Tertia Pars
Lecture 4: The Incarnation's Suitability: Summa Theologiae and Summa Contra Gentiles Compared

Transcript
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Now, the first objection is saying, well, God could do this without that, right? It wasn't necessary, he couldn't do it. Because he didn't get any power from becoming man, right? He didn't have already, he was omnipotent, right? And Thomas says, well, to the first effort should be said that that reason proceeds according to the first way of necessity, without which one cannot arrive at an end, right? So Thomas is not claiming here that it was necessary, absolutely, you might say, for man, for God to become man to redeem us, right? But there's no more suitable way of doing it, right? Than that, as the arguments in the body of the article would seem to indicate, right? So the first argument is saying, well, God could do it without us, right? So Thomas is admitting that, right? But that's not the necessity he's defending in the body of the article. Okay, second one, well, God doesn't demand more of us than we're capable of, right? Thomas says, to the second it should be said that some satisfaction can be said to be sufficient in two ways. In one way, perfectly, right? Because it is, what? Worthy to a certain, what? Equality, right? To recompense for the fault committed, right? And thus, the satisfaction of a pure man could never be, what? Sufficient. Because the whole human nature was corrupted through, what? Sin. Nor the good of any person, or even of many, would be able to, what? Recompense by equality for the destruction of the detriment of the whole of nature, right? Also, because a sin against God committed, it has a certain infinity from the infinity of the divine majesty, right? For, in offense is more grave, the more great is the one in whom it is done, right? So if I kick the king, I get more trouble than I kick you, right? Okay? But God is of infinite dignity, right? So the kind of infinity of this, right? Whence is necessary for a suitable satisfaction that the action of the one satisfying have an infinite efficacy as being of God and man, right? Now, another way, a satisfaction can be sufficient imperfectly, according as it is, what? Accepted by someone, right? And who is contented with this, even though it's not, what? Condigna. And in this way, the satisfaction of a pure man is sufficient. And because everything imperfect presupposes something perfect from which it is sustained, hence it is that the satisfaction of every pure man, truly a man, has satisfaction or efficacy and satisfaction of Christ, huh? Again, you could say we cannot satisfy, what? Perfectly without a God-made man, right? That's the kind of necessity he's talking about in the body article. Now, what's the third objection that he lessened his majesty, right? All right, so. To the third, it should be said that God, by assuming flesh, did not lessen his, what? What? Greatness, huh? And consequently did not lessen the reason for reverence to him, right? Which is actually increased by the growth of our, what? Knowledge of him, huh? For from the fact that he approached us, or he wished to approach us through assumption of flesh, right? He more, what? Draws us to knowing him, right? That's a pretty good answer, I think, to that third objection, huh? I was looking at Thuissa D'Avala's Bargain the other day again. And I remember she had a lot of devotion to St. Joseph, right? But I'd forgotten, you know, how much St. Joseph was guiding her, huh? And she's very insistent upon the fact that you should do the same, you know? Make this special appeal to Joseph, huh? I just remember, you know, from the foundations, the last thing I'd read of her, you know, all these monasteries or convents she was setting up, you know, she named him after Joseph, huh? But there's a very vivid thing there in the first few chapters there about Joseph helping her, huh? And she, you know... I always remember what Deconic said, you know, he said that now that we had the Marian century, you know, and these great mysteries of Mary have been clarified, maybe there'd be some mysteries of Joseph clarified next, you know? And there's some divine providence and having these mysteries be clarified in a certain order, huh? And so after the mysteries about Christ and the ones of Mary and then the ones of Joseph, you know, so maybe Teresa of Avila would be coming back in this respect, too, you know, that she was an early advocate of special devotion to Joseph, huh? It's kind of fascinating to see her attention to him, you know? It was so big. In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, very young angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gracias. