Secunda Secundae
Lecture 6: Growth and Enumeration of Articles of Faith

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In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, forward and move in our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas and Jelly Doctor. Amen. Help us to understand what you have written in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. We're up to Article 7 here in Question 1. To the seventh, one goes forward thus. It seems that the articles of faith do not, what, increase or grow according to the succession of times. Because, as the Apostle says in the Epistle to the Hebrews, chapter 11, verse 1, faith is the substance of things hoped for. But in all time, it's the same things that should be hoped for. Therefore, in all time, they're the same things believed. Well, that convinces me, this objection, right? He's never going to be able to answer these objections. I mean, he's done himself in, you know. Moreover, in the sciences humanly ordered, through the succession of times, there is growth brought about on account of the defective knowledge in the first ones who found sciences. As is clear through the philosopher, that, of course, refers to Aristotle by Antonio Messia, in the second book of the metaphysics. But the teaching of faith is not found humanly, but it's handed over from God. For it's a gift of God, as is said in the Epistle to the Ephesians, chapter 2, verse 3. Since, therefore, in God, there's no defect of knowledge, it can fall, it seems that from the beginning, the knowledge of the things to be believed was perfect, and that they did not increase according to the succession of times. That's a darn good objection. I'm convinced, huh? I mean, if you're not convinced now, I mean, that's what it takes you to. Moreover, the operation of grace is not less orderly proceeding than the operation of nature. But nature always takes its beginning from the perfect, as Boethius says in the book on the consolation of philosophy. A famous quote from Boethius. Sometimes they think of Boethius as the greatest mind between Augustine and Thomas, you know. But suddenly he's a very tough guy. Therefore, it seems that the operation of grace would take its beginning from perfect things. That those who first tweeted the teaching of faith would know it most, what? Perfectly, huh? You know, be wiser than the apostles? I mean, that's ridiculous, huh? Okay. Moreover, just as through the apostles, to us the faith of Christ has come, so also in the Old Testament, through the earlier fathers, knowledge arrived at the ones afterwards of faith. According to that in Deuteronomy chapter 32, verse 7. Ask your father, and he will announce to you. But the apostles were plenissime, most fully, huh? Instructed about the mysteries. For they took, right? As just as they were before in time, so they had it more abundantly than the others. As the gloss says, huh? Super that upon that of Romans 8.23. For we having the first fruits, you might say, of the spirit. We just got hand-me-downs, right? So how can we be superior? Therefore, it seems that the knowledge of things we believed did not grow through the succession of what? Times. Okay? Because I'm going to vote now. You're convinced, right? But against this, and sometimes it's very brief, because he's not replying to the objections yet. But against this is what Gregorius says, right? Gregory the Great, I guess, he's a big shot, huh? He's a big shot. That according to the, what? Time. The knowledge of the Holy Fathers grew, right? And that they were, what? The more they were near to the coming of the Savior, so much the sacraments of salvation were more fully, what? Received by them, right? Now, what the heck is Tom's going to say, huh? Well, let's go to the little part, right? Every article is divided into three parts, isn't it? Rule of two or three, right? I'm a great teacher of the rule of two or three. Most divisions should be into two or three, or both, right? Of course, it goes back to Socrates and Plato to divide into two always, and there's a very good reason for that, which is what? We divide by opposites, and opposites are two. Aristotle, when he's talking about there being three dimensions, you know, he quotes a weaker argument, but nevertheless interesting one, a sign. He says, three is the first number about which we say, what? All. So if you and I are going to the movies, both of us are going. But if you and I and all three of us are going, you know, we're all going, yeah. So three seems to be all, right? And you find this for the most part, right? So if someone divides into more than three, then you have to what? You divide into two or three and subdivide one of these into two or three until you get your ten, right? So when Thomas has explained the ten categories, right, he doesn't divide them at once into ten, but he divides them into what? Three. They're divided by the way something can be said of you or me or some other individual substance, right? So some things can be said of Michael by reason of what he is, and some things can be said of Michael not by reason of what he is, but something in him in addition to what he is. Or something can be said of him by reason of something outside of him, like he's in this room or he's clothed today, right? Okay. Or he's sitting, right? No, no, that's the second, yeah, that's the second, yeah, yeah. So he subdivides into three and then he subdivides them into two or three until he gets his ten, right, huh? When Thomas is dividing the text of what? Aristotle? Or when he's dividing even the sacred scripture, he'll divide usually into two or what? Three. So what about the four gospels, huh? See, we tend to divide the first three against the, what, the fourth one, yeah? Then the first three is divided into three, of course, huh? So it's a division into two and then a three. The answer should be said that thus it has itself in the teaching of faith, the articles of faith, as the