Secunda Secundae
Lecture 1: Structure of Moral Theology and the Seven Virtues

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Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angel, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray, pray for us. Help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. So some of you had the prologue and some of you don't, huh? So we'll kind of translate here. He says, Shakespeare's got a prologue to Romeo and Juliet, right? No. Yeah, to Romeo and Juliet. So he says, after the common consideration of virtues and vices and other things pertaining to the matter of morals, huh? And that was done in the, what? Prima Secundae, huh? It's necessary to consider each of these things in special, in particular, right? And Thomas gives a reason for this, huh? Speeches, more universal speeches, universal, are less useful in that actions are in, what? Particulars, huh? Okay? So in geometry, you get basically, what? Universal things, right? Every right-angled triangle, right? There's the angle. The square on the side opposite the right angle equal to the square on the sides. But this is said about all right-angled triangles, huh? Okay? Where every triangle's got its interior angles, you've got to do right angles. But doing something, which is what moral philosophy is about, is dealing with the particular, right? So if you can descend, Aristotle says this, right, huh? Okay? And in the Marietta edition, it says, St. Thomas expounding, right, the words of Aristotle and the ethics, right? Where he says the same thing, huh? He says, it's not only necessary to say universally what is virtue, but also to adapt it to special things, to singular things, huh? Okay? And Aristotle signs the reason for this, because in speeches which are about things to be done, the universals are more, what, empty, he says, huh? Okay? And the particulars are more true, huh? And Aristotle uses the reason that doings are about singulars, right? So Thomas is going to give us the thickest part of the summa, right? The particulars, huh? Now he makes a distinction here in the second paragraph. Something can be considered in special about moral things in two ways, huh? It can be special. In one way, on the part of the very matter of moral philosophy or moral theology, when one considers about this virtue or this, what, voice, huh? And another way, you have a special consideration as regards the special, what, states of men, as one considers about those who are subject and those who are in command, huh? And about the active and the, what, contemplative, huh? Or certain other differences of men, right, huh? Okay? The young and the old, and so on. Okay. First, therefore, we ought to consider especially about those things which pertain to every status of men. And secondly, especially about those things which pertain to these determined particular states of life, huh? Okay? Now, it should, however, be considered about the first, that if we determine part by themselves about the virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, huh? Donis, the vices opposed to the virtues, and the commands, the precepts, huh? It's necessary to say the same thing many times, huh? Which are not sufficiently treated of by this precept. You should not commit, what, adultery, right, huh? It's necessary to inquire about adultery, which is a certain sin, whose knowledge depends upon the knowledge of the opposite, what, virtue. Therefore, it will be a more condensed or compendious, right, and a speedier way of consideration. If together, under the same, what, tract, there is a consideration about, what, four things, right? So when you consider about the virtue, you will consider about the gift of the Holy Spirit, if there is one corresponding to it, that's perfecting it, huh? I mean, Thomas will compare the gifts of the Holy Spirit to what Aristotle calls heroic virtues. They're above what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. What's a hero in Greek mythology? Yeah, he's got maybe a human father or mother, and then the other parent is a god or a goddess, right, huh? So Thomas compares it to heroic virtues, huh? It's kind of above the human mode, huh? So we're going to consider in the same consideration the virtue, and if there's a gift of the Holy Spirit that perfects it, corresponding to that, right? And then about the opposite vices, right? Just like Aristotle in the Ethics takes up the virtues and the vices, what, together. Plato and Aristotle say there's the same knowledge of what? Opposites, right? And then the fourth thing, the affirmative or negative precepts, right? That correspond to this, what, virtue and vice, right? Now, it would be a mode suitable of consideration for the vices according to their own, what, species or type, right? For