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Amen. And help us to understand the true routine. In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. Okay, I thought today we'd go through this same consideration in the Summa Contagentiles. What I reproduced, you should have four pages there, is from the fourth book, the last book of the Summa Contagentiles, and it's chapter 54 of the fourth book. Or a little chapter, I guess. Capitula means a little chapter. When it was suitable for God to be made flesh, right? To become man. So we're going to look at the reasons, about eight of them, that Thomas gives here, as opposed to the, has everybody got a copy? Yeah. Eight reasons, which we're going to compare it to ten reasons that he gave in the, what? Summa Theologiae, right? Okay. So let's go back to the first paragraph again, since some of you just come in. He says that someone, diligently, lovingly, and piously, considers the mysteries of the Incarnation. He will find tantum, so great, a profunditatum, so great a depth of wisdom, sapientiae, that it exceeds, what? Human knowledge, huh? According to that, it's apostle, meaning St. Paul. What is stupid of God is wiser than, what? Man. Whence it comes about that to one, considering piously, always, semper, magis et magis. More and more wonderful, admirable reasons of this mystery are made manifest. It reminds me of Aristotle in the biological work, where he's examining the, what, bodies of the animals and seeing how well put together they are, right? And he exclaims that he does this to appreciate the mind that, what, made them, put them together, right? So he's kind of admiring that, right? But in for a theory, we can admire the same mind here when we consider the reasons for this, what, mystery, huh? Now, the first reason that Thomas gives will be in the next paragraph, huh? And it seems to be something we don't find reading the Summa Theologiae explicitly. First, therefore, this should be considered, huh? That the incarnation of God was the most, what, efficient, the most efficacious, aid to man tending towards beatitude, huh? Now, this is touching upon, what, hope, right, whereby you tend towards God as you're in, huh? For it has been shown in the third book of the Summa Contagentilis that the complete or perfect beatitude, huh, of man consists in the immediate vision of God. But scripture says, seeing God as he is, right? As St. John says, huh? Or as St. Paul says, seeing him face to face, huh? Now, when you study, how is it possible to see God as he is? What's only if God himself is joined, huh, to our mind as that by which we see God. So in his light, we shall see light, huh? You might say, well, can we be joined to God's mind, to God himself as the understandable form by which we understand? That sounds, you know, how could you hope for such a thing, right? Well, the incarnation gives us hope, right? Because there he joined human nature to his very, what, person, huh? So that he became a man, right, huh? If he can do that, then he can suddenly join himself to our mind so we might see him as he is. It could seem to some man, huh, that to this state, nunquam never, poset, was he able to arrive, huh? That the human understanding immediately, right, would be joined to the divine essence, the divine nature, the divine substance, as the understanding is joined to the, what, understandable. On account of the immense distance of the two, what, natures, huh? And thus he would, what, grow tepid, huh, about the seeking out this beatitude, huh, detained, huh, by the opposite of hope, which is, what, desperation, right? But through this, that God wished to unite to himself human nature in persona, right, most evidently to men is shown that man is able to be united to God by the, what, understanding, seeing him by seeing him immediately, huh? It was therefore most suitable that God would assume human nature, right, to raising, right, to hope, right, God's film, to raising hope for man to his, what, true beatitude, which is to see God as he is, huh? Whence, he says, after the incarnation of Christ, men began more to aspire to, what, this celestial or heavenly beatitude, according as he himself says, John 10, 10, I have come that they might have life and have it more, what, abundantly, right? Now, Thomas joined, I think that argument is kind of new, I mean, it's not really in the Summa Theologiae explicitly. Now, the second argument he gives in the bottom of this first page, in a way, corresponds to the sixth and seventh arguments in the Summa Theologiae, right? And, in a sense, we might prefer the devil to ourselves, right, because he's superior of mind, superior of being in many ways, right, huh? And, we might not have enough appreciation of our own dignity as a human being, huh, to know that we're going to be united, if we are good, to God immediately, huh? In the same way, we might, because we're animals, right, we might seek our happiness in those things that we have in common with the animals, and, then again, it would be through a lack of appreciation of our dignity, huh, okay? This is tied up with the main objection, the first objection Thomas gives in the Summa Contagentiles to the incarnation would be, hey, there's an infinite distance between God and us, right, huh? But, we're ordered, as an end, to being joined to God immediately, and then you see it's not so inappropriate for him to, what, unite human nature immediately to himself in his own, what, person. So, in a way, the second argument, you could say, corresponds, in a way, to the sixth and the seventh arguments in the second group there, right? The first and second in the second group, but I call them the sixth and the seventh. Simo, okay, at the same time, right, also through this, right, there's taken away from man impediments, huh, to attaining the attitude, huh, okay? So, this corresponds to the second group of reasons in the Summa, but