beginnings, huh? Principles, beginnings, as English word for that, known through themselves, right? In the doctrine which is had through natural reason, huh? So Euclid, in the beginning of the elements, right? He has the axioms, right? And the postulates, which are known to themselves. All right angles are equal. The whole is more than a part. In which beginnings a certain order is found? That some are contained in the others, implicitly, huh? Just as all beginnings are reduced to this as to the first of all. It's impossible at the same time to affirm and negate. As is clear through the philosopher, that's Aristotle by Antonia Messiah, in the fourth book of first philosophy, really called physics. There's to quote Shakespeare, huh? To be or not to be. That is the question. It's a question because you can't both be and not be, right? Yeah. Yeah. But it's one or the other, right? So. And likewise, all articles are implicitly contained in some first things that are what? Believable. As one believes God to be and to have providence about what? The salvation of men. And then the famous text here from Hebrews 11, 6. The one approaching God is necessary, right? To believe that he is. And that to those seeking him, he is. the what? Rewarder. Rewarder, yeah. For in the divine being is included all things which we believe to exist in God, what? Eternally. In which our beatitude, what? Consists. Kind of amazing there, looking at the compendium of theology, and the order there, it used to be verse of Summa, in the three things that follow upon the simplicity of God. So, in the Summa, you take up what? God is altogether simple, then he's perfect, then he's what? No, yeah, well, perfect, but that's attached to perfect. Then he's infinite, then there's just one God, right? Well, in the Summa Contagent, I mean, in the compendium of theology, it's just reverse. First he shows that he's, what, one, and he's infinite, and he's perfect, right? And you can argue from one of these to the other, right? I don't know if you could reduce, you could change the order of the theorems in Euclid, you know, and still, you know. I mean, if you have some, you find that these things are so closely related, right? You have something that we'll call A, you can use A to prove B, C, and D, immediately from A. It could also prove C from B, and D from C, right? So, I say, gee, because these things are really tied together, but you kind of see what he means by saying, what? Implicit, right? Yeah, yeah. Kind of amazing the Summa Contagent is. He's showing, you know, the basic arguments for saying that God is, what, simple and not composed, and then after he gives those basic arguments, about four or five of them, then he throws in arguments from God being good, universally perfect, and so on. He says, what does he do this for, you know? He shows these things are so, what, tied together, right? So, in the Essayim Divino, in the Divine Being, are included all the things that we believe to exist in God eternally, in which our Beatitude, what, consists. And in the Faith of Providence is included all the things which God in time has dispensed for the salvation of man, which are the, what, via, the road into Beatitude, huh? And in this way also, right, some of the the other subsequent articles are contained in other ones, as just in the Faith of the Redemption of Man is implicitly contained both the Incarnation of Christ and his Passion, and all things of what? This sort, huh? Thus, therefore, it should be said that as far as the Substance of the Articles of the Faith, there is not made any growth of them through the succession of times, because whatever the ones who came later, huh, or afterwards, believed to be contained in the Faith of the One preceding, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, in the Faith of the One preceding, although implicitly, right, yeah? But as far as what? Yeah. The number of articles increases, right, huh? Okay. So they speak of the thing from what? The definition of the Immaculate Conception, right, to the assumption as a Marian century, right? Well, these are not known before. Of course, they were known before, but they're made much more explicit now, right? Okay? My teacher, Connie, there was one of the theologians who had a private session with Pius XII, you know, whether it should be defined or not, huh? And so he went back to Thomas' teaching, you know, that strictly speaking, Peter is not in heaven now, because Peter is a creature composed of body and soul, and his body is not there. So you can say the soul of Peter is there, right? It's kind of a figure of speech to say Peter is there. You don't want to say it's about Mary. Yeah, so the whole Mary's got to be there, right? He was very impressed with this argument, you know, and so on. So I don't know what else he said to Pius XII, but interesting. My aunt, who was, you know, was Lutheran, you know, but she met Pius XII, she was very impressed with the man, you know, just, he was a very impressive character. So some things which are explicitly known by those who came afterwards, which by the ones who came before were not known explicitly, right? Whence the Lord says to Moses, Exodus 6-3, I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of what? Jacob. And my name of what? Yeah. I have not indicated to them, right? And David said, above the ancients, the old ones, I have understood, right? And the apostle says, this is Ephesians, huh? To other generations was not known, right? The mystery of Christ, as now it's been revealed, right? And to the holy apostles and prophets, huh? It's been a course of time, isn't it? What in terms is this the same as when? I suppose you would say that, yeah. See, it's the same life. Yeah. It says it develops, but it doesn't change. Mm-hmm. So the first objection then, huh, the one from, we all believe the same things. That always they were the same things hoped for among all, right? But nevertheless, to hoping for these things, men did not arrive except