it's manifest that the vices and the sins are diversified in kind, particular kind and species, that is to say, according to their matter or their, what, object, right? Not, however, according to other differences of sin as of the heart and of the mouth and of the deed, right, huh? Or according to infirmity or ignorance and malice and so on, huh? And other differences of the sort. And therefore, there's the same matter about which virtue rightly works or does and the vices opposed recede from, what, rectitude, right? Now, Thomas is going to give a division next of the, what, virtues, right? If, therefore, he says the whole matter of morals can be led back to the consideration of the virtues and all virtues can be further reduced to seven. What does he mean there? About which first were not to read. Oh, excuse me. Of which three are the theological virtues, huh? About first were not to consider. The other four are the, what? Cardinal virtues, huh? So he's going to resolve everything around these seven, right? Faith, hope, and charity. And then what are the cardinal virtues, huh? Well, there's prudence or foresight, right? Justice, right? Courage. And then temperance or moderation, huh? Now, when I think of those, those, uh, distinction of those three and the four, why are there four cardinal virtues, huh? You know why? Cardinal means what? Hinge, huh? Why does, uh, why are there four virtues around which all other virtues and so on hinge, right? Hinge on, huh? Why are there four cardinal virtues, huh? Because Plato and Aristotle knew about the four cardinal virtues, huh? Okay? Well, it's because there's four powers in us or four abilities in us. They're concerned with, what, what we do, right? One, which is used very rarely as reason. Another which we're using all the time is the will, right? And then there's two kinds of powers concerned with what we call sense desire, or what you might call emotions, right? One, two, three, four, five, five, five, five, five, five, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, six, seven, six, seven, six, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven, seven And the Greeks already knew about this. Plato and Aristotle talked about it a lot. In Greek, they say thumas and epithumia. And in Latin, they call it the irascible appetite, named for the most manifest of the emotions. And then the concupisable appetite. So the concupisable appetite is the translation of epithumia, Plato and Aristotle talked about, and thumas of the irascible appetite. Okay. Now what's the difference, very briefly, between those two kinds of emotions? Well, the concupisable emotions arise from something very simple, whether the object is agreeable or disagreeable to the body. And if it's agreeable to the body, right, then you have an emotion of liking or loving this. And if you don't have what you like or love, there is a desire, a wanting, right? And then when you get what you want, then there's joy or pleasure, right? Then you have three ones just like that, corresponding to the disagreeable, right? So I dislike fish, more or less, but especially salmon. You can't, you know, yeah, the only good fish is the disguised fish. You can't disguise salmon, right? So I try to, I dislike it, and therefore, so far as possible, I try to avoid it, right? And I remember when my kids were going to Trivium School, you know, one of the parents came from Alaska, right? They brought down this wonderful salmon, you know, for all of us. And then when I was in Quebec, they were visiting a friend and so on. I was invited to somebody's house, and the wife made salmon for us, huh? Well, then there's sadness, right, or pain, you know? It's forced upon you, right, huh? But you dislike it or you hate it, shall we say, and then you swerve away from it, right? And if it's inescapable, then there's sadness and pain, right, huh? Okay? Now, as a student in Quebec, I go to the same restaurant very much, and I'd always order steak and French fries, right? And the waitress got to know what I was going to get before I came in after a while. So she suddenly walked in the door, she'd yell out to the kitchen, you know, you know, with those steak and French fries, you know, for about a minute. So that's very easy to understand, the concupisional emotions, right? They arise from something being agreeable or disagreeable to the, what, senses, huh? Okay? So it's something that you would desire that corresponds to the senses, senses. Yeah, yeah, yeah. If you like it, right, huh? I like steak, so I want a steak every time I go to the restaurant, okay? And then I enjoy it when I get my steak, right? Or if I don't like it, like the salmon, right, and I try to avoid it, but if I can't avoid it, I've got to eat it to be polite or something. I'm sad, you