especially to the sixth and the seventh, huh? For since the perfect beatitude and happiness, huh, you could say of man, consists in the soul, what, enjoyment of God, huh? As has been said about, what does Augustine say, you know? Happy the man who sees God, even if he knows nothing else. Miserable the man who knows all other things if he doesn't know God. Blessed also the man who knows other things and God, but not for knowing other things, but for knowing God alone, right? Okay, since the perfect beatitude of man consists in the soul enjoyment of God, as has been shown above in the third book, is necessary that whoever, in those things which are below God, adheres finally, right, will be impeded from partaking of true blessedness. To this over, that man might be led to, what? Things below him could adhere to those things that are below God as an end. This could be by, what? Ignoring the dignity of his own, what? Nature, huh? From this, it happens that some, considering themselves only according to their bodily and... Sensing nature, which they have in common with other animals, right? In bodily things and in the pleasures of the flesh, they seek a certain bestial beatitude. Now, there's some people in our society all around. Okay. But then sometimes people have another problem here. But some, considering the excellence of some creatures above man, right? In regard to some things, they gave themselves over to the worship of them, right? Worshipping the world and its parts on account of the size of the thing, right? The magnitude of its quantity and the length of its time. Or the spiritual substances, right? The angels and the demons, on account of the fact that they are found to exceed man, both in their immortality and in the acumen, the sharpness of their mind, estimating that in these, as above man, existing above man, man should seek his beatitude, right? And he says, although as he guards some conditions, man is below some creatures. And in all the things, he is, what? Likened or like the lowest creatures, huh? Nevertheless, by order to his end, nothing exists higher than man except God alone, in whom alone the perfect beatitude of man consists. Now, this dignity of man, that he might be beatified by the immediate vision of God, God shows most suitably to the fact that immediately he assumed what? Human nature. Whence from the incarnation of God, we see it following, that the greater part of man, giving up the worship of angels or demons, and of any other creatures, and setting aside the pleasure of the flesh and bodily things, gave themselves to worshiping God, what? Alone, huh? In which, in whom alone, they expect the completion of their, what? The attitude, huh? According to what the apostle warns, huh? The things that are above, seek the things that are above, where Christ is, sitting at the right hand of God. Savor the things which are above, huh? Not the things which are upon earth, right? That's one argument here. The second argument is Summa Concentilis, but it seems to correspond to the sixth and seventh, the first two arguments, right? One of which is in terms of the devil, right? And the other in terms of, what? Not knowing your dignity, right? But Thomas kind of puts the two of them, what? Together, right? So there's an overlap there, but in the first argument, there's something more unique, yeah. Now the third argument, the second one here, on page two, corresponds to the first argument in the Summa Theologiae, the one from, what? Faith, huh? But it's interesting to read this, because he says things a little differently and brings this out in different ways. Further, because the perfect beatitude of man consists in such a knowledge of God, which exceeds the faculty or ability of every created understanding, as has been shown in the third book, it is necessary for there to be a certain, what? Foretaste, huh? Prelevatio, of this knowledge in man, by which is directed to that fullness of blessed knowledge. And this foretasting comes about through, what? Faith, huh? That's why when Thomas is going to divide faith sometimes into two parts, huh? Faith about the divinity of Christ and faith about the humanity of Christ, huh? And then he'll quote what Christ says in chapter 17 of St. John, right? This is eternal life, right? He might know you and him whom you have sent. And so he says, well, faith is a foretaste of that eternal life. What does eternal life consist in? What Christ tells us in seeing you and whom you have sent, right? So the humanity and the divinity of Christ, huh? And therefore, you have those two things in our, what? Faith, huh? Kind of a foretaste, huh? Now he says, the knowledge by which man is directed towards the last end, it is necessary that it be most, what? Certain. In that it is the beginning of all those things which are ordered to the last end. Just as the beginnings naturally known are most certain. He's talking about what? A whole is more than a part, right? To be or not to be. Can't both be and not be, right? He says, the most certain knowledge of something cannot be unless either it be known to itself, as to us are known in the first beginnings of demonstration, what we call the, what? Axioms, huh? Equals are equal to equals, results are equal. The whole is more than a part, so on. Quantity is equal to the same, good to