through Christ. And the more that they were remote from Christ, right, in time, so longer were they from the achievement of these things to be, what, hoped for. Whence the apostle says in the epistle to the Hebrews, according to the faith, all these are, what? Died. Died. Not having received the promises, but regarding them from a long distance, so to speak, huh? Yeah. For the more something is seen in the distance, the less distinctly it is, what? Seen. And therefore the goods hoped for are more distinctly known by those who were near to the coming of what? Christ, huh? Now the second objection, huh? Just a little look at this. Could you say that the apostles had explicit faith about the infallibility, the macroconception, the assumption, et cetera, et cetera? Well, maybe they knew more than we did about these things, huh? Because they were more in contact with the teacher, okay? They certainly had the implicit faith, they had the substance of the faith. Would you say they had explicit faith, or was that it was only explicit faith? We talked to them a lot, you know, and we don't necessarily have an account of every conversation that they had with Christ, huh? So, they're closer to him, right, huh? This is what Thomas is saying, he applied to the second objection, right, huh? To the second it should be said that the proficiency of knowledge happens in two ways. In one way, on the part of the one teaching, who knowledge, whether it be one or what? Many through the succession of times. And this is the reason for the growth in the sciences found through human what? Reason. In another way, though, on the part of the one what? Learning. Just as the teacher who knows the whole art does not at once, from the beginning, treat it to the what? Yeah. Because he's not able to what? Grasp. Grasp it, right? But bit by bit, paulatana, how Thomas likes to say that our mind sees paulatana bit by bit. Condescending to his what? Capacity. And for this reason men, what? Who grew, yeah, in the knowledge of faith, the succession of times. Whence the apostle in the epistle of the Galatians compares the state of the old testament to what? Childhood. Childhood, yeah. So in the part of the learner, huh? Kind of amazing the way Aristotle proceeds in the ninth book of wisdom, my favorite book in the book there. Childhood. Childhood. Basically, there's two things he's going to do in the ninth book. He's going to point out all the distinctions of ability and act, and then he's going to show the order, right? But the book is divided into three parts. So in the first part, he talks about motion and the abilities for motion. The ability to be moved, the ability to be moved by another, right? The ability to move another, right? And so on, right? The rational ability to move another and the natural ability to move another, right? And then the second part, he distinguishes the different senses of act, and now you see many more senses of ability, right? Why didn't he do that in the beginning? You know? If you weren't ready. He's got to give you a little bit, you know? Then he's got to give you this whole universality, right? And he's like, oh my gosh, what a smart guy he was, you know? You know how dumb I was, you know? He always called my old teacher, huh? Because you're like an undergraduate. And he was the wisest guy at the College of St. Thomas, you know, in St. Paul, Minnesota. Which is, they call themselves the University of St. Thomas now, but my day was at the College of St. Thomas. He was the wisest man in the whole college, huh? But he said, compared to Aristotle, he says, heck, the brain of an angler. Third objection now, right? Now let's go back to the third objection to make sure you know the operation here. He's comparing the operation of grace or the operation of nature, right? To the third, it should be said that for a natural generation, two causes are presupposed, huh? The agent and matter, hey, act and ability, right? But according to the order of the agent cause, huh, that is naturally before which is more perfect. And that way nature takes its origin from the perfect, huh? Because the imperfect things are not brought to perfection, except through some things already pre-existing that are perfect. But according to the order of the material cause, that is before which is what? Order. Yeah, yeah. So notice, I was talking about the text and the categories, or one of the five senses that Aristotle distinguishes of before is, or the cause is before the effect, right? Well, that's got many meanings, because the word cause has many meanings, right? So you can break that down, and here he's talking about the difference between the agent cause and the, what, material cause. So when Aristotle's talking, or not Aristotle, but when Thomas is leading into the perfection of God, he reasons him as being the first maker of all things, right? So he's a cause in the sense of the agent, right? And therefore he must be more perfect in these things that he's made, right? So that's one way of arguing to the perfection of God. There'd be many other ways, of course, of doing so. But that's where the moderns break down, right? Because they think, like the early Greeks, that the beginning of all things is what matter, right? And therefore the beginning of all things is the least perfect thing of all. Now they've got a, what, split personality. Because what's the end of human knowledge? On the beginning you've got to know the way things are, but that's not enough. You've got to know why they are the way they are, right? And if the cause of there being why they are has a cause, you don't really know things until you know that. So the final thing in our knowledge is to know what? The first cause. But then there's another argument, huh? Knowledge of a better thing is what? Better knowledge. So the end of all our knowledge must be a knowledge of the best thing. Now if the best thing is the first cause, everything fits together, as Aristotle says. The truth, all things