know, I'm not rejoicing the fact that we're having, you know, fish tonight or something. Okay? But it's not always easy to get what you want. And sometimes you have to, what, be tough and make an effort, right? Okay? And sometimes it's not easy to avoid, right? What you dislike and so on. So you need some strength, right? And this is what the irascible emotions are about, huh? So if there's a good that I like and that I want but I don't have, there's no difficulty in getting it, right? Just reach over to the bowl and eat it and so on. There's no irascible emotions at all, right? But suppose there's a difficulty, right? Suppose I see the girl and I like her and then I want her, right? A lot of other guys see her and I want her too, you know? Well, then I've got to make an effort, right? And if I think I can win her, then there arises an irascible emotion called hope, right? Now, this hope that we'll find is a theological virtue that's in the will, not in emotions, but there's a similarity between the two, huh? But if these other guys are more clever or more charming or more handsome or whatever that attracts a woman, I might begin to do what? Instead of having hope, I have what? Despair, right? Despair, right? I don't think I can do it, right? So when you go into a game or a football game, right, maybe you're going to be challenged today because it's a real good team, right? But if you have hope that you can win them, right, you make the effort. But if they're, you know, running over you, then you, what, get discouraged, despair, right? You give up. Now, those with regard to a good is not only pleasing to the senses, but it's difficult to get, right, you know, the sour grapes, what is that about? He saw the grapes. He desired them, right? But they're hard to get to, right? And finally, he, what, despairing, right? And therefore, he said, finally, what, they're probably souring or something like that, right? And that girl, she's probably spoiled, you know, she had so many boyfriends, you know, you know, yeah. I wouldn't want her anyway, you know, she wouldn't appreciate me, you know, so. You know, something like that, right, huh? Because of your emotions, right? But now, if it's something bad, right, and you can, what, just order something else in the menu. Ah, no problem, right, huh? But if you can't avoid this thing that is unpleasant to your senses, well, then there arises, what? If it's hard to avoid it, arises fear if you think you can't maybe avoid it. Or, if you think you can, then there's what? Boldness, yeah. Boldness, huh? Now, that arises, therefore, from desire and aversion, right, huh? These emotions of the harassment we just talked about. If you think you can get the difficult good or can't get it, right? You can avoid the difficult to avoid evil or you can't avoid it. These emotions arise, right? But absolute emotions, huh? Fear and boldness, hope and despair, right? Now, suppose you get the thing you desire and want. No difficulty, just enjoy it! But suppose you don't, what? But suppose you can't avoid the thing you don't want it. If you think you can't do anything about it, you know, you're just, you're sad, you know, pained, huh? But if, you know, you can do something about it, then there arises, what? Anger, right? So if you're stepping on my toe and causing me a great deal of pain, I say, hey, you're on my toe. And you say, so what? Well, if I think I can, you know, get you off my foot, I'm going to get, what, angry, right, huh? You know? If you're using my kids as target practice, right? I'm going to get angry with you. And anger is such a manifest emotion that the irascible appetite is named from it, right? But hope and despair and fear and boldness, as well as anger, those five emotions belong to the, what? The irascible, right? The six emotions that belong to the, what? Incubiscible. There's three about the good. Liking, wanting, enjoying, right? Hating or avoiding. And then pain or sadness, right? There's three about the good, three about the, what, bad. So, how many emotions are there altogether? The 11, right, huh? And you can get more particular because, you know, there's a particular object to these things, right, huh? But basically there's 11 kinds of, what, emotions, huh? I guess I discovered, you know, in classical music, you know, that the minor key is better for some emotions and the major key for other emotions. So, if you want to represent, what, sadness or anger, you tend to use a, what, minor key. key, right? When Mozart represents anger, right? Like in the D minor, C minor concertos, right? And he has fear in Don Giovanni, he's got the minor key, right? But for joy and hope and so on, you have major key, right? And sometimes when he represents a change from one to the other, right? From hope to