this way, isn't it? Can you be arguing against this? I don't know, I'm going to be surprised. Moreover, every composition seems to be from what? Parts. But the divine nature cannot have the notion of a part because every part has a notion of the imperfect. Aristotle, in the eight books of natural hearing, says the word perfect and the word whole mean almost the same thing. And therefore, in the fifth book of wisdom, you take up those two words, the word perfect and the word whole. Therefore, it is impossible that the person of Christ be composed from two natures. Moreover, what is composed from some things would seem to be homogenous with them, just as from bodies is not put together anything except a body. Therefore, if from the two natures something in Christ is composed, it would follow that that is not a what? Person but body. And thus, in Christ, there would be made a union in natures, and this is against what we showed before, right? But again, this is what Damascene says, huh? This guy's come back now, huh? In the third book, huh? On the orthodox faith, huh? In the Lord Jesus Christ, we recognize two natures. One, however, what? Hypostasis. That was quoted before, but then he goes on, right? He's a full quote. Ex utrisque compositum. Okay, well, Damascene must see some distinctions that I didn't see, you know? Probably, yeah. I answer, it should be said that the person or hypostasis in Christ can be considered in two ways. In one way, by that which it is in itself, huh? And thus, it is altogether as simple, just as in H of the Word. Well, that's what I was thinking about. It's unrightful to me to say that in H of the person was composed, right? Because in itself, it's something altogether what? Simple. In other way, according to the notion of person or hypostasis, to which it pertains to subsist in some what? Nature. And according to this, the person of Christ subsists in what? Two natures. Whence, although it is one thing subsisting, right? It is nevertheless other and other the ratio of subsisting, right? And thus, the person is said to be composed insofar as one subsists into nature. Okay? Now, going back to my only example, you know, where we had the second line drawn to that point, right? So it doesn't have its own in point. So, is that point composed? No, look at it in itself. That point is altogether what? Indivisible, right? But you can say this point is the beginning of line A and the beginning of what? Line B. And it's in line A and it's in line B. So, in thought, it's composed of it, but that's a little, you know, a little, that's what it means, right? But still, it seems to me, you know, that if you just were asked, you know, without indistinction, you'd say, well, it's not composed, huh? Because then you'd be ending up with the stories, right? But he's saying, alia, alia ratio subsistendi, right? Not other and other res, not another and other thing, right? There's only one person there, right? And that person is altogether simple, right? But this one person is subsisting in two natures. Just like this one point is altogether simple, right? In itself, it's altogether one, right? Not composed in any way whatsoever. But it's what? In line A, it's its beginning. And it's in line B, it's its beginning, right? Okay? Kind of strange, I just call it composed. To this, it's clear, he says, the reply to the first objection, which is talking about it being simple, right? Thomas said, okay, that's what I meant. It's in itself, right? Okay? The second argument is saying, well, if you have a composition, you've got parts, right? So he says, that composition of the person from the natures is not said by reason of parts, but by reason of what? Yeah. It's being two natures. Just as everything in which two things come together can be said to be composed of them, huh? Yeah. It can be said that it's composed from them. Yeah. And then to the third, he says, huh? About the homogeneity of things. To the third, it should be said that this is not verified in every composition. That that which is composed is what? Homogenous with the things composing it. But this is so only in the parts of the continuous. For the continuous is not composed except from continuous things. So a line is not composed of points, but of lines. And a surface is not composed of lines, but surfaces. For the animal is composed of the soul and the body, of which neither is a what? Animal. That's a very strange meaning of composed, though, right? I remember Father Belay talking about fear and there's going to be any fear in heaven, you know? It's a very attenuated meaning of fear, right? Very stretched meaning of fear, right? It's a little strange that you used the words there, Thomas. I don't know if I wanted to... I could be piously expounded, but I don't know if I want to extend this. See that, Tom? Yeah, okay. There's a couple longer. I don't know if I want to... I don't know if I want to...