harmonize, right? But if the first cause is matter, which is the least perfect of things, huh? The least form, then your ultimate end is, and the moderns can't. So Marxist says we've got to get busy and start making things. Yeah. The Connick spent a long time, you know, studying Marxism because it was very, very predominant at the time. But really, when you get through with this, you begin to realize even something about the Eucharist, huh? Why do you use natural things, huh? Kind of to make what? Why do you use fully natural things, like an apple or an orange or something, right? Why do you use bread, which is in some way made by us, and then wine, which is made by us to some extent, huh? Why do you use something made by us to institute the Eucharist? Why didn't you take water, something natural you got in the stream, and apples or something else that's natural? Well, the things we make ourselves, we seem to understand in the pedagogy. So he takes something that we ourselves have made, and now tells us that this is my body, this is my blood. The act of faith required in us is, what, greater than if you'd taken something purely natural. Kind of interesting, right? Because Marx was insisting, you know, that, and a lot of the moderns say that, huh? You have to make something to know it. So we know things best of all that we made ourselves. Then come back and say, this is interesting, that he took things made by us in a way, bread and wine, rather than purely natural things, to institute the, what, Eucharist, right? See if he's demanding even more. What? He wanted our cooperation as well. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He also wanted us to make a greater act of faith, right? These are things that we think we understand, you know, because we make, you know? My daughter has all the kids, little girls making loaves of bread, you know, they make all their breads themselves and so on. And my daughter's got ten children, you know, so they're all making bread, you know, little girls, and sometimes even the boys, right? So they know what bread is, right, huh? And it's curious, huh? These are the thoughts that occur. But there's a split personality in the modern mind, right? Because the end of all knowledge should be a knowledge of the best thing. And the end of all knowledge must be a knowledge of the first cause. And the modern, or the really Greek, even, to the thought that matters at the beginning of all things, they're not the same thing, right? You can't have two ultimate ends, right? Split personality or something, you know? Split division. He's touching upon it here in this third thing here. So he points out the difference, huh? In the order determined by the material cause and by the, what? The mover or maker, right? The agent cause, huh? Now, in the manifestation of faith, God is as the agent, right? Who has perfect knowledge from eternity, huh? Man is like matter, receiving the inflow of the divine, what? Agent, right? That's my little prayer there, huh? Move us, God, to know and love you, right? So he's the mover, and we're being moved to know and love him. So man is secret material, right? Receiving the influx of the divine agent. And therefore it is necessary for the knowledge of faith in men to proceed from the imperfect to the, what? Perfect. Though in men some have themselves by way of being an agent cause who were the, what? Teachers of the faith. Nevertheless, the manifestation of the spirit is given to such for the common, what? Tiltia. And therefore, such was given to the fathers who are the instructors of faith, of the knowledge of faith, as is necessary for that time to be treated to that people, either, what? Yeah. Or in a, what? A figure, right? So that explains a lot of the ways that things are said even in the creation description there in the first book of the Bible. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. What are you saying with the Eucharist, because it's interesting, so you go back to the miracle of Cana, where you actually used it. It was kind of his first public miracle, right, kind of amazing thing. I think it was wine and not beer that you eat. They were Middle Easterners, they weren't Germans. As I get older, my taste of beer declines, you know, and my taste of wine increases, you know, but not for beer. Okay, but now, this last objection here, and the reply is very interesting, because you're supposed to ask your father, right? To the fourth it should be said, the ultimate consummation of grace was made through Christ. Whence his time is said to be the time of what? Fullness, huh? The fullness of time. Amen. Galatians 4.4. And those, therefore, who were nearer to Christ, either before as John the Baptist or after his apostles, plenuous, right? More fully, huh? Knew the mysteries of what? Faith. Well, that's kind of an amazing thing to see, right? Whence, considering the status of man, we see this, that perfection is what? Yeah. And to that extent, man is a status that is more perfect, either before or after, the more he's closer to me. That's just talking about the material thing, right? But in the mind, huh? I think that's interesting what he says here. Secret, possibly. Plenius mysteria fide cognou verita. They more fully know these things, huh? Yeah. Because we're receiving it, yeah. Yeah. I hear you. Could you say then that the apostles had the fullness, polar knowledge, and then the explicitation? Yeah. Yeah. For us, it was over the course of time, yeah. Over time in the church. Yeah. And St. Paul says, you know, he did milk like the children, right? They couldn't take, you know. Did you foresee a future formulation of faith, or explicitation of faith, in the near future? Well, you know, my teacher, I mentioned De Connick, Charles De Connick, there at the whole university. He was a parietal son for the Cardinal Quebec and the Second Vatican Council, but I was mentioning how the fact he had this session of Pius XII, right, huh? But he thought, you