despair, from despair to hope, he switches the what? Keys, right? And they compare Mozart and Haydn. You say, Haydn, you know, he changes key, you know, out of variety is the spice of life. But Mozart, there's a reason why he chooses to change the key, right? But there's other subtle differences too, like, you know, G major and B flat are more concubiscible and D major and C major are more, what, irascible, right? So there are four faculties, you might say, or four abilities, right? Four powers, right? That we distinguish, huh? Conservative action, reason, will, irascible appetite, and gives appetite. That's four if you can count, huh? Okay? And how many cardinal virtues are there? Four. Because prudence, one of the four, which is the first of the four you'll take up later on after you go through the theological of virtues. Prudence is in reason, justice is in the will, courage is in the irascible, right? And, but temperance is in the concubiscible. Okay? One in each, right? See? That's kind of the hinge around which the other virtues swing, right? But look at faith, hope, and charity, right? Where are they? Well, we're going to find out that faith, hope, and charity have God as a, what, object, right? And is God sensible? See, hear, smell, taste, touch it? No, no. So the virtues that have God as an object are going to be in reason and the will and not in, what, the irascible or the concubiscible, right? There'll be certain, you know, infused virtues for that, you know, to perfect them. But the cardinal virtues which have God as an object, I mean, the theological virtues that have God as an object, right, will be in either the reason or the will. But I'm struck by the fact that there's one virtue in reason that's theological, which is fides or faith, and there's two in the will. Why that? See? See? In the case of the cardinal, there's just one hinge virtue, right? In each of the four, what, powers, right? In the theological one, there's two in the what? The will, yeah. Now, you mentioned faith, hope, and charity, huh? In that order, right? What is the order of those three? Is it the order of excellence? Because St. Paul tells us right away that charity is the what? The greatest, right, huh? One time Warren Murray and myself there were raised, once again, which is next after charity? Which is greater, faith or hope? Yeah, well, if you look at the spirit of questions on hope, you might find that answer, right? But Thomas sometimes gives a kind of simple distinction of the three. He says, by faith, we know what our end or goal is, eternal life. By hope, we start moving towards that end. And by love, we're already, what, joined to it in some way, right? That's why charity remains after we see God, right? But faith and hope give rise to other things, right? Okay. So, it's better, it's good to know what your goal is, but even better to be, what, heading towards it, and even better than that to be there, right, right? Okay. So, in terms of goodness or excellence, the fourth sense of order, by the way, faith, hope, and charity are not in that order, are they? Well, what is the order of those three, huh? Well, it's interesting, huh, that when Aristotle takes up the virtues, huh, he considers something before he takes up the virtues. And we should take up something before we take up the virtues, too. What is that? What is it that Aristotle takes up in the Nicomachean Ethics and the other, Edemian Ethics, right? Magna Morale and so on. What does it take up before he takes up the virtues? Yeah. The end or goal or purpose, right? Because the virtues are for the sake of what? Yeah, getting that end or purpose, huh? So, you've got to talk about what the end or purpose is, huh? And the virtues are either a way of getting there or they already, in some way, pertain to being there, right? And happiness involves activity in accordance with virtue, huh? So Aristotle talks about what happiness is, huh? Human happiness on this earth, what it is. And then he talks about the virtues you need to get there, right? And which are involved in leading a happy life, huh? Okay? Now, as I was saying before class, they're mega, you'll be on, mega cock on, right, huh? You know? These books are very heavy, you know? It's coming here, huh? Okay. This is the documents of Vatican II, right? Okay. Now, this is the, one of the two dogmatic constitutions, huh? What are the two dogmatic constitutions of the Vatican Council, the Second Vatican Council? What are they? What? Yeah, yeah. T-Virbum. And that's about what? Divine Revelation and so on. And then the other one is on the church, right? Kind of a completion of what was begun by Vatican I, huh? So this is taken from the dogmatic constitution on the divine revelation. So the dogmatic constitutions are the most, what, dogmatic, you might say, the most authoritative of what? The works, right? Just fundamental, right, huh? And if you have the Latin texture of the dogmatic constitution about divine revelation, then there is a short premium, huh? Okay? Which is the Greek word meaning paving the way, right? And I rather fond of this premium, right? And actually the, of course, it's plagiarizing, right, huh? Did you ever see that premium to this document? It takes words from two people. St. John, the evangelist, right? And St. Augustine, yeah, magnificent, huh? Okay? Today's the feast of, wait, St. Matthew. Did you study that? No. No. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Very strict there we had. Today was the feast of St. Matthew, right, huh? And, you know, the tax collector, what, right? Kind of funny, you know, simply, you know, come follow me, right, you know? Well, there's been famous paintings of this, you know, and kind of, wonderful thing, huh? Wonderful thing. Talking about incusual appetite, huh? We used to have a, I used to have a policy at the house there, that on the feast of an apostle, we had Whitbur floats. You know, it's just a marriage made in heaven between root beer and vanilla ice cream, you know, they go very good. So to celebrate the fact it was a, but it seems like we don't know too much about exactly where all the apostles went, did we? To evangelize, you know, Thomas went down to India, I guess, and Peter, of course, ended up in Rome, and so on. But anyway, so the, he says, the first two words are, guess what, dei verbum. So he says, dei verbum. So he says, dei verbum. So he says, dei verbum. So he says, dei verbum. So he says, dei verbum. So he says, dei verbum. So he says, dei verbum. So, dei verbum. So, dei verbum. So, dei verbum. So, dei verbum. Religiosi audiens, hearing religiously the word of God, right? Et fidenter proclamans, and faithfully what? Proclaiming, right? The sacrosancta synod, the most holy synod, right? Following the words of St. John, who says. Now what words do they quote of John? Well, it's from the first epistle of John, chapter 1, verses 2 to 3. He says, Ad nunciamus vobis, we announce to you, vitam aeternam, eternal life. Well, that's the very what? Inner goal, right? Before he even talks at all about virtues at all, right? In his praimia, right? Ad nunciamus vobis vitam aeternam, que eret apud patrum, which was before what? The father, right? And the peruit nobis, and appeared to us, right? Okay? Now it's interesting, he begins with that, right? He's going to go later on, the premium to what? Faith, hope, and charity, right? So, quad vidimus ad audivimus, what we have seen and heard, ad nunciamus vobis, we announce to you. Why? This is from St. John, this is all quote from St. John, beautiful. Ut ad vows, right? That you, societatem abiatis nobiscum, that you might have, what? Society? Yeah. And societas nostra, in our society, sit cum patre, et cum filio, eus Jesu Christo, right? Now, sometimes when someone is in a difficult situation in life, or some problems, and they ask me to pray for them, or I stand my own to pray for them, you know, because I see the situation, so on, I sometimes say this little prayer, and I say, may God the Father strengthen you, and God the Son enlighten you, and God the Holy Spirit fill your heart with love, his love. Now, could you explain the order of the three theological virtues by that? Because we appropriate sometimes to the Holy Spirit the giving of love, right? Kind of in our hearts, right? And we appropriate to, what? The Son enlightening us, right? This is the light that enlighten every man that comes into this world, right? So he enlightens us. Now, what would you appropriate to the Father? Strengthening us. Yeah, yeah. So that's like in my little prayer, huh? May God the Father strengthen you, and God the Son enlighten you, and God the Holy Spirit fill your heart with his love. But notice, huh, in the, when we take up faith, hope, and charity, when it was done, especially in catechetical instruction, right? With faith, they taught, what? The creed, and with hope, they taught the Our Father, and maybe the Hail Mary too, and then with love, they taught the Two Commandments of love and the Ten Commandments, right? So, maybe, you know, hope was tied up with, what? Prayer, right, huh? And of course, we pray, saying, Our Father, right? Now, the question, do you mean by Father, their God? Has it applied to God, or has it tried to the first person, right? But it seems kind of a connection there between the two, right, huh? But then the order of the, what? Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and the adaption doesn't follow the order of faith, hope, and charity, does it? So all that went for nothing, Mr. Burkos, right? Right? See? But at least he's told us what the end is, right? What the, the, the, the consul, the sacro, sancta, sin, sin, sin, sin, and I remember the Aristotle, talked about the end before he talked about the riches, right, huh? Well, maybe this wonderful Bramian would do the same thing, huh? So after those beautiful passage there from St. John, huh? Then he adds, or they add, Popter Aya, there from the commonest, adhering in Heron's vestiges, um, vestiges, of the consuls of what? Trent and the Vatican I, huh? Proponere intended, we intend to propose, right, huh? Genuine, huh? Genuine, huh? Genuine doctrinum, huh? De divina revelatione, right? Et de eus transmissione, right, huh? Ut salutis preconio mundus universus. And now, it's a quote from Augustine, right? De catechizondis wittibus, huh? The rough people who are not very well catacized, right? It's a beautiful work of this, huh? The universal world might audiendo credat, huh? Credendo sperat, sperando amet. That the universe, the whole world, right, mundus universus, by hearing might believe, right? By believing might what? Hope. And by hoping might come to love, right? So that's kind of like the first sense almost, the order of time, right? The order of what? Of generation, right, huh? So that is where hope, our faith is what generated first, right? So one movement begets another. Yeah, yeah. Hearing, believing, hoping, and loving. Yeah. The quote from Augustine is referring to him on the bottom of the finger. Audiendo credat, huh? By hearing, faith is from hearing, huh? Audiendo credat, credendo sperat, hmm? Sperando amet, right, huh? I have to believe by hearing before I'm going to hope, you know? I have to believe that God has called me to this, right? And he's going to what? You know, take care of me, right? And therefore I have hope, right? And unto I have hope, I can't really love God freely, huh? That's kind of interesting text to him, huh? That seems to be the order of faith, hope, and charity, right? But the order of excellence would be charity, hope, and faith, right? Okay? So just a little premise. That's not much of the page, right? I had to bring this big evil, huh? This mega cock on, this mega biblion, right, huh? What is this book here? No service, like. It's good for something. Yeah. So he's going to divide the consideration of the virtues, right? And the vices and everything according to the, what? The seven virtues, right, huh? So he says, thus, therefore, the whole matter of morals, huh? Reduced to the consideration of the virtues. All the virtues should be further reduced to seven, of which three are theological, right? About which, why not to first, what, treat, right? Because they're directing us to our last end, which is eternal life. The other four are cardinals about which he will later, what, treat, huh? It's curious, you know, that he takes up the cardinal virtues here in the summa. He'll take up prudence first and then justice and then courage and temperance last, right? Aristotle in the ethics, he takes up courage and temperance first, then he takes up justice, and then he takes up prudence, huh? Just three first, right? But why is one appropriate to the order for the philosopher, right? And the other for the order in theology, right? And the other for the author, right? And the other for the author, right? And the other for the author, right? And the other for the author, right? And the other for the author, right? And the other for the author, right? And the other for the author, right? And the other for the author, right? Well, they'll be taken up first, right? Aristotle doesn't talk about those, huh? Faithful and charity. He does talk about the four cardinal virtues, but he takes them up in the reverse order. To us, yeah. When Aristotle takes up the virtues, you know, virtue, you first kind of know in a kind of an outside way, it's a what? It's a what? Honorable habit, right? And there's a thing called the Medal of Honor, right? Congressional Medal of Honor, they're often called. It's the Medal of Honor. What do you get this for? Yeah. Courage, yeah. Not for temperance. Not for temperance. I can eat moderately and drink moderately all my life, and they won't give me a Medal of Honor. But for one glorious afternoon on the battlefield, I can get the Medal of Honor, right? And I can be just and pay all my debts and so on, huh? To all my life, and they won't give me a Medal of Honor, will they? Courage, yeah. I think the reason St. Thomas Aquinas treats those faith, hope, and charity first is because they're going to have an effect on your conduct. That would include temperance, prudence, courage, and justice. Those three theological virtues are going to affect the other four. But again, if you ask about God himself, right? Does God have the virtue of prudence? Well, not just