each other, so on. Or in those things which are known to themselves, they are, what? Led back, resolved. In the way that something becomes, say, what? A conclusion of demonstration becomes, what? Most certain, right? So if you follow the demonstrations of Euclid, you'll find that you're sure about the Pythagorean theorem, right? Not just taking it on. But that which is proposed to us about God to be held by faith cannot be, what? Per se known to man. Since it goes above the power of human understanding. Therefore, it's necessary that this be made known to man to someone to whom it is, what? Per se known. And although to all, seeing the divine essence, it is in some way known to itself, nevertheless, for the most certain knowledge, having, is necessary to make a reduction to, what? The first beginning of this knowledge. To it, to God himself. To whom it is naturally, per se known, not by delight and glory. And from whom it becomes known to all. just as the suititude of science is not had except by resolution to the first indemonstrable beginnings. It's necessary, therefore, for man, for perfect suititude about the truth of faith, that he be instructed by God, made a man. man, that man, in a human way, right, might perceive divine instruction. And this is what is said in John 1, verse 18. No one has seen God, but the only begotten who is in the, what? Blossom of his father, he will, what? Announce it. And the Lord himself said, John 18, verse 37, I, for this was born and came into the world that I might give testimony to the truth. Thomas gives that quote beginning in the Sumaconda Gentiles, where I, St. Alphonsus, the beginning of the meditations on the passion begins with, I came to cast fire upon the earth, right? We came to do both, right? But the purpose of the meditation and the passions is to get the love of God, and the purpose of the Sumaconda Gentiles is to know the truth about these things. On account of which we see that after the incarnation of Christ, more evidently and certainly, men were instructed in divine knowledge. According to that of the prophet Isaiah, chapter 11, the earth is, what? Filled with the knowledge of the Lord, right? So I just don't boys and girls saying, why did God make me? They all could have said it one time at least. So that argument is the same as the first one in the Summa Theologiae, right? But Thomas, you know, explains it a little differently there. Now the fourth argument here in the Summa Ante Gentiles. Further, since the perfect blessedness of man consists in the enjoyment of God, it's necessary that the affections of man be disposed to a desire of the divine what? Enjoyment. Just as we see to men, there's naturally a desire for what? The attitude, But the desire for the enjoyment of something is caused from the love of that thing, right? It's necessary, therefore, for a man tending towards perfect beatitude. but I don't know what it is, what it is, but I don't know that he be led into divine love, love of God. But nothing thus to love of someone leads us as an experience of his love towards us. But the love of God to men in no way could be more efficaciously shown to men than through this that he wished to unite himself to man in his very, what, person. And this is the first effect of love that we learn in our treatise on love, right, if you remember, those of you who have heard that. For it is proper of love to unite the one loving with the loved insofar as it is, what, possible. It is necessary, therefore, to man, tending to beatitude, that God become, what, man. And that corresponds to the third argument in the, what, Summa Theologiae, right, huh? And basically you get the same reason there, isn't it, that nothing more moves us to love someone than the experience of their, what, love for us, huh? So if a man and woman want to get married, you assume that they love each other, right? It's probably going to want to be joined together, unless they have somebody's money. They love somebody. What's that Psalm 18, you know, where the son comes out of the bridal chamber, right? And that's understood as referring to, what, the womb of Mary, right, which is the bridal chamber where he, in a sense, is married to human, what, nature, yeah. So it's the same idea, right? The union is the effect of love, right? So by his becoming man, being united with us, our very nature, in his very person, he showed how much he loved us, huh? He shows that further, you know, about what he does, but Thomas is talking about the mere fact of the incarnation itself, huh? Now, I think in the Summa Theologiae, he uses that middle term to also show hope, right? In other words, if I'm convinced that you love me, then I hope to get good things from you, right? But also, if I'm convinced that you love me and love me in an unselfish way, right, that's going to move me to love you, right? So you could use the same middle term for both hope and for what? Love. Love, yeah. But I think in both of these Summas, he uses it for love, but if I'm rightly in the Summa Theologiae, it's used for, what? The second reason for hope, right, huh? Okay. Well, so maybe I'm too early on it, but I'm wondering, why do you think of this Summa Theologiae as he begins with hope, then later he'll come back to faith and charity? Well, I think, you know, hope is the theological