know, how we speak of this as the Marian century, right? Beginning with the definition of the Immaculate Conception, you know? That being made very explicit, ending up with the assumption, right, huh? He thought that the mysteries about Joseph, right, which would fit your name, would become more, what? Yeah, yeah. That there'd be more unfolding of that, right? Interesting. And so, I know, John Paul II's got this thing on Joseph, you know, and so on. So, maybe this would be more unfolded, you know, huh? When I was a little boy in St. Paul, Minnesota, when I grew up, Islamic, every parish had, like my own parish church in Tivity, they had a little chapel for the Blessed Virgin and one for Joseph, you know? And they had a, going to a Catholic church, it seemed like everyone had it, you know, huh? A little separate chapel for those two guys, I mean those two persons. One for Mary and one for Joseph. People would, after Mass sometimes, go over to Mary's chapel or go over to Joseph's chapel and stuff. So, it seemed like Joseph should be, you know, mixed up. My sister's wedding, as an example of the parish, they had those altar in St. Joseph's chapel. So, my sister and her husband, after they'd seen communion, they used to marry the altar and cry. My brother Mark and his wife and his wife, they went over to just marry, you know? Yeah. The flowers, whatever it is, to marry and to honor her, you know? Do you see any further, I know some people call Mary as Mediatrix of All Grace, do you see any further Marian development aside from that one? I think it seems Rome is hesitant to explicitate that one. Yeah, yeah, but there's really some very explicit texts on it already, you know, huh? I mean, I suppose there could be, you know. Actually, the Second Vatican Council is kind of, in a sense, a completion of the first one, right? Yeah. And you were kind of defining the mysteries about what? The Church. The Church. Of course, there's a special chapter on Mary, right? In there, you know? The Church. Yeah, yeah. In some ways, her mediation is present in her title as Mater Ecclesi. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Which I was talking about my other teacher, a great teacher in Quebec there, was Monsignor Leon, right? I don't know if you've ever heard of him, but he was a heritage student of the Vatican, Ian DeConnick came from the Cardinal of Quebec and so on. But his article there in the Volatilogique and so-so-fique is called The Grace of Mary is of the Hypostatic Order, right? And I was going there at Dominican last time. You read that? Yes, and you'll have to give us a copy of that. I don't believe it. Yeah. You can get it, I have to get the reference there, but you can get it on the internet now, you know, the articles of the, you know, the Volatilogique and philosophique, huh? So, but Mary's grace is of a, what, different order, right, than other saints, right, huh? And that's because of the universal, the universal mediatrics, huh? But he has, you know, very good quotes on it, popes, you know, that touch upon that, you know? I'm always suspicious of anybody suspicious of Mary's, right? Dignity, right? I always think, you know, that that's a sure sign of something wrong with that person, you know? As a theologian, they hesitate to bestow upon Mary her proper praise, you know? Oh. Okay. So, now we're up to Ardu... Article 8, right? We're going to find out what the articles of faith really are now. To this 8th one proceeds thus. It seems that unsuitably are the articles of faith, what? Enumerated, right? Now those things which are able to be known by a demonstrative reason, right? That's by natural reason, therefore. Do not pertain to faith that before all should be believed, right? As has been said. But for God to be one can be known by, what? Demonstration. Even Aristotle knew that. Whence the philosopher proves this in the 12th book of, what? First philosophy, as he calls it. Deuteronomy of the Rhodes called Metataphusica, right? After the books in natural philosophy. And many other philosophers induces things for demonstrations, right? For this. Therefore, God to be one ought not to be one of the articles of faith, but it ought to be a, what? Preambuli, you know, so to speak, you know? Oh my gosh, yes. Moreover, just as it's a necessity of faith that we believe God to be omnipotent, so also we believe him to be knowing all things and providing for all things. And about both of these, some people have erred, right? If they're mistaken. Therefore, there ought to be among the articles of faith mentioned about the wisdom and the providence of God, just as about his, what? Tiptons, huh? Well, this is very convincing for a dummy like me, you know? Moreover, the same is the knowledge of the Father and the Son. According to that of John 14, who sees me, sees also the Father, right? You know, show us the Father, he said. Didn't he? Yeah. And when you've seen me, you've seen the Father, right? Therefore, there ought to be one article about the Father and the Son. It's the same reason about the Holy Spirit. Yeah, you've seen all the one articles, that's it. Moreover, the person of the Father is not less than that of the Son and the Holy Spirit. But many articles are laid down about the person of the Holy Spirit, and likewise many about the person of the Son. Therefore, many articles are not to be laid down about the person of the Father, right? I'm just looking at the, in the sentences, Thomas' commentary on the sentences, he has an explicit article. Whether the Father is before the, what? Son, huh? And I don't think he asks that explicitly in an article, in the Summa here, you know? But it's in the sentences, right? And so, I was looking at the body of the article there, and he says, in the beginning, he's denying that the Father is in any way before the Son. And he says, he's not before him in duration, he's not before him in nature, he's not before him in knowledge, he's not before him in dignity. So, that's almost exactly