prudence over the United States or the city of Worcester or something, but he has, what? Prudence over the whole universe. And in fact, he's got the excellence of prudence, right? And does he have justice? Yes. But does he have an irascible and cupid of apple type? No. He has an irascible and cupid of prudence, right? He has an irascible and cupid of prudence, right? He has an irascible and cupid of prudence, right? He has an irascible and cupid of prudence. He has an irascible and cupid of prudence. He has an irascible and cupid of prudence. He has an irascible and cupid of prudence. He has an irascible and cupid of prudence. He has an irascible and cupid of prudence. When it's in the consideration of some cardinal virtue, we'll consider all the virtues that pertain in some way to that cardinal virtue and the opposite vices. And thus, nothing of moral things will be omitted, right? Gravity is a soul wit, huh? He says a lot in a few words, huh? I had the great Charles Deconi teaching philosophy of nature there when I was in graduate school. And he had been teaching the physics there since the 1930s, and I was up there in 58, 60 there. He says, I still see something new every time I went. Yeah. And he and Monsignor Dion, who was also teaching there, they were parented in the Second Vatican Council, right? And they're over there in Rome there, and Monsignor Dion points something out that Deconi had missed. He says, how could I have missed it after all these years? He said, I was ready for this humility in the face of Thomas, because, Aristotle for that matter, because my great teacher, an undergraduate in Rome, in the Zurich, said, compare it to Aristotle, he said, and this guy was the wisest guy in the whole College of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, right? Now call themselves the University of St. Thomas, but in my day they were in the College of St. Thomas. He was the wisest man in the whole school. And he says to me one day, he says, compare it to Aristotle, he says, I've got the brains of an Angkor. And he was the wisest guy there, right? No, these other jerks would say that, you know. He laid it down, right, you know? So, Empedocles said, I'm on his worth saying, and he said more than once. Let's look on the first question here, right? Like Thomas says, a little premium about theology, about faith. About the theological virtues. First, we're not to consider about faith or belief. Sometimes I like to call feed as, instead of faith, I like to call it belief, right? Because sometimes faith has a sense of what? Trust, right? If I say he's a faithful servant or something, right? He's trustworthy, right? It seems to be more like hope than, what? Belief, right? So sometimes I like to translate it by belief, but Quebec, there you have the foie. F-F-O-Y, right? It's that foie. Secondly, about hope. They spay, right? Third, they caritate, right? We have a problem with charity, a little bit too in English, because charity kind of means, you know, giving money to this or that, right? Yeah. And sometimes they translate it love, but love is, you know, there's a multitude of things, right? The love of candy to the... The love of sin, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. In Greek, you have more names for love, right? Now, about faith or about belief, there is a four-fold, what, consideration occurs, right? First, about faith itself. Secondly, about the gifts of understanding and science corresponding to it, huh? Third, about the opposite, what, faces. Plato and Aristotle are always saying the same knowledge of opposites, right? Fourth, about the precepts pertaining to this, what, virtue, huh? We spoke about those four things before, right, in the poem, right? Now, about faith itself, first, we're not to consider about its, what, object. Secondly, about its act. And third, about the habit, right, of faith itself, the virtue of faith itself, huh? Now, where did Thomas learn that kind of order? Yeah, yeah. Because Aristotle is writing the three books on the soul, right? He says that we know the powers or the abilities of the soul by their, what, acts, right? And the acts by their, what, objects, right, huh? So, I have the ability to see and the ability to hear, for example, right? And how would you distinguish between the ability to see and the ability to hear? Well, by their acts, right? One is the ability to see and the other is the ability to hear, right? So, you know the difference between those two abilities by the difference in the two acts, right? But to see and to hear is to sense, right? And how do you distinguish between this sensing and that kind of sensing? Yeah. Because to see is to sense, what, color, basically, right, and light, huh? And to hear is to sense, what, yeah? And to taste is to sense.