virtue that in some ways is least, understood, huh? Right. And when Augustine and Thomas take up sacred doctrine according to faith, hope, and charity, according to hope, they take the Our Father, right? Yes. And as you know, in the Our Father, there's seven petitions, huh? Seven things we are taught by our Lord to ask for, right? But as Augustine and Thomas both point out, in teaching us what to ask for, we are at the same time being taught what to want. And so, if you look at the very order of the seven petitions, the first two refer to the what? To the end, right? And then the second, the third, and the fourth, to the means to the end, right? And then the last three, you know, the impediments to the end, huh? So the fundamental thing there is the end, right? So by hope, we are tending towards God as our very end, huh? And so Thomas says, I suppose in the Summa Contagentia, he's thinking of the fact that God became man, so we might reach this end, which is eternal life, huh? And so it's kind of naturally beginning with hope, because that's the virtue by which we tend towards this end, huh? And we tend towards it as something possible, right? So that's perhaps the reason why it begins with hope, right? Does it have anything to do with, I suppose I'm thinking of sort of the audience or whatever that this work is meant for. So this work, doesn't it have more of a general sense of appealing to reason or what's common to all men? Well, again, put it in the context a little bit of it, too. Yeah. The chapter before this is a chapter of objections, right? That's not suitable for God to become man, right? Okay. And the chapter following this is replying to all those 27 or whatever objections they are, right? And it's a little bit like the Oral of the Summa, where you have the objections first and then you have the bodyguard. These are three different chapters. But the first objection is that it's out of order, right? Because God is infinitely above us and man is among the lowest creatures. And therefore, for God to go all the way down here seems like, you know, the prince marrying Cinderella. But more than that, right? And so because of that distance, right? Now, so when Thomas begins, these first two arguments, you might say, right, are connected, right? Although one is in terms of the good, one is in terms of avoid the bad, right? But what's common with the first two arguments is the fact that there's something immediate between what? God and us, right? That God in himself, seeing him face to face, right, is in fact our end, right? So between our ends, you might say, and God, there's nothing, right? It's an immediate thing, yeah? And so our hope might be discouraged by the fact that there's such a distance between us. How can we be joined, right, huh? Or why would he even consider joining himself to us, right? But when he joined human nature to his very person, then that arouses our hope that we can be united to him as the understandable, right? In the same way, the fact that he wants us to have him as an end immediately, right, means that in some way we're equal to the angels, right? And far above the dogs and the cats, right? You can't attain the God, right, huh? Okay. So in terms of the objections that have been made, right, and the solution to the objections, this right away goes back to the first objection, if you saw the chapter 53, I guess it would be. Somehow hope being more common is a certain natural. Well, I mean, speaking as a philosopher, you know, I often say it's not enough to want to know the truth, right? Yeah. If a man despairs of knowing the truth, as most professors in the academic world, we despair of knowing the truth, right? And I always, you know, quote Whitaker Chambers, you know, talking about his coming back to Columbia there, and he's supposed to be convinced by the communist, right? You know, so he thought, yeah, the truth in some sense, right? But these are the guys who didn't take this stuff seriously one way or another, right? But his metaphor was they tweeted ideas like ping-pong balls. Well, I think it's a pretty good description of the academic world. A ping-pong ball is something you knock back and forth, but you don't take the ping-pong ball seriously. And you just play with it, right? And that's the way they tweet ideas and thoughts, right? You knock them back, what do you think? Bang, bang, bang, bang, bang, bang. But you never come to any truth, right? So these people are in, what? Despair, right? Okay. And I can see, you know, this is a very important thing in Plato's great dialogue, the Phaedo, right? Because in the Phaedo, they're trying to find out if the human soul is immortal or not. And Socrates gives some arguments that seem to indicate the soul is immortal, right? And then Simeon and Sebas come in with some objections and everything seems to collapse. And they all fall into a kind of, what? Despair, right? This is despair of, what? Knowing the truth about the soul, right? And the guy that Phaedo is narrating, his name from Phaedo, because Phaedo is present, you see, at the last day of Socrates, and he's narrating what took place, right, to another guy. And he's narrating what took place, right? And he's narrating what took place, right? And he's narrating what took place, right? And he's narrating what took place, right?