the order of the four in the categories, right? And Aristotle talks about the word before there, in the second or post-predicaments, huh? He says, the first sense of before is what? Time is before, right? Well, before in duration would be laid alongside that, because time is the duration most known to us, right? That would be the first one. The before in nature could be said to be corresponded to before it being. And then the last one, the accurate words, you know? Before in knowledge and before in what? Dignity or worth or goodness. So, in no way is the... It kind of strikes me that Thomas must know that text from the categories, right? It's really kind of amazing. The thing that he sees that in the second post-predicament, huh? The first post-predicament is a distinction of the opposites, right? Because you've got to see opposites before you can see before and after, right? So, you can't put the Son and the Holy Spirit before the Father, can you? Oh, you've got to adjust the argument of the real truth. Yeah, yeah. It's an equality thing. Yeah, yeah. You notice how in the Marietta here, they print the Thomas's answer, you know, and big thing, you know, as you can see right away, you know. So, my brother Mark and I were going to lock these guys up in the little shed, you know, and just give them the objections, you know, and they have to think about them for a week, you know, and come up with an answer if they could, and realize how dumb you are, you know, I mean, compared to Thomas, huh? Heraclitus, you know, one of the favorites is dispute. Heraclitus says dispute. Well, Thomas has what you call the, what, questionis disputate, right? You might have 15 or 20 arguments on one side and 10 on the other side. So, this is like an abbreviation, you know, for beginners of the, some of the prominent objections, you know, and so on. But it really exercises the mind, huh? Remember one time when I was teaching at St. Mary's College in California there, some of the philosophers down there at the University of California were asking, well, not one of these medieval disputations, you know, but it might be, you know, a good student, you know, thinking of one or two objections, another student, a couple of others, and then the, after all, but he's tied up there, then the master comes in and explains it, and then he, Thomas arranged a debate between himself and what, Albert the Great, I mean, did, between himself and Thomas, and of course Thomas won the debate. He says, you'll, his bellow will be heard around the world, right? This guy you call the dumb ox. Now, we're up to the fifth objection, I guess? Right? Yep. Okay, moreover, just as something is appropriated to the person of the Father and to the person of the Holy Spirit, you know what appropriation means, don't you, a little bit in the study of the Trinity? There's a certain likeness between some attribute of God and his personal properties of the person that it's appropriated to. So, to the person of the Son, according to, what, divinity. But in the articles, there's laid down some work appropriated to the Father, to with the opus of, what, creation, of even God the Father Almighty, creator of heaven and earth, right? But the whole Trinity they created, right? What's appropriated to the Father. And some work is appropriated to the Holy Spirit that he spoke through the prophets, right? Or that he enkindles charity in our hearts and so on, huh? Therefore, also, among the articles of faith, there ought to be some work appropriated to the Son, secundum divinitatum, right, huh? Well, he's the light of light as everybody comes into this world, isn't that one? I don't share about this objection here, but that's in the Gospel, though, right? It's not in the Creed, maybe, uh, specifically, huh? It's interesting, it's what they said there, the Holy Spirit has spoken through the prophets. I don't know from what source it is, but the Arabic translation of our Creed adds something to this in the Creed. It says the Holy Spirit has spoken through the prophets and the apostles. I know why they add it, what's the source, I don't know, but I think it's curious, it's interesting. But it's interesting because it connects that with the Church. Yeah. It's very, very important. I don't know the source of it. Moreover, the sacrament of the Eucharist has a special difficulty, right, among many articles. Therefore, it ought to be laid down as a special article, right? You think it's a special difficulty, right? And there's all these places in Europe there, you know, where some priest who is in some doubt about the real presence, right? Got a blood-soaked thing or something, you know? You're going to see that in Portugal? Maybe so, yeah. Santa Reina? Yeah, yeah. But I guess when I was a little boy in grade school there, you know, you're not supposed to go back with a host in your mouth, right, to take it out of your mouth, right? And sisters would tell us these, you know, pious stories, you know, by some kid putting it in his handkerchief, coming home with his blood. He's like, oh, boy, I'm not going to take it out of my mouth, you know? Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha. The only way the sisters are good, you know, in proportion to us kids, you know. I always remember the St. Joseph sisters had these black robes, you know, and they talked about how beautiful the snowflakes looked when they hit that black, you know. And they are beautiful, all these snowflakes, you know, but you'd see it on the black, you know. So I remember talking about God's beauty there in those things. Well, now we've got to look at the body of the article, right? But in the contrary, he says, is the authority of the church thus enumerating them? I am sure it should be said, this has been said, and this was in, I guess, article, what, six there, right? It says I have one here. Oh, four, okay. Those things per se pertain to faith by the vision of which we, what? Eternal life. And through which we are also led to eternal life, huh? But two things are proposed for us to be seen. One is the hiddenness of the divinity, right, huh? The vision of which makes us, what? Blessed, huh? And the mystery, right, of the humanity of Christ, through which we have excess in the glory of, what? The sons of God, as it's said in Romans 5, 2. And he gives this famous text here, right? Once it is said in John 17, 3, this is eternal life, that they might know you, God, the true God, and whom you have sent, Jesus Christ, huh? Okay? Now, I brought that with me here. But before that, just take the text from Hebrews there, right? Where in chapter 11, verse 1, huh? He gives what later on he'll talk about as being the definition of faith, right? Okay? So, in the Latin it says, in the Hebrews, this is the Hebrews, chapter 11, verse 1, est autum fides, faith is sperandorum, what? Substantia, right? And then verum argumentum, huh? Non operentium, huh? Argumentum, now, the question is how you should translate that, right? Of things not, what? Seen, huh? Okay? Now, in the Greek it says, huh? Estendipistis, right? Faith. Faith is. Elpizomenon, huh? Things believed. I hope for it, huh? I mean, hope for it, huh? Hypostasis, right? It doesn't use the Greek word for substance, there still has the categories, right? But hypostasis, right? It's kind of the idea of the foundation, right, huh? So it's the, uh, elpizomenon pragotona, things hoped for, right? The foundation. The foundation. Well, you know, and I studied under these famous guys, uh, Kassaric and, uh, Deconic and Dion, but also on Thomas, or even reading Euclid, you know, in the geometry. Now, here about the Pythagorean theorem, I believed the Pythagorean theorem before I even seen the demonstration, right? And so you believe in things that your teacher says to you. That's kind of a foundation. But later on, maybe you'll come to actually, what? Understand that it's so, right? And then I accepted not because Euclid said that, you know, the Pythagorean theorem is the truth, but because I see that it must be so, right, by the argument, huh? And so, um, uh, the belief that you have is a kind of foundation of what you're going to know or see later on, right? Even in human learning, huh? Okay? And so, um, but what is it that we hope for, right? But before I go on to that, huh? We'll come back to another text for that. Before I go on there. Um, you know, the Latin word in the second part of the definition is the argumentum, right? And I don't think that should be translated argument, right? It's not an argument in the sense of what we see on logic, right? It's not a syllogism or something that's great. See? Now, what is the Greek word, huh? The Greek word is, uh, elinkas. Gee, elinkas. Well, in Aristotle, you know, the book on specific refutations, right? The word for refutation is elinkas. Well, it doesn't mean the refutation of things not seen, right? You know? So I've got a problem about, you know, translating that, right? Now, myself, when I try to translate it, I translate it by the word conviction, right? Conviction of things not seen, right? And that is partly the notion of elinkas, right? Because refutation, right, makes you, what? You're overcome by it, right, huh? You see? And if it's a true, I mean, a specific refutation is not real refutation, right? But a real elinkas, right, is a refutation and it overcomes you, right, huh? You have to change your thinking now, right, huh? So, I kind of think we best translate it in English by conviction, right, huh? Your mind is overtaken and accepts that this thing you don't see is so, right, huh? Okay? It's not by argument, it's by reputation of it, right? But it's kind of, you have to be careful with the word, right? Uh-huh. You always check by ones by seeing how they translate these things, you know? I think some might actually translate, you know, conviction. What? It's by salvation. It's conviction. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Some pertain to the majesty of his divinity, the divinity, right? Some to the mystery of the, what? Humanity of Christ, which is a sacrament of piety, right? As is said in the first epistle to Timothy. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. three examples. Well, my teacher told me that in college, you know, the speech course, whatever it is, you know, you lose them if you say, give more than three examples, right? But three seems to be enough, right? I used to, when I was in Quebec, you know, you'd go to the restaurant and you'd get, you said, repart complet, complete meal, what does that mean? An appetizer of some sort, a main course, and some kind of a little dessert, you know, huh? It's got to have those three parts. That is complete repart, you know, complete, yeah, yeah. All the parts. Yeah, yeah. And Aristotle praises the great poet Homer for realizing the plot should have a beginning, a middle, and the end, yeah. And I say to people, you know, how many meals do you eat in a day? Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, I mean, it's very often true that three is enough, huh? Even reading in the great Heisenberg there, you know, we had in modern physics there, physics of the 20th century, we had these two great, what, two units, right? And you might say the, the, Einstein introduced, right? And the one that Planck introduced, right? There's got to be a third one, he said. It's kind of amazing to say the great, the great physicist, you know, saying that, right? You know, his mind just, you know, there's got to be a third one, he said, you know, just kind of obvious to him, right? Some say this is a reflection of what the Trinity, right, is the source of all things, right? The two is showing up so often, huh? You can't burn one long by itself. You can't burn two. You find trilogies, you know, very common, you know, more than tetralogies or something, you know, sort of thing. You get the young and the old and then you seem to need a third thing, middle age, you know, or something. A cane. Yeah. What? A cane. Yeah. Yeah. Well, Aristotle calls that, you know, not middle age, but he calls it prime of life, right? Oh. You know, he describes the rhetoric there, you know, the youth and the people who are in the primal life and in the old, right? And how the youth are more hopeful in the old or kind of, you know, those things don't turn out very good, you know? So. But how often do we divide human age into those three, right, huh? You know, that's enough. I still have a grade school, high school, and college, you know? You seem to need all three, huh? So. So he quotes that famous text, then, from John 17, 3, about what eternal life is, right? In that case, you too, right? And therefore, the first distinction of things to be believed, as we said already, is that some pertain to the majesty of the divinity, some pertain to the mystery of the humanity of Christ, huh? Now, about the majesty of the divinity, three things are proposed to us, huh? First, the unity of the divinity, and to this pertains the first, what? Article. Secondly, the trinity of, what? Persons. And about this, there are three articles according to the three, what? Persons. And third, there are proposed to us the private works of the divinity, of which the first pertains to the being of nature, and thus there is proposed to us the article of creation. The second to the being of grace, and under this article are proposed all things pertaining to the sanctification of man, right? And the third pertains to the being of glory, right? And thus there is laid down one article that covers both the resurrection of the flesh, and what? Eternal life, huh? And thus there are seven articles pertaining to what? Divinity, huh? Okay? But notice, huh, he's dividing by two or three all the time down there, isn't he? You know, like you couldn't understand the division into more than three, huh? The human mind breaks down and tries to divide into more than three. It's got to combine divisions of two or three to understand to some extent these things, huh? The way I came to this was that Plato, in the dialogues where Socrates is proceeding by dividing, he always divides into two, right? And then Aristotle, like in the parts of animals and so on, he's talking about the animals, he says, well, it makes some sense to divide into three here, you know, on the contrary to Plato. So, you put Plato and, what, Aristotle together, and the only guys who seem to say two or three, unless you go to Hegel, but he's always dividing into three, right? Kind of a raster trinity, yes. And so, among the great philosophers, there's only two or three guys who have tried to say, what, we should always divide by two, always divide by three, but not any other number. So, I say, let's combine the two and say, divide by two or three, or I sometimes say both, right? And maybe this is not true always, but it's true for the most part. So, it's going to be a good rule, even though it's not true always, right? You can have a rule that is true for the most part, right? And it's very hard to understand that division into more than three, you know, makes sense to us. Three means of persuasion, right? I was thinking of it in sort of practical manners, I think, of tabling equal parts. I wouldn't first start out with ten. That's what you could do, that's what the decimal system is. The metric system is not sensible. It's great on paper, you know, it's not sensible. He's going to divide it. He's going to divide the ones for what? Yeah. Likewise, about him whom he has sent, right? About the humanity of Christ, there are laid down seven articles, of which the first is about the incarnation or the conception of Christ. Secondly, of his nativity from the Virgin, right? My mother always admired this song, that, you know, he came right through, like he came through the wall, right? He came through the wall of her uterus. Third, about his passion and death and what? Yeah. Thomas explained in an earlier article there, how those three really have one difficulty, right? But God should die, I mean, my God. But if he can die, he can simply be buried and so on. Fourth, about his descent to what? Yeah. It's a very interesting article, right? People kind of misunderstand what it means, you know, sometimes. They may have spent a while in hell, you know. Suffering that way, right? He had suffered all he could have suffered, you know. The fifth is about the resurrection, right? The sixth about the ascension. And the seventh about his coming for judgment, huh? He had that in the Te Deum there too, right? The judgment. And sic in universo, and thus, in the whole universe there are what? Eight. Yeah. Now in Aristotle's greatest book there, the first philosophy as he calls it, how many books are there? Eight. Yeah. Fourteen books of wisdom. Two sevens, right? Fourteen books. Fourteen articles, huh? Isn't there in Scripture some place where it says there are seven angels that stand before God? Yeah. He goes, what is that, you know? And the seven wise men of Greece, right? Who met at the Oracle of Delphi, they say. Seven virgin daughters of the, who is it? Who is it? Didn't he have seven daughters? The deacon Philip? Oh. Was it seven daughters he had? Yeah. I don't remember. In the high school, unmarried, they were prophets that they were prophets. And this big book about the virtues, right, is divided into, what, seven, right? Faith, hope, and charity, and then the four cardinal virtues, right? So, exactly why seven is a symbol of wisdom, I'm not sure, you know. But it seems to be that for a long time. Yeah? Yeah. Yeah. There are seven parts of philosophy, or seven kinds of philosophy, right? There's three parts of looking philosophy, natural philosophy, mathematical philosophy, and first philosophy, and then three, what, parts of practical philosophy, ethics, domestic philosophy, political philosophy, and then logic, the tool of philosophy. See, there's seven parts, right? So, it's interesting, right? That, um. . . .